Delhi High Court
Tanushree Chopra vs Ministry Of Women And Child ... on 17 December, 2015
$~55.
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) No.11759/2015, CM No.31278/2015 (for exemption) & CM
No.31279/2015 (for placing on record CD marked as Annexure XII).
TANUSHREE CHOPRA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Smita Bankoti and Mr. Ashish
Sheoran, Advs.
versus
MINISTRY OF WOMEN AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
& ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Swaty Singh Malik and Mr. Ajay
Kumar, Advs. for R-1 along with Ms.
Renu Love, Assistant Director, DWC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
ORDER
% 17.12.2015
1. The petitioner, an employee of the respondent no.3 ITC Maurya
(employer), has filed a complaint with the Management of the employer of
sexual harassment meted out to her by her superior officer (who has not
been made a party). The employer of the petitioner has referred the said
complaint to its Internal Complaint Committee (ICC) (impleaded as
respondent no.2) constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and the said
ICC has commenced inquiry which is underway.
2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the ICC of the employer is
conducting the inquiry in violation of the procedure prescribed by the ICC
itself as well as in violation of certain settled norms for conducting such
inquiry including those prescribed by the various Governmental Agencies
and expounded by the Courts. It is inter alia contended that during the
W.P.(C) No.11759/2015 page 1 of 5
inquiry, (i) the petitioner and the alleged offender are made to sit in the same
room; (ii) the alleged offender is allowed to be present during the cross-
examination of the petitioner; (iii) the ICC seized the cell phone of the
petitioner containing the audio recordings though the petitioner had provided
transcript thereof; (iv) 2 ICC has confiscated another cell phone of the
petitioner which did not even contain anything pertaining to the complaint;
and, (v) the petitioner is being made to sit face to face with the alleged
offender. It is argued that though the petitioner has made grievances in this
regard to the ICC as well as to the employer but no action has been taken
thereon. Allegations of bias are also made against the members of the ICC
and it is alleged that one of the members has already observed that the ICC
cannot render any finding against the alleged offender.
3. The petitioner thus has claimed relief of dissolving the ICC for having
failed to conduct free and unbiased proceedings on her complaint and for
having failed to adhere the procedure laid down by the ICC itself.
4. It is also the grievance of the petitioner that the respondent no.1
Ministry of Women and Child Development has not appointed the Appellate
Authority within the meaning of Section 18 of the said Act which could
have been approached by the petitioner with the grievances as made in this
petition. Axiomatically, a direction to the respondent no.1 Ministry of
Women and Child Development to make such appointment is also sought.
5. It is yet further the grievance of the petitioner that her employer has
not complied with the requirements of Section 19 (a) and (c) of the Act i.e.
has not provided a safe working environment at the workplace and not
organised awareness programmes. A direction is sought to the employer to
W.P.(C) No.11759/2015 page 2 of 5
place on record the said compliances.
6. The counsel for the respondent no.1 Ministry of Women and Child
Development appearing on advance notice states that though presently there
is a vacancy in the office of the Authority notified under Clause (a) of
Section 2 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which
is the Appellate Authority under the aforesaid Act also in terms of Section
19 supra read with Rule 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal), Rules 2013 but the said
vacancy shall be filled up within a period of five weeks from today.
7. I have in the circumstances enquired from the counsel for the
petitioner as to what purpose an order dissolving the ICC would serve and
whether not the same would stall the making of recommendations which the
ICC is required to make within 90 days as provided in Section 11(4) of the
Act.
8. The counsel for the petitioner has contended that the said period of 90
days is already over and notwithstanding the same, the ICC has not
submitted its Report. It is further contended that after dissolving the ICC, the
employer should be directed to constitute a fresh ICC.
9. The counsel for the petitioner on enquiry whether there is any
provision in the Act for constitution of a fresh ICC by the employer in the
midst of an inquiry underway, has fairly stated that there is none.
10. I am of the view that this Court in exercise of powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India would not be justified in interfering with the
inquiry already underway before the ICC and interference wherewith would
delay the entire proceedings. The purport of the Act, as is evident from the
W.P.(C) No.11759/2015 page 3 of 5
various provisions thereof, is of expediency in such matters and of the
perpetrator if any found of the offence of sexual harassment being brought
to book at the earliest. Moreover, it is not as if the petitioner will not have
any remedies even if the report of ICC were to be prejudicial to the
petitioner. If the petitioner is aggrieved therefrom, the petitioner can always
appeal under Section 18 of the Act.
11. The counsel for the petitioner has informed that the employer, in its
Rules, has not constituted any Appellate Authority. If it is so, the Appellate
Authority provided for under Rule 11 supra would be the Appellate
Authority and the petitioner would have her remedies against the Report of
ICC before the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority, if finds
merit in the allegations as made by the petitioner in this petition, would
certainly be entitled to pass appropriate orders including of a fresh inquiry.
12. It is the settled principle of law that petitions under Article 226 should
not be entertained at interim stage as the same inevitably leads to delay and
multiplicity of proceedings. Reference in this regard can be made to a host
of judgments discussed by me in S.P. Parasher Vs. Rehabilitation Council
of India MANU/DE/4094/2011 against which LPA No.40/2012 was
dismissed on 18th January, 2012 and to The Secretary, Ministry of Defence
Vs. Prabhash Chander Mirdha (2012) 11 SCC 565.
13. As far as the grievance of the petitioner of non-compliance by the
employer of the requirements of Section 19 (a) and (c) of the Act is
concerned, admittedly no such complaint was made as is required to be
made to the District Officer under Section 20 of the Act prior to the making
of the complaint. The petitioner, if has any grievance in this regard, to
W.P.(C) No.11759/2015 page 4 of 5
immediately on the District Officer taking charge, make a complaint in this
respect and there is nothing to suggest that the District Officer would not
take appropriate action in that respect.
14. Binding the respondent no.1 Ministry of Women and Child
Development to the statement aforesaid to appoint the District Officer
within five weeks, the petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to,
if remains aggrieved from the recommendations ultimately made by the
ICC, appeal before the Appellate Authority.
No costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J
DECEMBER 17, 2015
'pp' ..
W.P.(C) No.11759/2015 page 5 of 5
