Delhi High Court
Ranjit Singh Kothari vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr. on 20 April, 2015
Author: Sunil Gaur
$~14 & 17
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: April 20, 2015
+ CRL.M.C.4198/2013 & CRL.M.A.NO.14994/2013
RANJIT SINGH KOTHARI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Suraj Prakash & Mr. Ayan
Bhattacharya, Advocates
versus
STATE & ANR. .... Respondents
Through: Ms. Nishi Jain, Additional Public
Prosecutor for respondent-State
Mr. Sanjeev Narula & Ms. Meha
Rashmi, Advocates for Respondent
No.2
+ CRL.M.C.2608/2014 & CRL.M.A.NO.8744/2014
RANJIT SINGH KOTHARI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Suraj Prakash & Mr. Ayan
Bhattacharya, Advocates
versus
THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .... Respondents
Through: Ms. Nishi Jain, Additional Public
Prosecutor for respondent-State
Mr. Sanjeev Narula & Ms. Meha
Rashmi, Advocates for Respondent
No.2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
JUDGMENT
% (ORAL)
Crl.M.C.Nos.4198/2013 & 2608/2014 Page 1
In the above-captioned two petitions, quashing of two complaints
under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 pertaining to
cheque amount of Rupees Fifty Six crores and Rupees Twenty One crores
odd respectively is sought on the ground that petitioner, who is accused
No.3 in these complaint cases, had resigned on 11th April, 2011 and the
cheques in question were dishonoured thereafter and so, continuance of
proceedings arising out of these two complaints is an abuse of process of
the Court.
Since quashing of two complaints is sought on identical grounds,
therefore, both the petitions were heard together and are being disposed
of by this common judgment.
At the hearing, learning counsel for petitioner had submitted that
resignation of petitioner from accused company has been accepted with
effect from 11th April, 2011 and so there is no justification to continue the
proceedings in the complaint cases in question against petitioner.
Learned counsel for petitioner had submitted that there are no averments
against petitioner to justify his prosecution in the complaints in question.
Aforesaid stand taken by learned counsel for petitioner is seriously
disputed by learned counsel for second respondent, who has placed
reliance upon decisions in Munish Soni v. Ravinder Kumar Jain 195
(2012) DLT 489, Nipam Kotwal & Ors. v. Dominos Printech India Pvt.
Ltd. 146 (2008) DLT 747 Ishan Systems Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Vijaya Bank
177 (2011) DLT 589, Ramaswamy Athappan & Anr. v. Bharti Infotel Ltd.
148 (2008) DLT 79, K.P.G.Nair v. State & Ors. 2008 (101) DRJ 704,
O.P.Aggarwal v. State & Ors. 2009 (108) DRJ 494, Suhas Bhand v. State
of Maharashtra & Anr. 1 (2010) BC 207 (DB), Sriprakash Jain v. Brijesh
Crl.M.C.Nos.4198/2013 & 2608/2014 Page 2
Arya & Anr. 2012 Law Suit (Del) 526, Rallis India Limited v. Poduru
Vidya Bhushan & Ors. (2011) 13 SCC 88 and N. Rangachari v. Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 108 to submit that liability under
Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, begins with the date of
issuance of cheque and not on the date of its dishonour and even if
petitioner had resigned before dishonor of cheque still he cannot escape
from his liability as he was in accused company on the date of issuance of
cheque in question.
After hearing both the sides and on perusal of complaints in
question, material on record and the decisions cited, I find that there are
averments against petitioner in the complaints in question and whether
accused company was aware of dishonor of cheque is a question of fact,
which cannot be pre-determined at this initial stage. During the course of
hearing, it was brought to the notice of this Court that Notice under
Section 251 Cr.P.C. has already been framed against petitioner and the
case is at the evidence stage.
In view of the averments made in the complaints in question, this
Court finds that petitioner's plea of his resigning prior to dishonor of
cheque is a question of fact, which is required to be determined at trial
and not in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan (2012) 4
SCC 547 has reiterated that inherent powers of this Court are to be
exercised in exceptional cases. On this aspect pertinent observations of
the Apex Court in Ujjal Kumar (supra) are as under: -
"It is true that the inherent powers vested in the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide.
Crl.M.C.Nos.4198/2013 & 2608/2014 Page 3
Nevertheless, inherent powers do not confer arbitrary
jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whims
or caprice. This extraordinary power has to be exercised
sparingly with circumspection and as far as possible, for
extraordinary cases, where allegations in the complaint or
the first information report, taken on its face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
alleged. It needs little emphasis that unless a case of gross
abuse of power is made out against those in charge of
investigation, the High Court should be loath to interfere
at the early/premature stage of investigation."
Applying the afore-noted dictum to the instant case, both these
petitions are disposed of while refraining to quash the complaints in
question but with liberty to petitioner to urge the pleas taken herein
before the trial court at the final hearing.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
APRIL 20, 2015
vn
Crl.M.C.Nos.4198/2013 & 2608/2014 Page 4
