Delhi High Court
M/S Aresko Restaurant Pvt Ltd & Anr vs New Delhi Municipalcorporation & ... on 10 April, 2015
Author: Manmohan
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CS(OS) 618/2015
M/S ARESKO RESTAURANT
PVT LTD & ANR ..... Plaintiffs
Through Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Sweta
Kakkad, Advocate with Mr.
Chaitnya Kaushik, Advocates
versus
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION & ORS ..... Defendants
Through Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Rachna
Golchha, Mr. Govind Kumar &
Ms. Pavni Poddar, Advocates
for NDMC.
Reserved on : 25th March, 2015
% Date of Decision : 10th April, 2015
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
JUDGMENT
MANMOHAN, J:
I.A. 4714/2015 [U/o. 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC]
1. Present suit has been filed for declaration, permanent and
mandatory injunction by a licensee of NDMC restaurant ad measuring
2618 sq. ft. of covered area and 16,300 sq. ft. of open area situated
adjacent to Lodi Garden. The prayer clause in the present suit is
reproduced hereinbelow:-
"a. A decree of declaration be passed in favour of the
Plaintiff and against the Defendants declaring the
communication dated 5th November, 2013, 3rd January,
2014, 29th January, 2014, advertisements dated 14th
February, 2014 and 21st February, 2014 or any other
decisions or resolution passed by the Defendants to be
null and void and not binding on the Plaintiffs.
b. Decree of perpetual injunction be passed in favour of
the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants restraining
them from taking any action including the action of
proposed auction in pursuance of advertisement dated
14th February, 2014 or any other advertisements that
may be issued or caused to be issued subsequently
seeking to auction the restaurant site in occupation of
the Plaintiff located besides the gate of Lodhi garden
(towards Jor Bagh) Opposite Mausam Bhawan, New
Delhi.
c. Pass a decree of mandatory injunction commanding
the Defendants to issue a formal letter of
extension/renewal confirming the extension/the
indenture dated 10th March, 2013 for a period of 10
years with enhancement of 10% licence fee every year
with respect to the restaurant space situated besides
the gate of Lodhi garden (towards Jor Bagh) Opposite
Mausam Bhawan, New Delhi.
d. Alternatively, in case it is contended and held that an
indenture is required to be executed then decree of
mandatory injunction be passed in favour of the
Plaintiff and against the Defendants directing them to
complete the ministerial act and execute the indenture
confirming the extension of the licence upto the
Plaintiffs for a further period of 10 years at the
enhanced amount of Rs. 59,213/- for the future
extended period.
e. Decree of permanent injunction restraining the
Defendants from in any manner interfering in the
peaceful occupation of the site situated besides the
gate of Lodhi garden (towards Jor Bagh) Opposite
Mausam Bhawan, New Delhi or creating any
impediment including disconnecting water / electricity
or creating any other impediment in the functioning of
the restaurant at the said site.
f. Costs of the suit may be in favour of the Plaintiffs
g. Pass such other or further order(s) as may be deemed
fit and proper in facts and circumstances of the
present case."
2. Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned senior counsel for plaintiffs
submitted that the plaintiffs‟ licence with regard to Lodhi Restaurant
stood renewed/extended for another period of ten years w.e.f. 05th July,
2013 after expiry of the ten years licence. He submitted that the right
to seek extension/renewal in terms of Clause 1 of the Licence Deed
was a vested right conferred upon the plaintiffs by way of an admitted
document, i.e. Licence Deed dated 10th March, 2003. Since
considerable emphasis was laid by him on Clause 1 of the Licence
Deed, the same is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"1. That the licence is for a period w.e.f 5.7.2003 to
04.07.2013 on „As is where is basis‟ and thereafter it shall
be the entire discretion of the licensor to renew the period
of license. In case it is decided by the licensor that the
license be renewed/extended for a further period as
decided by the licensor from the day following the date on
which the term of the license expires at a license fee
calculated at the rate of license fee payable under the
present license plus its renewal charges as decided by the
licensor or by the percentage as applicable under the
Policy of the Council for the time being in force as
monthly license fee of the renewed license provided the
licensees exercise his/her/their option for renewal of
license in writing for another term as decided by the
licensor within 60 days before the date of expiry of the
term of the present license and the licensees complete all
the required formalities for renewal of license within the
stipulated period of 60 days. In case the option for
renewal is not so exercised and the formalities are not
completed within stipulated period to the satisfaction of
the licensor it shall be presumed that the licensees is not
interested in further extension/renewal of his/her/their
license beyond the date of expiry of term of the license and
consequently the license shall stand determined ip-so-
facto with effect from the date of expiry of the term of the
present license and in the event of the licensees not
surrendering the vacant possession of the stall within the
stipulated period under this deed, the licensees shall
render himself/herself/themselves liable for action for
eviction and recovery of damages under Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971."
(emphasis supplied)
3. Mr. Chandhiok pointed out that in D. Nataraja Mudaliar vs.
The State Transport Authority, Madras, (1978) 4 SCC 290, the Apex
Court has held, "the Authority must, remember that a permit holder
has an ordinary right of renewal unless it is shown that outweighing
reasons of public interest lead to a contrary result."
4. Mr. Chandhiok contended that the Estate Policies of NDMC of
1999 and 2000 provided for renewal of licence on payment of
enhanced licence fee. The relevant portion of the Estate Policy of
NDMC of 1999 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"Estate Policy/Guidelines for dealing with Estate matters
xxx xxx xxx
Renewals
4. In the case of shops/stalls/kiosks/tharas/office
units/restaurants etc. the licence will be renewed for a
period of 10 years on year-to-year basis subject to
enhancement in licence fee at the uniform rate by 7% per
annum.
xxx xxx xxx
COUNCIL‟S DECISION
After detailed discussion & deliberations on various
items of the Estate Policy, the Council approved this
policy subject to the following modifications in the
proposals:
1. That annual enhancement in license fee would be @
5% as against 7% proposed earlier."
