Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 2806 Del
Judgement Date : 8 April, 2015
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ R.S.A. No.13/2014
Decided on : 8th APRIL, 2015
BALBIR SINGH ...... Appellant
Through: Mr.Rajiv K.Garg, Mr.Sanjay Gupta and
Mr.Akshay Gaur, Advs.
Versus
GANGA VISHAN @ VISHAN LAL ANAND ...... Respondent
Through: Ms.Anju Lal and Ms.Shalu Lal, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
V.K. SHALI, J.
1. This a regular second appeal bearing No.13/2004 titled Balbir
Singh v. Ganga Vishan @ Vishan Lal Anand. Although the appeal has
been filed in the year 2004, it has been admitted on 12.08.2008 by my
learned predecessor and while admitting the appeal, the following ten
questions have been framed as substantial questions of law involved in
the matter.
(1). Whether the GPA duly executed in favour of the respondent could be held to be cancelled without proof of the deed of cancellation and without proof of the service of alleged notice of cancellation of GPA to the attorney and the appellant/purchaser ?
(2). Whether adverse inference U/s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act ought to be taken against the respondent for not producing himself in the witness box to deny the false allegations in the written statement and to deny his own receipts of money ?
(3). Whether in the circumstances of receiving advance of Rs. 15,000/- himself, the respondent has confirmed and ratified the attorney of Shri S L Malhotra to sell the suit property to the appellant. And hence whether Shri Sardari Lal Malhotra was competent to execute the receipt dated 2.3.1987 and formal agreement to sell dated 6.7.1990, on behalf of the respondent ?
(4). Whether in the circumstances of non proof of copy of GPA dated 28.2.1985 the learned Additional District Judge could see and read an unproved document (photocopy of GPA) and without comparison with original ?
(5). Whether such copy of GPA dated 28.2.1985 could be read by the learned Additional District Judge without giving the parties an opportunity to lead further evidence and cross-examination on this document ?.
(6). Whether this unproved GPA could be used by the learned Courts to contradict, corroborate the evidence of the parties and whether it could be used to fill in the lacuna of the evidence of respondent ?
(7). Whether the learned Additional District Judge could look to this unproved document of photocopy of GPA dated 28.2.1985 to give a finding of fact?
(8). Whether the learned Courts below had jurisdiction to see unproved alleged deed of cancellation to give a finding of fact of cancelling the GPA of Shri S L Malhotra, and that also against the other evidence of the defendant showing that in fact the GPA dated 28.2.1985 was not cancelled ?
(9). Whether therefore the evidence of the parties was to be read or the unproved documents dated 20.1.1988 was to be read to give a finding that in fact the GPA dated 28.2.1985 in favour of Shri S L Malhotra was not cancelled ?
(10). Whether the findings and judgment of learned Court below is perverse, not based on evidence, and based only on surmises and conjectures, causing substantial injustice to the appellant ?
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the
learned counsel for the respondent.
3. Before dealing with the aforesaid questions, it may be pertinent
here to give a brief background of the case leading to the filing of the
present appeal.
4. The present appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 06.07.1990 and for permanent injunction. The
case which was set up by the appellant in the plaint was that the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan is the owner of the property bearing
No.27/3, Tihar II, Ashok Nagar, New Delhi having purchased the same
vide sale deed dated 31.07.1965. It was alleged that the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan had appointed one Sh.S.L.Malhotra as his
attorney on 28.02.1985 in respect of the suit property and authorized him
to sell the property in question. The said attorney (since deceased) is
alleged to have entered into an agreement to sell in respect of the suit
property in favour of the appellant for a total sale consideration of
Rs.46,000/-. It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant had made a
payment of Rs.41,000/- in four instalments i.e.Rs.15,000/- on 02.03.1987,
Rs.15,000/- on 26.08.1988, Rs.5,000/- on 10.10.1989 and Rs.6,000/- on
06.07.1990. It is at the time of receiving the final instalment of
Rs.6,000/- on 06.07.1990 that it is alleged by the appellant that the oral
agreement to sell the suit property was reduced into writing and receipts
were also executed for the payment received by Mr.S.L.Malhotra. It was
envisaged in the agreement to sell dated 06.07.1990 that the balance
consideration of Rs.5,000/- shall be paid by the appellant at the time of
registration of the sale deed by the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan. The
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan, as per the agreement to sell, was required
to obtain sale permission from original defendant Nos.2 & 3 before
execution of the sale deed. It was alleged that the respondent/Sh.Ganga
Vishan through is attorney Mr.S.L.Malhotra had assured the appellant
that the property in question is free from all encumbrances and title of the
suit property was clear and without any blemishes.
