Oriental Insurance Co Ltd vs Bijender Singh & Ors
2015 Latest Caselaw 9112 Del

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*    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                              Date of Decision : December 08, 2015
+     MAC.APP. 24/2011
      ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO LTD                     ..... Appellant
                      Through: Mr.Amit Gaur, Advocate.
               versus

    BIJENDER SINGH & ORS                      ..... Respondents
                  Through: Mr.R.R.Ahlawat, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI
PRATIBHA RANI, J. (Oral)

1. The Claim Petition No.954/2008 was filed by Sh.Bijender Singh in respect of the injuries suffered by him on 07.04.1997 on being hit by Tractor No.HR-11-5980. After inquiry, the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal while awarding a total compensation of Rs.8,40,800/- to the claimant/injured, denied recovery rights to the insurance company.

2. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned award denying recovery rights, the instant appeal has been preferred by the insurance company.

3. Mr.Amit Gaur, learned counsel for the insurance company has submitted that the offending vehicle was a Tractor whereas the driver was holding a licence to drive light motor vehicle (LMV). He has further submitted that the endorsement is required to be made to authorize a person to drive a Tractor which was not there on the driving licence of the driver i.e. respondent No.2 herein. Hence, the learned Tribunal should have granted recovery rights to the insurance company as the offending vehicle i.e. the Tractor was being driven

by a person who was not holding a valid driving licence to drive a Tractor. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Mekh chand & Ors. 2013 ACJ 1663, National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Shinder Kaur 1998 (2) ACJ 880 and M/s. Punjab Tractors Ltd. vs. Harinder Singh & Ors. 2015 ACJ 1691 in support of his contentions.

4. In the case National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Shinder Kaur (Supra) a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court has examined the issue as to whether a driver holding a driving licence authorizing to drive motor car/scooter, can be held to be holding a valid driving licence for driving a Tractor also. This issue has been examined in paras 8 to 11 of the report, as under:-

'8. As regards the controversy if the driver Harbans Singh had the licence to drive the tractor or not, the trial Court referred to the definition of "Light Motor Vehicles" occurring under subsection (21) of Section 2 of the Act. The same reads:--

"(21) "light motor vehicle" means a transport vehicle or omnibus the gross vehicle weight of. either or which or a motor car or tractor or road- roller the unladen weight of any of which, does not exceed (7,500) kilograms."

It certainly shows that it includes a tractor. But in this regard one cannot ignore the definitions of Sub-sections (26) and (27) of Section 2 which are also being reproduced below for the sake of facility :--

"(26) "motor car" means any motor vehicle other than a transport vehicle, omnibus, road-roller, tractor, motor cycle or invalid carriage."

(27) "motor cycle" means a two-wheeled motor vehicle, inclusive of any detachable sidecar having an extra wheel, attached to the motor vehicle."

The above quoted definitions clearly indicate that in the definition of motor car, the tractor is not included. It may be a light motor vehicle for purposes of Sub-section (24) of Section 2 of the Act. But it will not be a motor car as explained above, because of the definition of the said expression under Sub-section (24) of Section 2. These findings get support from the fact that expression "tractor" has specifically been defined under Sub-section (44) of Section 2 which means a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load other than equipment used for purpose of propulsion. Indeed it is clear beyond any pale of controversy that a motor car is not a tractor.

9. Reverting back to the facts it is clear that appellant had examined Ashok Kumar a clerk from the Transport Department as RW-2. He has deposed from the record with respect to the licence that had been granted to Harbans Singh. He deposed further that Harbans Singh had applied for issuance of a driving licence with respect to a scooter/car. The original application was submitted in Court which is Ex. R-2. He added that a notification had been issued regarding issuance of driving licences pertaining to different vehicles. Ex. R-1 is the copy of the driving licence and as is apparent from perusal of the judgment and a fact which was not disputed before us that driving licence of Harbans Singh was with respect to a scooter and car only. There is no mention that it is pertaining to a light motor vehicle or a tractor. Consequently, we have no hesitation in concluding that driving licence of Harbans Singh was only with respect to drive scooter and a car only.

