Paramount Plastic Industries vs Corporation Bank & Ors
2014 Latest Caselaw 4840 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                      Date of decision: 26th September, 2014

+              W.P.(C) 4413/2014 & CM No.9019/2014 (for stay)
       PARAMOUNT PLASTIC INDUSTRIES             ..... Petitioner
                  Through: Ms. Pratiti Rungta and Mr. Sumit
                           Pargal, Advocates.
                                      Versus
       CORPORATION BANK & ORS                  ....Respondents
                  Through: Mr. Rajive Mehra, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
                           Suresh Dutt Dobhal and Mr. Karan
                           Dev, Advocates for R-8.
                                    AND
+                              W.P.(C) 5581/2014
       GABLES INDIA PVT LTD.                      ..... Petitioner
                    Through: Mr. Vineet Tayal, Advocate.
                                      Versus
       CORPORATION BANK & ORS                 ..... Respondents
                  Through: Mr. Rajive Mehra, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
                           Suresh Dutt Dobhal and Mr. Karan
                           Dev, Advocates for R-8.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

1. The petitions impugn the order dated 6th June, 2014 of the Debts

Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Delhi of transferring S.A.

No.87/2013 filed by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4413/2014 before the

Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Jaipur and S.A. No.174/2013 filed by the

petitioner in W.P.(C) No.5581/2014 before the DRT Chandigarh to DRT-II,

Delhi, on an application of the respondent no.10 in both petitions (M/s

Harish Chandra (India) Ltd. (HCIL)) and in exercise of powers under

Section 17A of The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial

Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act).

2. W.P.(C) No.4413/2014 came up first before this Court on 22nd July,

2014 when, on the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the Full

Bench of this Court in Amish Jain Vs. ICICI Bank Ltd. AIR 2013 Delhi

172 has held that there is no provision in the DRT Act for transfer of

proceedings from one DRT to another, notice thereof was issued for 26th

August, 2014 and final determination/adjudication by the DRT-II, Delhi

stayed.

3. W.P.(C) No.5581/2014 came up first for consideration on 29th

August, 2014. However, since the senior counsel for the contesting

respondent appeared, we, with the consent of the counsels, heard both the

petitions finally and reserved judgment.

4. The facts not in dispute are as under:-

(i) The consortium of respondents no. 1 to 7 Banks, sometime in

January/February, 2013, issued notice under Section 13(2) of the

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) in

relation to the debt owed by the respondent no. 10 HCIL and others

and in July, 2013 took symbolic possession of various secured assets

including the secured assets at Jaipur and Chandigarh. Aggrieved

therefrom, the respondent no.10 HCIL instituted a Securitisation

Application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act being SA No. 80

of 2013 before the DRT-I, Delhi;

(ii) Some other persons claiming interest in the same secured assets

also filed other SAs under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before

DRT Jaipur, DRT Chandigarh and also before the DRT-I and DRT-

III, Delhi;

(iii) The respondent no.s 1 to 6 Banks filed an Original Application

under Section 19 of the DRT Act, being OA No. 8 of 2014, before the

DRT-II, Delhi for recovery of the said debt owed by the respondent

no. 10 HCIL and others;

(iv) The respondent no. 10 HCIL filed an application under Section

17A of the DRT Act before the DRAT, Delhi for transfer of

OA No. 8 of 2014 filed by the respondent no.s 1 to 6 Banks before

the DRT-II, Delhi to the DRT-I, Delhi where the SA filed by it was

pending;

(v) The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4413/2014 had also filed a

Securitisation Application being SA No. 87 of 2013 under Section 17

of the SARFAESI Act before the DRT Jaipur with respect to one of

the secured assets aforesaid situated at Jaipur, claiming a right/interest

therein;

(vi) Similarly, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.5581/2014 had filed a

