Delhi High Court
Pawan Kumar vs Shiv Chaudhary & Ors on 5 March, 2014
Author: Suresh Kait
$~1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 5th March, 2014
+ MAC.APP. No. 728/2013 & CM No.12234/2013
PAWAN KUMAR ..... Appellant
Represented by: Mr. K.K. Dubey, Advocate.
Versus
SHIV CHAUDHARY & ORS ..... Respondents
Represented by: Mr. Amit Gaur, Advocate for
Respondent No.3/Insurance
Company.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)
1. This appeal is directed against the impugned award dated 14.08.2012,
whereby the learned Tribunal has awarded compensation for a sum of
Rs.3,96,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of
filing of the claim petition till realization of the amount in favour of the
appellant for the injuries received in the accident.
2. Vide the present appeal, the appellant is seeking enhancement of
compensation amount noted above.
3. The Appeal is accompanied by an application under consideration
which is for condonation of delay of 252 days in filing the appeal.
4. Before considering the merits of the grounds raised in the appeal, the
appellant is required to cross over the main hurdle of delay in approaching
this Court. The circumstance in which delay in filing appeals under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is provided in the second proviso to Section 173
(1) of the Act. The same is reproduced for convenience:-
"173. Appeals-(1)....Provided further that the High Court may
entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of
ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented
by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time."
5. From the above, it is manifest that an appeal filed after the expiry of
period of 90 days may be entertained by the High Court only if it is satisfied
that the appellant was "prevented by sufficient cause" from preferring it
within the prescribed period. It is thus obvious that discretion in condoning
delay may be exercised by the High Court only if the appellant is successful
in showing that he was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the
appeal in time.
6. Keeping in view this principle, let us examine as to whether in the
present case the appellant has been successful in satisfying the aforesaid
requirement.
7. The grounds for condonation of delay have been mentioned in paras-2
to 7, which are reproduced as under:
" 2. That after receiving the compensation amount from the
Ld. Tribunal, the appellant was under depression and
was undergoing her (sic. „his‟) treatment.
3. That the appellant was not aware of appeal proceedings
and on an occasion one of the relatives of the appellant
who is an Advocate asked the appellant that the
compensation amount was on lower side and advised him
to file an appeal for enhancement of compensation.
4. That on 15.07.2013 the appellant came into contact with
his counsel for enhancement of compensation and hence
this appeal.
5. That in the above noted case, the Ld. Tribunal has
awarded a sum of Rs.1,37,000/- (sic as compensation of
„Rs.3,96,000/-‟ has been granted) vide judgment
dt.14.08.2012.
6. That the present appeal is barred by days due to the
reason stated above.
7. That the delay in filing the present appeal is neither
intentional nor deliberate but to the above said reason."
8. On a perusal of the pleadings as set out above, it is evident that it is a
case of gross negligence and latches. Moreover, counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant has also failed to give any plausible explanation for
this inordinate delay.
9. In view of the above discussion, the application for condonation of
delay is liable to be rejected for the following reasons:
(I) It is clear from paragraphs 2 to 4 that although one of the relatives of
the appellant, being an Advocate, had advised him to file an appeal
and thereafter, on 15.07.2013, he had contacted his counsel for filing
an appeal for enhancement of compensation, however, the instant
appeal was filed only on 07.08.2013. There is no explanation at all as
to when he was advised for filing the appeal and even what had
prevented him from filing the appeal in time. It is also not explained
as to why it took 22 days in filing this appeal even after contacting the
counsel on 15.07.2013.
(II) A litigant cannot take advantage of his own misdeeds in prosecution
of the case.
(III) The delay of about 252 days in this case is not bona fide and in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case is not liable to be
condoned.
(IV) The application is bereft of any cause, let alone sufficient cause,
which prevented him from filing the appeal within time and the
pleadings are absolutely vague, nebulous and devoid of any material
particulars in order to satisfy the second proviso to Section 173 (1) of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reproduced above in order to enable
this Court to exercise its discretion in condoning the inordinate delay
in filing the appeal.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that the
appellant has failed to show that he was prevented by sufficient cause in
preferring the appeal so belatedly. The application for condonation of delay
is accordingly rejected.
11. In the result, the MAC Appeal is dismissed.
12. No order as to costs.
SURESH KAIT, J.
MARCH 05, 2014
jg /sb
