Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 2307 Del
Judgement Date : 7 May, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 7th May, 2014.
+ CS(OS) 1112/1998
RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. B.B. Sawhney, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Vishnu Sharma and Mr. Lakshay
Sawhney, Advs.
Versus
VIJAY CABLE INDUSTRIES & ORS ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Rajesh Banati, Adv. for D-1&2
Mr. A.K. Singh, Mr. Arun Kr.
Panwar and Ms. Geentajali Khanna,
Advs. for UPFC.
AND
+ EX.P. 126/1997
SOM DUTT ENTERPRISES LIMITED .... Decree Holder
Through: Mr. B.B. Sawhney, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Vishnu Sharma and Mr. Lakshay
Sawhney, Advs.
Versus
VIJAY CABLE INDUSTRIES & ORS ..... Judgement Debtors
Through: Mr. Rajesh Banati, Adv. for D-1&2
Mr. A.K. Singh, Mr. Arun Kr.
Panwar and Ms. Geentajali Khanna,
Advs. for UPFC.
AND
CS(OS) 1112/1998, EX.P. 126/1997 & EX.P. 96/2008 Page 1 of 19
+ EX.P. 96/2008, EA No.189/2008, EA No.145/2014 (of UPFC u/O
21 R-58), EA No.75/2014 (of the Judgment Debtor u/O 21 R-58)
& EA No.34/2014 (of the decree holder u/S 151 CPC).
NATIONAL SMALL INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION LTD ..... Decree Holder
Through: Mr. Sanjay Sharma, Adv.
Versus
M/S VIJAY CABLE INDUSTRIES LTD.
AND ORS ..... Judgement Debtors
Through: Mr. Rajesh Banati, Adv. for JD-1&2.
Mr. A.K. Singh, Mr. Arun Kr.
Panwar and Ms. Geentajali Khanna,
Advs. for UPFC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
I.As. No.7948/1998 (of plaintiff u/S 151 CPC), 11037/2007 (of UPFC for
vacation of order dated 14th September, 1998), 3952/2014 (of UPFC for
impleadment as party to the suit) & 6220/2014 (of plaintiff for
impleadment of UPFC as a party to this suit) in CS(OS) No.1112/1998
1.
The suit i.e. CS(OS) No.1112/1998 has been filed under Order 34 of
the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908 for recovery of Rs.6,20,98,822.11
paise jointly and severally from the defendant No.1 M/s Vijay Cable
Industries, defendant No.2 Mr. Vijay Kumar Bhatia, defendant No.3 Mr.
Tilak Raj Bhatia, both partners of M/s Vijay Cable Industries as well as
from defendant No.4 Ms. Priya Bhatia wife of the defendant No.2 Mr. Vijay
Kumar Bhatia and defendant No.5 M/s Vijay Cables Ltd., by enforcement
of equitable mortgage of property No.A-111, New Friends Colony, New
Delhi and property No.37, Block-A, Phase-II, Noida, U.P., pleading:
(i) that as on 21st May, 1996, the defendant No.1 of which the
defendants No.2&3 were partners owed the principal sum of
Rs.3,23,75,000/- to the plaintiff towards price of goods sold, supplied
and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants No.1 to 3 and which
amount the defendants No.1 to 3 were unable to pay;
(ii) that the defendants No.1 to 3, to be able to continue making the
purchases from the plaintiff, agreed to create charge and/or mortgage
over their properties aforesaid and also offered the personal
guarantees of the defendants No.2 & 4 and which was agreed to by
the plaintiff;
(iii) that the defendants No.2 & 4 created equitable
mortgage/charge over property No.A-111, New Friends Colony, New
Delhi by depositing title deeds thereof with the plaintiff; similarly,
the defendant No.5 created mortgage of the property aforesaid at
Noida, U.P.;
(iv) that the defendants were however unable to pay their dues and
which at the time of institution of the suit stood at Rs.6,20,98,822.11
paise.
2. Summons of the suit were issued and vide ad-interim ex-parte order
dated 28th May, 1998, the defendants were restrained from alienating,
transferring or creating third party interest in the two properties aforesaid.
