Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 3438 Del
Judgement Date : 29 April, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision:29th April, 2015.
+ LPA No.41/2015
PARVEEN KUMAR BENIWAL ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Sunil K. Mittal with Mr. Vipin K.
Mittal, Advs.
Versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Zubeda Begum and Ms. Sana
Ansari, Advs. for GNCTD.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. This intra court appeal impugns the judgment dated 22nd December,
2014 of the learned Single Judge of dismissal of W.P.(C) No.8111/2014
preferred by the appellant. The said writ petition was filed impugning the
order dated 6th August, 2014 of the Lt. Governor of Delhi of dismissal /
rejection of the appeal under Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959 preferred by
the appellant against the order dated 1st April, 2014 of the Additional
Commissioner of Police (ACP) (Licensing) revoking the arms licence of the
appellant.
2. This appeal came up for admission on 12th February, 2015 when the
counsel for the respondents Govt. of NCT of Delhi (GNCTD) and ACP
(Licensing) appeared on advance notice and with the consent of the
counsels, arguments in the appeal were finally heard and judgment reserved.
3. The appellant, claiming to be carrying on business as a Cable TV
Service Provider, in the year 2006 applied for and was granted an arms
licence which was renewed from time to time. The ACP (Licensing), vide
order-cum-show cause notice dated 31st October, 2013 suspended the arms
licence of the appellant with immediate effect and called upon the appellant
to deposit the licenced weapon with the nearest Police Station immediately
and to show cause, as to why the arms licence of the appellant should not be
cancelled on the ground of the appellant, at the time of applying for renewal
of the licence, having not intimated the factum of his being involved in case
FIR No.409/2010 dated 27th December, 2010 under Sections 302/34 IPC of
Police Station K.N. Katju Marg, New Delhi and in case FIR No.280/2013
dated 24th August, 2013 under Sections 323/341/336/506/34 IPC of Police
Station Rani Bagh, New Delhi, and for which reason the ACP (Licensing)
was of the view that the appellant was "not a fit person to hold an arms
licence in the interest of public safety at large".
4. The appellant submitted a reply dated 8th November, 2013 to the
aforesaid show cause notice stating, that he had been falsely implicated in
case FIR No.409/2010 and had been acquitted on 8 th August, 2012 and that
the complainant in case FIR No.280/2013 had himself, when the appellant
had applied for bail thereunder, filed an affidavit that the FIR had been
lodged as a result of misunderstanding and further that with the consent of
the complainant, the said FIR stood quashed on 16th December, 2013. The
appellant further replied that his licenced weapon had never been used in the
commission of any crime nor was the case property in any crime and that he
"had not intentionally concealed" the said facts, while applying for renewal
of the licence and the said facts remained to be stated out of "sheer
inadvertence".
5. The ACP (Licensing) vide order dated 1st April, 2014 cancelled the
arms licence of the appellant, observing; (i) that a perusal of the order dated
8th August, 2012 in case FIR No.409/2010 supra showed that the appellant
had been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt and the Court had passed
strictures against the local police for faulty investigation etc.; (ii) that FIR
No.280/2013 had also been quashed on the ground of settlement with the
complainant and subject to cost of Rs.25,000/- on the appellant and the
same also did not constitute an honourable acquittal; (iii) rather, the FIRs
against the appellant showed the propensity of the appellant to indulge in
quarrel with the others; (iv) that the failure of the appellant to disclose the
said facts was in violation of the Arms Act; and, (v) that the appellant was
thus indeed not a fit person to hold an arms licence.
6. The Lt. Governor, Delhi dismissed / rejected the statutory appeal
preferred by the appellant, further noting that perjury proceedings had been
initiated against the person on whose statement the appellant had been
acquitted in case FIR No.409/2010 and observing that the order of the ACP
(Licensing) of revocation of licence was fair and there was no reason to
interfere therewith.