5. Mr. Chandhiok stated that the 2000 Estate Policy of NDMC only
applied to hotels, cinemas, commercial complexes and not to
restaurants which had been specifically dealt with in 1999 Estate
Policy of NDMC.
6. Mr. Chandhiok submitted that the Estate Policies of 1999 and
2000 stood incorporated in the licence deed by virtue of the doctrine of
incorporation. He stated that the plaintiffs exercised their right within
the period of limitation provided in Clause 1 of the licence deed vide
their letter dated 04th April, 2013 and in pursuance thereto NDMC
accepted enhanced licence fee and consequently, the licence stood
extended for another ten years automatically.
7. Additionally, Mr. Chandhiok submitted that Section 54 of the
Easement Act, 1882 provides that a licence can be created by express
or implied conduct of the guarantor. He stated that the defendants
from July, 2013 to January, 2014 admitted the plaintiffs to be the
licensee at enhanced fee and recovered the same. In support of his
contention, Mr. Chandhiok relied upon certain file notings of NDMC
officials which the plaintiffs had obtained under Right to Information
Act, 2005. Some of the officials notings relied upon by Mr. Chandhiok
are reproduced hereinbelow:-
"SUB: Renewal of licence of Restaurant at Lodi Garden
The Allottee of above cited Restaurant has submitted
his consent dated 04.04.2013 (Page 583/C) for renewal of
licence for further 10 years as per policy of the Council.
The Licence has been lying regularized in the name of M/s.
Aresko Restaurants Private Ltd. through its Director Sh.
Rajpal Singh Kochhar up to 04.07.2013 for running the
trade of „Restaurant‟ as per licence deed placed at page
560/C. On perusal of the record, Report is as under:
1 Name of the Allottee M/s. Aresko
Restaurants Private
Ltd. through its
Director Sh. Rajpal
Singh Kochhar
2 Licence Renewed up to 04.07.2013 (as per
Licence Deed)
3 Licence Dee Page 560/C
4 Permitted Trade Restaurant‟
(licensable)
5 Any Transfer involved No
6 Any Court Case Pending Nil
7 Any Vigilance Case Nil
Pending
8 Unauthorized Nil Civil Report
Constructions if any 586/C
Outstanding dues Noting (328/N)
12 Whether Cancellation No
It is also mentioned here that previously LA has
given his advise dated 03.07.2006 at page 324/N on the
observation of then Chairperson, NDMC in respect of Fair
Rent of the said Restaurant. Jt. Dir. (E) has given the
clarification in his note at page 325/N has cleared
mentioned that vide Reso. No.3(xxi) dated 30.08.2000 in
Para 6 (iii) it has been mentioned that enhancement of
Licence Fee on the renewal will be 10% per year and
licence may be for a period of 10 yrs.
Section 141(2) has not applied for in this case, it
applied for renewal in case of Hotel and the Cinema
complex is on mutually agreed term. (Para 3 of Reso
No.03(xxi) dated 30.08.2000. (Photocopy attached at Flat
"X").
In view of above facts & circumstances, it is
proposed that the licence of Double Storey restaurant at
Lodhi Garden, near main gate Lodhi Garden towards Jor
Bagh may be renewed for further 10 yrs. w.e.f. 05.07.2013
to 31.03.2023 on the licence fee worked out and annual
enhancement as per policy of the Council from time to time
for carrying the existing licensable trade of „Restaurant‟.
It is also covered under Reso. No.06 dated 18.03.1999.
The proposal may be submitted to Competent
Authoritiy/Dir. (Estate) for his kind approval of renewal of
the licence of above mentioned premises for a period of up
to 31.03.2023 in the name M/s. Aresko Restaurants Private
Ltd. through its Director Sh. Rajpal Singh Kochhar,
subject to completion of requisite formalities like
submission of a Non-judicial Stamp Paper worth of Rs.50/-
for execution of Licence Deed and deposit the Addl.
Security equivalent of 8 months of current Licence Fee
(after adjusting the previous security paid) etc.
Submitted pleased.
(Sd/-) 25/6/13
SO(E) Director (Estate-I) may kindly see for
necessary orders.
DD(E) (on leave)
DIR(E)
(Sd/-)
25/06/13
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding Market Rent/Fair Rent
As far as the current market rates is concerned, it is
also resolved vide Reso. No.3(xxi) dt. 30.8.2000, that on
the expiry of present terms of licence of hotels/cinema, the
licence shall not be renewed. The fresh licence shall be as
per provision of Section 141(2) of the NDMC Act, 1994.
That nearby of Double Storey Restaurant at Lodi
Garden, there are two markets one is Pandara Road
Market & few Restaurants are in Main Market, Lodhi
Road. In Pandara Road market shop No.3 is paying the
highest rate of licence fee of Rs.48,394/- per month for an
area of 217 sqft which comes to Rs.223/ Psft.
The total built up area of the said restaurant is 2618
sqft for sitting purpose whereas open space is 16,300 sqft.
In past we were charging normal rate for the open space
@ Rs.0.20 Psft per month as per licence deed executed in
1983. However, on the same calculation for the last 30
years, the rate would be Rs.6.00 Psft approx. at present.
In view of above, it is proposed that we can fix the
license fee of the Restaurant, in question, on competitive
rate of the Restaurants situated in Pandara Road market
for the space of 2618 sqft @ Rs.223/- Psft i.e.
Rs.5,83,814/- + Rs,97,800/- (16,300 sqft open space x Rs.
6/-) total of Rs.6,81,614/- pm on the higher side.
Submitted for kind information & further orders
please.