3. The plaintiff filed I.A. No.7948/1998 under Section 151 CPC
pleading that the Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation (UPFC) had issued
public notice/advertisement in the newspaper dated 4 th September, 1998
inviting offers for sale (under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations
Act, 1951) inter alia of the property No.A-111, New Friends Colony, New
Delhi claiming the said property to be lying with UPFC as collateral
security and contending that since the original title documents of the said
property were lying with the plaintiff, the said property could not be lying as
collateral security with the UPFC and seeking to restrain the UPFC from
selling, alienating, transferring or creating any third party interest in the said
New Friends Colony property.
4. I.A. No.7948/1998 came up before this Court first on 14th September,
1998 when notice thereof was issued and UPFC was in the meanwhile,
restrained from selling, alienating, transferring or creating third party
interest in the said New Friends Colony property.
5. UPFC filed a reply to the application contending, (a) that the
documents filed by the plaintiff of creation of equitable mortgage of the
New Friends Colony property in favour of the plaintiff were not the title
documents of the said property; (b) that as on 21 st May, 1996, when the
plaintiff claimed equitable mortgage to have been created, the defendants
had no right, title or interest to create equitable mortgage of the property in
favour of the plaintiff; (c) that the defendant No.1 and M/s Priya Cable (P)
Ltd. had availed loan facility from the UPFC in the sums of Rs.90 lakhs,
Rs.90 lakhs and Rs.50 lakhs and to secure the repayment of the aforesaid
loans, had deposited the original Conveyance Deed dated 24th October, 1996
of the New Friends Colony property with the UPFC; (d) that the sum of
Rs.1,19,66,952.18 paise was due from defendant No.1 M/s Vijay Cable
Industries and a sum of Rs.1,90,47,035.02 paise was due from M/s Priya
Cable (P) Ltd. to UPFC and UPFC, in exercise of its rights under the State
Financial Corporations Act, had advertised for sale of the said property.
6. The suit continued to languish and the ex-parte restraint order dated
14th September, 1998 against the UPFC continued. A perusal of the order
sheet does not show any effort having been made on behalf of UPFC to
have the said stay order vacated.
7. On 11th July, 2005, the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and
default; however application for restoration was filed and the suit was on
28th August, 2006 restored to its original position. Even in the interregnum
UPFC does not appear to have taken any step for sale of the property.
8. Ultimately, after nearly ten years, I.A. No.11037/2007 was filed by
UPFC seeking vacation of the ex-parte order dated 14th September, 1998,
contending that it was not even a party to the suit and that public dues were
held up owing to the ex-parte order dated 14th September, 1998; notice of
the said application was issued.
9. The plaintiff filed reply to I.A. No.11037/2007 contending that the
UPFC could not, after ten years, seek vacation of the ex-parte order dated
14th September, 1998, when no steps were taken earlier for vacation thereof.
10. The matter again continued to languish for nearly five years; the
orders dated 26th September, 2011, 5th January, 2012, 13th April, 2012 and
4th September, 2013 indicate that the defendants made a proposal for one
time settlement of the dues of UPFC but it was reported on 31 st October,
2013 that no settlement had been reached.
11. Strangely, UPFC then filed I.A. No.3952/2014 for impleadment as a
defendant in this suit and which application also is pending consideration.
12. The matter was listed before this Court on 27 th March, 2014 when it
was enquired from the senior counsel for the plaintiff as to how the plaintiff,
in this suit, to which UPFC was / is not a party, could seek interim order
against UPFC. It was also observed that UPFC, though had applied for
impleadment as a defendant but only on the ground of being affected by the
interim order dated 14th September, 1998 in the suit and if it were to be held
that the plaintiff could not have obtained interim order against a non-party
to the suit, the question of impleading UPFC as a party thereto would also
not arise. On request of the senior counsel for the plaintiff to prepare, the
matter was posted for 2nd April, 2014.
13. The plaintiff thereafter has filed I.A. No.6220/2014, also for
impleadment of UPFC as a party to the suit.
14. The senior counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for the UPFC
have been heard.
