Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 9114 Del
Judgement Date : 8 December, 2015
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 8th December, 2015.
+ W.P.(C) No. 3333/2004
PANCHAYATI AKHARA NAYA UDASEEN ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep K. Bakshi and Mr. Rajat
Navet, Advs.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Suparna Srivastava with Mr.
Manudev Sharma and Ms. Anushka
Arora, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Rajiv Bansal, Adv. for DDA.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel
with Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, Adv. with Mr.
N.T. Mr. Satish Kr. in person..
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The petitioner, claiming to a religious sect, has filed this petition (i)
for setting aside of the acquisition if any made in the papers of the
Government; and, (ii) to restrain the respondents i.e. Union of India (UOI),
Lt. Governor, Delhi, Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and Collector,
Acquisition (West) from taking possession of the land measuring 2 bighas
19 biswas (2975 sq. yds.) comprising in Khasra No.3146/923 (1 bigha and
17 biswas) and Khasra No.3075/922 (1 bigha and 2 biswas) situated in
village Bassai Dara Pur (Now Kirti Nagar Industrial Area), New Delhi.
2. Notice of the petition was issued and vide ad interim order dated 8th
March, 2004 status quo was ordered to be maintained in respect of the land
and building in question.
3. Counter affidavit has been filed by the DDA and by the UOI and a
rejoinder has been filed to the counter affidavit of the DDA. Vide order
dated 9th September, 2004 the ad interim order was confirmed and the writ
petition directed to be listed in the category of regular matters. The petition,
on 3rd May, 2013 was dismissed in default of appearance of the petitioner
but was vide subsequent order dated 13th May, 2013 restored to its original
position.
4. The matter came up before this Court on 6th July, 2015 when the
following order was made:-
"1. The petitioner seeks to restrain the respondent no.1 Union of India (UOI) and the respondent no.3 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) from taking possession of 2 bighas 19 biswas (equal to 2975 sq. yds.) of land in Khasra No.3146/923 (1 bigha 17 biswas) and Khasra No.3075/922 (1 bigha 2 biswas) situated in village Bassai Dara Pur (now Kirti Nagar Industrial Area), New Delhi.
2. It is the case of the respondents that the said land was acquired and possession thereof taken and that the petitioner is in unauthorized encroachment thereof.
3. The counsel for the respondent no.1 UOI on enquiry seeks time to produce before this Court the Notification vide which the land was acquired as well as the record of the proceedings undertaken for taking possession of the said land.
4. List on 6th August, 2015.
5. The Land Acquisition Collector (West) to remain present in Court in person on the next date of hearing."
5. Thereafter on 10th September, 2015 the following order was made:-
"1. This order is in continuation of the order dated 6 th July, 2015.
2. The counsel for the respondent No.1 Union of India (UOI) states that though on 6th August, 2015, pursuant to the directions in the order dated 6th July, 2015, the concerned official had appeared but is not present in the Court today. She has however handed over photocopies of some documents but from which no clarity in the matter appears.
3. The counsel for the respondent No.3 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) states that the respondent No.1 UOI had put the DDA into possession of the land on 2nd September, 1982.
4. From the documents handed over by the counsel for the respondent No.1 UOI it appears that there was a Notification dated 1st January, 1949 of acquisition of the subject land under Section 3 of the Re-settlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948.
However, there is a doubt whether the land was subsequently de-notified.
5. Upon the title of the petitioner being enquired into, the counsel for the petitioner states that the subject land is recorded in the name of the petitioner in the revenue records of the year 1948. The petitioner has however not filed any document of title of the property thereafter. Though counsel for the petitioner states that house tax was levied and electricity connection provided in the name of the petitioner on the said land, but the same cannot be said to be documents of title.
6. On enquiry, as to whether the land in the revenue records after 1949 is shown in the name of the petitioners or in the name of "Sarkar Daulat Madar", the counsel for the petitioner states that he has not examined the said revenue records.
