Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 2904 Del
Judgement Date : 13 April, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 505/1999
Reserved on: 21st January, 2015
% Date of Decision: 13th April, 2015
KAMLESH KUMAR AND OTHERS ....Appellants
Through Mr. M.L. Yadav, Advocate.
Versus
STATE OF DELHI ...Respondent
Through Mr. Varun Goswami, APP along with
Inspector Ram Niwas, P.S. Roop Nagar.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
By a common judgment dated 10th September, 1999, the appellants-
Kamlesh Kumar, husband of the deceased Neeta; his brother Kishore
Kumar and his sister-in-law Manisha have been convicted for offences
under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, for
short). By order on sentence dated 16th September, 1999, the appellants
have been sentenced to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.50,000/- each
for the offence under Section 304B IPC. In default of payment of fine,
they have to undergo Simple Imprisonment for three years. For the offence
punishable under Section 498A IPC, the appellants have been sentenced to
undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of
Rs.5,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, they would undergo
further Simple Imprisonment for six months each. The sentences, it is
directed, are to run concurrently and benefit of Section 428 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC, for short) has been granted.
2. The impugned judgment and order on sentence had also convicted
and sentenced Ujjam Ven, mother of the appellant-Kamlesh Kumar.
However, Ujjam Ven died during the pendency of the present appeal and in
terms of order dated 18th February, 2005, the appeal preferred by her stands
abated.
3. On the question of marriage of the deceased-Neeta with the
appellant-Kamlesh Kumar, we have evidence of Mannu Bhai (PW-1) that
the two had been married in October, 1994. According to Bharat Bhai‟s
(PW-2) deposition, the deceased Neeta had been married to the appellant-
accused Kamlesh since December, 1994. Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10) has
categorically deposed that the appellant-Kamlesh Kumar had got married
to Neeta on 13th December, 1994. He testified that deceased Neeta was the
daughter of his Bua, i.e. father‟s sister. We are inclined to accept the
testimony of PW-10 as to the date of marriage. Appellant-Kamlesh Kumar
in his statement recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C. has accepted that he
got married to Neeta on 13th December, 1994. Thereafter, she started
residing in her matrimonial home. However, appellant Kamlesh had
claimed that the other three accused, i.e., Ujjam Ven (since deceased),
Kishore Kumar and Manisha were residing in a separate house in Nand
Nagri. We shall examine the veracity of the said claim at a later stage.
4. On the question of unnatural death of Neeta on 6th June, 1995, we
have the testimony of Mannu Bhai (PW-1), to the effect that after about six
months of marriage of his daughter to the appellant Kamlesh (PW-1), he
came to know that Neeta had suffered burn injuries. Thereupon, he came to
Delhi and went to the police station to make enquiries. Retired SI V.P.
Singh (PW-8) has deposed that in the intervening night of 5th/6th June, 1995
he was posted as Incharge of Crime Cell, ISBT, Delhi, and past midnight
he had received a call regarding a burn case. On getting the said
information, he went to House No. 21/39, Shakti Nagar, Delhi and after
inspection he prepared a detailed report, marked Exhibit PW-8/A. At the
situs of the crime, PW-8 found out that the floor had been washed clean
before he had visited the spot. Vinod Kumar Gupta (PW-11), a neighbour,
who was previously residing in House No. 21/39, Shakti Nagar, has
testified that in the month of June, 1995 he was present in the house and at
night he had seen the appellants Kamlesh Kumar, Ujjam Ven (since
deceased) and Manisha sitting on a cot on the terrace. In the meanwhile,
PW-11 heard screams from the portion of the house under occupation of
Kamlesh and immediately rushed downstairs. He saw Neeta burning in the
miyani. Appellant- accused Kishore was not present there and others who
had gathered there, poured water to douse the fire. Neeta was immediately