(Sd/-)
18/9/13
SO(E) (Sd/-)
DD(E) 18/9/13"
8. Consequently, according to Mr. Chandhiok the licence stood
extended explicitly as well as in terms of Section 54 of the Easement
Act, 1882.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjay Poddar, learned senior counsel for
defendant-NDMC stated that premises in question had been given on
licence to the plaintiffs for a period of ten years with effect from 5th
July, 2003. He stated that the competent authority of defendant-NDMC
had taken a decision not to renew the licence beyond 4 th July, 2013 and
had also decided to award a fresh licence after auctioning the same.
10. Mr. Poddar stated that the defendant-NDMC had conveyed its
decision to the plaintiffs vide letter dated 5th November, 2013. He,
however, stated that the plaintiffs did not accept the offer of first
refusal given in the letter dated 5th November, 2013. He stated that the
defendant-NDMC subsequently vide its letter dated 21st February,
2014 withdrew the first refusal offer in view of the Resolution dated
29th January, 2014 passed by its highest decision making body, namely,
the Council. Mr.Poddar pointed out that consequently a public notice
for inviting bids had been issued by defendant-NDMC on 14th
February, 2014.
11. Mr. Poddar submitted that the argument of deemed extension of
licence was misconceived and had been rejected by this Court in both
the cases of M/s. Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. Vs. New Delhi
Municipal Council, 2014(209) DLT 784, M/s. Gesture Hotels and
Foods Pvt. Ltd. Vs. New Delhi Municipal Council, 2014 (210) DLT
359 (DB) and Chandu Lal Etc. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi,
ILR (1978) I Delhi 292.
12. Mr. Poddar further submitted that plaintiffs‟ reliance on NDMC
policy dated 18th March, 1999 was misconceived as the same related to
increase in licence fee for rehabilitation markets and other scattered
units in various NDMC markets which were governed by the earlier
resolutions. He pointed out that Para 9 of the said Policy itself stated
that the hotels, cinemas and other similar projects would be governed
by mutually agreed terms and conditions as entered into by the Council
from time to time. He contended that NDMC Policy of 1999 was not
applicable to the present case as the premises in question fell in the
excluded category and was not situated in a rehabilitation market.
13. Mr. Poddar pointed out that defendant-NDMC‟s subsequent
policy dated 30th August, 2000 clearly stipulated that cases relating to
hotels, cinemas and other similar projects would be governed by
Section 141(2) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 (for
short "NDMC Act) and such licences could not be renewed. In support
of his submission, Mr. Poddar relied upon the judgments of this Court
in M/s. Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra), M/s. Gesture
Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and judgment of the Supreme
Court in Aggarwal & Modi Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Another Vs. New
Delhi Municipal Council, (2007) 8 SCC 75.
14. Mr. Poddar reiterated that as the decision to put the premises on
auction had been taken by defendant-NDMC‟s highest authority, that
means, the Council in its meeting held on 29th January, 2014 in
exercise of its power vested in it under Section 141 of the NDMC Act,
such a decision would override any general policy decision issued
earlier.
15. Mr. Poddar submitted that though the present suit was actually
for specific performance of a renewal clause in a Licence Deed, yet the
plaintiffs realizing that such a suit was not maintainable had
camouflaged it as a suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory
injunction. He submitted that the plaint did not disclose any cause of
action for grant of relief of renewal and, therefore, the same was
required to be dismissed under provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
16. He stated that keeping in view the mandate of Section 64 of the
Easement Act, 1882, the plaintiff-licensee was only entitled to claim
damages in the event of wrongful termination of the license by the
licensor.
17. Mr. Poddar lastly pointed out that the plaintiff-licensee in its
earlier writ petition being W.P.(C) 986/2014 had filed an undertaking
that it would hand over peaceful vacant possession of the premises in
case the decision of the writ court went against it and it remained
unsuccessful in the appellate forum as it was agreed that in that event
the defendant-NDMC would not be obliged to take recourse to the
proceedings under the Public Premises Act for recovery. He stated that
admittedly the plaintiffs had withdrawn the said writ petition and
consequently, the plaintiffs were required to hand over vacant
possession of the premises in terms of their undertaking.
18. In rejoinder, Mr. Chandhiok stated that the renewal clause in
M/s. Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and in the present
case were not identical. He pointed out that in M/s. Gesture Hotels
and Foods Pvt. (supra) the renewal clause stated "it shall be the entire
discretion of the licensor to extend or not to extend the period of
license." whereas in the present case the renewal clause stated "it shall
be the entire discretion of the licensor to renew the period of license".
Mr. Chandhiok contended that the omission of the words "or not" in
the present case was significant. He submitted that the discretion in
Clause 1 of the licence was neither absolute nor unrestricted or
unfettered.
19. Mr. Chandhiok repeatedly emphasised that there was a
distinction between renewal/extension and fresh allocation of licence.
He pointed out that in the case of Mohd. Yunus Prevez Vs.
Agriculture Marketing Produce Committee, W.P.(C) 3349/2007
decided on 4th August, 2009 a learned Single Judge of this Court had
held that the parameters applicable in the case of renewal of licence are
different from the parameters applicable in the case of a fresh licence.
20. Mr. Chandhiok contended that the communication dated 5th
November, 2013 cannot be termed as an offer as contended by the
defendants as it was a decision. He also contended that the NDMC
Policy of 1999 was not confined to rehabilitation markets.
21. Mr. Chandhiok further submitted that the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Aggarwal & Modi Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Another
(supra) was per incuriam as the said judgment did not consider the
extant provisions of law. According to him, the Apex Court failed to
appreciate that the expression "otherwise transfer" in Section 141 of
NDMC Act related to transfer by sale or creation of lease at best and
nothing more. In support of his contention, he relied upon Section
2(47) of Income Tax Act, 1961 which defines the word "transfer" as
including any transaction involving allowing of possession of any
immovable property to be taken. He stated that in the present case
there was no transfer as only a bare licence had been given to the
plaintiffs.