7. The petitioner to also produce whatsoever documents in his custody or possession of his title to the land on the date of filing of the petition i.e. of the year 2004 or of shortly prior thereto.
8. The Land Acquisition Collector (West) to remain present in person on the next date of hearing with all records relating to the subject land.
9. List on 1st October, 2015."
6. On 2nd November, 2015 the following order was made:-
"1. This order is in continuation of the earlier orders dated 6th July, 2015 and 10th September, 2015.
2. In compliance of the directions contained therein Mr. M.T. Kom, Land Acquisition Collector (LAC)/ Adm. (West) and Mr. Satish, Kanoongo, LAC (Branch) along
with the record of acquisition of the subject land are present in person. Though their Advocate Mr. Yeeshu Jain is not available but Mr. Rajiv Bansal, Advocate for the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) states that he has examined the documents / records and therefrom it transpires that the acquisition was under the provisions of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 under which no Award was required to be made / published and the compensation was to be determined either by negotiation or by arbitration. He further states that the name of the petitioner appears as one of the persons with whom compensation was to be negotiated.
3. It is deemed expedient that the said officer files an affidavit detailing the position, Mr. Bansal though appearing for the respondent DDA is requested to assist in the preparation and filing of the affidavit along with the concerned documents as annexures thereto. The said affidavit be filed on or before 16th November, 2015 with advance copy to the counsel for the petitioner who may file response thereto.
4. The counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is not to file any further documents in terms of the earlier orders.
5. List on 26th November, 2015.
6. The said officers to remain present in Court on the date."
7. And thereafter on 26th November, 2015 the following order was
made:-
"1. The counsel for the petitioner states that the respondent No.3 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) has filed the affidavit on 16th November, 2015 and he needs time to go through the same.
2. List on 8th December, 2015."
8. It is the case of the petitioner:-
(i) that a religious Gurudwara/temple is established on the land in
question for the last over 57 years;
(ii) that before partition of the year 1947, one Shri Kishan Singh
was the owner of the land aforesaid and gave that land to one
Shri Lohari Mal Sadhu, who was an Udaseen Sadhu; a temple
with murti of Baba Srichand Ji was constructed on the land and
in that temple Guru Granth Sahib was displayed every day and
ceremonies of Gurudwara performed; for this reason, there "is a
complete temple in the sense managed by the petitioner";
(iii) that in the wake of partition, the Resettlement of Displaced
Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 was enacted to
expeditiously rehabilitate displaced persons on a permanent
basis as the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
entailing much delay were not considered suitable therefor;
(iv) that respondent DDA has no right to take possession of any
portion of the aforesaid land and the construction thereon has
been raised either by the petitioner or the tenants of the
petitioner;
(v) that Notification under Section 3 of the 1948 Act, unlike the
Notification under the 1894 Act, is a composite one;
(vi) that mere publication of the Notification did not divest the
owners of the ownership in the land because Section 4 of the
1948 Act provides that after the publication of the Notification
under Section 3, the Competent Authority was required to serve
by registered post on the owner of the land and the occupier a
notice stating the particulars under Section 3(1) of the Act;
(vii) that the land aforesaid was being managed by the Akhara
Udaseen Panchayati and therefore no doubt is left that this place
is being used for Gurudwara/temple;
(viii) by virtue of a Will, the said Shri Lohari Mal Sandhu gave the
land to the petitioner;
(ix) that since whole of the area was in possession of the petitioner
for religious worship, it could not have been the subject matter
of Notification of acquisition under Section 3 of the Act
aforesaid;
(x) that respondent DDA from February, 2004 had started
demolishing the land around the land in question and threatened
to demolish the construction raised on the subject land also;
(xi) that the land of the petitioner was never acquired or taken
possession of by the Ministry of Rehabilitation as is evident
from the fact that the land containing the Gurudwara and other
construction around it is being used by the tenants of the
petitioner who are in existence for the last over 50 years.
