Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 2884 Del
Judgement Date : 2 July, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 02.07.2014
+ RC.REV.131/2014, CM Nos.5669-70/14, Cav.288/2014
DINESH KUMAR GUPTA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. G.L. Rawal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Kuljeet Rawal & Mr. Jagjit Singh,
Advs.
versus
SH. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Asutosh Lohia, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI % MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
The present petition impugns an order dated 9.12.2013 whereby the
petitioner (tenant) has been directed to be evicted from the tenanted
premises being property No.2841, Gali Pipal Mahadev, Hauz Khazi, Delhi-
6. The order was passed in the petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) read
with Section 25 B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1956 wherein the eviction
petitioner/landlord had claimed the premises for his bonafide need. He
claimed that his family had eleven members and all of them were dependent
on the earnings of the firm being run by him; he was desirous of separating
the business of his three sons and required more commercial space; that on
the front side of the property had two shops, one of which was got vacated
wherein his eldest son had been installed to open and run a sanitary ware
business; now the petitioner needed the tenanted premises to settle his other
sons and all his grandsons who lacked commercial space. The application
for leave to defend disputed the eviction petitioner as a landlord; denied the
alleged bonafide need and contended that there was sufficient commercial
space available with the eviction petitioner on the ground floor of the
property No.2841, Gali Pipal Mahadev, Hauz Khazi, Delhi-6 of which the
petitioner became owner by way of a Will dated 6.1.1990 executed by his
mother. The petitioner/tenant claimed that rooms marked as Mark A, B, C
& D were being used for commercial space and for storage purposes; that
shop shown as Mark E was being used by the eldest son to run his business.
In the application for leave to defend, the present petitioner denied the
ownership of the tenanted premises of the eviction petitioner. He further
denied the dependency of the eviction petitioner's sons upon him for starting
their respective businesses. It was contended that the sons of the eviction
petitioners were well-settled running their respective business of sanitary
paint and hardware and therefore the requirement was not bonafide. It was
further contended that the eviction petitioner had required a complete floor
at premises No.2841, Gali Pipal Mahadev, Hauz Khazi, Delhi-6 which was
being used for commercial purpose and finally it was argued that the
eviction was sought only with a view to re-let the premises at exorbitant rate
of rent prevailing in the market. In reply however, the eviction petitioner
reiterated grounds made in the eviction petition and stated that he had
become owner of the ground floor of the property by way of Will dated
6.1.1990 executed by his mother and the rooms shown as Mark A, B, C, D
& E had been put to use as already averred in the petition; that the first and
the second floor of the property were being used only for residential
purposes; that he had sufficient funds to support the businesses of his sons.
He further explained that the third son will take over the firm which was
being run by him and finally that the property bearing No.2841, Gali Pipal
Mahadev, Hauz Khazi, Delhi-6 did not belong to him but to one Smt.
Madhu. Mr. G.L. Rawal, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner argues
on behalf of the petitioner that this was a case for requirement of additional
space for commercial purpose and the leave to defend ought to have been
granted. He submits that not only more than sufficient but excess
accommodation was available with the respondent/landlord and in such
circumstances where additional accommodation is sought, the leave to
defend out to have been granted. In support of his arguments, he relied upon
Santosh Dev Soni vs. Chand Kiran, 2001 (1) SCC 255; S.M. Mehra vs.
D.D. Malik, 2001 (1) SCC 256; Rajpal Singh vs. Gurmeet Kaur, V (2009)
SLT 142; Mohd. Jaffer & Others vs. Nasra Begum, 191 (2012) DLT 401 &
S.K. Sethi; Sons vs. Vijay Bhalla, 191 (2012) DLT 722 & Gangadas vs.
B.N. Singh & Anr. in RC Rev. NO.276/2012.