22. Mr. Chandhiok stated that the submission of the defendants that
public auction was the only means to maximise the consideration, was
erroneous as held by the Constitution Bench in Natural Resources
Allocation, in Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1.
23. Mr. Chandhiok further stated that as the licence clearly provided
that the plaintiffs would not be entitled for compensation, damages was
not an adequate remedy as contended by learned senior counsel for the
defendants.
24. Mr. Chandhiok lastly submitted that the plaintiffs had been
singled out as other licences in favour of restaurant owners had been
extended, like Delhi Darbar and Kake da Hotel.
25. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the
view that it is an admitted position that the plaintiffs had been given a
bare licence for a specific purpose of running a restaurant which has
expired by efflux of time on 4th July, 2013.
26. Clause 1 of the licence deed confers an absolute right / discretion
upon the licensor-NDMC to decide whether to renew the period of
licence or not. In the opinion of this Court, the deletion of the
expression "or not" in the present renewal clause makes no difference
to the meaning and import of the renewal clause. In fact, the
expression "or not" was otiose and redundant even in the case of M/s.
Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Consequently, there is no
distinction between the renewal clause in the present case and that of
M/s. Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The renewal clause
in both the cases confers absolute power and discretion upon the
defendant-NDMC to decide as to whether to renew the period of
licence.
27. Even Clause 13 of the licence deed in the present case
categorically states that the licence was renewable at the will of
licensor. Clauses 35, 36 and 45 of the licence deed clearly stipulate that
plaintiff-licensee shall hand over vacant possession on expiry of the
licence period. Consequently, this Court is of the view that Clause 1 of
the licence deed executed between the parties confers absolute
discretion upon the defendant-NDMC to renew or to terminate the
licence.
28. It is settled principle of law that a licensee has no legal right to
stay in the property after termination of the licence. A learned Single
Judge of this Court in Thomas Cook (India) Limited Vs. Hotel
Imperial & Ors., 2006 (127) DLT 431 has held as under:-
"26. The nature of occupancy is clearly permissive. In fact
it does not amount to possession at all. The relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant in terms of the
compromise decree was that of Licensor and Licencee and
not Lessor and Lessee. The plaintiff had use of the two
rooms under a licence. A licence does not create any
interest in the property. It merely permits another person to
make use of the property. There is no parting with
possession as the legal possession continues with the owner
(licensor). In C.M. Beena v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao: (2004)
3 SCC 595, the Supreme Court held:--
"Only a right to use the property in a particular way or
under certain terms given to the occupant while the owner
retains the control or possession over the premises results
in a licence being created; for the owner retains legal
possession while all that the licensee gets is a permission to
use the premises for a particular purpose or in a particular
manner and but for the permission so given the occupation
would have been unlawful (See Associated Hotels of India
Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor [AIR 1959 SC 1262])"
What is meant by parting with legal possession has been
explained by the Supreme Court in the context of sub-letting
in the case of Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra
Kumar: (1990) 2 SCC 331 (paragraph 5) in the following
words:--
"Parting of the legal possession means possession with the
right to include and also a right to exclude others. Mere
occupation is not sufficient to infer either sub-tenancy or
parting with possession."
Keeping these legal principles in mind, there is no doubt
that the plaintiff merely had a right to use the two rooms. It
cannot be said that the plaintiff was in possession thereof.
This is clear from the facts, as aforesaid, that under the
compromise decree the plaintiff was obligated to leave the
keys of the rooms at the reception at the close of each day;
the plaintiff was charged a daily tariff; the control and
possession of the rooms was explicitly retained by the
defendants; the rights of admission were reserved with the
defendants. Under these circumstances it cannot be said by
any stretch of imagination that the defendants had parted
with possession or that the plaintiff was in "possession" of
the said two rooms even during the period prior to the
revocation of the licence. Therefore, Mr. Kaul's reliance on
all those decisions with deal with the question of
dispossession without due process is misplaced. For, the
plaintiff had a mere right to use, it never was in possession
of the said two rooms, much less, in settled possession in
which the defendants had acquiesced.
27. This brings me to the second aspect of „due process of
law‟. It was urged by Mr Kaul that even if the plaintiff was
in unlawful possession it could only be evicted by due
process of law and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to an
order of injunction preventing the defendants from
removing the plaintiff from the said two rooms except
through due process of law. It must be made clear that this
argument fails in the context of this case because the
plaintiff was never in possession and therefore there is no
question of dispossession in the sense usually understood.
The plaintiff had a mere right to use, such right was
revocable, it has been revoked and the plaintiff is entitled
under section 63 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 to a
reasonable time to leave the premises and take away its
goods. The argument also fails because by rushing to court
the plaintiff has indeed invited a judicial determination of
its status. If it got an order of injunction it would enure to its
benefit. But, if it did not, then it can't be heard to say that
this court has to grant an injunction all the same because
otherwise it would give a licence to the defendants to
forcibly throw out the plaintiff without filing a suit for
possession.
28. The expressions „due process of law‟, „due course of
law‟ and „recourse to law‟ have been interchangeably used
in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled
possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot
be disturbed „forcibly‟ by the true owner taking law in his
own hands. All these expressions; however, mean the same
thing--ejectment from settled possession can only be had by
recourse to a court of law. Clearly, „due process of law‟ or
„due course of law‟, here, simply mean that a person in
settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law
having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner.
Now, this „due process process‟ or „due course‟ condition is
satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are
adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It
does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be
the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject
the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person
who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the
owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for
enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or
protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is
not of much consequence. What is important is that in either
event it is an action before the court and the court
adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the „bare minimum‟
requirement of „due process‟ or „due course‟ of law would
stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In
this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a
protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in
setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party
must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing
his rights i.e., for taking back something from the first party
who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court
hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction
anyway? I would think not. In any event, the „recourse to
law‟ stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial
determination is made with regard to the first party's
protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff's
failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean
that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms
would have been brought about without recourse to law.
