Delhi High Court
Ajay Suryavanshi & Ors. vs Union Of India & Ors. on 22 April, 2015
Author: Pradeep Nandrajog
$~8 & 12
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision : April 22, 2015
+ W.P.(C) 1611/2015
AJAY SURYAVANSHI AND ORS. ..... Petitioners
Represented by: Ms.Jyoti Singh, Sr.Advocate
instructed by Ms.Tinu Bajwa,
Advocate
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Vivek Goyal, CGSC with
Mr.M.Tapan Sharma, Advocate for
R-3 and R-4
W.P.(C) 3046/2015
S. RAVI CHANDRAN & ORS. ..... Petitioners
Represented by: Ms.Rekha Palli, Advocate with
Ms.Ankita Patnaik and Mr.Nikhil
Palli, Advocates
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Arun Bhardwaj, CGSC with
Mr.Rishi Kapoor, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI
W.P.(C) No.1611/2015 & 3046/2015 Page 1 of 24
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (Oral)
1. Whereas W.P.(C) No.1611/2015 has been filed by officers of BSF in
Group A service, W.P.(C) No.3046/2015 has been filed by officers in BSF
in the ministerial cadre. The commonality in the two petitions is the desire
of the petitioners for a cadre review to be carried out of their respective
cadre.
2. Vide OM dated April 05, 1995, drawing attention to an earlier OM
dated May 06, 1972, the Government of India, Department of Personnel and
Training had directed as under:-
"OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject: Guidelines for Cadre Review of Central Group
'A' Services.
Attention is invited to this Department‟s O.M.No.5/1/71-PP
(Vo.VI) dated 6.5.1972 with which detailed guidelines for cadre
management of Group „A‟ Central Services were issued. It
was, inter-alia, provided in the above guidelines that cadre
review of Group „A‟ Central Services would be held every three
years.
2. The question of revising the scheme of Cadre Review
with a view to making it based on long-term approach to the
cadre has been under consideration of this Department. After
careful consideration of all relevant factors, it has now been
decided that the cadre review of Group „A‟ Central Services
shall be hold ordinarily at the interval of every five years.
3. All the Ministries/Departments are requested to bring the
above instructions to the notice of Cadre Controlling
Authorities under their administrative control, for information
and guidance."
3. The present petitions highlight a rather unfortunate state of affairs on
account of laxity of the Government in not holding Cadre Review for 25
years for Border Security Force. The mandate of the DoPT OM dated April
05, 1995 has been brazenly violated.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that non-creation of posts at
Commandant to Additional Director General level (which is the Command
level), with the growth of the Force has resulted in acute stagnation in
promotions and a Deputy Commandant earns a promotion after fifteen years.
The stagnation in the ministerial cadre is alleged to be from the lower rank
of Sub-Inspector onward. It is the case of the petitioners that extreme de-
motivation has sunk in the officers. While on one hand the span of control is
increasing, as the base is being made broader the burden is shifting on few
shoulders due to lack of adequate number of officers at the command level.
5. Not that the problem in the ministerial cadre is less, one finds that the
same in the combat battalions is more.
6. We firstly note the issues which necessitate an immediate cadre
review pertaining to the Group-A officers and thereafter would put in a
tabular form the data relevant to be discussed by the competent authority
concerning the ministerial staff.
7. The two petitions could have been simply disposed of issuing a
mandamus to the Government of India to carry out a cadre review in a time
bound manner, but it would be useful if we highlight certain salient points
requiring the same to be considered while taking the decision for the reason
it would help the Government in focusing on the issues.
8. Average age of Commandant in BSF is 49.2 years and maximum
officers are in the age bracket of 48 to 52 years. Younger age profile is the
need of the hour, especially in a Combatised Force with main role of
combat, operations, security, border guarding etc. If the age profile at the
level of Commandant is not lowered the combat abilities of the force would
be weakened and this would be detrimental to the security of the nation.
9. Border Security Force was created by an Act of the Parliament on
December 01, 1965 as an Armed Force of the Union, for the purpose of
Border Security and matters connected therewith.
