Delhi High Court
S. Harvinder Singh Chadha vs S.Ujagar Singh Chadha & Ors. on 1 July, 2014
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 1st July, 2014.
+ FAO(OS) 416/2013, CMs. No.14405-06/2013 & 14408/2013
HARVINDER SINGH CHADHA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Sachin Chopra and Mr. Kamal
Bansal, Advocates.
Versus
SARAN KAUR CHADHA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Abhishek Vikram, Mr. Chetan
Lokur, Mr. Vikram Pradeep and Mr.
Mayank Mukherjee, Advocates for
R-1 to 3.
Mr. Virender Mehta, Advocate for
R-4.
AND
+ FAO(OS) 252/2014
HARVINDER SINGH CHADHA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Sachin Chopra and Mr. Kamal
Bansal, Advocates.
Versus
SARAN KAUR CHADHA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Abhishek Vikram, Mr. Chetan
Lokur, Mr. Vikram Pradeep and Mr.
Mayank Mukherjee, Advocates for
R-1 to 3.
Mr. Virender Mehta, Advocate for
R-4.
FAO(OS) Nos.416/2013 & 252/2014 & CS(OS) Nos.1333/2002, 1150/2002 & 1102/2003 Page 1 of 22
AND
+ CS(OS) 1333/2002, IAs No.2052/2004 & 16382/2013
S. HARVINDER SINGH CHADHA ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sachin Chopra and Mr. Kamal
Bansal, Advocates.
Versus
S. UJAGAR SINGH CHADHA & ORS. ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Abhishek Vikram, Mr. Chetan
Lokur, Mr. Vikram Pradeep and Mr.
Mayank Mukherjee, Advocates for
D-1 to 3.
Mr. Virender Mehta, Advocate for
D-4.
AND
+ CS(OS) 1150/2002 & IA No.6053/2002
S. HARVINDER SINGH CHADHA ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sachin Chopra and Mr. Kamal
Bansal, Advocates.
Versus
SARAN KAUR CHADHA & ORS. ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Abhishek Vikram, Mr. Chetan
Lokur, Mr. Vikram Pradeep and Mr.
Mayank Mukherjee, Advocates for
D-1 to 3.
Mr. Virender Mehta, Advocate for
D-4.
AND
FAO(OS) Nos.416/2013 & 252/2014 & CS(OS) Nos.1333/2002, 1150/2002 & 1102/2003 Page 2 of 22
+ CS(OS) 1102/2003
S. HARVINDER SINGH CHADHA ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sachin Chopra and Mr. Kamal
Bansal, Advocates.
Versus
S.UJAGAR SINGH CHADHA & ORS. ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Abhishek Vikram, Mr. Chetan
Lokur, Mr. Vikram Pradeep and Mr.
Mayank Mukherjee, Advocates for
D-1 to 3.
Mr. Virender Mehta, Advocate for
D-4.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. FAO(OS) No.252/2014 arising from CS(OS) No.1333/2002 came up
first for admission on 20th May, 2014 when, not finding any clarity in the
memorandum of appeal, while renotifying the same on 26 th May, 2014, the file
of CS(OS) No.1333/2002 was also sent for. FAO(OS) No.416/2013 also
arising from CS(OS) No.1333/2002 was listed on 20th May, 2014 and was also
ordered to be renotified on 26th May, 2014.
2. On perusal of the file of CS(OS) No.1333/2002 on 26 th May, 2014, it
prima facie appeared to us that the suit itself was not maintainable. The
counsel for the appellant/plaintiff however stated that he was not prepared to
address on the said aspect and on his request, the appeals and the suit were
adjourned to 29th May, 2014.
3. On 29th May, 2014, we heard the counsels for the parties on the
maintainability of CS(OS) No.1333/2002 as well as on the merits of the two
appeals. During the course of hearing, it transpired that CS(OS) No.1150/2002
and CS(OS) No.1102/2003 were also connected to CS(OS) No.1333/2002.