Securitisation Application being SA No. 174 of 2013 before the DRT

Chandigarh with respect to one of the secured assets aforesaid

situated at Chandigarh contending that though it had created security

of its asset to guarantee the repayment of the debt by the respondent

no. 10 HCIL but the said guarantee was conditional and its

asset/property was not liable to be taken over by the respondent

Banks;

(vii) During the hearing of the Transfer Application filed by the

respondent no.10 HCIL before the DRAT, it was also contended that

all SAs also, pending before different DRTs should be tried by one

and the same DRT, so as to avoid the possibility of conflicting orders;

(viii) The counsels for both the petitioners objected, contending that

since the assets/properties with respect to which they had filed the

SAs were located in Jaipur and Chandigarh respectively and where

they were/are also situated, it will be difficult for them to contest the

litigation at Delhi.

5. The DRAT did not find any merit in the objections of the petitioners

to transfer of the SAs aforesaid filed by them in DRT Jaipur and DRT

Chandigarh, to DRT Delhi. It was reasoned that the petitioners were also

parties to the OA No.8/2014 pending at DRT-II, Delhi and if they had no

difficulty in contesting the said OA at Delhi, their resistance to transfer of

SAs from Jaipur and Chandigarh respectively to Delhi was without

justification and dilatory.

6. The DRAT vide the impugned order dated 6th June, 2014 held that it

is appropriate that all the proceedings concerning the case are tried by one

and the same Tribunal and the same would be in the interest of justice and

would also avoid passing of any contradictory or conflicting orders. It was

further held that one Tribunal would also be able to appreciate the entire

controversy in correct perspective. Accordingly, the SAs filed by the

petitioners (pending before DRT, Jaipur and DRT, Chandigarh respectively)

along with the other SAs pending before DRT-I and III, Delhi and before

DRT, Chandigarh and DRT, Jaipur were transferred to DRT-II, Delhi where

the OA No.8 of 2014 was/is pending.

7. The challenge by the petitioners to the said order of the DRAT is only

on the ground that as per the dicta of the Full Bench of this Court in Amish

Jain (supra), the appeal/application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act

is maintainable only before the DRT within whose jurisdiction the

asset/property with respect to which the petition is filed is located and thus

the DRAT in exercise of powers under Section 17A of the DRT Act has no

power to transfer the applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act

from the DRT within whose jurisdiction the properties with respect to which

the applications are filed are situated, to another DRT. Much reliance is

placed on the observation in para 18 of the judgment in Amish Jain to the

effect that "there is no provision in the DRT Act for transfer of proceedings

from one DRT to another".

8. The Full Bench in Amish Jain (supra) was constituted, upon a doubt

having arisen as to the correctness of the judgment of the Division Bench of

this Court in Indira Devi Vs. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal 171 (2010)

DLT 439, in so far as holding that an appeal/application under Section 17 of

the SARFAESI Act can be filed not only in the DRT having jurisdiction

where the mortgaged property is situated but also in the DRT having

jurisdiction where the Branch of the Bank/Financial Institution which has

disbursed the loan is situated as well as in all DRTs which would have

jurisdiction in terms of Section 19(1) of the DRT Act read with Rule 6 of

the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (DRT Rules). The

Full Bench held:-

(a) that the reason which prevailed with the Division Bench in Indira Devi (supra), to hold that an appeal/application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act can be filed in any of the DRTs where the Bank under Section 19(1) of the DRT Act could initiate proceedings, was predicated on the DRT Act making a departure from Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in enabling the Bank to initiate proceedings not necessarily within the jurisdiction of the DRT where the mortgaged property is situated but in any of the DRTs; the Division Bench was guided by the consideration of giving the same opportunity of choosing jurisdiction to the borrower, as available to the Bank;

(b) however the Division Bench in Indira Devi fell in error in assuming the debt/money recovery proceedings to be initiated by the Bank under the DRT Act as equivalent to legal proceedings subject whereof is a mortgaged property, within the meaning of Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code; the proceedings referred to in Section 19(1) of the DRT Act are merely proceedings for recovery of debt and not for enforcement of mortgage;

