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Rita Narang & Anr. vs The State & Ors.
2015 Latest Caselaw 5711 Del

Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 5711 Del
Judgement Date : 7 August, 2015

Delhi High Court
Rita Narang & Anr. vs The State & Ors. on 7 August, 2015
Author: Manmohan Singh
*               IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                  Order delivered on: 7th August, 2015

+               I.A. No.797/2015 in Test. Cas. No.11/2011

        RITA NARANG & ANR.                               ..... Petitioners
                         Through             Mr. Prosenjeet Banerje, Adv.
                                             with Mr. Vipin Tyagi, Adv.

                                   versus
        THE STATE & ORS                                   .....Respondents
                                 Through     None

        CORAM:
        HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

1. By way of this order I propose to decide an application being I.A. No. 797/2015 under Section 151 CPC filed by the petitioners for exemption from filing administration cum security bond.

2. The petitioners filed the petition under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act for grant of probate of Will dated 14th May, 2007 executed by late Shri Har Kishan Singh Bhandari in respect of property a freehold flat bearing No.221, RPS, Shiekh Sarai-I, New Delhi-110017 which was disposed of by order dated 13th September, 2013 and a corrigendum was issued on 20th November, 2013 by this Court.

3. It is stated that the petitioners got the evaluation of the estate of the deceased carried out by evaluator which was total of

Rs.22,22,000/-. The petitioners received notice from the Registrar of this Court directing them to deposit blank court fee of Rs.1,05,872/- along with duly executed administration bond along with two sureties.

4. Accordingly the petitioners furnished the Administration Bond and affidavits of sureties namely Shri Rakesh Puri and Shri Ashok Aggarwal. However it was found that the property furnished by Shri Rakesh Puri was under mortgage and the property furnished by Shri Ashok Aggarwal was under joint name and the joint property holder was unable to procure his consent on the day of hearing. The counsel for the petitioners requested for more time to furnish a fresh administration bond and sureties and thus the matter was adjourned by the Registrar General.

5. It is stated that the petitioners are housewives and have no source of income. The petitioner No.1 is separated from her husband and is having great difficulty in procuring a surety as she has no job. She is currently staying with her daughter and has no other means of obtaining surety of such a high amount. She has no other property in her exclusive name. Similarly, the petitioner No.2 is a housewife and all properties owned by her is in the joint name of her husband who is refusing to co-operate with her and despite efforts she has been unable to secure the consent of the joint property holder.

6. It is further stated that the petitioners along with respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are natural heirs of the deceased. The petitioners along with the respondent No.2 and 3 are also the class 1 legal heirs of the deceased and there was no objection from any other party during the

course of the proceedings in the suit. Furthermore, respondent No.2 and 3 did not put any objection to the decreeing of letter of administration with annexed Will.

7. Reliance is placed on the judgement of this Court in Rajesh Sinha & Ors. vs State in Test Case 84/2011 decided on 6th April, 2015 wherein it was held as under:-

"7. The aforesaid aspect was examined in some depth by a Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sanjay Suri vs. State 2003 (71) DRJ 446, where counsel for the petitioner had argued that the requirement of execution of a bond should not operate in the case of a sole beneficiary under a will to whom letters of administration are granted. After taking into consideration the requirement for execution of an Administration Bond as prescribed under the statute, the petitioner therein was exempted from furnishing the same in the light of the following observations:- "21. The crux of the matter arising for consideration is whether a sole beneficiary under a Will, which has been duly proved, should be required to execute an administration bond for the administration of an estate, which is bequeathed to him and to which there are no other claimants. It is only on account of statutory bar under Section 222 of the Act, the said sole beneficiary and natural heir not being an executor, is not being granted the probate. It is not in dispute that had he been appointed the executor, there would have been no requirement or insistence on furnishing a surety or administration bond.

22. It would be seen that none of the duties of the Administrator as noticed in the preceding para-16 are required to be performed by a person, who is the sole beneficiary under the Will. It appears to me that the requirement of furnishing of

administration bond or surety bond for administration of an estate belonging to oneself is wholly redundant and could not have been intended to be covered by the statutory provision, namely, Section 291 of the Act.

23. On a question of proper interpretation of Section 291 of the Act, reference is invited to the following paras from Halsbury's Laws of England:-

Paragraph 898 at page 551 of Volume 44 : "The construction of ancient statutes may be elucidated by what in the language of the Courts is called contemporanea expositio, that is, by saying how they were understood at the time when they were passed."

Paragraph 860 at page 524 of Volume 44 : "Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it should not be reduced to a nullity by a literal following of language, which may be due to want of skill or knowledge on the part of a draftsman, unless such language is intractable."

24. Following are the well recognised principles of interpretation: - Statutes must be so construed as to make them operative. If it is possible, the words of a statute must be construed so as to give them a sensible meaning. A statute must, if possible, be construed in the sense which makes it operative and does not defeat the manifest intentions of the legislature and nothing short of impossibility so to construe it should allow a court to declare a statute unworkable.

If the Court is to avoid a statutory result that flouts common sense and justice, it must do so not by disregarding the statute or overriding it, but by interpreting it in accordance with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense

and justice. But the possibility of injustice which leads the Court to adopt a particular construction must be a real one.

25. There are instances, where the entitlement though fully covered under the statute has been denied on ground of public policy. In R Vs National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Connor" reported in (1981) 1 All ER page 770 was a case under the Social Security Act, 1975. A widow though entitled to the insurance as per condition of the statute for grant of social security was denied the allowance on public policy as she had created a status of widowhood by killing her husband. This is a case, where on ground of public policy the applicant fulfilling the entitlement under the statute was denied relief on grounds of public policy.