Accordingly, while reserving judgment, with the consent of the counsels, the
files of CS(OS) No.1150/2002 and CS(OS) No.1102/2003 were also
requisitioned. The counsels concurred that if CS(OS) No.1333/2002 was to be
held to be not maintainable, CS(OS) No.1150/2002 and CS(OS) No.1102/2003
filed by the same plaintiff shall also go.
4. We have perused the files of all the three suits.
5. CS(OS) No.1150/2002 was filed by the appellant/plaintiff for the relief
of declaration that the Sale Deed executed between the defendants No.1 to 4
therein was non est and for setting aside thereof and for declaring the
appellant/plaintiff to be the owner "of the property in question" to the extent of
25% and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants in the said suit
from selling, alienating, creating a third party interest or parting with
possession of property No.H-2/5, Model Town-II, Delhi, pleading:
(i) that the appellant/plaintiff Sh. Harvinder Singh Chadha is a „Non
Resident Indian‟ (NRI);
(ii) that the parents of the appellant/plaintiff (the erstwhile defendant
No.1 Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha being the father and the present defendant
No.1 Smt. Saran Kaur Chadha being the mother) were living in house
No.H-2/5, Model Town-II, Delhi;
(iii) that the two younger brothers of the appellant/plaintiff (defendant
No.2 Sh. Harmeet Singh and defendant No.3 Sh. Ravinder Singh
Chadha) were also residing along with the parents in the said house;
(iv) that the said house No.H-2/5, Model Town-II, Delhi comprised of
two and a half floors and was then mortgaged to Grindlays Bank;
(v) that the grandfather of the appellant/plaintiff had his business in
Kuwait and he died intestate in the year 1969; after his death, a Family
Agreement was arrived at between all his heirs and by virtue of which all
his assets were divided between his heirs; the said property No.H-2/5
Model Town-II, Delhi which was already registered in the names of the
father Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and his elder brother Sh. Mohinder
Singh Chadha fell to their share; the other heirs were paid money in lieu
of their his share in the property in question;
(vi) that the father Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and his elder brother Sh.
Mohinder Singh Chadha divided the property into two parts;
(vii) that thus the father Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha became half owner of
the property;
(viii) that however the said half portion of the property "was essentially
an ancestral property in the hands of the father Sh. Ujagar Singh
Chadha";
(ix) that the father and the younger brothers of the appellant/plaintiff
took loan by mortgaging the said half portion of the property to
Grindlays Bank but were unable to repay and the said half portion of the
property was ordered to be auctioned;
(x) that the appellant/plaintiff sent approximately Rs.15 lakhs to repay
the said loan and upon payment whereof, the auction of the property was
stopped;
(xi) that the appellant/plaintiff then raised a dispute as to how the said
property was mortgaged to the detriment of his interest and without his
knowledge;
(xii) that the father Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha, to avoid future disputes,
made a Family Settlement/Agreement on 4th August, 2000 and it was
agreed that 25% share in the property would belong to the
appellant/plaintiff, 20% share would belong to the defendant No.2 Sh.
Harmeet Singh, 25% share would belong to the defendant No.3 Sh.
Ravinder Singh Chadha and the remaining 30% share was to remain with
the parents Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and Smt. Saran Kaur Chadha; this
Family Settlement was accepted by all by affixing their signatures
thereon;
(xiii) that the appellant/plaintiff in the visit to India in July, 2002 learnt
that the property was being sold without his knowledge, to the defendant
No.4 Sh. Dharamvir Yadav;
(xiv) that the appellant/plaintiff was the owner of 25% share as property
being ancestral, having been inherited by his father Sh. Ujagar Singh
Chadha in turn from his father;
(xv) that in lieu of the said interest of the appellant/plaintiff, share to
the extent of 25% had also been settled in his favour.
Accordingly, the suit for the relief of declaration and injunction as
aforesaid was filed.