7. The ACP (Licensing) in the counter affidavit to the writ petition filed
before the learned Single Judge also pleaded; (a) that the appellant, on 17 th
August, 2012 had applied for renewal of his arms licence; (b) that in
Column No.15 of the prescribed form for renewal of arms licence, the
appellant was asked "whether presently / previously involved in any
criminal case (whether convicted / acquitted or pending trial), if yes details
of the case"; (c) that the appellant against the said Column wrote "N/A"; (d)
that on the basis of the information so furnished by the appellant, his arms
licence was renewed till 30th April, 2015; (e) that concealment of material
facts, while applying for or seeking renewal of arms licence, is a ground for
revocation of licence; (f) that the appellant neither in the reply to the show
cause notice nor in the personal hearing given to him could give any
justifiable reason, as to why he indulged in suppression of material facts; (g)
that the Supreme Court in Chandrakant Hargovindas Shah Vs. Deputy
Commissioner of Police (2009) 7 SCC 186 has held that the statutory
authority is justified in revoking the licence, where the licencee is guilty of
„suppressio veri' and „suggestio falsi‟; (h) that the Full Bench of the Patna
High Court in Kapil Deo Singh Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1987 Patna 122 held
that registration and pendency of criminal case for a major offence is an
adequate reason to justify the suspension or revocation of arms licence.
8. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition finding /
observing / holding: (I) that the argument of the appellant that since he had
been acquitted and / or since the FIRs had been quashed, his arms licence
could not be cancelled / revoked, has no merit as the issue is not, whether
the appellant is guilty but whether a reasonable person could infer that the
appellant was involved in those incidents; (II) that the standard of proof
required for conviction in a criminal proceeding, of the guilt being proved
beyond reasonable doubt, is materially different from the consideration that
the licensing authority has to bear, while forming an opinion, whether to
revoke a licence; (III) that for licensing authority to take note of possible
involvement of the licencee in an offence, conviction is not essential--all
that is required to be considered is the likely involvement in the incident;
(IV) that the offence of which the appellant was accused in both the FIRs
were serious; (V) that this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India would not supplant its opinion over that of the
concerned authority; (VI) that there would be no interference in the opinion
of the ACP (Licensing), unless the decision was found to be arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable or for extraneous considerations or the decision
making process was faulty; (VII) that it could not also be said that the
decision of the statutory authorities was so unreasonable which no prudent
person could have formed; (VIII) that merely because the appellant had
been acquitted, did not mean that the appellant in response to Column No.15
of the application form for renewal of licence, was not required to disclose
the FIRs; (IX) that the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Sheru
Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Police (Licensing), Delhi 50 (1993) DLT 390
could not be read as laying down that arms licence could never be revoked
on the ground of mere involvement in criminal cases, if the licensed weapon
was not used.
9. The counsel for the appellant before us, besides reiterating the
contentions urged before the ACP (Licensing), Lt. Governor and the learned
Single Judge, has relied on para 14 of the opinion of one of the Judges of the
Division Bench in Sheru supra, on para 12 of Braham Parkash Vs. State
(1994) 53 DLT 454 (DB) and on the judgment dated 5th July, 2010 of a
learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Writ (C)
No.22659/2006 titled Govind Singh Vs. State of U.P.
10. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents has taken us through the
form filled up by the appellant on 17th August, 2012 for renewal of his arms
licence and has drawn attention to Section 17(3)(c) of the Arms Act which
empowers the licensing authority to suspend / revoke an arms licence, if
inter alia satisfied that the holder of the licence for any reason is unfit for a
licence under this Act or if so deems necessary for the security of the public
peace or for public safety or if the licence was obtained by suppression of
material information or on the basis of wrong information.
11. We are entirely in agreement with the reasoning given by the learned
Single Judge and after having considered the contentions raised and the
judgments relied upon by the counsel for the appellant, do not find any
reason to, in exercise of our jurisdiction under the Letters Patent, interfere
therewith.
12. Section 17(3) of the Arms Act is as under:
"(3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence-
(a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or
(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or
(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or
(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or
(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence."
13. Suppression of material information or furnishing of wrong
information at the time of obtaining the licence has expressly and
specifically been made a ground for revocation of the licence. It is not
controverted that the same applies to obtaining renewal of licence as well.
It is not as if, it has been left to the discretion of the applicant for arms
licence, as to what information should be furnished. The information which
the ACP (Licensing) requires for forming an opinion, whether to grant /
renew an arms licence is prescribed in the form, format whereof is contained
in the Arms Rules, 1962 framed under the Act. It thus follows that all the
information required to be furnished in the said form is material
information. One of the information sought is in Column No.15 as noticed
above. Thereunder, the applicant is required to disclose not only, whether at
the time of filling up of the form but previously also, if he / she was
involved in any criminal case and whether he / she was convicted or
acquitted therein along with the details thereof. The same is undoubtedly a
material information for the ACP (Licensing) to form an opinion, whether to
grant an arms license or not. To be fair to the counsel for the appellant, he
has not even argued that the said information is not material. Section
17(3)(c) makes the mere suppression of said information a ground for
revocation. Again, to be fair, the counsel for the appellant has not even
controverted that the appellant did indeed suppress the information which he
was required to furnish in Column No.15. What he however contends is
that since on the date of filling up of the form, the said cases were not
pending and in one the appellant had been acquitted and in another the FIR
had been quashed, the appellant inadvertently did not furnish the said
information. However, the column leaves no manner of doubt that even any
previous involvement in a criminal case alongwith the outcome thereof, is
required to be disclosed. Section 17(3)(c) of the Act does not qualify the
words "suppression of material information" with the words "intentional".