(c) that for enforcement of mortgage SARFAESI Act was enacted;

(d) that the question of territorial jurisdiction for the remedy of

appeal/application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act thus has to be construed not in the light of the DRT Act making a departure from the principle enshrined in Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code;

(e) that Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides for filing of the appeal/application thereunder not to any DRT but only to the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter, but does not specify the jurisdiction;

(f) however since the cause of action for an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is the taking over of the possession/ management of the secured asset and which cause of action can be said to have accrued only within the jurisdiction of the DRT where the secured asset is situated and the possession thereof is taken over, it is the said DRT only which can be said to have jurisdiction in the matter;

(g) that exercise of jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act by DRTs of a place other than where the secured asset is situated is likely to lead to complexities and difficulties and which are best avoided;

(h) that the remedy under Section 17 is available not only to the borrower or mortgagor, but also to any other person aggrieved from the measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act; if it were to be held that more than one DRT will have jurisdiction, it may also lead to remedy under Section 17 against same action under Section 13(4) being invoked by different persons before different DRTs; "there is no provision in the DRT Act for transfer of proceedings from one DRT to another";

(i) that Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act, requiring disposal of appeals/applications under Section 17, "as far as may be" in accordance with the provisions of the DRT Act and the Rules framed thereunder is to be read as providing for disposal of appeals/ applications under Section 17 in accordance with the provisions of DRT Act and the Rules made thereunder save as otherwise provided in the SARFAESI Act;

(j) that the principles of Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code are reflected in Sections 14 and 17A of the SARFAESI Act; and,

(k) that Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code recognizes a well established principle that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where such res is situated and a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is not situated has no power to deal with and decide the rights or interests in such property or to give an effective judgment with respect thereto.

It was thus held that an appeal/application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act can be filed only before the DRT within whose jurisdiction the property/secured asset against which action is taken is situated and in no other DRT.

9. We may at the outset state that the observation aforesaid in Amish

Jain (supra) to the effect that there is no provision in the DRT Act for

transfer of proceedings from one DRT to another, though of a larger Bench,

is clearly erroneous. Attention of the Full Bench (of which one of us i.e.

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J. was a member) was not drawn to Section 17A (2) of

the DRT Act which, while defining the powers of the Chairperson of the

DRAT provides that the Chairperson of the DRAT having jurisdiction over

the Tribunals may, on the application of any of the parties or on his own

motion after notice to the parties and hearing them, transfer any case from

one Tribunal for disposal to any other Tribunal. Amish Jain (supra) was

not concerned with the aspect of transfer of appeals/applications under

Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The observation aforesaid in Amish Jain

came to be made while holding that the view taken in Indira Devi, may lead

to the remedy under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act against the same

action being invoked by different persons before different DRTs. The said

observation cannot bind this Bench. The Full Bench of this Court in

Lachman Das Bhatia Hingwala Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of

IT (2011) 330 ITR 243, on a conspectus of a host of case law, inter alia

held, (i) that a decision often takes its colour from the question involved in

the case in which it is rendered; (ii) every judgment must be read as

applicable to facts provided, since the generality of the expressions which

may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law; (iii) it

would therefore be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from

the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its

ratio and not every observation found therein; (iv) a mere casual expression

carries no weight at all and every passing expression of a Judge cannot be

treated as an ex cathedra statement having the weight of authority;(v) to

interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become

necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion

is meant to explain and not to define; and, (vi) it is not everything said by a

Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. Recently, the

Supreme Court in Deepak Bhandari Vs. Himachal Pradesh State

Industrial Development Corporation Limited AIR 2014 SC 961 has

reiterated the same position.

