Dev Pratap Singh vs Union Of India & Ors.
2015 Latest Caselaw 2965 Del

$~43
        THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                                       Judgment delivered on: 15.04.2015

+       W.P.(C) 6364/2014 & CM 15343/2014


DEV PRATAP SINGH                                          ... Petitioner
                                         versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                                 ...       Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:-
For the Petitioner              : Mr Ateev Mathur with Ms Richa Oberoi
For the Respondent No.2         : Mr Yeeshu Jain with Mr Siddharth Panda and
                                  Ms Jyoti Tyagi
For the Respondent No.3         : Mr Pawan Mathur with Mr Himanshu Gupta

CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

                                JUDGMENT

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)

1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner seeks the benefit of Section

24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to

as the "2013 Act") which came into effect on 01.01.2014. The petitioner,

consequently, seeks a declaration that the acquisition proceeding initiated under

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "1894 Act") and

in respect of which Award No. 15/1987-88 dated 05.06.1987 was made, inter

alia, in respect of the petitioner's land, comprised in Khasra Nos. 1803/1 (0-

16), 1803/2 (3-0), 1808 (4-16), 1809/2 (3-08), 1800/2 (1-02), 1800/3 (1-02) and

1800 (0-04), measuring 14 bighas and 8 biswas in all, in village Chattarpur

shall be deemed to have lapsed.

3. In this case, it has been admitted by the concerned Land Acquisition

Collector that physical possession of the subject land has not been taken. It is,

however, contended that compensation was deposited in Court in CM (Main)

No.1411/2013 on 30.12.2013 pursuant to an order passed by this Court in the

said matter. Insofar as the question of deposit in Court is concerned, the same

has already been considered by us in Gyanender Singh v Union of India &

Ors: W.P.(C) 1393/2014 decided on 23.09.2014 wherein this Court held that

unless and until the compensation is tendered to the persons interested, mere

depositing of the compensation in court would not be sufficient and cannot be

regarded as having been paid. Therefore, following the decision in Gyanender

Singh (supra), the deposit in Court cannot, in this case be, regarded as

compensation having been paid to the petitioner.

4. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the second

proviso to Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, which has been introduced by virtue of

the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (hereinafter

referred to as the "said Ordinance"). The newly added proviso reads as under:-

"Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded."

(underlining added)

5. On a plain reading of the proviso, it is evident that its purpose is to

compute the period of five years referred to in Section24(2) of the 2013 Act.

Certain periods are to be excluded in computing the said period referred to in

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The periods to be excluded are:-

(1) the period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court; or (2) the period specified in the Award of a Tribunal for taking possession; or (3) such period where possession has been taken but the compensation is lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose.

6. The learned counsel for the respondents are relying on the third

alternative inasmuch as it has been contended that the amount of compensation

has been deposited in court. Consequently, it is urged that the entire period

during which this amount was lying deposited in court ought to be excluded.

But, that would be of no help to the respondents inasmuch as the amount was

deposited in court on 30.12.2013 and the Act of 2013 came into force on

01.01.2014, just one day later. Therefore, the only benefit, even if it is

assumed for the sake of argument that such benefit can be given to the

respondents, would be of one day. The award was passed way back in 1987

and, therefore, the exclusion of one day would not be of any use to the

respondents.

7. In any event, the question of compensation lying deposited in court

would only arise in a case where possession had been taken. In the present

case, admittedly, the possession has not been taken. This being the situation,

the newly inserted proviso has no application. We agree with the submission

made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that unless and until possession

is taken, the third alternative mentioned in the second proviso does not get

triggered even though compensation may be lying deposited in a court or in

any designated account maintained for such purposes.

8. Furthermore, the second proviso to Section 24(2) is similar to the

proviso introduced by the 2014 Ordinance which has been held to be

prospective by virtue of the Supreme Court decision in M/s Radiance Fincap

(P) & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. decided on 12.01.2015 in Civil Appeal

No.4283/2011 and Karnail Kaur & Ors. Vs. State Of Punjab & Ors. decided

on 22.01.2015 in Civil Appeal no.7424 of 2013. The rights vested in the

petitioner as on 01.01.2014 by virtue of the 2013 Act have not been taken away

by virtue of the introduction of the second proviso to Section 24(2) of the said

Ordinance.

9. That being the position, the question of payment of compensation will

have to be construed in the light of the various decisions rendered by the

Supreme Court and this Court in:-

(i) Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors: (2014) 3 SCC 183;

(ii) Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC 564;

(iii) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014; and

(iv) Surender Singh v. Union of India and Ors.: W.P.(C) 2294/2014 decided 12.09.2014 by this Court.

In Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), it has been held that unless and until

the compensation was tendered to the persons interested, mere deposit of the

compensation amount in a court would not amount to payment of

compensation. This aspect has also been considered in Gyanender Singh &

Others v. Union Of India & Others: WP (C) 1393/2014 decided by a Division

Bench of this Court on 23.09.2014. The same would be the position in respect

of a deposit in "any designated account maintained for this purpose".

Consequently, the mere deposit in the court, without being offered or tendered

to the persons entitled would not ipso facto amount to payment of

compensation.

10. As such, in the present case, neither physical possession of the subject

land has been taken nor has any compensation been paid to the petitioner. The

Award was made more than five years prior to the coming into force of the

2013 Act. No period is liable to be excluded inasmuch as the second proviso,

which has been newly inserted by virtue of the said Ordinance, is not

applicable, as indicated above.

11. As a result, the petitioner is entitled to a declaration that the said

acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act in respect of the subject

lands are deemed to have lapsed. It is so declared.

12. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no

order as to costs.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J

April 15, 2015 dutt