Delhi High Court
Shri Khem Chand vs Union Of India & Anr on 18 July, 2014
$~9
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LA.APP. 131/2014
Decided on 18th July, 2014
SHRI KHEM CHAND ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. B.D. Sharma, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Siddharth Pandey, Adv. for R-1.
Mr. Kunal Sharma, Adv. for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATHAK
A.K.PATHAK, J.(ORAL)
CM No. 4405/2014 (Condonation of Delay)
1. Appellant‟s land ad measuring 8 bighas and 16 biswas forming part of
khasra no. 92/22, situated in the Village Kakrola, New Delhi was acquired
by the Government vide Notification No. F10(6)/88 L&B dated 6 th June,
1991 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short
hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟). Vide Award No. 1/93-94 dated 2nd
April, 1993 Land Acquisition Collector assessed the market price of
acquired land as `96,875/- per bigha in respect of Block „A‟, `38,000/- per
LA. APP 131/2014 Page 1 of 5
bigha in respect of Block „B‟ and `32,000/- per bigha in respect of Block
„C‟.
2. Dissatisfied by the quantum of compensation awarded by the Land
Acquisition Collector appellant filed a Reference Petition under Section 18
of the Act which was referred to the Reference Court. On the basis of
evidence adduced by the parties and placing reliance on the judgments of
this Court learned Reference Court, vide judgment dated 24 th January, 2007,
has assessed the market value of appellant‟s land as `1,09,500/- per bigha.
3. Dissatisfied by the rate fixed by the Reference Court, present appeal
has been filed by the appellant on 6th March, 2013. There is a delay of 2465
days, that is, more than six years in filing the present appeal.
4. By this application, appellant has prayed for condonation of delay of
2465 days in filing the appeal on the ground that he learnt from his co-
villagers in the Panchayat that Supreme Court had dismissed the Special
Leave Petition of some of the villagers against the judgment of Delhi High
Court. Thereafter, he enquired from the villagers regarding procedure to be
followed for getting enhancement and he was advised to approach High
Court. Accordingly, he contacted his counsel and filed this appeal.
LA. APP 131/2014 Page 2 of 5
5. The grounds taken by the appellant are vague and general in nature
and not sufficient to justify the delay of 2465 days. Every litigant is
supposed to approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation.
In any case he has to approach the Court without any undue delay and in
case he approaches the Court belatedly he has to explain the delay by
sufficient reasons. Indubitably, Court has not to adopt a hyper technical
approach while scrutinising the reasons furnished for the delay but at the
same time some cogent and justifiable reasons have to be offered. The delay
cannot be condoned merely on the asking of a party. It is also well settled
that ignorance of law cannot be taken as an excuse, inasmuch as, in this
case, appellant cannot be permitted to claim ignorance about the legal
procedure to be followed in such like matters, since he had already pursued
the legal remedy available to him under Section 18 of the Act against the
Award with the assistance of a lawyer.
6. Merely because some relief had been granted by the court to some
other villagers, by itself, cannot be a good ground to explain the delay. In
Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2013 (6) Supreme 144,
Apex Court has held as under :-
LA. APP 131/2014 Page 3 of 5
"14. In P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002
SC 1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of
law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay vs.
R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
7. In Mewa Ram (Deceased) by His LRs & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana
Through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon (1986) 4 SCC 151,
petitioner had approached the Supreme Court after about three years, in
view of the fact that in two other cases compensation was enhanced. Apex
Court held thus: "merely because this Court in the two cases of Paltu Singh
LA. APP 131/2014 Page 4 of 5
and Nand Kishore enhanced the rate of compensation to `17.50 per square
yard, could not furnish a ground for condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act". In State of Karnataka and Ors. vs. S.M. Kotrayya and
Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 267, Apex Court rejected the contention that a petition
should be considered ignoring the delay and latches on the ground that
petitioner filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by
the Court in a similar case. It was held that the said ground cannot furnish a
proper explanation for delay and latches. It was further observed that such a
plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay
and latches.
8. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that no sufficient and
cogent reasons have been furnished by the appellant to explain the delay of
more than six years. Accordingly, application is dismissed.
9. Since application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, appeal
is also dismissed as time barred.
A.K. PATHAK, J.
JULY 18, 2014
ga
