Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 4259 Del
Judgement Date : 9 September, 2014
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 5992/2014
ARGHYA KUMAR NATH ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. Sunil Dalal, Advocate
versus
PROF. D.S. RAWAT & ORS. ..... Respondent
Through Mr. Amit Bansal with Ms. Senjal
Khanna, Advocates
% Date of Decision : 9th September, 2014
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
JUDGMENT
MANMOHAN, J: (Oral)
CM APPL. 14631/2014 in W.P.(C) 5992/2014 Allowed, subject to just exceptions.
W.P.(C) 5992/2014 & CM APPL. 14630/2014
1. Present writ petition has been filed seeking a direction to respondents to set aside the rejection of petitioner's nomination for the post of President on 3 rd September, 2014. Petitioner also seeks a direction to respondents to allow him to contest for the post of President in College Student's Union 2014.
2. In the accompanying application for stay, the petitioner has sought a direction to respondents not to conduct election for the post of President in the College Student Union of Sri Aurobindo College.
3. It is pertinent to mention that petitioner's nomination was rejected on the ground that his signature on the nomination form did not match with the signature on the Identity Card.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner states that petitioner's nomination form has been rejected merely on the difference of one alphabet 'K' in the signature on the form. He submits that the Delhi University notification does not provided for cancellation of nomination on any such frivolous ground. He further submits that the impugned order is non reasoned and is in violation of principles of natural justice.
5. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the writ court is under a mandatory obligation to entertain the present writ petition as it is neither frivolous nor vitiated by malice. In support of his submissions, he relies upon the Division Bench of this Court in Narender Kumar Jain Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2008 X AD (DELHI) 105.
6. Though there is no absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition in electoral matters, yet once an election process has commenced, it must normally be concluded in accordance with its schedule and any challenge to the election must await the conclusion of the election. The Courts normally pass orders only to assist completion of elections and not to interdict the same.
7. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court after considering a number of judgments has in LPA 523/2013, The Yachting Association of India vs. Boardsailing Association of India and Ors. held as under:-
"22. In the case of N.P. Punnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem Dist. And Others: AIR 1952 SC 64, the Supreme Court, inter-alia, considered the meaning of the word „election‟ as used in Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India which provided that no election to the Parliament would be called in question except by a election petition. The Supreme Court observed that the word „election‟ had
acquired a wide and a narrow meaning. While in the narrow sense it could mean the election of a candidate. In the wider sense, the word „election‟ could encompass the entire electoral process culminating in declaring the election of a candidate. The Court summed up its conclusions as under:-
"16. The conclusions which I have arrived at may be summed up briefly as follows:
(1). Having regard to the important functions which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognized to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time-schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over, so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted. (2). In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to ''anything which does not affect the election; ''and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the ''election'' and enable the person affected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any Court while the election is in progress."
In the case of Supreme Court Bar Association and Ors. v. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774, the Supreme Court has expressed a similar view as under:
"43. It hardly needs to be emphasized that in any Body governed by democratic principles, no member has a right to claim an injunction so as to stall the formation of the governing body of the Association. No such right exists in election matters since exercise of a right conferred by a rule is always subject to the qualifications prescribed and limitations imposed thereunder. .....
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
"60. Further, the appellants had rightly pointed out to the learned Judge that election process had already started and, therefore, injunction, as claimed, should not be granted. Since 1952 this Court has authoritatively laid down that once election process has started the courts should not ordinarily interfere with the said process by way of granting injunction. The argument advanced by the appellants that election process having started, the injunction should not be granted is dealt with by the learned Judge by holding that in the present case the plaintiffs have not prayed for injunction against the election process."
23. The principles of law relating to election of candidates under the Representation of People Act, 1951 have been extended to elections in general also. In the case of Shri Sant Sadguru (supra), the Supreme Court while considering a case of elections to the Managing Committee of a society registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 reiterated the settled law as under:-
"12. In view of our finding that preparation of the electoral roll being an intermediate stage in the process of election of the Managing Committee of a specified society and the election process having been set in motion, it is well settled that the High Court should not stay the continuation of the election process even though there may be some alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll. It is not disputed that the election in question has already been held and the result thereof has been stayed by an order of this Court, and once the result of the election is declared, it would be open to the appellants to challenge the election of the returned candidate, if aggrieved, by means of an election petition before the Election Tribunal."