6. Considering that we are at this stage concerned with the maintainability
of the suit, need is not felt to refer to the defense of the defendants therein or to
the issues framed in the suit.
7. CS(OS) No.1333/2002 was filed by the appellant/plaintiff for
cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 12th July, 2002 of the aforesaid property in
favour of the aforesaid defendant No.4 Sh. Dharamvir Yadav and for delivery
of possession thereof to the appellant/plaintiff, being the lawful owner to the
tune of 25% of the said property, asserting the same rights in the said property
as asserted in the previous suit No.1150/2002. It was stated that though the
appellant/plaintiff had filed CS(OS) No.1150/2002 and vide ex-parte ad-interim
order dated 17th July, 2002 therein, status quo qua title and possession of the
property was ordered to be maintained but it was learnt that a Sale Deed dated
12th July, 2002 had already been executed in favour of said Sh. Dharamvir
Yadav and possession of the property had also been handed over to him on 18 th
July, 2002. It was further pleaded that the father Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha,
from the sale proceeds of the aforesaid property had purchased property
No.33-A, North Avenue, Punjabi Bagh, near Punjabi Bagh Club, New Delhi
vide Sale Deed dated 6th August, 2002. The appellant/plaintiff in the said suit
thus also claimed the relief of declaration of the said Sale Deed dated 6 th
August, 2002 of purchase of Punjabi Bagh property to be non est and in the
alternative for partition of the Punjabi Bagh property to the extent of his 25%
share therein.
8. CS(OS) No.1102/2003 has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff for
recovery of Rs.20,10,000/- from his father Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and his
brothers Sh. Harmeet Singh and Sh. Ravinder Singh Chadha, being the amount
sent by him in June, 2000 for saving the said property from auction at the
instance of Grindlays Bank with which the said property had been mortgaged.
9. FAO(OS) No.416/2013 was filed impugning the order dated 30 th
November, 2011 of the learned Single Judge limiting the right of the
appellant/plaintiff to examine himself only and closing the right of the
appellant/plaintiff to lead any other evidence. The said appeal was
accompanied with applications for condonation of delay in filing and re-filing
of the said appeal; notice only of the application for condonation of delay has
been issued.
10. FAO(OS) No.252/2014 has been filed impugning the order dated 4 th
April, 2014 of the learned Single Judge of dismissal of the application filed by
the appellant/plaintiff for recall of the aforesaid order dated 30 th November,
2011 impugned in FAO(OS) No.416/2013.
11. We had during the hearing on 26th May, 2014 enquired from the counsel
for the appellant/plaintiff, as to what was the right of the appellant/plaintiff to
the Model Town property, asserting which CS(OS) No.1150/2002 and CS(OS)
No.1333/2002 had been filed.
12. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff had argued, (i) that the said
property, though was purchased in the name of the father of the
appellant/plaintiff i.e. Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and his elder brother Sh.
Mohinder Singh Chadha but the father of the appellant/plaintiff at the time of
purchase was 15 years old only and not earning; (ii) it was thus evident that the
said property had been purchased by the grandfather of the appellant/plaintiff,
though in the name of the father of the appellant/plaintiff; (iii) this was further
evident from the Agreement dated 10th August, 1969 (regarding house No.H-
2/5, Model Town-II, Delhi) between all the legal heirs of the grandfather of the
appellant/plaintiff including the father of the appellant/plaintiff, whereunder the
father of the appellant/plaintiff Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and his brother Sh.
Mohinder Singh Chadha paid of the share of the other legal heirs in house
No.H-2/5, Model Town-II, Delhi already registered in the names of Sh. Ujagar
Singh Chadha and Sh. Mohinder Singh Chadha, on the premise of the same
being the property of the father of Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and Sh. Mohinder
Singh Chadha. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further drew our
attention to the Agreement dated 29th May, 1975 between Sh. Ujagar Singh
Chadha and Sh. Mohinder Singh Chadha partitioning the said Model Town
property by metes and bounds between themselves. The counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff thus contended that the half share of property No.H-2/5,
Model Town-II, Delhi in the hands of the father Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha was
ancestral property and the appellant/plaintiff also had a share in the same.
