Delhi High Court
Chatur Singh vs State & Anr on 26 September, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 26th September, 2014
+ CRL.M.C. 2815/2013 and Crl.M.A.10760/2013
CHATUR SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Janinder Kumar Chumbak, Adv.
versus
STATE & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Yogesh Verma, APP for the State.
Mr.Vinod Wadhwa, Adv. for R-2.
+ CRL.M.C. 2884/2013 and Crl.M.A.10967/2013
KOTAK MAHINDRA PRIME LTD ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Janinder Kumar Chumbak, Adv.
versus
STATE & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Yogesh Verma, APP for the State.
Mr.Vinod Wadhwa, Adv. for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VED PRAKASH VAISH
VED PRAKASH VAISH, J. (ORAL)
1. These are two petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of
FIR No.628/2004 under Sections 323/379/384/392/420/506/34 IPC
registered at PS Prashant Vihar, Delhi.
2. Since both the petitions have arisen out of common FIR No.628/2004,
therefore, both the petitions are being disposed of by this common
order.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have
settled the matter with respondent No.2/complainant and settlement
agreement was executed on 16.08.2004. He also submits that in terms
of settlement, vehicle bearing registration No. DL 8C G 4152 which
was financed to respondent No.2 was released to him.
4. The brief facts of the case are that complainant Satish Goel lodged a
complaint that he entered into HP Agreement on 25.06.2001 for
purchase of car and a loan of Rs.2,64,600/- was sanctioned to him. The
amount of loan was to be repaid in 41 installments of Rs.7,700/- each
w.e.f. June 2001 till November 2004. The complainant purchased a car
bearing registration No. DL 8C G 4152 and repaid 22 installments
without any default. The complainant defaulted in payment of 10
monthly instalments. The complainant offered to return the vehicle but
the petitioner refused and instead asked the complainant to pay lump
sum of outstanding amount of Rs.77,000/-. On 09.03.2004,
complainant paid the amount of Rs.77,000/- and the petitioner issued
receipt for the same. On 07.06.2004 when the complainant along with
his friend, Praveen Rana were going to his house, they were stopped
by two persons who came on motor cycle. They pulled out the
complainant & gave beating to him and snatched away the car bearing
registration No. DL 8C G 4152. The complainant made a complaint to
the police. Thereafter, on the directions of Metropolitan Magistrate,
Delhi, FIR No.628/2004 under Sections 323/379/384/392/420/506/34
IPC was registered at P.S. Prashant Vihar, Delhi.
5. Learned APP for the State submits that on completion of investigation,
charge-sheet was filed. The petitioner Chatur Singh absconded and
process of proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. was issued against
him and he was declared proclaimed offender on 13.04.2010. On
21.06.2013, Chatur Singh moved an application for cancellation of
process of proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. He was admitted to
bail by learned Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 26.06.2013.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the
vehicle was released by the orders of learned Metropolitan Magistrate,
Delhi vide order dated 16.08.2004. Counsel for respondent No.2 also
submits that respondent No.2/complainant has not settled the matter
with the petitioners.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of 'State of AP vs.
Gourishetty Mahesh & Ors.', (2010) 11 SCC 226, has analysed the
scope of exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has, inter alia,
observed as under:-
"18. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would
not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court.
It is true that Court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
other wise, it would be an instrument in the hands of a
private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time, Section 482 is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and brings about its closure without full-fledged
enquiry.
19. Though High Court may exercise its power relating to
cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, the power should
be exercised sparingly. For example, where the allegations
made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused
or allegations in the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence
or do not disclose commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused or where there is express legal bar
provided in any of the provisions of the Code or in any other
enactment under which a criminal proceeding is initiated or
sufficient material to show that the criminal proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused due to private and personal
grudge, the High Court may step in.
20. Though the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 are wide, however, such power requires
care/caution in its exercise. The interference must be on
sound principles and the inherent power should not be
exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. We make it clear
that if the allegations set out in the complaint do not
constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by
the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the
same in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482."
8. On a bare reading of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that the High
Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is
competent enough to quash the criminal proceedings pending against
the accused in a Court in order to prevent the abuse of process of Court
to secure the ends of justice. However, said powers should be
exercised sparingly. If the procedural law provides for an equal
efficacious remedy to the party concerned, then naturally High Courts
would be reluctant to invoke powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
9. In the light of the aforesaid, I find no reason to quash the FIR by
invoking inherent powers of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
10. Thus, the petitions are dismissed.
Crl.M.A.10760/2013 & Crl.M.A.10967/2013
Both the applications are dismissed as infructuous.
(VED PRAKASH VAISH)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 26, 2014
gm