taken to the hospital in a car. Constable Rajbir Singh (PW-12) has deposed
that around 11.10 P.M. on 5th June, 1995, he had received a call informing
him that a woman in House No. 21/39, Shakti Nagar, Delhi, had suffered
from burn injuries. On reaching the spot, he found that the floor had been
cleaned with water. Some pieces of burnt clothes were found lying there,
which were lifted and sealed. Some burnt rags were also lifted from the
drain near the house and taken into possession vide seizure memo, marked
Exhibit PW-12/A. This statement of PW12 Constable Rajbir Singh
corroborates the statement of PW-8 SI VP Singh. SI Shiv Nath (PW-17)
had deposed that DD No. 34A was marked to him for necessary action and
thereafter he along with a constable had gone to Hindu Rao Hospital and
collected the MLC of Neeta, aged about 22 years. The MLC, marked
Exhibit PW- 15/A, mentions that Neeta was brought to the said hospital at
10.30 P.M. on 5th June, 1995, with alleged history of „burn by self‟. As per
the MLC, Neeta had sustained 75- 80% burns on her body and was
declared medically unfit for statement. The MLC of Neeta was proved by
K.V. Singh (PW-15), Medical Record Clerk, Hindu Rao Hospital, who had
testified that he was working as a Record Clerk for the last ten years and
had seen Dr. Veer Singh signing and writing. He was conversant with the
writing of Dr. Veer Singh and he could identify the same. He further
deposed that Dr. Veer Singh had left the hospital three years back in 1996
(PW- 15‟s testimony was recorded on 13th May, 1999). She was referred
to RML Hospital, but since they refused to admit her, she was subsequently
admitted to Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narayan Hospital. On 7th June, 1995
she succumbed to her injuries in the hospital. All the while, when Neeta
was in the hospital, she was declared medically unfit to make a statement.
Post-mortem of the deceased-Neeta was conducted by Dr. S.B. Singh (PW-
13) on 9th June, 1995 at about 11.30 A.M. The patient had dermo-
epidermal burn injuries all over the body, except front and back of the
outer half of the right thigh and buttock; soles of both feet; both axillae and
perineal area; back of the right side chest; back of the abdomen and upper
2/3rd part of both buttocks. Skin had peeled off at most of the places,
exposing red and white base. Hairs of scalp, eye lashes, eye brows had
been burnt and singed. Blackening of skin was to be seen at most places
due to depositions of soot due to unburnt carbon particles. Burns extended
to 75% to 80% of the total surface area of the body. On internal
examination, it was found that soot was also present in the trachea and all
organs were congested. PW-13, Dr. S. B. Singh opined that the cause of
death was burn shock and toxemia consequent upon burn injuries. In his
opinion, the injuries were ante-mortem and were about two days old. All
injuries were caused due to burns by fire. He proved the detailed post-
mortem report, marked Exhibit PW-13/A, by deposing that it was in his
writing and was duly signed by him.
5. Having thus dealt with the question of the deceased victim‟s
marriage to the appellant Kamlesh and the unnatural death of the victim, it
would now be apposite to deal with the questions of pivotal significance
i.e. whether the deceased Neeta was subjected to harassment and cruelty by
the appellants or some of them and whether the same was in connection
with demand for dowry, so as to bring it under the ambit of Section 304B,
IPC. The offence under Section 498A is broader and wider in its scope and
ambit as it includes cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relatives,
on account of dowry or even otherwise. Two contentions have been raised
by the appellants before us. Firstly, the appellants aver that the deceased-
Neeta was never subjected to any cruelty and harassment on account of
dowry or otherwise. Secondly, they allege that the prosecution has not
been able to adduce concrete evidence to show that any such dowry
demand was made soon before the victim‟s death. The defence counsel
also challenged the prosecution version on the ground that the main
witnesses in the case i.e. Mannu Bhai (PW-1), the father of the deceased
and Bharat Bhai, (PW-2) had turned hostile and had not endorsed the
prosecution‟s story.
