Delhi High Court
Sh. Munni Lal And Anr vs Union Of India And Ors on 25 November, 2014
Author: Badar Durrez Ahmed
$~12
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 25.11.2014
+ W.P.(C) 4650/2012 & CM No.8487/2014
SH. MUNNI LAL AND ANR .... Petitioners
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS ..... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr Rakesh Kumar Garg and Mr Rajiv Kumar Ghawana
For the Respondents : Mr Yeeshu Jain and Ms Jyoti Tyagi, Advocates for LAC/L&B
Ms Shobhana Takiar for DDA
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL
JUDGMENT
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)
1. The affidavit handed over by Mr Yeeshu Jain on behalf of the Land
Acquisition Collector is taken on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner
does not wish to file a rejoinder affidavit.
2. The petitioners seek the benefit of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as „the 2013 Act‟) which came
into effect on 01.01.2014. A declaration is sought to the effect that the
acquisition proceeding, which is the subject matter of the present writ petition,
ought to be deemed to have lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
3. The Award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
as „the 1894 Act‟) was made vide Award No. 19/97-98 dated 19.12.1997 and it
was in respect of, inter alia, the petitioners‟ land comprised in Khasra Nos.
17/10 Min (2-04), 7/11 Min (2-04), 18/6 (5-02), 18/15 Min (4-18) measuring
14 bighas 8 biswas in all in village Shahpur Garhi.
4. It is an admitted position that the physical possession of the subject land
has not been taken by the land acquiring agency. However, the learned counsel
for the respondents contend that the physical possession could not be taken
because of the operation of the stay order passed in W.P.(C) No. 179/1996. It is
an admitted position that the stay order continued to operate till 01.01.2014
when the 2013 Act came into effect. This aspect of the matter concerning the
submission that possession could not be taken because of the operation of the
stay order and that in such a situation the respondents should not be prejudiced,
was considered by this Court in the case of Jagjit Singh & Ors. vs. UOI & Ors:
W.P.(C) 2806/2004 and other connected matters which were decided by this
Court on 27.05.2014. In that decision, this Court observed as under:-
"8. The learned counsel for the respondents also submitted
that no party can be put to a disadvantage because of an act of
the Court. Since this Court had passed interim orders, it
cannot work to the disadvantage of the respondents.
9. We have already set out section 24 of the new Act in
its entirety. It is evident that section 24(2) of the new Act is a
non-obstante provision. The conditions which are required to
be satisfied before the deeming provision is triggered are:-
(i) The award should have been made under
section 11 of the old Act, more than five
years prior to the commencement of the
new act; and
(ii) Physical possession of the land in question
should not have been taken; or
(iii) The compensation should not have been
paid.
These conditions are unqualified. It does not matter as
to what was the reason behind the non-payment of
compensation or for not taking possession. If the legislature
wanted to qualify the above conditions by excluding the
period during which the proceedings of acquisition of land
were held up on account of stay or injunction by way of an
order of a Court, it could have been expressly spelt out. In
fact, whenever the legislature thought that it was necessary to
spell out such an intention, it did. An example of this is to be
found in the first proviso to section 19 (7) of the new Act
which is as under:-
"19(7)........Provided that in computing the
period referred to in this sub-section, any period
or periods during which the proceedings for the
acquisition of the land were held up on account
of any stay or injunction by the order of any
Court shall be excluded."
10. Furthermore, it would be instructive to refer to the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandurang
Vinayak (supra) which has been relied upon by Mr Sethi, the
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners.
In that decision the purpose and meaning of a statutory fiction
was being considered. While doing so, the Supreme Court
referred to an English decision in the case of East End
Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council: (1952)
A.C. 109 and in particular to an observation of Lord Asquith
which was to the following effect:-
"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of
affairs as real, you must surely, unless
prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real
the consequences and incidents which, if the
putative, state of affairs had in fact existed,
must inevitably have flowed from or
accompanied it. ....The statue says that you must
imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say
that having done so, you must cause or permit
your imagination to boggle when it comes to
the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs."
11. Following the above observation, it is obvious that the
deeming provision of section 24(2) is a legal fiction which is
a created and an imagined situation. We ought not to be
concerned with the inevitable corollaries that may flow out of
it unless there is a clear prohibition in the statute itself. Once
the state of affairs is imagined as real, the consequences and
instances would also have to be imagined as real. Therefore,
the fact that the possession could not have been taken by the
respondents because of interim orders of the Court, would not
in any way prevent this Court from imagining the state of
affairs stipulated in Section 24(2) of the new Act. The only
conditions that are required for the deeming provisions to be
triggered are that the award must have been made five years
or more prior to the commencement of the new Act and that
either physical possession of the land has not been taken or
that the compensation has not been paid. In fact in these writ
petitions all the conditions stands satisfied. Therefore, the
contention of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be
accepted."
5. As a consequence, it has to be held that the respondents did not take
physical possession of the subject land. With regard to the allegation of
compensation, it is the case of the respondents that the compensation also could
not be paid in respect of the said land because of the stay order referred to
above. This aspect is covered by the above discussion with regard to
possession. As such, for the purposes of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, it has to
be held that compensation has not been paid and the physical possession of the
subject land has also not been taken by the Land Acquiring Agency. The
Award was also made more than five years prior to the commencement of the
2013 Act. Therefore, all the ingredients of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as
interpreted by the Supreme Court and this Court in the following decisions
stand satisfied:-
(1) Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki and Ors: (2014) 3 SCC 183;
(2) Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC
564;
(3) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on
10.09.2014;
(4) Surender Singh v. Union of India & Others: WP(C)
2294/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this Court; and
(5) Jagjit Singh & Ors. vs. UOI & Ors: W.P.(C) 2806/2004
decided on 27.05.2014.
6. As a result, the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the said
acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act in respect of the subject
land are deemed to have lapsed. It is so declared.
7. The writ petition and CM No. 8487/2014 are allowed to the aforesaid
extent. There shall be no order as to costs.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
NOVEMBER 25, 2014 SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J
SU