Thus, we are not required to go into the question, whether the suppression
was intentional and / or bona fide and / or inadvertent. Once it is found that
there was suppression of material fact or wrong information was given at
the time of obtaining / renewing arms licence, the same, without anything
more, constitutes a ground for revocation of licence. The said ground of
revocation is independent of the other grounds of revocation i.e. of the
Licensing Authority deeming revocation to be necessary for the security of
the public peace or for public safety. Thus, once the ground of revocation
under Section 17(3)(c) i.e. of suppression of material information /
furnishing of wrong information is made out, the concerns of public peace
or public safety are irrelevant.
14. The Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram
Ratan Yadav (2003) 3 SCC 437 was concerned with an application for an
employment also requiring the applicant to disclose whether he had ever
been prosecuted / kept under detention / bound down / fined, convicted by a
Court of law of any offence and whether any case was pending against him
in any Court of law and a consequent term of appointment that suppression
of any information may lead to dismissal from service. Finding the answers
given in the application form to the said queries to be negative and which
turned out to be false, the order of dismissal from service was passed and
which was challenged by a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court
allowed the writ petition accepting the explanation that the said queries in
the application form were not understood properly and that the criminal case
had been withdrawn by the State Government and holding that the charge in
the criminal case also was not so serious. The Supreme Court set aside the
judgment of the High Court and held that the object of requiring the said
information was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents of the
applicant, to judge his suitability. It was further held that suppression of
material information and making a false statement had a clear bearing on the
character and antecedents of the applicant and a candidate who had
suppressed material information / given false information could not claim a
right to continue in service and the employer was within its right to
terminate the employment.
15. As far as the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant in
Sheru supra is concerned, the challenge therein was to the order of
suspension of arms licence-cum-show cause notice against revocation
thereof. The two members of the Division Bench rendered separate
opinions. While one (Jaspal Singh, J.) held that Section 17(3) permits
suspension of arms licence but found fault with the ground of suspension
inter alia observing that though pendency of major or capital crime case
may possibly lead to the conclusion that the person is unfit for licence, more
so, when the licensed weapon is used or employed in the alleged crime but
the pendency of a single criminal case where admittedly no firearm was
used, cannot attract Section 17(3)(b), the other learned Judge (Mahender
Narain, J.) held that there could be no order of suspension of arms licence,
without hearing the licencee and holding an enquiry and giving reasons
therefor. Sheru supra was thus concerned only with a ground of suspension
under Section 17(3)(b) and the ground of suspension / revocation under
Section 17(3)(c) i.e. of suppression of material facts, while applying for
licence / renewal of licence, did not fall for consideration therein. We
therefore do not find the opinion of one of two Judges of the Division Bench
in Sheru supra to be of any relevance to the present controversy.
16. Similarly, Braham Parkash supra also is not found to be of any
relevance to the present controversy. The outcome therein was as a result of
a conclusive finding of fact that the arms licence holder had not concealed
any facts and that the Court of competent jurisdiction had held the criminal
case against him to be false and fabricated. The position here is entirely
different. Not only is the appellant guilty of suppression within the meaning
of Section 17(3)(c) supra but the culmination of the criminal cases against
the appellant is not on a finding of the same being false and fabricated but as
a result of settlement and / or by giving benefit of doubt to the appellant.
We may in this regard also notice that the appellant has also shied away
from filing before us the judgment of his acquittal or the proceedings in the
petition filed for quashing of the other FIR and which would have thrown
light on the nature of the involvement of the appellant. Though during the
hearing, we asked the counsel for the appellant for the same but he did not
have the same in his file also. Even after the judgment has been reserved,
no copies thereof have been filed.