6. The trial court has arrived at the conclusion that Mannu Bhai (PW-
1), the father of the deceased, had been won over by the appellants. The
Trial court has arrived at a similar finding in respect of Bharat Bhai (PW-
2), a neighbour, who used to reside in House No. 21/34, Shakti Nagar,
Delhi at the relevant time. It is to be noted that the FIR in the present case
i.e. FIR No. 151/ 1995, marked Exhibit PW-1/ A was registered on the
statement of Mannu Bhai (PW-1), duly signed by him. This was accepted
by PW-1 in his examination-in-chief. Perusal of PW1‟s Court testimony
reflects that he has prevaricated on several material points. At one point,
PW-1 asserted that his statement was recorded at the police station, but
later resiled to state that his statement was recorded by the SDM in Tis
Hazari Courts. On cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor for the
State, Mannu Bhai (PW-1) has voluntarily stated that he was forced to
make the statement to the SDM by his relatives. On cross-examination by
the defence counsel, he endorsed the defence version that the deceased
Neeta was living happily with her in- laws. PW-1 deposed that Neeta had
written letters to him in which she said that she was leading a happy
conjugal life. He accepted the defence version by stating that his daughter
was unhappy on account of her inability to conceive and not on account of
any mal-treatment by her in- laws or for failure to bring dowry. On the
contrary, testimonies of Arvind (PW-3) and Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10) as
noticed below are contrastingly different and implicate the appellants. On
bare perusal of the statement made by PW-1 Mannu Bhai to the SDM,
Exhibit PW-1/A, it can be seen that PW 1 had at that time asserted that his
daughter had complained of harassment meted out to her by her in-laws to
procure dowry. He acknowledged receiving a letter from Neeta, where she
had mentioned that she was fed up on account of such harassment in her
matrimonial house. On appraising the statements of PW1, we realise that
there are glaring contradictions in his statements; Exhibit PW 1/A and the
court deposition. Arvind, PW-3 has deposed that he had been residing in
House No. 21/44, Shakti Nagar, Delhi for six years and had known the
appellants and the deceased Neeta. He was aware of the fact that the
appellant Kamlesh Kumar had married Neeta, the deceased, in 1994.
Arvind was a tailor by profession and the deceased-Neeta used to help him
by stitching blouses. She used to collect cloth from his shop and stitch
blouses at her home. She had on several occasions told him about the
harassment, she suffered at the hands of her mother-in-law Ujjam Ven
(since deceased) and brother-in-law Kishore Kumar. She was tortured and
tormented by her in-laws for bringing insufficient dowry. She was denied
right to visit her parental home. The deceased Neeta had told PW-3 that
her mother-in-law and brother-in-law used to demand money from her and
would forcibly take away the money she earned from stitching. These
facts had been divulged by Neeta on a visit to the house of PW-3, about
two months prior to her death. In the cross-examination, Arvind (PW-3)
was equally assertive. He has stated that his shop was at a short distance
from the house of the appellant and it was barely a five minutes walk. He
was familiar with and knew the appellants. The appellants were three
brothers and were tailors. They were his biradri bhais. He had joined in
the investigation of the case and his statement was recorded by the SDM.
7. Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10) was equally forthright and testified that he
was working as a tailor in Delhi with one Bharat Bhai during the relevant
period, before he shifted to his village. He used to visit the matrimonial
home of Neeta occasionally and he also had opportunities and occasion to
meet her either in the house of Bharat Bhai, his employer, or in the house
of one Arvind, who was also from Gujarat. Neeta used to also stitch
clothes for Bharat Bhai. Neeta would complain about her in-laws, i.e.,
mother-in-law, husband, brother-in-law and sister-in-law, who were
harassing her to procure more dowry from her paternal home. PW- 10
Kamlesh has deposed that Neeta had once asked for Rs.5000/- from him to
be paid to her in-laws, but he was unable to arrange the amount. This
request for money was made at about 3-4 P.M. when he was on his way to
his shop, about two months prior to her death. In his examination-in-chief,
PW-10 Kamlesh Kumar had asserted that Neeta after hearing of his
inability to arrange Rs. 5,000, had asked PW-10 to speak to her father. She
had requested PW-10 to arrange and get the money for her father. Neeta
was maltreated in her matrimonial home and was constantly vilified for
dowry. This led to frequent quarrels. PW-10 Kamlesh came to know
about the occurrence on 6th June, 1995 and thereafter he immediately went
to the hospital. Neeta was alive at that time but could not speak because
her condition was very precarious. She had sustained serious and extensive
burn injuries. In his cross-examination, Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10) deposed
that he knew the appellant Kamlesh Kumar even before his marriage to
Neeta, as he used to visit his house. He belonged to their biradri.