(xii) the petitioner has been paying House Tax of the premises;
(xiii) that as no notice of acquisition of the land was issued neither
under Section 3 nor under Section 4, the question of filing any
objection under Section 6(1) did not arise;
(xiv) that the Ministry of Rehabilitation vide letter dated 13 th January,
1955 has stated that further acquisition of land for re-settlement
of displaced persons may not be undertaken as sufficient land
had already been acquired;
(xv) for this reason also the subject land could not be taken
possession of by the respondent DDA in the year 2004; and,
(xvi) that there was a threat of demolition of construction on the
subject land and hence this petition.
9. The respondent DDA in its counter affidavit has stated that, (i) the
land in question was transferred to the respondent DDA from the Ministry of
Rehabilitation under package deal vide letter dated 2nd September, 1982; (ii)
physical possession was taken over vide letter dated 12 th November, 1984;
and, (iii) the site was vacant then and there was only a Shiv Mandir
encroaching over an area of 126 sq. yds. It is thus stated that the land
belongs to the respondent DDA and the Gurudwara/temple is unauthorised
encroachment on the respondent DDA land and the respondent DDA is
within its right to remove the said encroachment. Documents in support
thereof are filed with the counter affidavit.
10. The petitioner in its rejoinder to the counter affidavit of the respondent
DDA has pleaded that besides the Gurudwara/temple over 126 sq. yds.,
certain other structures were raised to house some of the devotees of the
Gurudwara who were paying rent and therefore the property was assessed to
House tax.
11. The respondent UOI in its counter affidavit has stated that (i) in 1967
the Government approved the proposal of the then Ministry of Works and
Housing in regard to large scale acquisition and development and disposal of
land in Delhi which inter alia provided that the unutilised lands with the
Department of Rehabilitation within the urbanisable limits of Delhi should
be transferred to DDA; (ii) that the Ministry of Supply & Rehabilitation
(Department of Rehabilitation) vide letter dated 2nd September, 1982
transferred the unutilised lands to the respondent DDA on payment of Rs.30
crores by the respondent DDA; and, (iii) that in 1984 the Ministry of
Rehabilitation handed over physical possession of the said land including the
subject land to the respondent DDA.
12. The Land Acquisition Collector, in response to the order dated 2nd
November, 2015 aforesaid in this proceeding has deposed, (i) that the
records reveal that a Notification under Section 3 of the 1948 Act was issued
sometime in late December, 1948 or early January, 1949 for the lands falling
in village Basai Darapur; the said Notification also included the land subject
matter of the present writ petition; (ii) that the appropriate Government took
the actual, vacant and physical possession of the aforesaid notified land on
11th March, 1949 and Award/Offer No.1304 was passed subsequently; in the
absence of the last page/s of the said Award/Offer, the exact date on which
the said Award/Offer was made is not available; however from the
documents/letters written by some of the affected persons of the said
acquisition, it is borne out that the date of the Award/Offer was 13 th March,
1962; the subject land is also included in the said Award/Offer; (iii) the said
Award/Offer records that the possession of the main portion of the land was
taken on 11th March, 1949; however despite best efforts, the possession
proceedings could not be traced out in the records; (iv) that records reveal
that after passing of the Award, one of the persons affected by the
acquisition proceedings wrote a letter dated 19th March, 1971 to the
Secretary, Land & Building Department seeking to take advantage of some
de-notification proceedings on the pretext that there was already a
construction on his land; the said letter also mentions the date of Award as
13th March, 1962 and the date of Notification as 1st January, 1949; (v)
another letter dated 7th December, 1972 on the file also confirms that the
possession of the land was taken on 11th March, 1949; (vi) that there is on
record another undated report submitted by the Patwari sometime in the year
1979 who had inspected the site on 2nd February, 1979 and had found built
up houses on the subject land; and, (vii) that some of the persons affected by
the acquisition proceedings tried to take the advantage of some de-
notification proceedings on the basis of their land being built up at the time
of Notification and thereafter; that the subject land was never de-notified.