(emphasis supplied)
29. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the
defendants, the view taken by learned Single Judge in Thomas Cook
(India) Limited (supra) was approved by the Supreme Court in Maria
Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Others Vs. Erasmo Jack De
Sequeira (Dead) Through LRs, (2012) 5 SCC 370.
30. This Court is also of the view that mere acceptance of the
licence fee subsequent to revocation of licence would not mean that
NDMC had extended the term of licence. It is well settled that merely
on acceptance of licence fee after its determination would not amount
to deemed extension. In Chandu Lal Etc.(supra) a Full Bench of this
Court has held as under:-
"34. Shri Saigal next contended that or revocation of the
license, the petitioners possession of the Kiosks was that of
trespasser and having accepted license fee subsequent to the
revocation of the license, the Corporation acquiesced in the
possession of the petitioners as trespassers, in the
circumstances the Corporation has no right to dispossess
the petitioners by force. This submission is equally devoid of
force. In accepting license fee subsequent to the revocation
of the license, all that can be said is that the license was
extended up to the period the license fee was accepted but it
cannot be said that the Corporation in any manner
acquiesced in the alleged trespass or that the petitioners
came to acquire "settled possession". The basic fallacy in
this argument is the assumption that on acquiring liberty to
occupy the Kiosk possession of it was passed to the
petitioners. The petitioners being licensees legal possession
all along remained with the Corporation. That being so, as
held by the Supreme Court in Munshi Ram & Ors. v. Delhi
Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702, the Corporation had a
right to reenter the premises and reinstate itself provided it
does not use more force than necessary. Such an entry
would be received only as a resistance to an intrusion upon
possession which had never been lost. Further, the law does
not require a person whose property is forcibly tried to be
occupied by trespassers to run away and seek the protection
authorities, there being nothing more degrading to the
human spirit than to run away in the face of peril."
(emphasis supplied)
31. The plaintiffs reliance upon internal noting of defendant-NDMC
is contrary to facts and untenable in law. In fact, after the internal
notings referred to by Mr. Chandhiok, the Chairman of NDMC and
Council had given cogent reasons underlying their decision to auction
the premises. The relevant portion of the decision of Chairman and
Council are reproduced hereinbelow:-
"Chairman, NDMC
Notings prepages refer. In principles I agree with
the premise of open auction with price discovery as
automatic benefit. However, the last, conscious decision
in r/o such a situation, taken by the Council in case of
Hotel Taj Man Singh, is of Dec‟12 wherein open auction
with first right of refusal to be given to the last lease-
holder/license holder, has been enunciated as a principle.
In the instant case also, I am inclined to follow exactly the
same principle, well established in the Council‟s
resolution of Dec 12, till the council itself, in some future
meeting, deviates from its own earlier decision/resolution
and revises or amends it. Till then, it is the principle.
We may make all preparations for open auction at
the earliest with FRR to the existing licensee. The reserve
price may be arrived at as per calculation at „X‟; of page
335/N ante.
(Sd/-)
23.9.13"
Council‟s Decision
xxx xxx xxx
M/s. Aresko Restaurants Pvt. Ltd vide dated
7.5.2013 have applied for further renewal of the licence
for a period of ten years w.e.f. 5.7.2013. The case was
processed. The current licence fee which is being paid is
Rs. 59,213/- per month.
In this regard, in terms of para 6(i) of the Council
Reso. No.3(xxi) dated 30.8.2000 on the expiry of present
term of licence of hotels/cinema and other similar
commercial complexes, the licence shall not be renewed.
The fresh licence shall be as per provision of Section
141(2) of the NDMC Act, 1994.
Accordingly, it was considered appropriate to give
the property at the gate of Lodhi Garden in open auction
at the prevailing market rates as the different between the
licence fee being received from M/s. Aresko Restaurants
Pvt. ltd and the market rate of comparable properties is
huge. So in order to safeguard revenue, M/s. Aresko
Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. has already been informed through a
written communication as per decision taken by the
competent authority that the property in question will be
put to open auction with First Right to Refusal to the
present occupant/licensee and they have also been
informed to pay damages at the rate of Rs.6,81,614/- per
month after the expiry of the licence. Further, the
decision of the Council taken in some other cases of Estate
Department like Taj Man Singh Hotel is consistently for
open tendering or for open auction of premises with First
Right to Refusal to be given to the licensee. This was
followed as principle even in the present case till the
Council itself, in some future meetings, deviates from its
own earlier decision/resolution and revises or amends the
relevant Section 141(2) of NDMC Act."
32. In any event, the Apex Court in a catena of judgments has held
that an internal noting cannot be treated as a decision of the
Government. The Supreme Court in Delhi Union of Journalist
Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India &
Ors., 2013 (11) Scale 177 has held as under:-
"17. In Shanti Sports Club and Anr. v. Union of India and
Ors. (supra), a similar question was considered in the
context of noting recorded by the then Minister, Urban
Development for release of the acquired land in favour of
the Appellant. While rejecting the Appellants' prayer, this
Court referred to the earlier judgments and held:
"All executive actions of the Government of India
and the Government of a State are required to be
taken in the name of the President or the Governor
of the State concerned, as the case may be [Articles
77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other instruments
made and executed in the name of the President or
the Governor of a State, as the case may be, are
required to be authenticated in such manner as
may be specified in rules to be made by the
President or the Governor, as the case may be
[Articles 77(2) and 166(2)]. Article 77(3) lays
down that:
"77.(3) The President shall make rules for the
more convenient transaction of the business of the
Government of India, and for the allocation among
Ministers of the said business.