8. The counsel for the appellants has tried to assail the testimony of
Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10) and Arvind Kumar (PW-3) as not credible and
trustworthy. According to the defence, their testimonies ought to be
rejected and disbelieved. However, in our considered opinion, there was
no reason or cause for PW-3 and PW-10 to falsely implicate the appellants
and make false allegations against them. They certainly knew the
appellants and also the deceased. The fact that they were tailors is crystal
clear. It is also an accepted position that the appellants Kishore Kumar,
Kamlesh Kumar and the third brother Rajesh were also tailors. PW-3 and
PW-10 were perturbed on coming to know about the burn injuries suffered
by Neeta on 6th June, 1995. PW-10 had visited both the hospital and the
house, i.e., the matrimonial home of the deceased-Neeta. The deposition of
PW- 10 Kamlesh and PW-3 Arvind inspires confidence and is a genuine
narration of the real and true state of affairs in the deceased victim‟s
conjugal home. The contention of the defence on this account therefore
fails and is rejected.
9. The appellants have also placed reliance on the testimony of Vinod
Kumar Gupta (PW-11), who was a neighbour of the appellants and the
deceased at the time of the occurrence to undermine the credibility of PW-
10‟s and Pw-3‟s depositions. PW-11 had deposed that he previously lived
as a tenant in House No. 21/39, Shakti Nagar, Delhi from 14th August,
1994 till October, 1997. On 5th June, 1995, he had come to the roof of his
tenanted premises in order to sleep, when he noticed that appellants-
Kamlesh Kumar, Manisha and Ujjam Ven (since deceased) and a female
child were sitting on a cot. He had exchanged courtesy with them, but
soon thereafter heard a scream and rushed downstairs. Son of the landlord
had also come there by that time and they saw Neeta burning in the attic
(miyani). The appellants except the appellant Kishore Kumar were present
there and they started pouring water to douse the fire. Neeta was then
taken to the Hindu Rao Hospital in the car of a third person. In the cross-
examination, Vinod Kumar Gupta (PW-11) had deposed that Neeta as
observed by him, was happily living with her in-laws. We do not however
think that the aforesaid testimony of Vinod Kumar Gupta (PW11) reflects
or shows that the depositions of Arvind (PW-3) and Kamlesh Kumar (PW-
10) were false and make belief. The deceased got married six months prior
to the date of occurrence and was living in her matrimonial home. Quite
naturally, it would have taken time to adjust in a new setup and to open up
with unknown persons. At the same time, we also have evidence that the
deceased Neeta was doing tailoring work and in that connection she had
interaction with Arvind (PW-3) and Kamlesh Kumar (PW- 10), who were
also tailors by profession and belonged to her native place in Gujarat. We
need to be cognizant of human psychology and realise that commonality of
profession and native place reflect bonds of affinity between the deceased
Neeta and PW-3 and PW-10 and so she had opened up to them and spoken
about her ill-treatment in her matrimonial home. The deceased Neeta
might not have developed the same kind of empathy with Vinod Kumar
Gupta (PW-11) to speak to him. Thus, the factum that the deceased Neeta
had not spoken to Vinod Kumar Gupta (PW-11), who was a neighbour and
a stranger to her, does not in any way dent the prosecution version or even
create an iota of doubt regarding the testimonies of Arvind (PW-3) and
Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10).
10. Another issue or contention raised by the defence relates to the
satisfaction of the condition "soon before" postulated under Section 304B,
IPC. The defence counsel has argued that for Section 304B to apply, the
prosecution has to first show that „soon before the death‟ the deceased was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative, for or in
connection with any demand of dowry. The defence submitted that in the
instant case, the prosecution has failed to adduce any evidence to show that
soon before the unnatural death of Neeta, she was subjected to harassment
or cruelty on account of or in connection with demand of dowry. We are
however satisfied that in the present case the prosecution has successfully
discharged the preliminary and primary burden placed on it. Indisputably,
the unnatural death had occurred within six months of marriage. Arvind
(PW-3) and Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10) had deposed about the pitiable
condition of the deceased and her tribulations in her matrimonial home on
account of her failure to bring dowry, which ultimately culminated in her
death by way of burning.
11. To articulate and understand the meaning of the expression "soon
before" and whether the said condition is satisfied in the case at hand, we
would like to examine the case law on the said subject. In Sunil Bajaj
versus State of M.P., (2001) 9 SCC 417, referring to the aforesaid
ingredient/condition of Section 304B, it was observed that conviction for
an offence can be on the basis of evidence, which may be either direct or
circumstantial or both. In the facts of the said case, it was held that there
was no evidence of demand of dowry or the deceased being subjected to
cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry. The marriage in that
case had taken place in 1991 and the death had taken place in 1995. The
Court had relied upon written communications and other factors while
ruling out the applicability of Section 304B, IPC.
