Balwant Kaur Chaudhary & Anr. vs Rambir Singh
2014 Latest Caselaw 3531 Del

*        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                         Reserved on: 12.03.2014
                                                     Date of Decision: 05.08.2014

+                          RC.REV. No.459 of 2012

BALWANT KAUR CHAUDHARY & ANR.               ..... Petitioners
           Through: Mr. Rajiv K. Chaudhary, Adv.

                                         versus

RAMBIR SINGH                                                     ..... Respondent
                           Through:   Mr. S.C. Singhal, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI

NAJMI WAZIRI, J.

1. This petition impugns an order dated 23.8.2012, whereby the petitioners' petition under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) was rejected. The petitioners had sought the eviction of the respondent-tenant from the tenanted/suit premises bearing No.31/7, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi. The respondent/tenant has admitted that vide written agreement dated 18.4.1996, the tenanted premises were leased out to him by Shri Ashok Chaudhary, husband of petitioner No.2, Smt. Geeta Chaudhary. With the passage of time, Shri Har Krishan Lal Chaudhary, husband of petitioner No.1 started claiming to be the owner of the property, for which he had filed a petition bearing No.E-215/2002, which is stated to be pending. Later the LRs of

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Shri Har Krishan Lal Chaudhary started claiming themselves to be, as legal heirs, landlords of the suit premises. The tenanted premises were sought by the petitioners on the ground of their bona fide personal need since they claimed to have had no alternate accommodation available to them to meet their requirements. They had sought the rejection of the application for leave to defend, which was sought by the respondent/tenant under Section 25B of the Act. However, instead of granting or rejecting the said application, the Trial Court dismissed the eviction petition itself on the ground that since petitioner No.2, Smt. Geeta Chaudhary, had died and it was admitted that her husband had let out the premises, therefore, the petition under Section 14D would not be maintainable. The Trial Court was of the view that for a person to invoke Section 14D of the Act, the premises must be required by the widow for her own use as residence. It is a special provision directed specifically in favour of the widows. The relief is specified and limited to a particular category of persons, i.e. widows and cannot be said to be extendable to the requirement of the family of the widow. The Trial Court concluded that with the demise of the petitioner concerned, i.e. petitioner No.2, her personal needs came to an end, hence, the petition would become infructuous. The Trial Court found that the judgements relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners, i.e. Parmeshwari Das v. G.R. Kohli 9 (1973) DLT 13 and Shakuntala Bai & Ors. v. Narayan Das & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3484 were not applicable to the facts of

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the present case, since the first case relied upon dealt with the landlord requiring the tenanted premises for the bona fide personal requirement for his own and his family's residence, while the latter case dealt with commercial accommodation being put to use by widows.

2. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have impugned the order on the following grounds:

i. That the Trial Court fell into an error by overlooking the fact that the determinative date for construing the requirement of landlord is the date of eviction petition and subsequent facts cannot be taken into consideration. Reliance is placed upon the judgements of the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604;

ii. That in a case where a decree was passed in favour of the landlord on account of his personal need and he dies during the pendency of an appeal by the tenant against the decree, the bona fide need would not come to an end and the legal heirs of the landlord would be entitled to a decree [Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia (1973) 1 SCC 688];

iii. That the petition was filed by two widows, viz. Smt. Balwant Kaur and Smt. Geeta Chaudhary, therefore, the need for the tenanted premises would continue with the surviving widow.

3. The short question before this Court is whether a widow's need under Section 14D of the Act would survive even after her demise.

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Section 14D of the Act reads as under:

"14D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow. - (1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.

(2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her."

4. This Court in Luxmi Marketing (P) Ltd. v. Mohini Gujral 43 (1991) DLT 342 has held that "Section 14D of the Act would apply to a case where the premises had been let out prior to the landlady becoming a widow. The reason for this is apparent. The landlady may suddenly become a widow and may have urgent need for the premises in question. It was, therefore, necessary to provide for a situation where speedy relief can be granted to the widow. The use of the expression "immediate possession" in Section 14D clearly indicates that the said provision is to apply where the widow is in urgent need of premises for her residence. When an unexpected event like the death of her husband occurs, a need for residence may arises immediately or after sometime. Section 14D is meant to cater to such situations where such a need arises."

5. In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005) 2 SCC 271 (decided

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by 5 Hon'ble Judges), the Supreme Court held that Section 14D of the Act benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions, "let out by her or by her husband" and "such premises" in Section 14D would be redundant. The Supreme Court further reasoned that:

"28. ....the widow's right to recover immediate possession of the premises arises only if the premises were let out by her or by her husband, and not by anyone else. It appears to us that the legislature has purposely employed a different expression in Section 14D as also in Section 14B and 14C. We are here concerned with an application filed under Section 14D which specifies in clear terms that a widow can invoke the provisions only if she has let out the premises, or if her husband had let out the premises. If, as observed in Kanta Goyal v. B.P. Pathak and Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 814, the expression, "the premises let out by him" has been used only to convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, and not that he had himself let out the premises, the legislature would not have then used the expression "let out by her, or by her husband." The very fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one which was let out by the widow or by her husband implies that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by any other person. If the intention of the legislature was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use of the words "the premises let out by her, or by her husband" would have been unnecessary and the Section would have simply read as follows:

"Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are

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required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises."