Likewise, Article 166(3) lays down that:
166.(3) The Governor shall make rules for the
more convenient transaction of the business of the
Government of the State, and for the allocation
among Ministers of the said business insofar as it is
not business with respect to which the Governor is
by or under this Constitution required to act in his
discretion.
This means that unless an order is expressed in the
name of the President or the Governor and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by the
rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on
behalf of the Government.
A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting
simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents
expression of opinion by the particular individual.
By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be
treated as a decision of the Government. Even if
the competent authority records its opinion in the
file on the merits of the matter under consideration,
the same cannot be termed as a decision of the
Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon
by issuing an order in accordance with Articles
77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting
in the file or even a decision gets culminated into
an order affecting right of the parties only when it
is expressed in the name of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in
the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article
166(2). A noting or even a decision recorded in the
file can always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or
overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of
the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the
power of judicial review.
(emphasis supplied)
18. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to
the facts of this case, we hold that note dated 2.12.1999
recorded by the Minister, Urban Development cannot be
made basis for quashing the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4"
(emphasis supplied)
33. Further, this Court is of the view that plea of discrimination with
all material particulars has not been taken in the plaint. In any event, it
is settled law that Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept
and cannot be enforced in a negative manner. The illegality or
irregularity cannot be perpetuated on the ground that illegal benefits
have been extended to others. In Union of India and Others vs. M.K.
Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"25. There is another angle to the issue. If someone has
been wrongly extended a benefit, that cannot be cited as a
precedent for claiming similar benefit by others. This
Court in a series of decisions has held that guarantee of
equality before law under Article 14 is a positive concept
and cannot be enforced in a negative manner; and that if
any illegality or irregularity is committed in favour of any
individual or group of individuals, others cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of courts for perpetuating the same
irregularity or illegality in their favour also on the
reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which
have been illegally extended to others. (See Chandigarh
Admn. v. Jagjit Singh[(1995) 1 SCC 745] , Gursharan
Singh v. NDMC [(1996) 2 SCC 459] , Faridabad CT Scan
Centre v. D.G. Health Services [(1997) 7 SCC 752] , State
of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [(1997) 3 SCC 321 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 801] , State of Bihar v. Kameshwar
Prasad Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 845]
and Union of India v.International Trading Co. [(2003) 5
SCC 437] )
26. A claim on the basis of guarantee of equality, by
reference to someone similarly placed, is permissible only
when the person similarly placed has been lawfully
granted a relief and the person claiming relief is also
lawfully entitled for the same. On the other hand, where a
benefit was illegally or irregularly extended to someone
else, a person who is not extended a similar illegal benefit
cannot approach a court for extension of a similar illegal
benefit. If such a request is accepted, it would amount to
perpetuating the irregularity. When a person is refused a
benefit to which he is not entitled, he cannot approach the
court and claim that benefit on the ground that someone
else has been illegally extended such benefit. If he wants,
he can challenge the benefit illegally granted to others.
The fact that someone who may not be entitled to the relief
has been given relief illegally, is not a ground to grant
relief to a person who is not entitled to the relief."
(emphasis supplied)
34. This Court is of the view that the Constitution Bench judgment
in Natural Resources Allocation, In Re. Special Reference No.1 of
2012 (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case as in the
said case the Court had only observed that alienation of natural
resources is a policy decision and the means adopted for the same are
executive prerogatives and auction as a mode of distribution cannot be
conferred the status of a constitutional principle. But in the present
instance, the executive has taken a decision on its own to execute a
new licence for the restaurant after auctioning the same in accordance
with its statute.
35. This Court is also in agreement with Mr. Poddar‟s submission
that the 18th March, 1999 NDMC Policy deals with rehabilitation
markets and not with commercial properties/complexes like
restaurants. This would be apparent from the following paragraphs of
the 1999 Estate Policy of NDMC. The same are reproduced
hereinbelow:-
" xxx xxx xxx
These issues mainly relates to the increase in licence fee
for rehabilitation markets and other scattered units in
various NDMC markets which are governed under
resolution No. 55 dated 7.7.78 read with resolution No.1
dated 21.7.78 which are on the lower side taking into
consideration the prevailing trends in the markets and to
bring uniformity on renewals made after every ten years
for shops, stalls, kiosks, tharas office spaces etc.
1. General enhancement of licence fee
At the annual rate of 7% irrespective of the category of
property (rehabilitation licencees, tendered shops, earlier
rehabilitated markets, reserved categories etc.).
xxx xxx xxx
9. Special categories
Hotels, cinemas and similar projects etc. may be
governed as per mutually agreed terms and conditions as
entered into by the Council from time to time."
(emphasis supplied)
36. It is pertinent to mention that an identical argument of renewal
based on 1999 Policy of NDMC was rejected by a learned Single Judge
of this Court in M/s. Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The
relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"18. Plaintiff in the plaint has extracted incomplete Clause (I) of
the licence agreement and when the complete Clause (I) is
compared with the extracted portion of Clause (I) of the licence
agreement in the plaint, it is apparent why the plaintiff has
extracted only a portion of the said Clause. The comparison
between the clause quoted by the plaintiff and the actual clause
(I) is as under:
Clause quoted by the plaintiff Complete Clause (I)
.................... it shall be That the licence shall be for
renewed/extended for a a period of 10 years ending
further period as decided by upto 11-7-2012 and
the Licensor from the day thereafter it shall be the
following the date on which entire discretion of the
the term of the Licence licensor to extend or not to
expires ............... provided extend the period of licence.