The documents in support of the averments in the affidavit are filed
therewith.
13. The petitioner has filed a response to the aforesaid additional affidavit
but no reference thereto is made in the hearing; moreover the averments
therein are legal.
14. According to the Re-settlement of Displaced Persons (Land
Acquisition) Act, the State Government, whenever deems necessary or
expedient to acquire speedily any land for the resettlement of displaced
persons, is to (i) issue a Notification to that effect in the official Gazette
stating the area and the boundaries of the land proposed to be acquired and
the date on which such acquisition will be made and a Public Notice is to be
issued in that regard; (ii) thereafter serve a notice under Section 4 on the
owner and occupier of the land; (iii) the land vests absolutely in the State
Government upon notice under Section 4 being served/published and the
State Government/competent authority is free to proceed to take possession
thereof; (iv) Section 6 enables the person interested in any land which has so
become vested in the State Government to file his objections if any to the
acquisition within one month from the vesting of the land and requires a
decision on the said objection to be taken by the competent authority; and,
(v) compensation is to be determined in accordance with Section 7 of the Act
and to be paid under Section 8 of the Act.
15. The counsel for the petitioner has argued (a) that the respondents have
not produced before this Court any Notification under Section 3 of the Act;
(b) that the respondents have also not produced before this Court any notice
issued or published under Section 4 of the Act or any proceeding to show
possession was taken; (c) similarly no proof of payment of any
compensation has been shown; (d) that admittedly the land has not been put
to the use for which it was acquired and thus the acquisition is bad; and, (e)
that since there existed a temple/Gurudwara on the subject land, the same
was exempted from acquisition in accordance with sub Section (2) of
Section 3 of the Act.
16. Per contra, the counsels for the respondents Collector, Acquisition
(West) and DDA have contended that the scheme of acquisition under the
said Act is different from that under the Land Acquisition Act and under the
said Act the land vests in the State Government immediately after issuing of
the Notification and the vesting of the said land is not dependent upon the
payment of compensation.
17. I have considered the rival contentions. Though undoubtedly the
respondents have not produced the documents as highlighted by the counsel
for the petitioner and in fact whatever has been produced has also been
produced only in pursuance to the orders dated 6 th July and 10th September,
2015 but it cannot be lost sight of that the said issues have been raised for
the first time in the year 2004. The respondents, after nearly 60 years of the
acquisition, could not be expected to be retaining all the records. Attention of
the counsel for the petitioner has been invited to Section 114(e) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that the Court may presume that official
acts have been regularly performed. In the said context it can be recorded
that the copy of the Award which has been placed on record mentions that a
Notification under Section 3 was issued and the possession had been taken.
18. The counsel for the petitioner has responded by drawing attention to
the judgment dated 19th December, 1980 of the Division Bench of this Court
in LPA No.259/1972 titled M/s. Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram & Company
Ltd. Vs. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and has contended that the
occasion for the petitioner to raise all the said disputes arose only when the
possession was sought to be taken and thus the petitioner cannot be said to
be guilty of laches, acquiescence or waiver. It is further contended that
without Notification under Section 4 being produced and/or the Gazette in
which the Notification under Section 3 was published and without showing
the possession taken proceedings, no presumption of the said procedure
and/or of the acquisition having been completed can be drawn. Attention is
further invited to illustration of Section 114 supra which provides that the
Court shall have regard to the fact that judicial act, the regularity of which is
in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances in drawing the
presumption under illustration (e). It is thus contended that no case for
drawing presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act also is made
out.
19. I have considered the rival contentions.
20. I am unable to agree with the counsel for the petitioner that Section
114(e) of the Evidence Act would have no application to the matter.