13. We enquired from the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, whether not it
was the plea of the appellant/plaintiff that the paternal grandfather of the
appellant/plaintiff had died in the year 1969 i.e. after the coming into force of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
14. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff replied in the affirmative.
15. We further enquired from the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that if it
was so, whether not the property inherited by the father of the
appellant/plaintiff from his own father, would be personal property in the hands
of the father i.e. Sh. Ujagar Singh Chadha and the appellant/plaintiff would
have no share therein.
16. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff then drew our attention to the
Agreement dated 4th August, 2000 between the father of the appellant/plaintiff,
mother and brothers and which is as under:
"AGREEMENT
I Ujagar Singh Chadha S/o Late Shri Gurbachan Singh Chadha
R/o H-2/5 Model Town Part-II Delhi-9 hereby confirm this
agreement that I have three sons (namely)
1) Harvinder Singh Chadha gifted him 25% of share in
property bearing No.H-2/5 Model Town Delhi-9
2) Harneet Singh Chadha gifted him 20% of share in
property bearing No.H-2/5 Model Town Delhi-9
3) Raminder Singh Chadha gifted him 25% of share in
property bearing No.H-2/5 Model Town Delhi-9
4) Remaining 30% of the share in property bearing No.H-
2/5 Model Town Delhi-remains to my wife Mrs. Saran Kaur
Chadha and myself Ujagar Singh Chadha.
Dated: 4th August, 2000 Ujagar Singh Chadha
1) Harvinder Singh Chadha Sd.
Sd. Address H-2/5 Model
Town II Delhi-9
2) Harneet Singh Chadha "
Sd.
3) Raminder Singh Chadha "
Sd.
4) Saran Kaur Chadha "
Sd.
This agreement is made in four original copy as per
proposal date 4th August made by me, my elder son who is at
present residing at Kuwait will sign all four copies as agreed.
Witness: Ujagar Singh Chadha
Sd. Sd.
Des Raj Malhotra
E-144, Kamla Nagar
Delhi-110007."
and contended that the appellant/plaintiff under the said document has a
25% share in the property.
17. We enquired from the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, whether the
aforesaid document is registered.
18. The answer was in the negative.
19. We further enquired that if the appellant/plaintiff did not have any share
in the property as claimed, on the basis of the property being ancestral, how any
share in the property in favour of the appellant/plaintiff could be created for the
first time by such an unregistered document and how there could be a gift of
immovable property without a registered document.
20. As aforesaid, the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff on 26 th May, 2014
sought adjournment to address on the aforesaid queries.
21. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff on 29th May, 2014, to support his
case, of the property being ancestral in the hands of the father of the
appellant/plaintiff and the appellant/plaintiff having a right/share therein, relied
on Rohit Chauhan Vs. Surinder Singh (2013) 9 SCC 419, Sheela Devi Vs. Lal
Chand (2006) 8 SCC 581 and Baljinder Singh Vs. Rattan Singh
MANU/SC/7926/2008.
22. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents/defendants referred to
Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Kanpur Vs. Chander Sen AIR 1986 SC 1753,
Yudhishter Vs. Ashok Kumar AIR 1987 SC 558, Commissioner of Income-
tax, Jaipur Vs. Hirehmal Nawalakha AIR 2001 SC 3648 and Gomtibai Vs.
Mattulal (1996) 11 SCC 681.