10. The Boarder Security Force is deployed in various capacities. Even in
war time, it guards the border being the first line of defence, and during the
1971 war, its role was applauded by the then Prime Minister in following
words:-
"As the first line of our defence, the Border Security Force had
to bear the immediate brunt of the enemy onslaught. The
manner, in which they faced the fire and the support they gave
to the Army, had played a crucial role in our ultimate success."
11. 14 Battalions of BSF are deployed at the Line of Control under
Operational Control of the Indian Army dominating the high altitude and
mountainous terrain round the clock in freezing sub-zero temperature in the
Himalayas.
12. In the past few years BSF has been independently countering the
offensive firing and shelling from across the Line of Control in the Jammu
region in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, which probably is the most hostile
area in the Line of Control.
13. BSF is a unique Force, with diverse responsibilities and accordingly,
has been sanctioned various wings in the form of Air Wing, Artillery, Water
Wing, Marine Battalion and floating BOPs not held by any other Border
Guarding Force. BSF has also been entrusted with legal powers under
Cr.P.C., Customs Act, NDPS Act, Arms Act etc.
14. The officers of BSF spend most of their life in difficult and
inhospitable terrain along 6624 km of the border with Bangladesh and the
Line of Control with Pakistan.
15. The force operates in adverse climatic conditions with geographical
challenges of the terrain. The Western theatre extends from the Arabian Sea
to the never ending salt flats of Rann of Kutch and further to the mighty
Himalyas, marked by extremes of weather in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan to
snow wastelands of Pir Panjals in the Valley. In the Eastern theatre the
Force mans the vast expanse of Sunderban Deltas & Brahmputra River to
the world's largest rainfall zone of Meghalaya, and most cerebral malaria
prone thick Jungles of Tripura, Mizoram and Meghalaya in extremely hot,
moist and humid conditions.
16. Though fenced, the Western border faces graver challenges of
infiltration of foreign trained militants, smuggling of narcotics and
counterfeit currency.
17. Still partially unfenced, the Eastern border attracts large number of
illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. Border smuggling in cattle and essential
commodities, euphemistically called informal trade, is prevalent. Cases of
counterfeit currency and apprehension of jihadi elements have also taken
place in recent years in the Eastern theatre.
18. Almost 1/3rd of the Force, at any given time, remains committed on
duties other than Border Guarding, resulting into launching of reserves. And
the troops move from one Hard Area to another Hard Area like a Battalion
deployed on Line of Control after completion of its tenure moves to Tripura
from one end of the country to another with no peace deployment in
between to recoup and rejuvenate.
19. According to the petitioners the Force is working with literally No
Reserves. Even the Group of Ministers in their report on National Security
noted, vide Para 5.98:-
"5.98 The Reserve Battalion is a necessary component of the
overall strength of a Border Guarding Force and therefore,
should be sanctioned at the rate already approved by the
Committee of Secretaries in the case of the BSF. A number of
other measures also need to be taken with a view to improve the
capability and morale of the Border Guarding Forces, to deal
with their border responsibilities in an effective manner."
20. The role of BSF has impact on international relations of the country
like in the case of death of Felani, a 15 years old Bangladeshi girl, who got
tangled in barbed wire in early hours and was shot by BSF troops. This not
only drew ire of International Human Rights community but also damaged
the image of the force.
21. Few incidents in the past need to be highlighted for they bring out the
ailing problems in the command functioning of the force, and one would
have expected the Ministry of Home Affairs to do some introspection and
logical thinking.
(i) Boraibari Killings. There is still enormous confusion over what really
caused the worst flare-up on the Indo-Bangladesh border since the 1971 war.
It is an image that will haunt relations between India and Bangladesh for
years to come. The body of a slain Border Security Force jawan tied to a
pole and carried like an animal carcass. Accompanying it were the grisly
visuals of trussed up, mutilated and brutalized bodies of 15 other BSF
personnel including the Commanding officer killed in the Boraibari incident.
(ii) Samba Militants Infiltrations and Attacks. Notwithstanding the claim
of BSF that it foiled the infiltration bid and that over dozen terrorists had
retreated to Pakistan after firing 1,000 rounds from their weapons,
Intelligence Bureau has blamed the BSF for the sudden rise in infiltration on
International Border in Jammu.
