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Mohd. Imtiyaz vs Mohd. Naseem
2014 Latest Caselaw 4115 Del

Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 4115 Del
Judgement Date : 3 September, 2014

Delhi High Court
Mohd. Imtiyaz vs Mohd. Naseem on 3 September, 2014
Author: Valmiki J. Mehta
*            IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+            RC.REV.No.594/2012 & C.M.No.20598/2012 (stay)


%                                                     03st September, 2014


MOHD. IMTIYAZ                                                 ......Petitioner
                           Through:      Mr.Gaurav Bhardwaj, Advocate.

                           VERSUS

MOHD. NASEEM                                                 ...... Respondent
                           Through:      Mr.R.D.Mishra, Advocate.

+            RC.REV.No.600/2012 & C.M.No.20783/2012 (stay)


MOHD. SIRAJ                                                    ......Petitioner
                           Through:      Mr.Gaurav Bhardwaj, Advocate.

                           VERSUS

MOHD. NASEEM                                                 ...... Respondent
                           Through:      Mr.R.D.Mishra, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?


VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. Both these petitions under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,

1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') challenging the impugned order

dated 23.7.2012 of the Additional Rent Controller dismissing the leave to

defend applications can be disposed of by this common judgment as the

landlord in both the cases is the same and who is the respondent herein, and,

the need prayed in the eviction petitions is also common i.e for the son of the

respondent/landlord Mohd. Jafar who is unemployed and not doing any job,

and therefore the need for the suit/tenanted premises.

2. For the sake of convenience, reference is being made to the facts of the

RC. REV.No.594/2012.

3. The respondent/landlord filed the subject eviction petition for bonafide

necessity under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act for eviction of the petitioner/tenant

from the tenanted room on the ground floor with common latrine and bathroom

in property bearing no. AB-430, Amar Puri, Nabi Karim, New Delhi on the

ground that the respondent/landlord has a son namely Mohd. Jafar who as of

date is about 23 years of age and not doing any job, and therefore the

respondent/tenant needs the tenanted premises as a shop for his son to start his

business. The respondent/landlord pleaded that he has no other alternative

suitable accommodation/commercial premises for his son to carry on his

business. The respondent/landlord also pleaded that the expenditure of his

family is increasing, and therefore he needs his son Mohd. Jafar to start his

business and earn money so as to meet the family expenses.

4. The petitioner/tenant contested the eviction petition by filing his leave to

defend application. Two main grounds were urged before the Additional Rent

Controller and which are also urged before this Court for grant of leave to

defend. Firstly, it is pleaded that the respondent/landlord owns one commercial

premises at Dilshad Garden, Delhi as also another commercial property bearing

no.7203 at Main Qutub Road, Delhi, which were pleaded to be alternative

suitable accommodation. The second reason on which the leave to defend was

prayed to be granted was that the respondent/landlord had transferred the suit

premises to one Sh.Bijender Singh, and therefore though originally the

respondent was the owner/landlord of the premises with whom the rent

agreement was executed, subsequently the respondent/landlord has ceased to be

the owner/landlord of the suit property. Reference is invited to a civil suit

which is said to be pending between the respondent and Sh.Bijender Singh in

the court of Sh. Vimal Kumar Yadav, Ld. ADJ, Delhi.

5. In my opinion, both the grounds urged for seeking leave to defend are

totally misconceived and the Additional Rent Controller was justified in

dismissing the leave to defend application.

6. The first ground urged on behalf of the petitioner/tenant was a bald self-

serving averment, and the Additional Rent Controller has rightly rejected this

contention by observing that once the respondent/landlord has denied that he

owns the properties as stated by the petitioner/tenant, no bonafide triable issue

arises, and which would have only arisen if the petitioner/tenant had filed some

documents to show that the properties at Dilshad Garden and Main Qutub Road

belonged to the respondent/landlord. The Additional Rent Controller is

justified in rejecting the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner/tenant,

inasmuch as, if on the grounds such as these leave to defend is to be granted,

then all that the tenants will have to do is to make a reference to some

imaginary property being owned by the landlord and the courts would be

compelled to grant leave to defend in their favour, however, that is not a

position in law. The first argument urged on behalf of the petitioner/tenant is

therefore rejected.

7. The second argument urged on behalf of the petitioner/tenant that the

respondent is no longer the owner/landlord of the suit/tenanted premises, this

argument is also without any basis because the petitioner/tenant admits that

there was a rent agreement with the respondent and to whom the rent was paid.

The issue as to whether the respondent has lost the ownership of the

suit/tenanted premises to one Sh.Bijender Singh cannot be held today against

the respondent unless there is a final judgment in a civil suit which holds that

the respondent is no longer the owner of the suit/tenanted premises and that the

suit premises are allegedly owned by one Sh.Bijender Singh. I may note that

the respondent/landlord has specifically pleaded before the Additional Rent

Controller that Sh.Bijender Singh had played a fraud with the respondent, and

with respect to which an FIR No.44/04 u/S 420/467/468 and 471 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) has been lodged in the Police Station Nabi Karim.

Also, mere pendency of a civil suit and even if there is a status quo order

passed in favour of the parties thereto cannot mean that the respondent has lost

the title because a status quo is only an interim order during the pendency of

the suit to maintain status quo inter se the parties in that suit, but that status quo

order has no concern with an eviction petition which is filed by the

respondent/landlord to evict his tenants. There is no order of the civil suit

which is filed that the respondent/landlord cannot take possession from the

tenants.

8. It was also argued on behalf of the petitioner/tenant that the

respondent/landlord cannot have requirement of two shops for his one son,

Mohd. Jafar, however, surely for the respondent/landlord's son to carry on his

business if two shops are required, then the tenants cannot object that the

business should be carried on only from one shop area of which is just 10ft X

14ft and not from another shop also.

9. In view of the above, there is no merit in these petitions, and the same

are therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J SEPTEMBER 03, 2014 KA

 
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