23. We had invited the attention of the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff to a
judgment dated 30th January, 2013 of one of us (Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw) in
CS(OS) No.823/2010 titled Neelam Vs. Sada Ram, where on a conspectus of a
case law in this regard including Chander Sen and Yudhishter supra it was
held that after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the
property inherited by a male from his father is held as self acquired property in
which children of such male do not acquire any right by birth. Thus, even if it
were to be held that the Model Town property, though purchased in the name of
the father of the appellant/plaintiff was not his self acquired property but held
benami by him for his own father (and which plea of benami is also prohibited
by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988), even then the grandfather
of the appellant/plaintiff having died in the year 1969 i.e. after coming into
force of the Hindu Succession Act, the said property would be held by the
father of the appellant/plaintiff as his personal individual property and the
appellant/plaintiff would not have any right or share therein. It would matter
not that the said property was, besides in the name of the father of the
appellant/plaintiff was also in the name of elder brother of the father of the
appellant/plaintiff and the father of the appellant/plaintiff and his brother
partitioned the same between them. Similarly, it would matter not that the
father of the appellant/plaintiff and his brother paid off the share of their other
siblings in the said property. These facts would not change the character of the
inheritance in the hands of the father of the appellant/plaintiff from that of
personal individual property to ancestral property.
24. As far as the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff are concerned, in Rohit Chauhan supra, the question as has
arisen herein, did not arise for consideration therein. It is a settled principle of
law (see Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 2
SCC 111, Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. Vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate (2005) 2 SCC
489 and Inderpreet Singh Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab AIR 2006 SC 2571) that
a judgment is a precedent on what arises for consideration therein and what is
decided thereby and not on what can logically be deduced therefrom. The
Supreme Court in Rohit Chauhan supra proceeded on the premise that the
property was ancestral property and the only question for adjudication therein
was, whether a male borne subsequent to the date of partition of ancestral
property would have a share therein or not. The Supreme Court held that such
a son would have a share in the property which was ancestral in the hands of
the father. As far as Sheela Devi supra is concerned, though the counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff merely handed over a copy thereof and did not chose to read
any portion thereof but we find the same, rather than helping the
appellant/plaintiff, being against the appellant/plaintiff. The Supreme Court in
the said judgment reiterated, what was held in Chander Sen supra i.e. that after
coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it would be difficult to
hold that a property which devolves on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu
Succession Act would be HUF in his own hands vis-à-vis his own son.
Similarly, neither was any passage in Baljinder Singh supra referred to by the
counsel for the appellant/plaintiff nor do we find any relevance thereof to the
matter in issue.
25. It has thus but to be held that the appellant/plaintiff did not have any
share in / right to the Model Town property on the ground of the same being
ancestral property.
26. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff also has pegged his case on the
Agreement dated 4th August, 2000 supra. Though he agrees that there can be
no gift without a registered document the reliance by the counsel for the
respondents/defendants on Hirehmal Nawalakha and Gomtibai supra, both
laying down that without registration there can be no gift, is apposite in this
regard and admitted "that the appellant/plaintiff cannot claim partition of the
property" but contended that the appellant/plaintiff "on the basis of the said
Agreement dated 4th August, 2000, would still be entitled to stop his father
from dealing with the said property". Alternatively, it is contended that the said
Agreement would qualify as a Family Settlement. It is also faintly suggested
that the said document is also indicative of the manner in which the father
desired the property to be distributed.
27. We are unable to accept either of the aforesaid contentions. The father of
the appellant/plaintiff by the aforesaid document dated 4th August, 2000, even if
the same were to be read into evidence, purported to gift in praesenti undivided
share in his aforesaid property. It is so clearly borne out from the repeated use
of the word "gifted" in the said document. The rule of construction is well
settled that the intention of the executant of a document is to be ascertained
after considering all the words in their ordinary natural sense; the document is
required to be read as a whole to ascertain the intention of the executant.
Reference in this regard can be made to F.M. Devaru Ganapati Bhat Vs.