(iii) Commandant & 2IC martyred in ANO. In 2012, in an incident in a
Left Wing Extremist Operations in Balimela, Orisha the Battalion lost its
Commandant and the Second-in-Command.
(iv) Suicidal / Fratricidal Incidents. The data of suicidal and fratricidal
incidents since the year 2010 indicates that there is a problem of proper
administrative, logistic and behavioral support mechanism. This is evident
from the following:-
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
(v) Growing disciplinary and Court case. A weak administrative grievance
redressal set up in any organization leads to growth in seeking respite from
Judiciary. The growing court cases of BSF on various issues is also
indicative of the same.
22. The span of control and responsibility of BSF Commanders has over
stretched, is the claim of the petitioners and this data provided by the
petitioners needs to be considered by the authority constituted to carry out
the cadre review. At present BSF has 124 Battalions guarding the borders
and 62 Battalions away from Border Guarding, which is causing undue
stress and strain on the ranks and file. The entire work of national security
at Indo-Pak Line of Control and Indo-Bangladesh border is on the shoulders
of a few. Lack of Cadre Review in 25 years has resulted in no post creation
at command levels. A cursory look in to the growth of BSF reveals that the
basic functional unit i.e. Battalion has been burdened with an additional
company from the existing 6 coy units raising the overall strength of a BSF
Battalion to 1210. Whereas, war time role of BSF stipulates its active
participation with the Army whose Battalions are on a 4 coy concept with a
strength of 800 (approximately). This aspect needs to be taken note of while
carrying out the exercise of cadre review for the reason the control of
command by a Commandant in BSF has increased. Likewise, it needs to
be considered whether at the Sector and Frontier level the control of
command is so structured that the command remains in control.
23. The data provided by the petitioners regarding the level of
responsibility at different levels in the Force is as below:-
S.No. Rank Appointments Level of Span of Control
Responsibility (Stregth)
Command Previous Present
1. AC Coy Comdr Company 137 137
2. DC Staff offr Battalion 1027 1210
3. 2IC Second-in-command Battalion 1027 1210
4. Comdt Battalion Comdr Battalion 1027 1210
5. DIG Sector Comdr 3-4 Battalions. 3500 5000
6. IG (a) FtrComdr, 3- 4 Sectors 12000 20000
(b) Head of TrgInstns,
(c) Head of the Dtes at
FHQ,
7. ADG Staff Officer and link 2-3 Dtes - -
between Dtes and DG
8. Spl DG Theatre Comdr 6-7 Frontiers - 1,20,000
24. We need not emphasise that the over stretched span of control of
every Commander adversely affects the operational, administrative and
logistics support system if designed to cater for 6 Service Coys per
battalion, 3 battalions per Sector and 3 Sectors per Frontier. The data
provided by the petitioners show that a number of BSF Battalions and
companies were raised due to national exigencies, but the corresponding
increase, either in the number of Frontiers and Sectors or in their level of
command was not catered for. Thus, the cadre review exercise must
consider the need to synchronize the need for post at the command level
and the above with the operational efficiency of the force. The case of the
petitioners is that a Sector should consist of only three battalions and a
Frontier should have only three Sectors under it. We are highlighting said
view projected by the petitioners, all of whom are senior officers and have
the experience of commanding the battalions, and their experience finding
reflection in their opinion needs to be considered by the Government.
25. The growth of any Force is expected to create career opportunities for
the officers and men, but the present scenario of officers stagnating in
particular ranks for years points to the opposite. It is apparent that mid-
term cadre restructuring is no alternative to a planned exercise of cadre
review, rather these knee-jerk reaction have created new dimensional
problem of career growth by creating ranks in the junior and lower mid-
level hierarchy of the force.
26. Another issue of the ageing profile of officers of the force at the
command level i.e. for the post of Commandant and above has also been
projected by the petitioners, as per data:-
Age of Officers Picking up Command (years)
Year Total
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57
2015 It is unlikely that any officer will pick up the rank of NIL
2016 Commandant due to non-accrual of vacancy. NIL
2019 4 3 3 4 8 4 2 2 1 31
27. The data would evince that presently, the officers in BSF are picking
up the rank of Commandant in the age bracket of 47 to 52 years and the
average age of picking up Command is 48 years. If the cadre review is not
done immediately the situation would deteriorate in the years to come. We
simply highlight that the commandants of the battalion of BSF lead their
troops in combats and officers of young age are expected to lead the
battalions because of the inhospitable terrain in which the force operates.