10. The next question for consideration is, whether in exercise of powers

under Section 17A of the DRT Act, the Chairperson of the DRAT can

transfer appeals / applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act from

one DRT to another and particularly from a DRT having territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the same to a DRT having no territorial jurisdiction.

11. As far as the question of transfer from DRT having territorial

jurisdiction to a DRT having no territorial jurisdiction is concerned, Section

17A of the DRT Act, while conferring power on the Chairperson of the

DRAT for such transfer, does not impose any condition of the transfer being

permissible only to such DRT which would also have territorial jurisdiction

or transfer being not permissible to a DRT which does not have territorial

jurisdiction. We have thus wondered whether there is any such restriction

under the general law of transfer of proceedings from one Court to another.

Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) confers power on

the High Court as well as District Judge, of transfer of suits, appeals or other

proceedings from one Court to another. The same also does not contain any

such restriction though Sub-Section (5) thereof clarifies that such power of

transfer can also be exercised with respect to a suit or proceeding instituted

and pending in a Court which has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. We

find the High Courts of Allahabad (in Kishore Lal Vs. Balkishan AIR 1932

All 660), Madras (in P. Madhavan Unni Vs. M. Jayapandia Nadar AIR

1973 Mad 2), Rajasthan (in Maliram Nemichand Jain Vs. Rajasthan

Financial Corporation AIR 1974 Raj 204), Orissa (in Mulraj Doshi Vs.

Gangadhar Singhania AIR 1982 Ori 191 and in Anima Das Vs. State of

Orissa MANU/OR/0046/2003), Kerala (in Thomas Vs. Sunnichan

MANU/KE/0688/2003), Punjab & Haryana (in Deepika Vs. Vinod Bhalla

MANU/PH/0429/2004) and Karnataka ( in M.V. Rekha Vs. Sri Sathya

MANU/KA/1315/2010), all to have held that in exercise of powers of

transfer, proceedings can be transferred to a Court which does not even

enjoy territorial jurisdiction. It was reasoned that else the very purpose and

object of conferring the power to transfer will be nullified and it was held

that the words in Section 24 of the CPC "competent to try" (and which we

may notice, are missing in Section 17A of the DRT Act) do not refer to

territorial jurisdiction. We respectfully concur with the said view. Reference

in this regard may also be made to Usha Vs. Palisetty Mohan Rao (2002)

10 SCC 544 where the opposition to transfer on the ground of the Court to

which transfer was being sought having no jurisdiction under the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1956 was negatived by holding that the powers of transfer are

altogether different from the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act and that

if such an opposition were to be accepted then no transfer of any case can be

made in as much as the matter would have been filed in a Court having

jurisdiction to deal with it and that such an interpretation would stultify the

process of law and render nugatory the provisions relating to transfer.

We therefore hold that merely because the Full Bench in Amish Jain

(supra) has held that the DRT within whose territorial jurisdiction the

secured asset with respect to which action under Section 13(4) of the

SARFAESI Act has been initiated would have exclusive territorial

jurisdiction to entertain appeal/application under Section 17 of that Act,

cannot come in the way of transfer if otherwise permissible of the said

appeal/application to another DRT.

12. That takes us to a more fundamental question, whether in exercise of

powers under Section 17A of the DRT Act, the Chairperson of the DRAT

can transfer an appeal/application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act

from one DRT to another. The counsels for the petitioners have vehemently

argued that the power of transfer under the DRT Act cannot be invoked qua

a proceeding under the SARFAESI Act. Upon our drawing attention of the

counsels to Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act, providing that the DRT

will dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the DRT

Act and the Rules made thereunder, the counsels contended that the same is

only with respect to the procedure and rules for disposal of the

appeals/applications and will not extend to incorporate in the SARFAESI

Act, Section 17A of the DRT Act.