12. In Hira Lal and Others versus State (Government of NCT), Delhi,
AIR 2003 SC 2865 reference was made to Section 113B of the Evidence
Act, 1872, which reads as under:-
"[113B. Presumption as to dowry death-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code."
Adverting to the 21st Report of the Law Commission of India on
Dowry Deaths and Law Reforms, it was observed that Section 113B,
Evidence Act, raises a presumption in law when an accused is tried under
Section 304B, IPC. When death occurs otherwise than under natural
circumstances and where the victim had been subjected to cruelty or
harassment prior to her death in connection with demand of dowry, it
would be viewed as a case of dowry death. Referring to the question of
what constitutes "soon before", the Supreme Court elucidated that this was
a relative term and interpretation of the same would depend upon the
factual matrix of each case. No strait jacket formula should be applied or a
ritualistic, mechanical interpretation resorted to while construing the said
aspect. The proximity test, as prescribed by the Supreme Court in a catena
of cases, does not specify a definite period and determination of the said
period is to be left to be determined by the courts depending upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. Suffice, it was indicated that the
expression "soon before" would normally imply that the intervening period
between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question
should not be unduly long so as to break the connect between the two. If
the alleged incident of cruelty is so remote in time and has become stale, so
as to not disturb the mental equilibrium of the victim concerned, it would
be of no consequence. Otherwise, the requirement of "soon before" is
satisfied. A similar view was expressed in Kaliyaperumal and Another
versus State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 9 SCC 157.
13. In Sudhakar versus State of Maharasthra, (2000) 6 SCC 671, the
Supreme Court while referring to a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in
Protima Dutta v. State, [(1977) 81 CWN 713 elucidated that in cases
where there is sustained cruelty, proximity may even extend to a period of
three years. In Harjit Singh versus State of Punjab, (2006) 1 SCC 463,
the Supreme Court emphasised that the idea behind the expression "soon
before" is to emphasize that death should in all probabilities have been the
aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. There should be a perceptible
nexus between the death and the dowry related cruelty or harassment of the
victim. Interval or gap between cruelty and death should not be very wide,
for the court must be in a position to gauge that in all probability the death
was on account of harassment or cruelty for dowry. Recently, the Supreme
Court dealt with this issue in Anjanappa versus State of Karnataka, JT
2013 (14) SC 340 and Surinder Singh versus State of Haryana, AIR 2014
SC 817. In Anjanappa case (supra), parents of the victim had turned
hostile and the Court observed that they were either won over or
pressurized into supporting the accused. It was further held that the trial
court should have seen through the insincerity and dishonesty in the
statements of the victim‟s parents and relied upon evidence of other
witnesses. The Supreme Court relied upon the dying declaration and ruled
out any possibility of accidental death. The aforesaid judgment would be
relevant in the facts of the present case, as we are satisfied that this is not a
case of accidental death. Again, this is a case wherein father of the
deceased Mannu Bhai (PW-1) has taken a diametrically opposite stance
from the version given earlier. It is also to be noted that in the present case
the crime scene or the place of occurrence was washed clean prior to the
arrival of the police team. The photographs placed on record, marked
Exhibit PW-9/ 1 to 5, do indicate presence of burnt rags in a room and the
fact that the floor was clean. The said photographs were taken by
Constable Mahi Lal (PW-9) at about midnight on 6th June, 1995. Neither
the facts indicate, nor is it palpable that this was a case of accidental fire.
In the statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellants accept that
deceased-Neeta was not very happy with her marriage with Kamlesh
Kumar propounding that she was interested in getting married to someone
else in Gujarat and also because she could not conceive a child. At the
same time, it was stated that it was a case of accidental death. The
statement that deceased-Neeta could not conceive and was unhappy on that
account is rather far-fetched as the marriage had taken place barely six
months back. No such suggestion was given by the father or other public
witnesses including Arvind (PW-3) and Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10).
Similarly, the statement that deceased-Neeta wanted to marry a third
person appears to be concocted and invented. No details or particulars to
corroborate the same have been given. Had the deceased-Neeta liked
someone else, it would have been indicated or so stated specifically and
clearly. As far as the theory of accidental fire is concerned, it has not even
been stated or argued that Neeta was cooking food at the relevant time and,
therefore she accidentally caught fire. As per the post-mortem report and
the MLC Exhibits PW-13/A and PW-15/A, Neeta was badly burnt and was
smelling of kerosene. There was soot all over her body. The question of
accidental fire, therefore, does not arise.