26. Reference at this stage may also be made to the Maxwell on interpretation of statutes with regard to the "golden rule". The learned author noticed as under: "The So called 'golden rule' is really a modification of the literal rule".

27. It was stated in this way by Parke B:

"It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further".

28. Considering the nature of the Testamentary and Intestate succession, the object and purpose sought to be achieved by Section 291 and thus applying the aforesaid principles of interpretation of statutes, it would be seen that Section 291 of the Act is not intended to cover within its ambit the

cases of a sole beneficiary and legal heir under a Will being required to furnish administration/surety bond. One cannot administer the estate or his own estate against himself, for which he be required to give an indemnity or administration bond. Besides, none of the purposes and objectives of Section 291 of the Act are covered or fulfilled by the execution of an administration/surety bond by the sole inheritor or beneficiary under the Will duly proved. Such an exercise would be an exercise in futility. In the instant case if the petitioner's grand son was to mismanage or maladminister, he would be doing so only against his own and personal interests. A right that clearly vests in him by virtue of the bequest. Hence insistence of furnishing the administration bond in the present case would not only be meaningless and without any purpose, but inconsistent with succession. Section 291 in the light of the foregoing principles of interpretation, as noticed, has to be interpreted so as not being applicable to a case of a sole beneficiary and legal heir, under a duly proved Will insofar as requirement of furnishing an administration bond is concerned." (emphasis added)

8. In line with the aforesaid decision is the judgment in the case of Richa Pardeshi vs. State 2012(131) DRJ 92, where the petitioner had sought grant of letters of administration in respect of the estate of her deceased father. Being the sole legatee, the Court had exempted the petitioner from furnishing an Administration Bond by holding that any decision to give effect to Section 291 which prescribes that an Administration Bond be furnished by a sole beneficiary or a sole legatee, would lead to an absurd consequence, for the reason that such a beneficiary/legatee would stand as a surety for the estate of the deceased, which has exclusively devolved upon him and it would be paradoxical to hold that a person can stand surety for himself.

9. On a conspectus of the above legal position on the requirement of furnishing a surety and Administration Bond, it may be noted that in a majority of decisions, it has been held that where a sole beneficiary/legatee is involved, the requirement of offering an indemnity bond/surety bond is dispensable for the simple reason that it would be an exercise in futility to call upon a sole beneficiary/legatee under a will that has been duly proved, to furnish an Administration Bond/Surety Bond when the estate of the deceased has been bequeathed in favour of the very same person. Even when it comes to cases where petitions are filed for grant of letters of administration under a will, on account of the bar imposed under Section 222 of the Act that stipulates that probate can be granted only to an executor appointed by the will, the courts have ordinarily adopted a liberal approach and have taken a pragmatic view by holding that judgments pronounced in exercise of testamentary and intestate succession are in the nature of proceedings in rem and the statutory provisions and rules are framed to realize the ultimate objective of succession.

11. The same view finds resonance in cases where there are more than one beneficiary/legatee of the estate of the deceased. While reiterating the principle that the objective of testamentary and intestate jurisdiction is to enable the Court to accord legitimacy and authenticity by giving its seal of approval to succession of the estate of the deceased, the courts have observed that the ultimate objective is of grant of succession and to realize the said objective, the statutory provisions and rules ought to be interpreted in a manner that are in furtherance to realizing the intention of the deceased, instead of obstructing it by getting hypertechnical. At the same time, the courts have been cautious in cases of intestate succession for the reason that a greater degree of care is required to be taken when an administrator is to be appointed with a surety and security taken for due administration of the estate of the deceased.

12. In the present case, the petitioners are the natural heirs of the deceased, late Shri Tarini Prasad Sinha. Petitioners No.2 and 3 have issued letters of authorization in favour of the petitioner No.1 authorizing him to pursue the case on their behalf and they have no objection to the letters of administration being granted in favour of the petitioner No.1. The citations that have been issued in the press have not elicited any objections from any quarter. Being satisfied with the evidence produced by the petitioners, letters of administration were granted in favour of the petitioner No.1, vide order dated 18.9.2013. After the grant of the letters of administration, petitioner No.1 has already furnished the Administration Bond and deposited the court fee stamps and now he seeks exemption from filing the surety bond.

13. In view of the fact that letters of administration have been granted to the petitioner No.1 in the absence of any contest, this Court is of the opinion that the condition of filing a Security Bond for the entire value of the estate of the deceased, assessed at Rs. 6,37,60,383/-would be extremely onerous on him. It is therefore deemed appropriate to allow the present application and permit the petitioner No.1 to furnish a Surety Bond for a sum of Rs.10 lacs (rupees ten lacs) as this would serve the purpose without unnecessarily burdening him. Needful shall be done within two weeks."

8. In the present case respondent No.2 and 3 did not raise any objection to the grant of letter of administration pertaining to Will. In view of the judgement referred above, this Court is of the view that the condition of filing Administration and Security Bond for the entire value of the estate of the deceased, assessed at Rs. 22,22,000/- is to be recalled as raised by Registry by allowing the prayer of the present application. Ordered accordingly. Instead the petitioners are permitted to furnish a personal bond before the Registrar General within four weeks.

9. The application is accordingly disposed of.

10. List before the Registrar General on 15th September, 2015 for accepting the personal bond of the petitioners, as directed above.

(MANMOHAN SINGH) JUDGE AUGUST 07, 2015

 
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