28. The petitioners have indicated the age profile of officers in the various
ranks above the post of Assistant Commandant till that of the Inspector
General of the Force as under:-
Age Number of officers in the grade of
Group(Years) ADG IG DIG Comdt 2IC DC AC
Below 25 - - - - - - -
25 to 29 - - - - - 1 263
Total - 13 159 308 305 1548 1157
29. If the pleadings of the writ petitioners are correct, the average age of
officers from the rank of Second-in-Command till the rank of Additional
Director General would be as under:-
AVERAGE AGE OF COMMANDERS
60 57.8
60 53.8
49.2
ADG IG DIG COMDT 2IC
30. Keeping in view the number of available posts currently, it emerges
from the data that all officers in the rank of commandant and Deputy
Inspector General, 97% officers in the rank of Second-in-Command, 68%
officers in the rank of Deputy Commandant and 81% officers in the rank of
Assistant Commandant would be attaining the eligibility to earn further
promotion in the next two years, but almost entire cadre would be
stagnating.
31. The petitioners have referred to the data provided on the website of
the Ministry of Home Affairs, showing the police force in the States
sharing the border with Bangladesh or the Line of Control with Pakistan,
and therefrom would require the said data to be considered while carrying
out the cadre review. The data would reveal that the bordering states have
many higher level posts for their growth. In all the bordering States the
Force level is between 4323 to 103857 men in comparison to 246963 of
BSF. These States have Additional Directors General ranging from 1 to 30,
as against only 4 in BSF. The data of the police personnel in the bordering
States would reveal that for every 18828 police personnel there is 1 officer
of the rank of Special Director General or Director General. But in BSF
for 82321 personnel there is only 1 officer of the rank of Director General.
The men to officers ratio, put in a graphic tabulation would be as under:-
32. Following the Kargil War, the Indian Army realized that one of the
basic problems was, the not so young profile of the officers at command
levels. Ajai Vikram Singh Committee (Extracts from 34th report of Standing
Committee on Defence) made the following recommendations on age
profile:-
Rank Existing Ages in Proposed Ages in
Year(Approx) Years(Approx)
Lt Col 38-39 34-35
Colonel 41-42 36-47
Brigadier 50-51 44-45
Major General 54-55 51-52
Lt General 56-57 55-56
33. It is expected that while carrying out the cadre review of BSF, similar
requirement of age profiling shall be taken into account.
34. It is pertinent to mention here that the Government has managed other
civil cadres very well. Timely cadre reviews of these cadres have ensured
good growth and creation of higher posts, thus meeting the career
aspirations of the men of the cadre. The creation of additional districts in
States by bi-furcating the existing districts is a living proof thereof.
35. Put in a pyramidal form, the complete organizational structure of BSF
as of today would be as under:-
1-ADG
13-IsG
130-DIsG
267-COs
273-2ICs
1515-DCs
1857-ACs
36. Just for the sake of comparison, it is expected that while carrying out
the cadre review it would be taken note of that as regards the administrative
services in India, the comparison with BSF shows huge imbalances as of
today. Whereas percentage of Higher Administrative Grade and above posts
in BSF is a meager 0.05% of the total strength of the organization in the
Indian Economic Service it is 5.46%, in the Indian Statistical Service it is
2.29% and in some State Civil cadres it ranges between 15.84% to 24.32%.
