Delhi High Court
Shri Om Prakash Sharma vs Bank Of India And Anr. on 16 April, 2015
Author: Valmiki J. Mehta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) No. 4080/2007
% 16th April, 2015
SHRI OM PRAKASH SHARMA ..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Shiparna Chatterjee, Advocate.
Versus
BANK OF INDIA AND ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. B.K. Misra, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, petitioner impugns the order of the respondents/Bank dated
14.6.1984 whereby petitioner was removed from service. Petitioner was
charge-sheeted for the facts that with respect to accounts of over a dozen of
customers he received amounts in cash but he did not deposit the amounts of
the cash in the Bank. Disciplinary proceedings commenced against the
petitioner vide the charge-sheet dated 1.6.1983 and culminated in the order
of the Disciplinary Authority dated 4.5.1984 and which is sought to be
impugned in the present petition.
2. The present petition has been filed on 18.5.2007 i.e after around
23 years of the impugned order having been passed on 14.6.1984 and
therefore the petition is clearly barred by the doctrine of delay and laches
and the principle of limitation and which aspects have been explained by the
Supreme Court recently in its judgment in the case of State of Orissa and
Anr. Vs. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC 436 and the relevant paras in this
regard read as under:-
"52. In the very first appeal, the respondent filed Writ Petition on
11-11-2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated 6-10-1989
w.e.f. 1-1-1986 without furnishing any explanation for such
inordinate delay and on laches on her part. Section 3 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, makes it obligatory on the part of the court to
dismiss the Suit or appeal if made after the prescribed period even
though the limitation is not set up as a defence and there is no plea to
raise the issue of limitation even at appellate stage because in some
of the cases it may go to the root of the matter. (See Lachhmi Sewak
Sahu v. Ram Rup Sahu: AIR 1994 PC 24 and Kamlesh
Babu v. Lajpat Rai Sharma: (2008) 12 SCC 577.)
53. Needless to say that Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in writ
jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on
public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ
petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and
laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay scale may give
rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the petition
may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the court
may refuse to grant relief for the initial period in case of an
unexplained and inordinate delay. In the instant case, the Respondent
claimed the relief from 1-1-1986 by filing a petition on 11-11-2005
but the High Court for some unexplained reason granted the relief
w.e.f. 1-6-1984, though even the Notification dated 6-10-1989 makes
it applicable w.e.f. 1-1-1986.
54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition
should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the
petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief
granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a
proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up
from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases
where some diligent person had approached the Court within a
reasonable time. (See Rup Diamonds v. Union of India: (1989) 2
SCC 356, State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya: (1996) 6 SCC 267
and Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana: (1997) 6 SCC 538.)"
(underlining added)
3. No doubt, against the petitioner the criminal cases were
dismissed but, the same was basically because of lack of evidence in one
case or that there was no entitlement to prosecute the petitioner as a public
servant in another case, however, law is well settled that departmental
proceedings and criminal case proceedings operate parallely and
simultaneously and that even exoneration of a charge-sheeted official in the
criminal case will not lead to exoneration in the departmental proceedings.
Therefore, petitioner had necessarily to challenge the dismissal order of the
Bank dated 14.6.1984 within the period of limitation, and which has not
been done, and since the delay and laches in this case is of as many as 23
years the writ petition is not maintainable.
4. In view of the above, I have no option but to dismiss the
petition on the ground of delay and laches. No costs.
APRIL 16, 2015/Ne VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