He then contended that the eviction petitioner was not the owner of
the premises on the basis of a Will as claimed and that indeed the eviction
petitioner himself admitted that the property came to him as a share on
account of partition deed in suit No.578/66 in the Court of Sh. Kanwar
Shamsher Singh, Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi by virtue of which he got the
ground floor of the said property. He submits that as per law any award or
decree conferring title of immovable property having value of more than
Rs.100/- must be registered. He submits that insofar as the Award was not
registered it cannot be taken into cognizance and in any case this itself
would be a matter of trial. He relied upon the ratios of Sachindra Mohan
Ghosh vs. Ramjash Agarwalla, AIR 1932 Patna 97 and M/s. Bajaj Auto
Ltd. vs. Behari Lal Kohli, AIR 1989 SC 1806 in support of these
contentions.
Having considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties as
well as the impugned order, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is
estopped from raising an issue under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act
to dispute ownership of the landlord especially since he has been paying rent
to the petitioner as a landlord. Furthermore, vide order dated 1.5.2013, the
eviction petitioner was allowed to place on record the Award dated
19.10.1966 passed in suit no.578/66 to show that the ground floor portion
was allotted to him. Hence the Trial Court rightly concluded that "there was
nothing on record to doubt the ownership of the petitioner qua the tenanted
premises". With respect to the bonafide requirement, the Trial Court had
considered the explanation regarding all the shops and premises available to
the landlord and concluded that shop which was got vacated was given to
the eldest son to run his business therefrom. There was no other commercial
space available to the landlord to settle his other sons for their proposed
business. The Trial Court found that the tenant had brought nothing on
record to substantiate his plea that the other sons of the petitioner were not
dependent upon him and/or were duly engaged in their respective businesses
or that the said sons were owners of any other property. In the
circumstances, the Court concluded that all the sons of the eviction
petitioner were dependent upon him for commercial space to run their
respective businesses. The Trial Court accepted the explanation of the
landlord that there were six shops/rooms available out of which five were in
his possession, one of which was occupied by the petitioner for his office
purpose and three other small rooms were being used for storage of sanitary
articles and the fifth one which was got vacated had been put in possession
of his eldest sons. The sixth one was the tenanted premises. There was
nothing on record which would controvert the said position. In view of the
fact that no document had been placed on record to show that the property
No.2841, Gali Pipal Mahadev, Hauz Khazi, Delhi-6 was owned by the
eviction petitioner/landlord and also the fact that the petitioner had
convincingly controverted the plea of ownership of the said premises, the
Trial Court rightly rejected the plea of the tenant. The Trial Court also
rejected the tenants apprehension that the eviction petitioner was motivated
by a desire to re-lease it only for higher rent. This apprehension of course
would be taken care of by the provision of Section 19 of the DRC Act
whereby the tenant can get possession of the tenanted premises if it is let out
or sold by the landlord within three years of the eviction. This Court is of
the view that insofar as the landlord had shown that he was the owner of the
premises or at least as long as the petitioner was paying rent to the
respondent/landlord, he would be estopped from raising a plea of ownership
apropos the tenanted premises in view of the settled law of estoppel under
Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, there would be no need
to refer to the dispute, apropos ownership, as raised by learned counsel for
the petitioner. Furthermore, the judgments cited by learned Senior Counsel
would be applicable only in cases where a triable issue was raised. In the
present case no triable issue is made out.
In view of the circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove, all
the commercial space available with the landlord had been duly accounted in
his reply. The property bearing No.2841, Gali Pipal Mahadev, Hauz Khazi,
Delhi-6 was a red herring introduced by the tenant, the said property was
owned by some other person i.e. Smt. Madhu, and not by the landlord. The
bald averments apropos all the sons of the petitioner having been settled in
their respective businesses would not tantamount to a triable issue.
Something more ought to have been brought on record to substantiate this
argument. The Trial Court rightly rejected this and the contentions of the
tenant and finally dismissed the application for leave to defend. In view of
the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the impugned order
does not suffer from any infirmity and calls for no interference by this
Court. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
NAJMI WAZIRI, J JULY 02, 2014 ak
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