Reference to the illustration of Section 114(e) is misconceived. While
Section 114(e) provides "that Court may presume that judicial and official
acts have been regularly performed", the illustration providing "but the
Court shall have regard to the fact that a judicial act, the regularity of which
is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances" is in relation
to a judicial act only and not with respect to the official act. Moreover, even
if it were to be applicable to official act, all that it provides is that if the „act‟
is performed under exceptional circumstances then the same would also be
considered while drawing the presumption under Section 114(e). It is not the
case of the petitioner or of the respondents that the acquisition concerned
was under exceptional circumstances.
21. Else, the question whether illustration (e) to Section 114 supra is
applicable to acquisition proceedings or not is not res integra. Supreme
Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal Vs. Union Of India AIR (1996) 10 SCC
721 held that it is not the law and could not and would not be the law that
publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification (under Land
Acquisition Act, 1894) in the locality should be established beyond shadow
of doubt and benefit should be extended to the owner or interested person of
the land. It was held that presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence
Act can be raised that official acts have been properly done unless proved
otherwise. After satisfying itself on the basis of material on record, the
Supreme Court expressed satisfaction that the notifications must have been
published in the locality.
22. A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana headed
by Justice J.S. Khehar in Mehar Singh Rathi Vs. Union of India
MANU/PH/0741/2006, upon finding that the objections of the land owners
filed under Section 5A (again of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) along with
the recommendations of the Land Acquisition Collector were sent to the
Government, drew a presumption that they were duly considered by the
Government and held that the fact that decision of the said consideration was
not communicated to the petitioners could not dislodge the presumption of
due consideration of the objections.
23. The High Court of Kerala in Susanna Vs. State of Kerala
MANU/KE/0493/1997, on a reading of the affidavits as well as copies of the
notification, drew a presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act
that local publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act was made.
24. A Division Bench of the High Court Bombay in Sharnappa V.
Patrika Vs. State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0475/1983 also appears to
have accepted the contention of the Advocate General that from the records
of the Land Acquisition Officer, a presumption would arise under Section
114 of the Evidence Act.
25. Mention may lastly be made of a judgment of the Division Bench of
the High Court of Calcutta in Hakim Fazal Mohammad Vs. State of West
Bengal MANU/WB/0270/1968 holding that giving of the substance of the
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act being an official
act, must be presumed to have been properly done unless the contrary is
proved. Finding the plaintiff in that case to have not given any positive
evidence to the contrary it was concluded, drawing the presumption under
Section 114 of the Evidence Act, that the notices as required under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act were duly published.
26. I, on the basis of the material on record and the pleadings and the
affidavits filed, am satisfied that a case for drawing the presumption of the
subject land having been notified for acquisition under the provisions of the
1948 Act and having been acquired is made out. The petitioner, rather than
producing any positive evidence to prevent this Court from drawing the said
presumption has rather, in the petition itself, admitted to the acquisition and
are now, after eleven years of the filing of the petition, attempting to change
its stand. The petitioner in the petition itself has referred to the acquisition
proceedings under the 1948 Act and if there had been no acquisition
proceedings, the question of the petitioner challenging the same would not
have arisen. The counsel for the petitioner of course contends that the
petitioner pleaded so on the basis of information received by the petitioner
from the respondent DDA just prior to the filing of the petition. However,
that is not how the case is pleaded in the petition. Not only so, even if it were
to be presumed that the petitioner learnt from the respondent DDA, there
was still nothing in the letter dated 12th February, 1984 of the Ministry of
Rehabilitation to the respondent DDA from which the petitioner could have
made pleadings with respect to the happenings in 1949-50.
27. Not only so, the petitioner has been unable to dislodge the recording
of the land in the revenue records in the name of "Sarkar Daulatmadar" i.e.
the Government. Had the land not been acquired, the petitioners would have
insisted upon mutation of the land in the revenue record in its own name and
would not have been satisfied with the land being recorded in the revenue
records in the name of the Government. I have in this regard perused the
records produced by the Land Acquisition Collect in the Court and which
show that pursuant to the award/offer, the land was transferred from the
name of the petitioner to the name of the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Even
today the counsel for the petitioner is not able to state whether after 1 st
September, 1952 the petitioner bothered to have the land mutated in its name
and/or objected to the same being recorded in the name of Ministry of
Rehabilitation.