5. It was further alleged that the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan had
failed to obtain the requisite permission despite the fact that the
appellant/plaintiff had been approaching the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan
for acceptance of balance payment of Rs.5,000/- and getting his title
perfected. The respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan had been avoiding the same
for one reason or the other. It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant
was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement at all times
and even at the time of filing of the suit and before filing of the suit, even
a notice dated 22.07.1996 was also served on the respondent/Sh.Ganga
Vishan requiring him to perfect the title of the appellant and as he had
failed to do so, the appellant/plaintiff had been constrained to file the suit
for specific performance. The respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan contested the
suit and took preliminary objection with respect to the maintainability of
the suit on the ground that the appellant had suppressed material facts. It
was alleged by the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan that the
appellant/plaintiff had trespassed in the suit property in collusion with
Mr.S.L.Malhotra, the attorney of the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan. It
was also stated by the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan that the attorney of
Mr. S.L.Malhotra had been revoked on 20.01.1988 by a document which
was duly registered. It was also alleged by the appellant that the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan is the owner of the property and the
appellant has no right, title or interest in the suit property. The suit
property was stated to be in occupation of one Sh.Prithipal Singh as a
tenant at the rate of Rs.7.50 per month at the time when the property was
allotted to respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan and he was directed to pay rent to
the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan. It was alleged that Mr.Prithipal Singh
had sublet the premises in question to Manjeet Singh and Miyan Khan
and had also demolished a portion of the premises.
Respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan through his attorney Sh.S.L.Malhotra filed
an eviction petition and got an ex parte judgment in his favour on
17.02.1986. Thereafter the execution application for ejectment of the
tenant was also field through the attorney Sh.S.L.Malhtora, but during the
pendency o the proceedings, the GPA in favour of Sh.S.L.Malhotra was
revoked after giving notice dated 19.01.1988 with an instruction to him to
return the original documents relating to the suit property. On 20.01.1988,
revocation deed was registered and a fresh attorney Sh.V.K.Anand was
appointed for pursuing the litigation. In the meanwhile, the
appellant/plaintiff appeared in the court of learned ARC claiming himself
to be in possession of the suit property by virtue of an agreement to sell
etc. The execution proceedings were disposed of vide order dated
16.09.1994 directing the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan to file a suit for
possession. It was admitted that Mr.S.L.Malhotra had been appointed as
the attorney on 28.02.1985, but it was stated that he was never authorized
to sell the property in question. It was specifically denied that the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan had received any amount towards
consideration for sale of the property and his signatures on the receipt of
Rs.15,000/- were stated to be forged. It was further stated that in view of
the revocation of power of attorney of Sh.S.L.Malhotra, the agreement to
sell as executed thereafter are null and void and it was prayed that the suit
of the appellant/plaintiff be dismissed.
6. So far as the original defendant Nos.2 & 3 are concerned, they took
a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the suit on the
ground of locus and they also contested their being made a party on the
ground that they were neither necessary nor proper parties.
7. The respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan also filed a suit against the
present appellant/plaintiff being suit for possession which was numbered
as 574/02. Vide order dated 12.02.2001, the evidence was ordered to be
recorded in Suit No.574/02 where the appellant/plaintiff examined
himself as DW-1 and proved various documents. The learned trial court,
heard the arguments, analyzed the evidence and so far as the suit for
specific performance filed by the present appellant/plaintiff is concerned,
the appellant has not been able to prove the agreement to sell dated
06.07.1990 having been validly executed in his favour by the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan through his attorney. For arriving at this
conclusion, the learned trial court has taken note of the fact that the
appellant did not prove that the attorney Sh.S.L.Malhotra had any
authority under the so called power of attorney dated 28.02.1985 to sell
the property and accept the sale consideration for and on behalf of the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan. Therefore, if that was the position and
Sh.S.L.Malhotra was not competent to sell the property, he could not
have created any right, title or interest in favour of the appellant/plaintiff
so as to bind the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan. The suit for specific
performance was accordingly dismissed on 24.04.2003 by the learned
trial court.