While carrying out the cadre review, the structural ratio in an organized
cadre as per DoPT instructions should be kept in view, and we do no more
other than lift the monograph from the website of DoPT. The structural
ratio for Group-A posts in a cadre advocated by DoPT is as follows:-
The Grades % as per Held by BSF The ideal
monograph requirement
HAG (ADG and above
GP 12000 and above)
Non Functional Grade
(GP 8700)
STS (Dy Comdts GP
6600)
Total 100 2254 2254
37. As per DoPT guidelines the ideal structure of a cadre should be as
under:-
HAG & above
SAG
NFSG
JAG
STS
38. The present cadre structure of BSF is as under:-
1-ADG
13-IsG
130-DIsG
267-COs
273-2ICs
1515-DCs
1857-ACs
39. We would emphasize that the writ petitioners of WP(C)
No.1611/2015 have prepared, what they feel should be the result of the
cadre review, and have given justification for the same. Thus we direct that
apart from the present order, the entire record of WP(C) No.1611/2015
should be placed before the Cadre Review Committee.
40. The writ petitioners of WP(C) No.3046/2015 have, put the data of the
ministerial cadre in a tabular form to highlight the inadequacy of the
ministerial cadre and other technical cadres to handle the growing work of
the organization. The cadre strength is as under:-
S.N Cadre Strength Entry Level Promotion avenues
available up to the
rank of
Technical Cadres
1 Communication 11,811 HC ADG
(RO/Fitter/Cipher),ASI
2 MT Workshops 1,840 Const ADG
3 Engineering 1,418 HC & SI Comdt
4 Air Wing 583 CT,HC,ASI,AC&DC IG
5 Water Wing 1,243 CT and SI 2IC
6 Law 31 LO Gde-II/DC CLO/IG
7 Medical 1,851 AC (MO) SDG (M)
8 Veterinary 114 AC (Vety) DIG (Vty)
9 Ministerial 5,355 LDC/ASI (Clerk) from AC(M)
1968 to 2005 and HC
(Min) from 2005
10 Stenographic 505 SI (Steno) from 1968 to AC (PS)
2005 and ASI (Steno)
from 2005
41. The said writ petitioners have put in a tabular data the growth of the
force since its establishment. The same would be as under:-
Year No. No. of No. of Trg STC Strength of force and Strength of Group-A
of SHQr FtrH Insttn s Min cadre Posts
Bns s Qrs s Str. of Str. of Min GD Min cadre
the force cadre and
%
1965 25.5 06 02 00 00 30,000 157 299 In 1968, in
(0.5%) order to
1966 44.5 07 03 04 00 41,430 258 734 maintain
(0.6%) discipline of
1967 52.5 11 03 04 00 49,178 258 834 the Force,
(0.6%) non
1968 68.5 11 03 04 00 63,238 258 994 secretarial
(0.6%) staff was
1969 73.5 11 03 04 00 67,638 278 1044 combatised
(0.4%) as per
1971 74 12 05 05 00 68,776 360 1120 orders of
(0.5%) GOI. A few
1972 75 14 05 05 00 70,000 360 1140 Group-'B'
(0.5%) posts at the
1973 77 14 05 05 00 79,227 509 1160 level of
(0.6%) AC(AO/SO
1980 79 16 06 05 00 80,394 509 1197 ) and
(0.6%) OS/SM
1983 84 17 07 05 00 90,606 509 1259 were
(0.6%) available
1984 85 17 07 05 00 91,626 509 1269 for Min
(0.6%) Cadre.