14. In Surinder Singh's case (supra), it was held that the proximity test
is not a rigid one; rather it calls for adopting a pragmatic and sensitive
approach by the courts. In the said case, the death had occurred within
three months and four days of marriage, which was a very short period and,
therefore, the Court observed that the test of "soon before" was satisfied. It
was further observed that the test should be applied in such a manner so as
not to defeat the purport of the provision and without losing sight of reality.
The meaning which ought to be given should be in accord with the
legislative intent. It was observed:-
"25. Before closing, the most commonplace argument must be dealt with. In all cases of bride burning it is submitted that independent witnesses have not been examined. When harassment and cruelty is meted out to a woman within the four walls of the matrimonial home, it is difficult to get independent witnesses to depose about it. Only the inmates of the house and the relatives of the husband, who cause the cruelty, witness it. Their servants, being under their obligation, would never depose against them. Proverbially, neighbours are slippery witnesses. Moreover, witnesses have a tendency to stay away from courts. This is more so with neighbours. In bride burning cases who else will, therefore, depose about the misery of the deceased bride except her parents or her relatives? It is time we accept this reality. We, therefore, reject this submission."
15. One of the pleas taken in the present appeal is that Kishore Kumar
and Manisha, brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the deceased were
residing separately. This is not correct and is not borne out from the
record, including the cross-examination of the public witnesses. Presence
of Manisha is clearly deposed to by Vinod Kumar Gupta (PW-11). Arvind
(PW-3) and Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10) have also referred to the acts of
cruelty and dowry demand by three appellants.
16. The appellants had also examined Prakash Chand Gupta (DW-1),
who deposed that Kishore Kumar had a separate house and used to reside
in Nand Nagri with his wife, mother and children and the appellant-
Kamlesh Kumar used to reside separately with his wife Neeta, the
deceased. However, in his cross-examination, DW-1 was not able to point
out the address of the appellants at Nand Nagri or the house number of
appellant-Kamlesh Kumar at Shakti Nagar. In the cross-examination of
Mannu Bhai (PW-1) and Bharat Bhai (PW-2), no such suggestion was
made. In fact, Bharat Bhai (PW-2) in his cross-examination had stated that
the accused persons, i.e., appellants, including Ujjam Ven (since deceased)
were living in Shakti Nagar, though he accepted that the accused persons,
i.e., the appellants and Ujjam Ven (since deceased) were also having
another house in Nand Nagri. No such suggestion was given during the
cross-examination of Arvind (PW-3) or Kamlesh Kumar (PW-10). The
said plea is, therefore, rejected.
17. The last issue relates to the quantum of sentence to be awarded. We
do not see any convincing/ persuasive reason or ground to alter the
sentence awarded to the appellant-Kamlesh Kumar, husband of the
deceased-Neeta. However, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded
to Kishore Kumar, brother-in-law and Manisha, sister-in-law of the
deceased. Their sentence is accordingly reduced to a period of seven years
for the offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC. They shall also
undergo a Rigorous Imprisonment for three years for the offence under
Section 498A, IPC imposed. Fine of Rs.50,000/- for the offence under
Section 304B, IPC and Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 498A, IPC
imposed by the trial court is also maintained. In default of payment of fine
for offence punishable under Section 304B, they shall further undergo
Simple Imprisonment for a period of one year and in default of payment of
fine for offence punishable under Section 498A, they shall undergo a
Simple Imprisonment three months each instead of Rigorous Imprisonment
for three years and Simple Imprisonment of six months each imposed by
the trial court. The sentences will run concurrently and benefit of Section
428 Cr.P.C. will be granted. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated
above. Trial court records will be sent back. The appellants, who are on
bail pursuant to suspension of sentence, shall surrender within a period of
one month from today to undergo the remaining sentence. In case the
appellants do not surrender, the trial court shall take steps to enforce
compliance. Trial court record will be sent back.
-sd-
(SANJIV KHANNA) JUDGE
-sd-
(ASHUTOSH KUMAR) JUDGE APRIL 13, 2015 VKR
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