28. As far as the aspect of taking over of possession in pursuance to
acquisition is concerned, Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority,
Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394 held that no hard and fast
Rule can be laid down as to what would constitute taking possession of
acquired land. It was further held that if the acquisition is of a large tract of
land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take
physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be
sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate
document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their
signatures on such document.
29. In the present case, as aforesaid the petition has been filed after long
delay. Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs.
Industrial Development and Investment Company (P) Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC
501 held that when there is an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and
when all steps taken in acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court
should be loath to quash the notification. Similar view was expressed in
C.Padma Vs. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (1997) 2
SCC 627, Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698,
Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs. Shah Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48
and M/s. Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC
695.
30. Mention in this regard may also be made of a recent judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in Rajendra Prasad Vs.
State of Rajasthan MANU/RH/1656/2014 where, from revenue records it
was held to have been established that the possession was taken and it was
held that therefrom it could not be said that the appellants were never
dispossessed. It was further held that the petitioners having not challenged
the same could not after long delay challenge the acquisition. An exhaustive
discussion in this regard is also to be found in another judgment of the High
Court of Rajasthan in Ajay Pal Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan
MANU/RH/1488/2015.
31. Mention may also be made of the judgments of this Court in Nagin
Chand Godha Vs. Union of India MANU/DE/0995/2003 and Dr. Rajbir
Solanki Vs. Union of India 148 (2008) DLT 363 to the effect that the
Collector need not prove actual physical possession being taken over so long
as the record indicates possession is taken over.
32. Qua the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner of challenge to the
acquisition on the ground of the land being used exclusively for the purpose
of religious worship, the counsel for the petitioner fairly admits that there is
nothing on record to show that any gurudwara or temple existed on the
subject land prior to notifications aforesaid. In the absence thereof, no such
challenge can be sustained.
33. I am therefore of the opinion that the subject land was acquired by the
Ministry of Rehabilitation under the Rehabilitation Act supra. The question
of the petitioner today, in writ jurisdiction saving their possession thereof,
does not arise. The petitioner, if had any objection to the acquisition ought to
have raised the same at the contemporaneous time. The petitioner has clearly
encroached upon the acquired land and cannot now protect its unauthorised
possession.
34. There is thus no merit in the petition. The petition is dismissed and the
interim order is vacated.
35. Supreme Court in Abhimanyoo Ram Vs. Stte of Uttar Pradesh (2008)
17 SCC 73 has held that the Court after vacating the interim order has a duty
to balance the equities. The petitioners herein have enjoyed the interim order
in these proceedings for the last nearly 11 years and the case set up by the
petitioner in the petition has been found to be false. The petitioner is thus
liable to compensate the respondents for unauthorised occupation of the land
from 8th March, 2004 till the date of dispossession and the mesne profits
need to be determined by the Estate Officer of the respondent DDA.
36. The counsel for the petitioner states that the petition has been filed by
a Society. However, the petition is found to have been filed not on behalf of
the Society but by Mahant Dwarka Dass and the last affidavit has been filed
by Mahant Dhuni Dass. The Estate Officer, DDA to determine the said
compensation under Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and in the said inquiry also determine
who would be liable for payment of the said compensation.
37. The petitioner / its Mahant to appear before the Estate Officer of the
respondent DDA in this regard on 22nd January, 2016.
38. It is clarified that these proceedings are only for determination of
compensation and hence the possession of the petitioner being unauthorised,
the respondents are at liberty to take all measures available in law for
removal of the petitioner and others who are in possession through the
petitioner from the subject land.
No costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
DECEMBER 08, 2015 „pp‟..
(corrected & released on 24th December, 2015)
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