24. In light of the aforesaid judgments, we are inclined to accept the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the election process having commenced, the same ought not to have been interdicted and any challenge to the election could be pursued only after the elections are over. We further do not find that any irreparable loss or prejudice would be caused to respondents Nos.
1 to 12, if the election process as commenced is concluded. Accordingly, the directions contained in the impugned order restraining the opening of the ballot boxes and counting of the votes are set aside. The appellant would be at liberty to complete the election process and declare the results.
25. We further clarify that we have not expressed any opinion as to the merits of the disputes between the parties and it shall be open for the respondent nos. 1 to 12 to pursue their challenge to the elections in the pending writ petition.
26. The parties are left to bear their own costs."
(emphasis supplied)
8. This Court would also like to clarify that the term 'election' includes all steps and entire process commencing from the date of notification of election till the date of declaration of result. Consequently, at this stage, that means, prior to declaration of result, there can be no stay of the election process.
9. Moreover, this Court is of the opinion that in election matters the remedy available is to challenge it by way of an election petition or by way of a suit or in accordance with the agreed dispute resolution mechanism. In K.K. Srivastava and Others vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 494 it was held, "It is well settled law that while Article 226 of the Constitution confers a wide power on the High Court there are equally well settled limitations which this Court has repeatedly pointed out on the exercise of such power. One of them which is relevant for the present case is that where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election."
10. In Nanhoo Mal and Others vs. Hira Mal and Others (1976) 3 SCC 211, the Supreme Court after referring to N.P. Ponnuswami vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, 1952 SCR 528 has held that election disputes can be challenged only by way of an election petition and Article 226 remedy should
normally not be invoked for the same. In N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"25. (2). In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to ''anything which does not affect the election; ''and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the ''election'' and enable the person affected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any Court while the election is in progress."
11. In Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 487 the Supreme Court has also held as under:-
"19. It is well-settled principle that where elections are conducted in accordance with the provisions of a statute and the statute also provides a remedy of settlement of election disputes by filing an election petition before a tribunal, it is that remedy alone which should be availed of and recourse cannot be taken to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. This view has been taken in a series of decisions rendered by this Court. The earliest decision was rendered in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer [1952 SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64] by a Bench of six learned Judges. In this case the nomination paper of the appellant for election to the Madras Legislative Assembly was rejected by the Returning Officer. The appellant challenged the rejection of the nomination paper by filing a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer on account of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, which says that no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. In appeal, this Court examined the question whether the writ petition
would be maintainable at the initial stage against an order rejecting the nomination paper. Certain observations made in AIR para 9 of the reports are relevant and they are being reproduced below: (SCR p. 228)
"The law of elections in India does not contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts having been expressly excluded), and another after they have been completed by means of an election petition. Any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court."
20. In AIR para 12 it was observed:
"Where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of.
It will be a fair inference from the provisions of the Representation of the People Act to draw that the Act provides for only one remedy, that remedy being by an election petition to be presented after the election is over, and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate stage."
21. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851] it was held that if during the process of election, at any intermediate or final stage, the entire poll has been wrongly cancelled and a fresh poll has been wrongly ordered, that is a matter which may be agitated after declaration of the result on the basis of the fresh poll, by questioning the election in the appropriate forum by means of an election petition in accordance with law.
22. The same view has been taken in regard to the elections held in accordance with some statutory provisions where Article 329(b) of the Constitution is not applicable and they are not governed by the Representation of the People Act. In K.K. Shrivastava v. Bhupendra
Kumar Jain [(1977) 2 SCC 494 : AIR 1977 SC 1703] the dispute related to election to the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh under the Advocates Act and Rule 31 of the Election Rules framed by the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh provided that all disputes arising under the Rule shall be decided by a tribunal to be known as an Election Tribunal. The defeated candidate approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the election which was allowed by the High Court. This Court set aside the judgment of the High Court with the following observations: (SCC p. 496, para 3) "Where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms."