15. To meet the observation of the Court on 27 th March, 2014 that no
interim order against a non-party to the suit could have been obtained, the
senior counsel for the plaintiff has relied on the judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in Tax Recovery Officer XVI, New Delhi Vs. Punjab &
Sind Bank 161 (1986) ITR 220. In that case, a) the Punjab & Sind Bank
had filed a suit for recovery of the dues from its debtors who had also
created equitable mortgage of their property in favour of the Bank; b)
interim order restraining the defendants from alienating, encumbering or
parting with possession of the property was obtained; c) during the
pendency of the suit, the Income Tax Department published a notice for
auction of the same property in realization of the income tax dues of the
defendants. The Division Bench of this Court held that while the Bank was
a secured creditor, the Income Tax Department was an unsecured creditor
and thus the dues of the Bank would have priority over the income tax dues.
It was further held that since the security held by the Bank was in jeopardy,
the Court was entitled to, in exercise of powers under Section 151 of the
CPC, issue an injunction even against a person who is not a party to the suit
as otherwise the property vesting with the Bank would have been in
jeopardy and the Bank would have been denied justice. It was thus held that
Section 151 CPC can be invoked even against a third party.
16. The senior counsel for the plaintiff has also referred to Indian Bank
Vs. Ashoka Builders & Promoters MANU/DE/0337/1992, where a learned
Single Judge of this Court, following the judgment supra also held that an
injunction order can be issued under Section 151 CPC against a party who
may not be a party to the main suit.
17. The counsel for the UPFC has not been able to argue to the contrary.
18. Though I respectfully differ from the proposition, of it being open to
the Court to issue an interim order against a non-party to the suit, for the
reasons,
(i) that the interim orders are in aid of the final relief and when the
question of granting a final relief does not arise owing to such person
not being a party to the suit, no question of granting interim relief
against such party can arise;
(ii) Section 151 CPC enables the Court to make such orders as may
be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court; however grant of an interim order against a
person, the dispute with whom is not for adjudication before the
Court, amounts to enabling the plaintiff/applicant to, without calling
upon the Court to adjudicate the dispute if any with a person and
without impleading that person, obtain interim order against him, is
an abuse of the process of the Court;
but the judgments aforesaid would bind me, unless found to
have been overruled / dissented from.
19. I have therefore examined the legal position. My research shows,
a) that the aforesaid judgments have not been referred to in any
subsequent judgments;
b) that a Division Bench of this Court in Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Limited Vs. Shri Hari Chand Sachdeva AIR 2001
Delhi 307, though without reference to the earlier judgments in
Punjab & Sind Bank and / or Ashoka Builders & Promoters, set
aside the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge inter alia
on the ground that the relief prayed for in the application (for interim
relief) was totally outside the scope of the suit and that no relief could
have been granted in favour of a party to the suit 'against a third
party';
c) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court also, in Basket
Ball Federation of India Vs. N.S. Ziauddeen, Tamil Nadu
Basketball Association MANU/TN/0263/2013 held that granting of
an order of injunction against a third party, without impleading it,
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law;
d) a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala in Balakrishnan
Nair v. Mohammed Kunju MANU/KE/0127/1963 and the High
Court of Kerala in Varghese Vs. Fast Line Builders and Developers
Kerala Pvt. MANU/KE/1232/2013,
e) a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in K.P.M.
Aboobucker Vs. K. Kunhamoo AIR 1958 Madras 287,
f) the High Court of Gujarat in Shahbuddin Ismailbhai
Ghaswala Vs. Keshavlal Lallubhai Tandel MANU/GJ/0250/1985,
and,
g) the High Court of Allahabad in L.D. Meston School Society
Vs. Kashi Nath Misra AIR 1951 Allahabad 558,
to have also held that no order of injunction can be passed to affect a
person who is not a party to the proceeding, observing that an interim
relief granted during the pendency of a suit, cannot be of greater
scope than what could be granted in the suit itself and thus the Court
has no jurisdiction to grant by way of interim relief what could never
be granted in the main suit itself;
h) a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in
Unnamalai Achi v. Umayal Achi MANU/TN/0569/1967, relying on
Manoharlal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal AIR
1962 SC 527 did hold that in suitable cases, injunction could be
issued under Section 151 CPC, though in the facts of that case,
refused to grant such injunction;
i) as far as the power of the Court to grant injunction outside
Order XXXIX Rules 1&2 CPC is concerned, the same has been put
beyond a pale of controversy in Tanusree Basu Vs. Ishani Prasad
Basu (2008) 4 SCC 791 where it has been held that Order XXXIX
Rules 1&2 CPC are not the sole repository of the power of the Court
to grant injunction and Section 151 CPC empowers the Court to grant
injunction, if matter is not covered by Rules 1&2 of Order XXXIX;
however, the occasion for considering the grant of injunction against
a non-party to a suit did not fall for consideration therein.