10. In that event respondents' learned counsel as already pointed above has pressed the argument that intention was to get a licence to drive a light motor vehicle and, therefore, it should be so read that the

licence was for driving of the tractor also. In our considered opinion the said contention is indeed totally devoid of any merit. While interpreting a statute the plain meaning of the word has to be followed, particularly when there is no ambiguity in interpreting the same. Reference to some of the precedents on the subject would be in the fitness of things. In the case of Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor. MANU/PR/0001/1939 it was observed :--

"But in truth when the meaning of words is plain it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions."

Same question was considered by the Supreme Court in the case Shri Ram v. The State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0075/1960 : AIR 1961 SC 674. In paragraph 8 the fundamental rule of interpretation of statutes was described to be :--

"One of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous "no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature."

Similarly while interpreting the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 in the case of Anandji Haridas & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh MANU/SC/0337/1975 : AIR 1975 SC 946 the view point was the same and the Court concluded :--

"9. As a general principle of interpretation, where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence such as Parliamentary Debates, Reports of the Committees of the Legislature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act is admissible to construe those words. It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or

susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning, that external evidence as to the evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of the circumstances which led to the passing of the statute may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which the Legislature had in view in using the words in question." The Constitution Bench in the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L. V. A. Dikshitulu, MANU/SC/0416/1978 : AIR 1979 SC 193 provided the following guidelines :--

"The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed "according to the intent of they that made it" (Coke), Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to regardless of the consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction, such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation."

Same was the view in the case of Dr. Ajay Pradhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0139/1988 : AIR 1988 SC 1875 and also subsequently in the case of Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd. v.

Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, MANU/SC/0035/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 152. The Court held:--

"The choice between a strict and a liberal construction arises only in case of doubt in regard to the intention of the Legislature manifest on the statutory language. Indeed, the need to resort to any interpretative process arises only where the meaning is not manifest on the plain words of the statute. If the words are plain and clear and directly convey the meaning, there is no need for any interpretation."

Thus it is abundantly clear from what has been held above that when the language is clear and plain, the statute has to be interpreted accordingly. Literal meaning has to be given. In such like circumstances the intention has not even to be looked into. It has already been discussed above that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 makes a clear distinction between a motor car and a tractor. Both may be light motor vehicles. But when the licence was applied and granted for scooter and a car, it cannot be taken to be one for a tractor. The learned Tribunal was patently in error in thus concluding to the contrary.

11. It is obvious from the findings arrived at above that Harbans Singh did not have any licence to drive the tractor. Even if the tractor thus was insured, it will not fasten any liability on the appellant. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Narain v. Samitra Devi (1997) 3 PLR 578.'

5. The case of the appellant/insurance company is squarely covered by the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Shinder Kaur's case (Supra) . In the instant case, the offending vehicle was a Tractor and it is proved on record that the driver of the Tractor was not having any endorsement on his driving licence authorizing him to drive a Tractor.

6. It is informed by learned counsel for the appellant that respondent No.2 the driver of the offence vehicle has expired. The owner/respondent No.3 has not appeared as a witness to prove that he has not committed breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy or that the Tractor was not entrusted by him to the driver i.e. respondent No.2 at the time of accident.

7. In the absence of any evidence by the owner of the offending vehicle that he had taken necessary precautions to avoid the breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy, it has to be held that by allowing a person not holding a driving licence authorizing him to drive a Tractor, the owner/respondent No.3 has committed willful breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy, hence the appellant/insurance company is entitled for recovery rights.

8. Accordingly, recovery rights are given in favour of the appellant/insurance company to recover the compensation amount from the owner of the offending vehicle without having recourse to independent civil proceedings.

9. The Appeal is allowed to the above extent. Statutory amount deposited by the appellant/insurance company at the time of filing of the appeal, be refunded to the appellant/insurance company.

10. LCR be sent back alonggwith copy of this order.

Copy of the order be given dasti to learned counsel for the appellant, as prayed.

(PRATIBHA RANI) JUDGE DECEMBER 08, 2015 'st'