23. In Gujarat University v. N.U. Rajguru [1987 Supp SCC 512 : AIR 1988 SC 66] the dispute related to election to the Court of Gujarat University. Some teachers challenged the holding of elections by means of a writ petition before the High Court which was allowed. In appeal, this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court with the following observations: (SCC p. 516, para 6) "6. It is well settled that where a statute provides for election to an office, or an authority or institution and if it further provides a machinery or forum for determination of dispute arising out of election, the aggrieved person should pursue his remedy before the forum provided by the statute. While considering an election dispute it must be kept in mind that the right to vote, contest or dispute election is neither a fundamental nor a common law right, instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions. It is not permissible to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution bypassing the machinery designated by the Act for determination of the election dispute. Ordinarily the remedy provided by the statute must be followed before the authority designated therein. But there may be cases where exceptional or extraordinary circumstances may exist to justify bypassing the alternative remedies."
24. There are several other decisions where the same view has been taken. S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan [(1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988 SC 616] is a case relating to election to the office of Chairman of a Panchayat Union under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 where it was held that the parties who are aggrieved by the result of the election can question the validity of the election by an election petition which is an effective alternative remedy and it is not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the election process.
25.C. Subrahmanyam v. K. Ramanjaneyullu [(1998) 8 SCC 703] is a case relating to election under the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act and in a short judgment it was observed that the main question for decision being the non-compliance with a provision of the Act which is a ground for an election petition in Rule 12 framed under the Act, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not have been entertained for this purpose.
26. In Ashok Kumar Jain v. Neetu Kathoria [(2004) 12 SCC 73] a writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the election held under the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972. This Court observed that Section 66-A of the said Act provided that an election under the Act could be challenged only by presenting an election petition and except in some exceptional extraordinary circumstances, normally remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the election by filing a writ petition would not be available.
27.Umesh Shivappa Ambi v. Angadi Shekara Basappa [(1998) 4 SCC 529] is a case relating to election of the President, Vice- President and Chairman, etc. under the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, wherein the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution set aside the order by which the nomination of the first respondent therein was rejected. This Court reversed the judgment of the High Court with the following observation: (SCC p.
529) "Once an election is over, the aggrieved candidate will have to pursue his remedy in accordance with the provisions of law and the High Court will not ordinarily interfere with
the elections under Article 226. The High Court will not ordinarily interfere where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy available, particularly in relation to election disputes."
28. Similar view has been taken in Harnek Singh v. Charanjit Singh [(2005) 8 SCC 383] which is a case relating to election of Chairman of the Gram Panchayat and the judgment of the High Court by which the order of the Returning Officer was set aside in a writ petition was reversed.
29. As discussed earlier, the pleadings of the parties show that the dispute raised was purely factual in nature as to whether some confusion had been created regarding the date fixed for holding of the meeting of the Committee for electing the office-bearers of the Executive Board. The dispute could more appropriately be resolved by examination of oral evidence to be led by the parties. The writ petitioner Avtar Singh Hit claimed that on account of the confusion in dates he could not attend the meeting though he was very keen to participate in the meeting and contest for the office of the President of the Executive Board. In view of the nature of the dispute raised, the proper remedy for the petitioner was to file an election petition as provided in Section 31 of the Act where parties could have got opportunity to lead oral evidence. No exceptional or extraordinary circumstances were disclosed which could justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution and for not availing the remedy provided by the statute. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the writ petitions ought not to have been entertained for resolving the dispute relating to election and on this count alone the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed."
12. The Division Bench judgment in Narender Kumar Jain (supra) offers no assistance to the petitioner as in the said case the Court dealt with a writ petition which challenged the order passed by Delhi Cooperative Tribunal setting aside the election to the Board of Directors of the Cooperative Bank as void ab initio. Consequently, the said judgment dealt with a writ petition post declaration of result and not prior to the election process having been
completed -- like in the present case.
13. This Court is also of the opinion that the power of judicial review conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to prevent cases of abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities. A writ lies where performance of a public or statutory duty is involved. Writs can also be issued against private authorities discharging public functions, provided the decision sought to be challenged or enforced is in discharge of a public function.
14. Consequently, elections of bar association/society/trade union/college union is a matter of internal management, which does not entitle the aggrieved party to a public remedy like a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. Keeping in view the aforesaid, present writ petition and applications are dismissed with liberty to petitioner to challenge the election result after declaration of the same in accordance with law.
MANMOHAN, J SEPTEMBER 09, 2014 rn
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