20. The law therefore is found to be, that while injunctions outside Order
XXXIX Rules 1&2 CPC can be granted in exercise of inherent powers of
the Court under Section 151 CPC, there is no dicta, at least of the Supreme
Court on the aspect, whether even under Section 151 CPC, injunction can be
issued against a non-party to the suit. The views of the High Courts have
been noticed above.
21. However, even if interim injunction against a non-party to a suit can
be given, the same does not imply that such injunction is to be granted at the
mere asking. It still remains to be adjudicated, whether this is a fit case for
grant of interim injunction, even against a non-party, and on which aspect
also arguments were heard on 2nd April, 2014.
22. As far as the merits of the injunction are concerned, I am of the view
that no case for granting interim injunction restraining the UPFC from
proceeding with the sale of the subject property in exercise of powers under
Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act is made out, for the
following reasons:
(I) There is no challenge in the present suit to the right of the
UPFC to sell the property.
(II) As far back as on 4th September, 1998, upon public notices of
sale being issued by the UPFC in the newspaper, the plaintiff became
aware of the claim of the UPFC to the said property and of the right
asserted by the UPFC to sell the same and though the plaintiff applied
for and obtained injunction restraining UPFC from so selling the
property but the plaintiff till now i.e. for nearly 16 years has not made
any such challenge, neither in this suit by seeking amendment thereof
nor by filing any other proceeding. In fact, no steps for impleading
UPFC as a party to this suit also were taken till this Court during the
hearing on 27th March, 2014 expressed doubts about the right of the
plaintiff to sustain interim injunction against UPFC without the UPFC
being a party to the suit.
(III) Even now, no application for amendment of the plaint to
challenge such right/claim asserted by the UPFC has been sought.
(IV) The right even if any of the plaintiff to challenge the claim of the
UPFC may now also be barred by time; however, no final opinion
thereon can be expressed without the plaintiff even making such a
challenge.
(V) Though UPFC also has filed a misconceived application for
impleadment as a party to this suit but only for the purpose of having
the stay order dated 14th September, 1998 vacated; the same thus does
not compel me to take a different view.
(VI) When in the circumstances aforesaid, it does not fall for
adjudication in this suit, whether UPFC is entitled to sell the property
or not, this Court cannot continue any further the interim injunction
restraining the UPFC from selling the said property; any continuance
of the said interim order would amount to this Court injuncting during
the pendency of the proceedings, what it is not called upon to injunct
on the culmination of the said proceedings and which in my view is
clearly impermissible in law.
(VII) What has emerged during the hearing is that the defendant
No.2 Mr. Vijay Kumar Bhatia and the defendant No.4 Ms. Priya
Bhatia acquired the New Friends Colony property vide General
Power of Attorney and Special Power of Attorney dated 5 th April,
1996 in favour of the defendant No.4 Ms. Priya Bhatia and
Agreement to Sell in favour of the defendant No.2 Mr. Vijay Kumar
Bhatia and upon introduction of the scheme for conversion of
leasehold rights in the land underneath the property into freehold, got
executed a Conveyance Deed of freehold rights dated 24th October,
1996 executed in favour of the defendant No.4 Ms. Priya Bhatia.
(VIII) Mortgage by deposit of title deeds was purported to be created
in favour of the plaintiff by depositing with the plaintiff, the
Agreement to Sell and the Power of Attorney in favour of the
defendants No.2&4 and mortgage by deposit of title deeds is
purported to be created in favour of UPFC by deposit of the
Conveyance Deed dated 24th October, 1996.