8. The appellant/plaintiff feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and
decree preferred RCA No.38/2003 which was also dismissed by the first
appellate court holding that Sh.S.L.Malhotra was not authorized under the
general power of attorney dated 28.02.1985 to have executed an
agreement to sell, power of attorney and receipts regarding the sale of the
suit property by respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan to the appellant/plaintiff
and whatever limited authority under the general power of attorney was
with Sh.S.L.Malhotra, the same had extinguished with the deed of
revocation of power of attorney dated 20.01.1988 and appointment of
Sh.V.K.Anand as a new attorney vide registered deed of GPA on
20.01.1988. Therefore, the documents executed by Sh.S.L.Malhotra in
favour of the appellant/plaintiff cannot bind the respondent/Sh.Ganga
Vishan. Accordingly, the first appeal was also dismissed upholding the
finding returned by the trial court.
9. It is in this background that the aforesaid ten questions have been
framed by my learned predecessor.
10. I have gone through these questions as well as heard the learned
counsel for the parties. In my considered opinion, the questions which
have been framed are not questions of law much less substantial
questions of law except question No.10 which is as follows:
'Whether the findings and judgment of learned court below is perverse, not based on evidence, and based only on surmises and conjectures, causing substantial injustice to the appellant?'
11. I feel that it would be appropriate to deal with each of the questions
and pass observations as have been reflected by the two courts below:
(1). Whether the GPA duly executed in favour of the respondent could be held to be cancelled without proof of the deed of cancellation and without proof of the service of alleged notice of cancellation of GPA to the attorney and the appellant/purchaser ?
(5). Whether such copy of GPA dated 28.2.1985 could be read by the learned Additional District Judge without giving the parties an opportunity to lead further evidence and cross-examination on this document ?.
12. The GPA which is sought to be relied upon by the appellant for
setting up a case of specific performance is dated 28.02.1985. The learned
trial court has observed that under this document, no power had been
conferred on Sh.S.L.Malhotra to transact the property for and on behalf of
the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan. This finding has been upheld by the
first appellate court. If this document itself did not confer any power to
the attorney to sell the suit property, everything else become
inconsequential, but the fact of the matter remains that the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan has proved the registered notice dated
19.01.1988 (Ex.PW1/4) and revocation of power of attorney vide
revocation deed executed on 20.01.1988 (ExPW1). The very fact that the
document of revocation of power of attorney in favour of
Sh.S.L.Malhotra is duly registered, that in itself, is deemed to be a notice
to the public at large. Apart from this, there is another aspect of the
matter with regard to the proof of the attorney. The basic principle of
proof is that one who asserts must prove. The appellant/plaintiff had filed
a suit for specific performance claiming that Sh.S.L.Malhotra, attorney,
had executed an agreement to sell dated 06.07.1990 in his favour on the
strength of that attorney. Therefore, it was essentially for the appellant to
prove not only the agreement to sell, but also the attorney. The appellant
has not proved that power of attorney by virtue of this agent had the
power to sell the suit property. Only a photocopy thereof has been
produced by him. So far as the respondent is concerned, he has not
disputed the contents of the photocopy of the attorney produced by the
appellant dated 28.02.1985. In the light of the fact that the content of the
attorney dated 28.02.1985 having not been contested by any of the
parties, therefore, the question framed by my learned predecessor as
question No.5 does not arise at all. The parties are not given an
opportunity to fill up a lacuna in their case after the pronouncement of the
order and, if any party, feels aggrieved, it has to move an application
under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, which, in the instant case, the
appellant/plaintiff has not done. This answers question Nos.1 & 5.
QUESTION NO.2
(2). Whether adverse inference U/s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act ought to be taken against the respondent for not producing himself in the witness box to deny the false allegations in the written statement and to deny his own receipts of money ?
13. Assuming that an adverse inference is drawn against a person on
account of having not entered into the witness box under Section 114(g)
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that in itself would not entitle the
appellant/plaintiff to a decree of specific performance. The basic dictum
has been affirmati non neganti incumbit probatio i.e. 'one who asserts
must prove' and the appellant has miserably failed to prove his case on
the issue with regard to the agreement to sell dated 06.07.1990 having
been executed validly in his favour by the attorney Sh.S.L.Malhotra when
the attorney did not have the power to execute the same. Issue No.2 is
accordingly answered in the light of the above and even if an adverse
inference is drawn against the respondent, it does not entitle the appellant
to a decree of specific performance.