13. Though undoubtedly the SARFAESI Act does not contain any

provision for transfer of appeals/applications under Section 17 thereof from

one DRT to another but it cannot be lost sight of that the SARFAESI Act

not only constitutes the DRT constituted under the DRT Act as a forum for

deciding the appeals /applications under Section 17 thereof but by Section

18 thereof also designates the DRAT, also constituted under the DRT Act,

as an Appellate Tribunal for hearing appeals against the orders of DRT on

appeals/applications under Section 17 of the Act. Section 18(2) again

provides that the DRATs shall dispose of the appeals against orders of the

DRTs under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act in accordance with the

provisions of DRT Act and the Rules made thereunder. The question which

arises for consideration is whether in such legislative mandate, even in the

absence of anything specific in the SARFAESI Act, the DRAT can be said

to have the power of transfer of appeals/applications under Section 17

thereof.

14. In this regard we may at the outset notice that the Supreme Court in

Transcore Vs. Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 125, in the context of the

question whether withdrawal of OA in terms of Section 19(1) of the DRT

Act is a condition precedent for taking recourse to the SARFAESI Act, held

that the remedies of enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI

Act and the DRT Act are complementary to each other and there is no

inherent or implied inconsistency between these two remedies under the two

different Acts. Recently, in Mathew Varghese Vs. M. Amritha Kumar

(2014) 5 SCC 610 the same view was reiterated in the context of the

interpretation of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rules 8 and

9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. It was held that on a

reading, together of Sections 35 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act it will have to

be held that in the event of any of the provisions of the DRT Act not being

inconsistent with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the application of

both the Acts namely the SARFAESI Act and the DRT Act would be

complementary to each other. It was further held "the effect of Section 37

would, therefore, be that in addition to the provisions contained under the

SARFAESI Act, in respect of the proceedings initiated under the said Act, it

will be in order for a party to fall back upon the provisions of other Acts

mentioned in Section 37, namely, the Companies Act, 1956, the Securities

Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, the Securities and Exchange Board of

India Act, 1992, the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial

Institutions Act, 1993, or any other law for the time being in force". It was

accordingly held that the provisions of Section 29 of the DRT Act would

also apply to actions taken under the SARFAESI Act even though there is

nothing in the SARFAESI Act applying the provisions of Section 29 of the

DRT Act to actions thereunder, the only caution being that no conflict with

reference to any of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, takes place. The

ratio of the said judgment, in our opinion applies to the present situation

also.

15. We may further notice that vide Section 17A(1) of the DRT Act, the

Chairperson of the DRAT exercises general power of superintendence and

control over the DRTs under his jurisdiction and it is in this power of

superintendence that Section 17A(2) empowers the Chairperson of the

DRAT to transfer any case from one Tribunal for disposal to any other

Tribunal. We find it hard to digest that though the SARFAESI Act also

constitutes DRT as the forum for adjudication of appeals/applications under

Section 17 thereof and the DRAT as the forum to hear appeals under

Section 18 thereof against the orders of DRT on appeals/applications under

Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act but the Chairperson of the DRAT would

not have power of superintendence over the DRTs whilst the DRTs exercise

powers of adjudication of appeals/applications under Section 17 of the

SARFAESI Act. The same would tantamount to denuding the Appellate

Authority under the SARFAESI Act from an essential power and which we

do not find to be conducive to the scheme of hierarchy of fora for

adjudication provided under the SARFAESI Act. Once, SARFAESI Act

constitutes DRAT as the Appellate Authority of DRTs exercising

adjudicatory powers under the SARFAESI Act, to hold that DRAT does not

have the power of superintendence over DRT would be nugatory of the

appellate powers of DRATs. Such power of transfer in our view in the

scheme of the Act has to be held inherent and implicit in the DRAT,

particularly when guidelines for exercise thereof are prescribed in the DRT

Act. We, in taking the view that such power of transfer, is an inherent

power, are supported at least by two Division Benches of the High Court of

Punjab and Haryana in Kishan Chand & Co. Vs. S.K. Jain (1965) 16 STC

521 and Devi Dass Gopal Kishan Vs. State of Punjab (1973) 31 STC 536.