Prabhakar Ganapathi Bhat (2004) 2 SCC 504. Such a reading of the
document clearly shows the intention of the executant thereof i.e. of the father
of the appellant/plaintiff to "gift" undivided shares in the property to his three
sons. The signatures obtained of the three sons on the said document are in
acceptance of the gift. The fact that the transfer of the said shares was to be in
praesenti and the document was not to operate after the demise of the father, as
was faintly suggested (and which is not even the case made out) is evident not
only from use repeatedly of the word "gifted" by the maker thereof but also
from the „remaining undivided share‟ in the property being described as
"remains to my wife Mrs. Saran Kaur Chadha and myself Ujagar Singh
Chadha". Unless the intent was for the „gift‟ to come into operation
immediately, the father Ujagar Singh Chadha in his lifetime would have been
the owner of 100% rather than 30% share in the property. Similarly, if it had
been the intent of the parties to the document that all of them were the owners
of the property and had the parties merely intended to by way of Family
Settlement settle or define their respective shares, the word „Settlement‟ or
„Partition‟ instead of the word "gifted" would have been used. Moreover, a
Family Settlement envisages claims and counter-claims to property, which are
settled thereby. An immovable property cannot be permitted to be transferred,
even to family members, under the garb of a Family Settlement, without paying
the stamp duty and without complying with the law of registration.
28. Rather, we enquired from the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that
whether not the appellant/plaintiff by signing the said document, accepted the
factum of the father being the sole absolute owner of the Model Town property,
in as much as if the father was not the sole absolute owner thereof, there would
have been no question of his gifting the same to others.
29. We fail to understand as to on what basis the appellant/plaintiff, if not
having any right of partition, because of not having any share in the property,
can be said to have a right to prohibit his father from dealing with the property
which was exclusively of the father.
30. In our opinion, the Agreement dated 4th August, 2000 supra cannot even
be read in evidence since the same on the face of it is a gift and since the same
is neither duly stamped nor registered.
31. We therefore hold that the plaintiffs in CS(OS) No.1150/2002 and in
CS(OS) No.1333/2002, on a reading thereof do not disclose any right, title,
claim or interest of the appellant/plaintiff to the Model Town property, neither
for the reason of the same being ancestral property not on the basis of the
document dated 4th August, 2000.
32. Once the appellant/plaintiff is not found entitled to have any right to / or
share in the Model Town property, the appellant/plaintiff can have no right to
the Punjabi Bagh property stated to have been bought out of the sale proceeds
of the Model Town property, also.
33. In that view of the matter, CS(OS) No.1150/2002 by which the
appellant/plaintiff sought to prevent the father from dealing with the Model
Town property and CS(OS) No.1333/2002 by which the appellant/plaintiff
sought cancellation of the sale by the father of the Model Town property to the
defendant No.4 Sh. Dharamvir Yadav and claiming 25% share therein as well
for partition of the Punjabi Bagh property, on the averments in the plaint, are
found to be not maintainable and not disclosing a cause of action and are liable
to be dismissed summarily.
34. What saddens us is that the defendants/respondents allowed the suits to
continue for a period of nearly 12 years and the suits put to trial exhausting the
resources of this Court which could have been well spent on adjudication of
bona fide disputes between the parties. When the counsel for the
respondents/defendants, upon the question being raised by us as to the
maintainability of the suits could cite the judgments to contend that the suits
were indeed not maintainable and liable to be dismissed summarily, we fail to
understand why they did not do so earlier and as to why they were satisfied
with the suits remaining pending. Though we raised the said query to the
counsels during the hearing but no reply was forthcoming.
35. Resultantly, CS(OS) No.1150/2002 and CS(OS) No.1333/2002 as well
as FAO(OS) No.416/2013 and FAO(OS) No.252/2014 arising from CS(OS)
No.1333/2002 are dismissed. Decree sheet be drawn up. For the reasons
aforesaid, no costs.
36. CS(OS) No.1102/2003 is only for recovery of money allegedly advanced
by the appellant/plaintiff for saving the Model Town property. The same will
have to be decided on its own merits.
37. Accordingly, the file of CS(OS) No.1102/2003 be returned and the same
be listed before the learned Single Judge on 10 th July, 2014, as already
scheduled.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE
JULY 01, 2014
bs