QUESTION NO.3
(3). Whether in the circumstances of receiving advance of Rs. 15,000/- himself, the respondent has confirmed and ratified the attorney of Shri S L Malhotra to sell the suit property to the appellant. And hence whether Shri Sardari Lal Malhotra was competent to execute the receipt dated 2.3.1987 and formal agreement to sell dated 6.7.1990, on behalf of the respondent ?
14. A perusal of the issue shows that the respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan
is alleged to have ratified and confirmed the acts of Sh.S.L.Malhotra by
receiving Rs.15,000/- and whether Sh.S.L.Malhtora was competent to
execute the receipt dated 02.03.1987 and agreement to sell dated
06.07.1990.
15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if
for the sake of argument, it is assumed that Sh.S.L.Malhotra was not
competent to sell the suit property, but the very fact that
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan had himself executed the receipt dated
02.03.1987 for a sum of Rs.15,000/- tantamount to confirming and
ratifying all the facts with regard to the sale of the suit property in favour
of the appellant.
16. So far as the aforesaid question is concerned, the answer is to be
found in Dharmarajan & Ors. v. Valliammal & Ors; AIR 2008 SC 850
wherein it has been held that the questions formulated were neither
questions of law nor substantial questions of law and the High Court was
held to be finding out a new case which was not even pleaded and the
high court was entering into appreciation of evidence on the basis of non
existing substantial questions of law and consequently the order of the
High Court was set aside.
17. One of the essential ingredients while deciding a civil case is that
not only a party must plead, but also must prove his case and if there is no
pleading with regard to a particular aspect of the matter, then no amount
of evidence produced or arguments advanced at the stage of final hearing
will be taken cognizance of. In the instant case, the appellant while filing
the suit for specific performance has nowhere pleaded that alternatively
Sh.S.L.Malhotra, even if it is assumed, that he was not competent to
execute the agreement to sell, his actions were ratified by the
respondent/Sh.Ganga Vishan by accepting the amount of Rs.15,000/- and
therefore, there was a validly executed agreement to sell dated
06.07.1990 by Sh.S.L.Malhotra. In the absence of any such pleading, this
argument of the appellant could not be accepted nor could this be treated
as a question of law much less a substantial question of law.
(4). Whether in the circumstances of non proof of a copy of GPA dated 28.2.1985 the learned Additional District Judge could see and read an unproved document (photocopy of GPA) and without comparison with original ?
(6). Whether this unproved GPA could be used by the learned Courts to contradict, corroborate the evidence of the parties and whether it could be used to fill in the lacuna of the evidence of respondent ?
(7). Whether the learned Additional District Judge could look to this unproved document of photocopy of GPA dated 28.2.1985 to give a finding of fact?
(8). Whether the learned Courts below had jurisdiction to see unproved alleged deed of cancellation to give a finding of fact of cancelling the GPA of Shri S L Malhotra, and that also against the other evidence of the defendant showing that in fact the GPA dated 28.2.1985 was not cancelled ?
(9). Whether therefore the evidence of the parties was to be read or the unproved documents dated 20.1.1988 was to be read to give a finding that in fact the GPA dated 28.2.1985 in favour of Shri S L Malhotra was not cancelled ?
18. These questions have been dealt with while discussing question
Nos.1 & 5. These are all questions of appreciation of evidence and not
questions of law much less substantial questions of law.
19. So far as the last question with respect to the perversity is
concerned, I have been taken by the learned counsel for the parties
through the evidence and I have also satisfied myself with the findings
returned by the two courts below. The case set up of perversity is non-
existent when there is absolutely no evidence in order to return and
support a finding of fact. This answers question No.10 also that there is
no perversity in the finding returned by the first appellate court.
20. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the finding returned by the
two courts below with regard to the factum of Sh.S.L.Malhotra being not
authorized to execute the sale deed is suffering from any perversity. The
said attorney was not authorized to sell the property under the power of
attorney dated 28.02.1985 and the same also stood revoked vide duly
registered revocation deed dated 20.01.1988 by giving him a notice one
day prior to the same.
21. In totality of the circumstance, I do not find that there is any
question of law, as formulated by my learned predecessor, involved in the
matter which will change the findings returned concurrently by the two
courts below.
22. Accordingly, the present appeal is totally misconceived and the
same is dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J.
APRIL08, 2015 dm
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