We may further notice that the Supreme Court in Ranbir Yadav Vs. State of

Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392 has held that the power of the High Court of

superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India includes the

power to pass orders for administrative exigencies and expediency including

the power of transfer. It was held that so long as the power can be and is

exercised purely for administrative exigencies without impinging and

prejudicially affecting the rights and interests of the parties to any judicial

proceeding, there is no reason to hold that administrative powers must yield

to judicial powers. It thus follows that if it were to be held that DRAT has

no such power to transfer proceedings under the SARFAESI Act from one

DRT to another, the said power will have to be necessarily exercised by the

High Court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India. We see no reason to burden the High Courts in this regard when the

power within the ambit of the statute can be exercised by the DRATs.

16. We may also at this stage notice Section 5A of the SARFAESI Act,

which remained to be noticed in Amish Jain (supra) also, and which is as

under:-

"5A. Transfer of pending applications to any one of Debts Recovery Tribunals in certain cases--(1) If any financial asset, of a borrower acquired by a securitisation company or reconstruction company, comprise of secured debts of more than one bank or financial institution for recovery of which such banks or financial institutions has filed applications before two or more Debts Recovery Tribunals, the securitisation company or reconstruction company may file an application to the Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction over any of such Tribunals in which such applications are pending for transfer of all pending applications to any one of the Debts Recovery Tribunals as it deems fit.

(2) On receipt of such application for transfer of all pending applications under sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the application an opportunity of being heard, pass an order for transfer of the pending applications to any one of the Debts Recovery Tribunals. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal under sub- section (2) shall be binding on all the Debts Recovery Tribunals referred to in sub-section (1) as if such order had been passed by the Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction on each such Debts Recovery Tribunal.

(4) Any recovery certificate, issued, by the Debts Recovery Tribunal to which all the pending applications are transferred under sub-section (2), shall be executed in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (23) of section 19 and other provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) shall, accordingly, apply to such execution."

In our view, Section 5A also is reflective of the DRAT, while

exercising power as an appellate forum under Section 18 of the SARFAESI

Act, having the power to transfer the appeals/applications under Section 17

of the SARFAESI Act from one DRT to another. We have considered and

ruled out the possibility of the same being indicative of the power of transfer

of the DRAT being limited to the proceedings as mentioned in Section 5A

only and not to appeals/applications under Section 17 of the Act. The need,

in our view, to expressly enact Section 5A, inspite of the DRAT even while

exercising powers as an appellate forum under Section 18 of the SARFAESI

Act having power to transfer derived from Section 17A of the DRT Act

arose, because in exercise of powers under Section 17A, the proceedings

could be transferred only from one DRT within the jurisdiction of the DRAT

to another DRT also within the jurisdiction of the DRAT. Section 5A

enables the DRAT having jurisdiction over any of the two or more Tribunals

where the applications mentioned therein are pending, to transfer all

pending, applications to one DRT only.

17. We therefore hold that the DRAT in the present case had the

jurisdiction to transfer the proceedings pending before DRT, Jaipur and

DRT, Chandigarh to DRT-II, Delhi.

18. Though the counsels for the petitioners have not challenged or

controverted the reasons for which the DRAT in the present cases has

exercised the power of transfer but we may notice that the reasons given by

the DRAT are in consonance with the spirit of the judgment of the Full

Bench in Amish Jain (supra) as well the spirit of Section 5A of the

SARFAESI Act. The Supreme Court in Kulvinder Singh Vs. Kandi

Friends Education Trust (2008) 3 SCC 659 and Pannalal Binjraj Vs.

Union of India AIR 1957 SC 397 has held that there should be no hesitation

to transfer the case even if it has caused some inconvenience to one of the

parties to the lis.

19. No other argument has been urged.

20. No merit is found in the petitions which are dismissed.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 bs