Licencee exercises his In case it is decided by the
option for renewal of licensor that the licence be
Licence in writing for renewed/extended, it shall be
another term of 10 years renewed/extended for a
within 60 days before the further period as decided by
date of expiry in the present the Licensor from the day
Licence and the Licencee following the date on which
completes all the required the term of the Licence
formalities for renewal of expires at a monthly licence
Licence within the fee payable under the present
stipulated period to the licence plus its 5% (or by the
satisfaction of the Licensor, percentage as applicable
it shall be presumed that the under the policy of the
Licensee is not interested in council for the time being in
further extension/renewal of force) as monthly licence fee
his/her Licence beyond the of the renewed licence
date of expiry of the term of provided the licensee
the Licence ......... exercises his option for
renewal of Licence in writing
for another term of 10 years
within 60 days before the
date of expiry in the present
Licence and the Licencee
completes all the required
formalities for renewal of
Licence within the stipulated
period of 60 days. In case the
option for renewal is not so
exercised and/or the
formalities are not completed
within the stipulated period
to the satisfaction of the
Licensor, it shall be
presumed that the Licensee is
not interested in further
extension/renewal of his/her
Licence beyond the date of
expiry of the term of the
Licence and in the even of
the licensee not surrendering
the vacant possession of the
shop within the stipulated
period under this deed, the
licensee shall render
himself/herself liable for
action for eviction and
recovery of damages under
the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act,
1971. (portion extracted by
plaintiff is underlined)
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
22. The policy dated 18.03.1999 relied upon by the plaintiff
deals mainly with the issue relating to the increase in licence fee
for rehabilitation of markets and other squatter units in NDMC
markets which are governed under resolution 55 dated
07.07.1987 read with resolution No. 1 dated 07.07.1978. The
reference to renewal in the said policy is only for the purposes of
the enhancement of the licence fee on unit basis.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
26. For the purposes of seeking specific performance of a term of
a licence, it is necessary that there should be an obligation on
the defendants to renew the term of the licence under the
agreement. Where there is no obligation on a party to do a
particular act, the specific performance of such an obligation
cannot be sought. The specific performance can be sought of an
obligation which is mandatory. Where discretion is given to the
party to perform or not to perform the obligation and the
discretion is unfettered or absolute, specific performance cannot
be granted.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
28. The licence agreement stipulates that the allotment of the
licensed premises in favour of the licensee was purely temporary
which could be revoked at any point of time without assigning
any reason and in the event of the revocation, the licencee was
bound to evict the premises without any claim for compensation.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
33. There is no contractual terms between the parties that makes
it obligatory for the defendants to renew the licence. On the
contrary, the clauses give an absolute discretion to the
defendants to renew or not to renew the terms of the licence.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
37. Similarly, in the present case, the rights and obligations of
the plaintiff would be governed by the licence granted to the
plaintiff. The terms of the licence would be insulated from the
tentacles of any statutory law or policy and would be beyond the
reach of any restrictive provision contained in the same. The
licence confers unfettered discretion on the defendant to renew
or not to renew the terms of the licence and any contrary
provision of statute or policy would be overridden by the terms
of the licence.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
39. The Division Bench in the case of RAJASTHAN BREWERIES
LTD. (SUPRA) has laid down that Specific performance will not
be ordered where damages are adequate remedy or where the
party applying for relief is guilty of a breach of the contract or is
guilty of wrongful conduct or where the contract involves
personal service or where the contract requires constant
supervision or where the party against whom specific
performance is sought is entitled to terminate the contract. If the
party against whom specific performance is sought, is entitled to
terminate the contract, the order will be refused as the defendant
could render the direction to perform nugatory by exercising his
powers to terminate. This principle has been held to be
applicable whether the contract is terminable under its express
terms or on account of the conduct of the party seeking specific
performance. Further it has been laid down that clause (e) of
Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 lays down that
injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of contract,
the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. If it
is found that a contract which by its very nature is determinable,
the same not only cannot be enforced but in respect of such a
contract no injunction could also be granted and this is mandate
of law. This, however, has been held subject to the exception that
where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a
certain act, coupled with a negative agreement, express or
implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstances that the court
is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative
agreement shall not preclude it from granting an injunction to
perform the negative agreement. The Division Bench has further
held that if it is ultimately found that termination was bad in law
or contrary to the terms of the agreement or of any
understanding between the parties or for any other reason, the
remedy of the plaintiff would be to seek co mpensation for
wrongful termination but not a claim for specific performance of
the agreements."
(emphasis supplied)
37. The aforesaid judgment of the Single Judge was upheld by the
Division Bench in M/s. Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra)
wherein it was held as under:-
"10. We have at the outset invited the attention of the
senior counsel for the appellant/plaintiff to Section 64 of
the Indian Easement Act, 1882 which provides that where
a licence has been granted for a consideration and the
licensee, without any fault of his own is evicted by the
grantor before he has fully enjoyed under the licence the
right for which he contracted, he is entitled to recover
compensation from the grantors and have enquired from
the senior counsel whether not the same is indicative of an
agreement, even if any of the renewal of licence, being
incapable of specific performance and even if the licensee
has a right of renewal and the licensor wrongfully denies
such renewal, the claim if any of the licensee would be for
damages/compensation only.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
13. Reference in this regard can be made to The
Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan AIR 2002 SC
2051 laying down that under Section 64 even if a licensee
is evicted, though grounds for revocation of licence do not
exist, or forcefully evicted, his only remedy is to recover
compensation from grantor and not to resume occupation.
The same view is also taken by a Division Bench of the
Kerala High Court in FAO No. 63/2013 titled
as Trivandrum Golf Club v. State of Kerala. One of us
(Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.) also in Keventer Agro
Ltd. v. Kalyan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. MANU/DE/1479/2013 and
FAO(OS) No. 278/2013 preferred whereagainst was
dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on
30.05.2013, has taken the same view and which was
subsequently also taken in Ashok Kumar v. Paramjeet
Kaur MANU/DE/ 3900/2013.
14. In view of the aforesaid legal position and when in
terms of the same the appellant/plaintiff has no chance of
succeeding in the claim for specific performance, the
question of protecting the possession of the
appellant/plaintiff in the interregnum does not arise.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
19. We, on a reading of the renewal clause aforesaid in the
licence are satisfied that the renewal thereof was in the
sole discretion of the respondent/defendant. The appellant/
plaintiff thus cannot force the respondent/ defendant to
renew the lease."