By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband, the legislature has clearly excluded from the purview of the said provision "premises let out by any other person" even if in course of time the widow may have become its landlord. We are obliged to read the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature. The expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose husband had let the premises before his death, and which premises the widow requires for her own use."

6. From the aforesaid it is clear that the requirement for the tenanted premises has to be of the widow, of a property let out either by her or her husband and the requirement has to be personal to the widow. The statute stipulates that the premises should be required by the widow for her own residence the need should be personal in nature. This expression is quite different from the expression in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, which reads - "....required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him....". Quite clearly Section 14D was introduced for a specific class of persons, i.e. widows, who had either let out their own property or the property

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was let out by the husband and that upon the demise of the husband the widow felt the need for the tenanted premises. Hence, the family members or legal representatives of the widow would not be able to exercise the option under the aforesaid provision. The said provision clearly is limited to the widow and her own residence. It does not extend to her dependent or her family members. Therefore, upon her demise, her need too would come to an end.

7. The petitioners have relied upon Shakuntala Bai & Ors.I (supra) to contend that the death of the eviction-petitioner, during the pendency of an appeal against an order of eviction would not result in abatement of the petition so as to "lead to rendering the whole proceedings ..... infructuous and colossal waste of time". The learned counsel for the petitioners have further relied upon the decision of this Court in Civil Revision No.528/1998 titled Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi decided on 23.9.1998 to contend that where the landlady had died during the pendency of the petition her family members would be entitled to the eviction for their bona fide requirement, since the eviction petition had been filed by the landlady for her requirement as well as that of her family. However, it is to be noted that neither of the aforesaid cases would be applicable to the present case since they did not deal with a provision as specific as Section 14D of the Act. Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi (supra) referred to a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act whereas Shakuntala Bai (supra)

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dealt with Sections 2, 12, 12(1) &14(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, neither of which concern the special clause introduced to provide urgent relief through summary proceedings under Section 25-B of the Act, to widows who would require the tenanted premises let out either by their husband or by them for their own bona fide need.

8. Reliance of the petitioners upon Sahu Basheshar Dayal Banker & Ors. Vs. Sujata R. Nath Thr. LRs. 152 (2008) DLT 18 is misplaced since that case related to an order of eviction in a petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act by the landlady, in which she required the premises for her own bona fide requirement. She had also filed another petition under Section 14D of the Act. The leave to defend was not granted since the pendency of the petition under Section 14D of the Act was not considered a ground to grant leave. Ultimately the eviction order was passed since the ARC found that the lady was suffering from cancer, undergoing chemotherapy and otherwise there were compelling circumstance regarding her grandchild who was mentally retarded and her married daughters visiting her, to help her, also required additional rooms, etc. The order was passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, i.e. bona fide need of the landlady and her family. The Court held that merely because the landlady has died, the eviction order passed by learned ARC could not be buried or set at naught. The LRs had a right to reap the benefits of the decree. The requirements considered by the learned

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ARC were of the landlady and her family. The main member of her family living with her was a mentally retarded son who needed care and attention apart from landlady's own care and attention. Therefore, insofar as the order was passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act the benefit of the order would continue to the rightful successors of the eviction petitioner. Quite clearly this was not a case of a widow petitioning for vacation of tenanted premises under Section 14D of the Act.

9. Likewise reliance of the petitioner on S.N. Kapoor (Dead) By his LRs Vs. Basant Lal Khatri & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 171 too is misplaced since that facts of the case are entirely different. An eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act was filed by the landlady which was subsequently sought to be converted to a petition under Section 14D of the Act by the widow/landlady. In that case the widow was alive when the case was decided by the Supreme Court, which considered that the requirement of the appellant landlady was bona fide hence an order of eviction should follow. In the present case the widow who had petitioned under Section 14D of the Act had expired before the eviction petition could even be adjudicated upon by the Rent Controller. Hence, the aforesaid case too would not be applicable to the present one.

10. The ratio of Gaya Prasad (supra) is hardly in issue since the cause of action fizzled out with the demise of the eviction-petitioner etc. i.e. the widow concerned namely Smt. Geeta Chaudhary. For the same reason Phool Rani (supra) too would be inapplicable.

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11. It is not disputed that the tenancy had been created by late Shri Ashok Kumar Chaudhary and indeed the tenant had admitted to the tenanted premises being let out by the husband of petitioner No.2 by way of a written agreement dated 18.4.1996. Insofar as only one landlord has been admitted, the claim of the first petitioner that the property had been let out by her husband Shri Har Krishan Lal Chaudhary would be irrelevant and the petition by her would not be maintainable under Section 14D of the Act. Any dispute between the legal heirs of Shri Har Krishan Lal Chaudhary and Shri Ashok Kumar Chaudhary may well be triable before the appropriate forum but not in an eviction petition under Section 14D of the Act.

12. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at in the impugned order. The petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed.

AUGUST 05, 2014                                      NAJMI WAZIRI, J.
b'nesh

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