1986 90 18 07 05 08 1,00,188 3245 1909 As per RRS
(3.23%) 1985, 10%
1987 103 21 07 05 08 1,14,029 3248 2125 vacancies
(2.83%) out of 50%
1988 115 23 08 05 08 1,26,879 3311 2331 for
(2.6%) promotion
1989 127 26 08 05 08 1,39,695 3316 2532 to the rank
(2.37%) of AC(GD),
1990 147 26 08 05 09 1,60,844 3415 2840 there was a
(2.12%) unified
1994 156 28 08 05 09 1,83,914 3485 2989 Group-'A'
(1.89%) cadre in the
1996 157 28 08 05 09 1,84,941 3489 3004 BSF for
(1.88%) promotion
up to the
rank of IG
2001 160 28 08 05 09 1,88,012 3513 3049 00
(1.86%)
2003 157 39 10 05 09 2,10,261 3697 2948 00
(1.75%)
Year No. No. of No. of Trg STC
Strength of force and Strength of Group-A
of SHQr FtrH Insttn s Min cadre Posts
Bns s Qrs s Str. of Str. of Min GD Min cadre
the force cadre and
%
2005 157 39 10 05 09 2,10,261 3697 2948 67
(1.75%)
2009 157 42 11 05 09 2,19,560 4508 3295 72
(2.06%)
2010 164 42 12 05 09 2,28,798 4776 3419 74
(2.08%)
2011 171 43 13 05 11 2,40,650 5067 3566 77
(2.1%)
2012 173 44 13 05 11 2,43,442 5115 3605 78
(2.1%)
2013 176 46 13 05 11 2,46,959 5195 3667 85
(2.1%)
2014 180 46 13 05 11 2,52,059 5259 3731 85
(2.0%)
2015 186 46 13 05 11 2,56,876 5355 3827 85
(2.0%)
Total Sanctioned Strength including all other establishments 4098 85
42. The data provided by said writ petitioners would show that the
sanctioned strength of officers in the Ministerial and Technical cadres is
much below that in the General Duty cadre, and if one finds a severe
imbalance at the command level in the General Duty cadre, one need not
emphasize the gravity of the imbalance in the Technical and Ministerial
cadre. The submissions of the writ petitioners of WP(C) 3046/2015 may
briefly be summarized. They would be as under:-
I. Group-A posts of GD cadre are sanctioned for guarding
the international borders of the country being a non-technical
cadre. The GOI is incurring huge expenses on their initial
Basic training followed by training under Army and a number
of in service professional courses, however, only Asstt Comdt
(GD) officers are performing duties in the border areas and
once they are promoted to the rank of Dy Comdt and above,
they are shifted to perform functions of the Technical cadre of
the BSF without any proper technical training . Besides, GD
Cadre officers are also being pulled out from various other
establishments for performing the duties of Law officer-,
Communication, Motor and Transport, AIA, Water Wing, Air
Wing and Ministerial nature duties etc illegally and they
remain posted at various HQrs till their retirement.
II. At the time of raising of BSF, there was only one post of
Commandant, 01 Deputy Commandant and 08 Asst.
Commandants, which has now been increased to 01 Comdt, 01
2IC, 06 DCs and 07 ACs. Further, an additional 7th Coy has
also been added but the post of Inspector (Head Clerk) has not
been up-graded to the level of AC(Min) ,which is
disproportionate to the nature of duties as service records in
respect of all the serving personnel and retirees are being
maintained at the level of Batallions/Establishments in the BSF.
III. All the Office oriented and duties of administrative
nature in BSF and such posts like Quarter Master Duty in the
Bns, Joint Assistant Director (Adm)/(now substituted by DC
(Adm) in the Sector HQrs/other establishments and, DDO in all
the Bns, Sector HQrs, Frontier HQrs, Other Establishments
and at Force HQrs, New Delhi, which are meant for the Min
Cadre officers are presently usurped by the GD Cadre
Officers.
IV. In Sector HQrs, a post of 2IC had been additionally
sanctioned. In FtrHQrs, the post of Commandants has been
upgraded to the level of DIG and an additional posts of 01 2IC
and 02 DyComdts have been sanctioned. In the STCs, the post
of Commandant has been upgraded upto the level of DIG and
an additional post of 2IC, 02 posts of DyComdts and 02 posts of
ACs have been provided.
V. The authorization of Ministerial staff for Force HQrs at
New Delhi is un-changed since 1971 and all the functional
requirement of Ministerial nature and administrative and
Accounts and Drawing and disbursing Officers etc are being
manned by the GD Officers and men by posting them against
non-sanctioned post and un-authorized attachment from field
formations despite of serious audit objections by various audit
parties.
VI. As per the Recruitment Rules of 1985, General Duty
(GD) cadre, Ministerial (Min) Cadre and Communication
cadre were unified for promotion to the rank of Asstt Comdt
(GD) and above with an objective that the deployment on
ministerial nature job and to supervise communication stream
of the Force will be made by the competent authority on the
basis of their working back ground. Entry in
GD/Communication/ Min Group-„A‟ Cadre was from the post
of Assistant Commandant (AC) General Duty. A provision of
10% quota for promotion in GD cadre was made by GOI in
1985.