(emphasis supplied)
38. In any event, Section 141(2) of the New Delhi Municipal
Council Act reads as under:-
"141. Disposal of immovable property.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The consideration for which any immovable
property may be sold, leased or otherwise transferred shall
not be less than the value at which such immovable
property could be sold, leased or otherwise transferred in
normal and fair completion."
39. The Supreme Court in Aggarwal & Modi Enterprises (P) Ltd. &
Anr. (supra) has interpreted the said Section as under:-
18. For appreciating the true scope and ambit of Section
141(2), it is to be noted that by nature of the proposed
changes it has to be treated as fresh transaction
particularly when not only the nature of property changes
but also the lease has expired. Though strong reliance was
placed on a Resolution dated 18-3-1999 by the appellants,
it is to be noted that the said resolution has practically no
effectiveness in 2006.
xxx xxx xxx
22. The mandate of Section 141(2) is that any immovable
property belonging to NDMC is to be sold, leased, licensed
or transferred on consideration which is not to be less than
the value at which such immovable property could be sold,
leased, or transferred in fair competition. The crucial
expression is "normal and fair competition". In other
words, NDMC is obligated to adopt the procedure by
which it can get maximum possible return/consideration
for such immovable property. The methodology which can
be adopted for receiving maximum consideration in a
normal and fair competition would be the public auction
which is expected to be fair and transparent. Public
auction not only ensures fair price and maximum return it
also militates against any allegation of favouritism on the
part of the Government authorities while giving grant for
disposing of public property. The courts have accepted
public auction as a transparent means of disposal of public
property. (SeeState of U.P. v. Shiv Charan Sharma, Ram &
Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, Sterling Computers
Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd., Mahesh
Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial
Corpn., Pachaiyappa's Trust v. Official Trustee of
Madras, Chairman and MD SIPCOT v. Contromix (P)
Ltd., New India Public School v. HUDA, State of
Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and Haryana Financial
Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills.)"
(emphasis supplied)
40. This Court is of the view that the expression „transfer‟ is of wide
amplitude and the definition of transfer under Income Tax Act cannot
be imported into the NDMC Act. In fact, this Court in Kanakdhara
Credits Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mukesh Kapil & Another, CS(OS) 2670/2011
decided on 9th May, 2013 has held as under:-
"20. In the opinion of this Court, the expression
„transfer‟ as used in Clause 2 of the Special Power of
Attorney is of extremely wide amplitude. In Black‟s Law
Dictionary, Ninth Edition, the expression „transfer‟ is
stated to mean "any mode of disposing of or parting with
an asset or an interest in an asset, including a gift, the
payment of money, release, lease, or creation of a lien or
other encumbrance........the term embraces every
method--direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary--of disposing of or parting with
property or with an interest in property."
41. It is settled law that a policy to be legal and valid has to be in
conformity with the statute. Keeping in view the mandate of Section
141(2) of the NDMC Act, this Court is of the view that the 1999 Estate
Policy of NDMC cannot be interpreted to hold that licence of a
commercial complex like a restaurant has to be renewed after expiry of
every ten years only on a nominal increase of licence fee of 10%.
42. Mr. Chandhiok‟s submission that the judgment in Aggarwal &
Modi Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr. (supra) is per incuriam cannot be
accepted as it does not satisfy the test for the same i.e. it is not given in
ignorance of terms of a statute or of a rule having force of a statute. In
any event, the Supreme Court in a recent decision in South Central
Railway Employees Cooperative Credit Society Employees Union vs.
B. Yashodabai and Others, (2015) 2 SCC 727 has held as under:-
"14. We are of the view that it was not open to the High
Court to hold that the judgment delivered by this Court
in South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society
Employees' Union v. Registrar of Coop. Societies [South
Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society
Employees' Union v. Registrar of Coop. Societies was per
incuriam.
15. If the view taken by the High Court is accepted, in our
opinion, there would be total chaos in this country because
in that case there would be no finality to any order passed
by this Court. When a higher court has rendered a
particular decision, the said decision must be followed by
a subordinate or lower court unless it is distinguished or
overruled or set aside. The High Court had considered
several provisions which, in its opinion, had not been
considered or argued before this Court when CA No. 4343
of 1988 was decided [South Central Railway Employees
Coop. Credit Society Employees' Union v. Registrar of
Coop. Societies. If the litigants or lawyers are permitted to
argue that something what was correct, but was not
argued earlier before the higher court and on that ground
if the courts below are permitted to take a different view in
a matter, possibly the entire law in relation to the
precedents and ratio decidendi will have to be rewritten
and, in our opinion, that cannot be done. Moreover, by not
following the law laid down by this Court, the High Court
or the subordinate courts would also be violating the
provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
16. We do not want to go into the arguments advanced by
the learned counsel appearing for the respondents before
the High Court for the simple reason that it was not open
to them to advance any argument which would run
contrary to the judgment delivered by this Court in South
Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society
Employees' Union v. Registrar of Coop. Societies [South
Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society
Employees' Union v. Registrar of Coop. Societies. In our
opinion, the High Court did something which would be like
setting aside a decree in the execution proceedings."
(emphasis supplied)
43. Consequently, this Court is of the view that plaintiff is not
entitled to any relief from this Court. In fact, this Court is prima facie
of the view that the present plaint is not maintainable as it is barred by
law and the issues raised in the plaint are no longer res integra.
However, this Court shall decide on this aspect after pleadings are
complete in the present case.
44. With the aforesaid observations, present application is dismissed
and the interim arrangement, if any, stands vacated.
CS(OS) 618/2015
List on the date already fixed.
MANMOHAN, J
APRIL 10, 2015
js/rn
