Rohit Trikha & Ors vs State (Govt Of Nct Of Delhi) & Anr
2014 Latest Caselaw 6677 Del

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*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+      CRL.M.C. 4975/2014

       ROHIT TRIKHA & ORS                                    ..... Petitioner
                    Through:            Mr. Puneet Bajaj and Mr. Amit Bajaj,
                                        Advocates with petitioners in person.

                          versus

       STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) & ANR         ..... Respondents
                     Through: Mr. P.K. Mishra, APP for the State
                              with SI Anju Tyagi, PS Tilak Nagar.
                              Mr. R.K. Tyagi, Advocate for R-2
                              with R-2 in person.

       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA

                          ORDER

% 11.12.2014

Crl. M.A. 17052/2014 (for exemption) Exemption, as prayed for, is allowed, subject to all just exceptions. The application stands disposed off.

CRL.M.C. 4975/2014

1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of FIR No. 79/2014 registered under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC at Police Station Tilak Nagar on 21st January, 2014 on the ground that the matter has been amicably settled between the parties.

2. Issue notice.

Mr. P.K. Mishra, Additional Public Prosecutor and Mr. R.K. Tyagi,

Advocate enter appearance and accept notice on behalf of the State/respondent No.1 and respondent No.2, respectively.

3. Petitioners as well as complainant/respondent No.2-Sonia Trikha are present in person and are also identified by the Investigating Officer/ SI Anju Tyagi, Police Station Tilak Nagar.

4. The aforesaid FIR is stated to have been lodged by respondent No.2/complainant consequent upon certain matrimonial and domestic disputes that arose between the parties pursuant to her marriage with petitioner No.1-Rohit Trikha on 13th April, 2006.

5. It is stated that when the matter was under investigation, both the parties arrived at a settlement on mutually acceptable terms whereby it was agreed that the complainant shall be paid a sum of Rs.9,50,000/- in full and final settlement of all her claims and dues. At the same time, complainant and petitioner No.1 agreed to file a joint petition seeking dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. Thereafter, the parties instituted proceedings before the Family Court in HMA No. 45/2014 and orders in first motion were duly passed by the concerned Family Court. In those proceedings, on 10th February, 2014 a joint statement of the parties, setting out all the terms and conditions of the settlement, was duly recorded by the Principal Judge, Family Courts, Tis Hazari, Delhi. A copy of the said petition and the joint statement recorded by the court below as well as the orders on the first motion passed by the Court on 10th February, 2014, has been handed over by counsel for the petitioner at the Bar. The same is taken on record.

6. Thereafter, the marriage between petitioner No.1 and complainant has been dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B(2) of Hindu Marriage Act on 9th September, 2014 in HMA No.

1749/2014. A copy of the decree sheet has also been annexed to this petition.

7. Out of the total agreed amount of Rs.9,50,000/-, Rs.6,50,000/- has already been paid to the complainant. Balance amount of Rs.3,00,000/- has been handed over to her in the Court today by way of a demand draft bearing No. 214798 dated 8th December, 2014 drawn on Bank of Baroda.

8. The complainant approbates the aforesaid settlement and states that she has no further grievance in the matter; and with the aforesaid payment, nothing further remains due to her from the petitioners. She states that she does not wish to pursue the matter any further and prays that the same be closed.

9. Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submits that looking to the overall circumstances and since the matter pertains to a domestic and matrimonial dispute; where the parties have amicably settled the matter and have obtained divorce by mutual consent; and the complainant is no longer interested in supporting the prosecution, no useful purpose will be served in continuing with the proceedings.

10. Under the circumstances and looking to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, which has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the basis of a settlement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:

"58. ....However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or

such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated."

And also in Narinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.

2014(2) Crimes 67 (SC) where the Supreme Court held as follows:-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal

proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3 Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4 On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6 Offences under Section 307 Indian Penal Code would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 Indian

Penal Code in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307Indian Penal Code is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete

or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

I am of the opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus at this stage itself, since the parties have resolved their differences and have obtained divorce by mutual consent; and since the complainant is no longer interested in supporting the prosecution, because of which, its chances of success in the matter are in any case greatly diminished.

11. Consequently, FIR No. 79/2014 registered under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC at Police Station Tilak Nagar on 21st January, 2014 and all proceedings emanating therefrom, are hereby quashed.

12. The petition stands disposed off.

SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA JUDGE DECEMBER 11, 2014 AK