17. Govind Singh supra also merely holds that mere involvement of the
licence holder in a criminal case cannot ipso facto lead to the conclusion
that it is not in the interest of security of public peace or public safety that
the licence should be revoked. The same is also not a judgment on Section
17(3)(c).
18. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to
a recent judgment dated 15th January, 2014 of a Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No.62/2014 titled State of U.P. Vs.
Mahipat Singh 2014 (2) ALJ 443 holding; (A) that the scheme of the Arms
Act and the Arms Rules indicates that a wide discretion has been given to
the licensing authority; (B) that maintenance of law and order and public
peace and safety is the responsibility of the State; (C) that a citizen cannot
assert a right to hold a firearm licence; (D) that the discretion which is
conferred upon the licensing authority cannot be confined to fixed
categories; (E) whether there is a perception of threat to the security of a
citizen has to be considered by the licensing authority; (F) that the Court
cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the licensing authority about a
perception; (G) that the scope of judicial review is limited; (H) that where
the relevant circumstances have been taken into consideration and no
extraneous considerations were taken into account, it would be outside the
purview of judicial review of the Court to substitute its own opinion with
the opinion of the licensing authority.
19. We respectfully concur with the view aforesaid of the Division Bench
of the Allahabad High Court.
20. Mention may also be made of the judgment of the Division Bench of
this Court in People for Animals Vs. UOI 180 (2011) DLT 460 holding that
grant of a licence for acquisition and possession of firearms was only
statutory privilege and not matter of fundamental right under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India; such a licence is materially different from a
licence for manufacture, sale etc. and while latter confers a right to carry on
a trade or business and is a source of earning livelihood, the former is
merely a personal privilege for doing something which without such
privilege is unlawful; grant of such a privilege does not involve the
adjudication of the right of individual nor does it entail civil consequences
save that rejection of an application for grant of licence or cancellation of a
licence may become legally vulnerable if arbitrary or capricious or without
application of mind; it was further held that no citizen has a blanket right to
carry firearms and the application for firearms may be made mostly with the
object of protecting the person or property but which too is mainly the
function of the State.
21. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Devendra
Tukaram Katke Vs. The State Of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0271/2009 has
held that once the concerned authority has for reasons recorded and for
ensuring security of public peace and public safety cancelled the arms
licence, the same ought not to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction since it
raises disputed questions of fact.
22. One of us (Mr. Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.) sitting singly has in judgment
dated 5th October, 2011 in W.P.(C) No.7360/2011 titled Dharambir Khattar
Vs. GNCTD inter alia held as under:
"9. Our society has recently witnessed scenes/situations hitherto unknown. There have been instances where people, owing to the tensions of city life, have at the slightest provocation and in a fit of rage misused firearms. There have been cases where firearms have been used to kill, it appears for the sheer joy, without even any reason or provocation. The assessment made by the authorities in whom the power is vested to assess whether a person is a suitable person to hold a firearm or not and whether allowing a person to continue holding a firearm is fraught with danger cannot be lightly interfered with. As aforesaid the petitioner has no right to
possess a firearm. Though the petitioner has enjoyed the privilege for over two decades but the recent developments qua the petitioner viz of being an accused in a scam and hiding the same from the licensing authorities do certainly constitute a cause for the licencing authorities to revoke such licence."
The aforesaid applies to the present controversy also. Once the rules
require an applicant for arms licence / renewal thereof to disclose his
previous involvement in a criminal case alongwith the particulars, acquittal
is no defence to such non-disclosure. It is for the licensing authority to
judge the effect of such acquittal and acquittal in a criminal case does not
take away the duty of the applicant for arms licence / renewal thereof to
disclose the same. As aforesaid, the statute has made mere non-disclosure, a
ground for revocation of licence. The Supreme Court in A.P. Public Service
Commission Vs. Koneti Venkateswarulu (2005) 7 SCC 177 while following
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan supra negatived the argument that there was
no mala fide intention in not giving full particulars by holding that of the
purpose for which the information is called, the authority seeking the
information is the ultimate judge and it is not open to the candidate to sit in
judgment about the relevance of the information called and decide to supply
it or not. Similarly, the plea of inadvertence was negatived by holding that
the said plea taken as an excuse for suppression / false declaration for the
first time after the truth was discovered is unacceptable.
23. We therefore find the appeal to be thoroughly misconceived and
dismiss the same with costs of Rs.10,000/- payable to the Delhi Police
Welfare Fund, PHQ, I.P. Estate, New Delhi within four weeks hereof.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE APRIL29, 2015 bs.
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