(IX) Though the counsels have addressed lengthy arguments on the
aspect, whether there can be said to be any mortgage in favour of the
plaintiff in the said state of affairs.
A. with the counsel for the plaintiff relying on:
(a) Amulya Gopal Majumdar Vs. United Industrial Bank
Ltd. AIR 1981 Calcutta 404 (DB); Angu Pillai Vs. M.S.M.
Kasiviswanathan Chettiar AIR 1974 Madras 16 (DB); Miss
J.J. Villa Vs. C.A. Petley AIR 1934 Rangoon 51; and,
Syndicate Bank Vs. Estate Officer & Manager, APIIC Ltd.
(2007) 8 SCC 361, in support of the contention that equitable
mortgage can be created by deposit of Agreement to Sell,
possession memo etc.;
(b) Rachpal Vs. Bhagwandas AIR 1950 SC 272, Deb Dutt
Seal Vs. Raman Lal Phumra AIR 1970 SC 659, United Bank
of India Ltd. Vs. Messrs Lekharam Sonaram and Co. AIR
1965 SC 1591, Parkash Dev Chopra Vs. The New Bank of
India Ltd., New Delhi AIR 1968 Delhi 244 (DB), Kakoo Shah
Uttam Chand Vs. Kamla Wati AIR 1969 Delhi 120 and Sir
Hari Shankar Paul Vs. Kedar Nath Saha AIR 1939 Privy
Council 167, to contend that the document of creation of
equitable mortgage is not required to be registered; and,
(c) Smt. Rajamma Vs. Sri. Mahant P. Krishnandagiri
Goswamy AIR 1973 Mysore 310 (DB) and Sunil Kumar
Singh Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India AIR 1976
Calcutta 224 (DB), to contend that equitable mortgage can be
created for money due earlier also.
AND
B. the counsel for the UPFC relying on Suraj Lamp and
Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana AIR 2012 SC 206,
Rambaran Prosad Vs. Ram Mohit Hazra AIR 1967 SC 744 and
Narandas Karsondas Vs. S.A. Kamtam AIR 1977 SC 774, to contend
that an Agreement to Sell is not a document of title even if
accompanied with a Power of Attorney,
but as aforesaid, the said question does not fall for adjudication
in the present case and I refrain from rendering any opinion thereon.
(X) The counsel for UPFC has also relied on Bakemans Industries
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. New Cawnpore Flour Mills AIR 2008 SC 2699 to
contend that rights granted to Financial Institutions under State
Financial Corporation Act have overriding effect on provisions of
Companies Act except Section 529A; on Punjab Financial
Corporation Vs. M/s Surya Auto Industries AIR 2010 SC 266 to
contend that the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the acts and
deeds of a financial corporation and on Union Bank of India Vs.
SICOM Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 121 to contend that a debt which is
secured by reason of a provision of a statute becomes the charge over
the property and must be held to prevail over the crown debt due to
the State or King.
23. I am therefore of the view that even on the facts and circumstances,
no case for continuing the stay is made out.
24. The ex-parte ad-interim order dated 14th September, 1998 which has
not been confirmed till now, is thus vacated and IA No.7948/1998 is
dismissed and IA No.11037/2007 is allowed.
25. Resultantly, the application of UPFC for impleadment in this suit,
being IA No.3952/2014 is dismissed as infructuous.
26. Axiomatically, I.A. No.6220/2014 of the plaintiff for impleadment of
UPFC is also dismissed for the reason of being not accompanied with any
application for amendment of the plaint and as per the averments in the
existing plaint, UPFC being not found to be a necessary or proper party to
the suit and also on the ground of laches.
EX.P. 126/1997, CS(OS) 1112/1998 & EX.P. 96/2008
27. List CS(OS) No.1112/1998 & Ex.P. No.126/1997 before the Joint
Registrar on 11th July, 2014, as already scheduled.
28. List Ex.P. No.96/2008 before the Joint Registrar on 23 rd May, 2014,
as already scheduled.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
MAY 07, 2014 bs
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