Manoj Kumar Kanojia vs State Of Delhi & Anr
2015 Latest Caselaw 9432 Del

*   IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+   CRL.M.C. 2494/2014
                                  Date of Decision : December 18th, 2015
    MANOJ KUMAR KANOJIA                                     ..... Petitioner
                         Through:       Mr.Vaibhav Dang, Adv.

                         versus

    STATE OF DELHI & ANR
                                                              ..... Respondent
                         Through:       Mr.G.M.Farooqui, APP.
                                        Mr.Ishwender Chaudhary, Adv.for R-
                                        2 to R-4.

           CORAM:
           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI

    P.S.TEJI, J.

1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed

by the petitioner, namely, Mano Kumar Kanojia for quashing of FIR

No.194/2011 dated 02.07.2011, under Sections 279/304A IPC

registered at Police Station Vasant Vihar on the basis of

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) arrived at between the

petitioner and respondent no.2, namely, Sh. Deepak Sharma, on

30.04.2014.

2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State

submitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has been

identified to be the complainant/first-informant of the FIR in question

and respondent no.3 & 4, namely, Smt. Bimla Sharma and Sh. Rajni

Kant Sharma, respectively, to be the victims in the present petition by

their counsel.

3. Respondent Nos.2, 3 & 4 present in the Court, submitted that

the dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the

MOU, during the pendency of the application for compensation under

Section 166(4) of the M.V.Act, 1988, the parties entered into an

amicable settlement, whereby the petitioner- herein, offered to a pay a

sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs as lump sum amount towards the settlement of the

claim petition and the present criminal case. Further it is mentioned

that with the intervention of the Ld. Tribunal the respondent no. 2 and

his family members accepted the above offer. In terms of the

settlement, a sum of Rs.2.25 lacs has already been paid to the

respondent no.2 by the petitioner. It is also mentioned in the MOU

that the respondent no.2 does not want to pursue the FIR in question.

Respondent nos.2 & 3 affirmed the contents of the aforesaid MOU.

All the disputes and differences have been resolved through mutual

consent. Now no dispute with petitioner survives and so, the

proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end.

Statements of the respondent Nos.2, 3 & 4 have been recorded in this

regard in which they stated that they have entered into a compromise

with the petitioner and have settled all the disputes with them. They

further stated that they have no objection if the FIR in question is

quashed.

4. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex

Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in

cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

"61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings."

5. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a

recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC

466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh

(Supra) are as under:-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the

High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship

or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

6. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to

prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

The respondent nos.2, 3 & 4 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in

question and have stated that the matter has been settled out of their

own free will. As the matter has been settled and compromised

amicably, so, there would be an extraordinary delay in the process of

law if the legal proceedings between the parties are carried on. So,

this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case to invoke

the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of

process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

7. The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provision

of law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process is

abused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured;

where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to

avoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provision

of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of

justice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to

circumvent the express provisions of law.

8. It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram

Anatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014 and in the case of

Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009

has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the

Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice

or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is

not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.

9. It is a well settled law that where the High Court is convinced

that the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not

affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of

such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace

and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.

In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and

energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in

entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is

compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.

Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675

the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of

Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not

compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of

securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,

section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of

quashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified the

exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the

proceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts

and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-

compoundable.

In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that

notwithstanding the fact the offences under Sections 279/304A IPC

are non-compoundable offences, there should be no impediment in

quashing the FIR under these sections, if the Court is otherwise

satisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.

10. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of

statements made by the respondent Nos.2, 3 & 4, the FIR in question

warrants to be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon

need to be quashed.

11. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.194/2011

dated 02.07.2011, under Sections 279/304A IPC registered at Police

Station Vasant Vihar and the proceedings emanating therefrom are

quashed against the petitioner.

12. This petition is accordingly disposed of.

(P.S.TEJI) JUDGE DECEMBER 18, 2015 dd