VII. In the year 1999, Recruitment Rules for different Group-
„A‟ cadres in BSF were framed and came into force. In
supersession of the BSF (Seniority, Promotion and
Superannuation of Officers) Rules 1978 and BSF (Assistant
Commandant) RRs 1985, separate RRs called the BSF (GD
Officers) RRs 2001 were notified on 28-06-2001. Since, the
seniority of Inspector (Communication) and Inspector (GD) is
unified, the representation of Communication cadre in Group-
„A‟ cadre in BSF (GD Officers) RRs 2001 was kept intact which
is a Technical and Non-Technical cadre respectively.
VIII. With regard to Min Cadre, the said provision of 10%
quota out of 50% vacancies for promotion to the rank of
AC(GD) was abolished in the RRs, 2001. Though, it was
decided to formulate a separate Min Staff Group „A‟ Cadre
for which initially 08 posts of DCs and 26 posts of ACs were
sanctioned vide MHA‟s order dated 31-08-2000 and further
augmentation in the strength of Group „A‟ posts was to be done
in overall cadre review. But neither 34 posts were made
functional nor further identification of Group-„A‟ posts for Min
Staff was done and the chapter was closed only by up gradation
of the existing posts of AC(SO), AC(AO), SM(OS) to the grade
of AC(Min) during restructuring in 2003. At present only those
posts which were up-graded within the ministerial cadre are
available for promotion to the rank of AC(Min).
IX. While the proposal for abolition of 10% quota of Min
Staff for promotion to the rank of AC(GD) was under
consideration, it was decided in Jan 1999 that promotional
avenue to be provided to Min Staff for promotion to Group-„A‟
post should be comparable to that of GD personnel. Further,
Shri L K Advani the then Hon‟ble Home Minister had approved
in F.No. 16/10/97-Pers/BSF on 02.06.2000 that there is a need
to have senior officers from Ministerial Cadre who man the
offices at the Force HQ, Sector HQ and Ftr HQrs level which
was finally approved by the Shri. Yashwant Sinha, Hon‟ble the
then Finance Minister.
X. As per norms for staff for Recruits Training Centres
(RTCs) for basic training of Constable (recruits) in the CAPFs,
one post of AC (Min)/AO has been agreed to by the MoF vide
their ID No. 78955/E.I/Coord.I/2013 dated 09.07.2013, which
is yet to be sanctioned for existing STCs in the BSF, where
various in service courses are also being run in addition to
basic training of Constables and other direct recruits but not
implemented in BSF till date.
XI. One post of AC(Min) has been sanctioned for the BSF
NDRF Bns for Administrative as well as Drawing and
Disbursing Officer (DDO)duty whereas, for the BSF Field Bns
no Gazetted Post in the Min Cadre has been sanctioned
proportionate to the increased work load. It is the Min staff
who performs the duties of Cashier, Accountant, Senior
Accountant and Accounts Officer, therefore, the duties of DDOs
to supervise Accounts Section in the Bns/Estts should be
assigned to the officers of Min Cadre for effective supervision
instead of getting done it by the GD cadre as being done in the
BSF.
43. While carrying out the cadre review exercise the Committee concern
would consider the data provided by the writ petitioners of WP(C)
No.3046/2015 and would consider the submissions made by them.
44. Since the respondents have not denied their responsibility to carry out
a cadre review in BSF we dispose of the two writ petitions directing that the
cadre review exercise should be completed within the next six months,
because time is running out and the issues raised in various writ petitions
before us concerning BSF show an extreme level of frustration in the
enrolled and appointed members of the force, which is not good for the
security of the country. We further direct that while carrying out the cadre
review the salient features of the requirement of the force as is brought out
by the writ petitioners, which finds a reflection in our present decision,
would be duly considered by the Committee appointed and the two writ
petitions would be treated as a representation to the said Committee.
45. We have endeavoured to pen profile the problem brought to our
notice by the petitioners so that while carrying out the cadre review the
Committee can focus on the problems, and we would expect reasons to be
given by the Committee if the suggestions put forth by the petitioners are not
to be accepted.
46. No costs.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
JUDGE
(PRATIBHA RANI)
JUDGE
APRIL 22, 2015
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