Vaishno Devi vs Suraj Bhan
2014 Latest Caselaw 2130 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                                               Date of Decision: 29.04.2014
+      RC.REV. 154/2014 & Caveat No.361/2014
       VAISHNO DEVI                                     ..... Petitioner
                          Through:      Mr. Puneet Agrawal, Adv.

                          versus

       SURAJ BHAN                                         ..... Respondent

                          Through:     None.


       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI

%      MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI (Oral)

1. This petition impugns an order dated 30th November, 2013 whereby the petitioner/tenant's leave to defend under Section 25-B(5) of the DRC Act, 1958 was rejected and an eviction order was passed in respect of the tenanted premises consisting of two rooms with tin roof with facility of bath, latrine and kitchen on ground floor in property No. 2989/1 A, Gali No.14, Ranjeet Nagar, New Delhi. The eviction-petitioner had required the premises for his bonafide need for starting an independent business for his elder son Vikram, who was a teacher by profession and is also running a coaching centre from the third floor of the property No.WZ-111, Shadi Pur, New Delhi. It was the eviction-petitioner's case that the tenanted premises were required both for residential use as well as for running a coaching institute. The bonafide need was also claimed for the eviction-petitioner's third and fourth sons namely Jitender Singh and Arun Singh respectively, who are pursuing their under graduate studies but they both needed separate

rooms for themselves and no room was available to accommodate them; that his family comprised himself, his wife, four sons and daughter about 35 years along with the family of elder son Vikram and his wife and a four years old daughter; thus the eight adult members and a minor child were living in a constricted space on the first and third floors of the aforesaid property. It was the eviction-petitioner's case that the tenanted premises were rented out by his father to the husband of the present tenant, at the monthly rent of Rs.90/-, for residential purpose excluding electricity and other charges. The eviction-petitioner's father Sh. Siri Lal passed away on 17.4.1970 leaving behind the tenanted premises as well as the property Nos. WZ-111 and WZ-125, Shadi Pur, New Delhi. After partitioning the property, the first and third floors of property WZ-111, Shadi Pur, New Delhi along with the tenanted premises came to the share of the eviction- petitioner. Hence he became the absolute owner of the same.

2. In the leave to defend application, the tenant has admitted the tenancy and the ownership of the tenanted premises in favour of the eviction- petitioner/respondent herein. However, she sought to raise some triable issues such as: i) there were thirty tenants in the premises and ii) the petitioner had sufficient accommodation available to him, hence iii) there was no bonafide need; iv) that all his children are well settled living separately and leading separate and independent lives and v) the site plan filed along with the eviction petition was false. These contentions were refuted by the landlord. After considering the records and arguments of the counsel, the Trial Court found that the tenant's contention of thirty rooms being available to the landlord was a vague defence, unsupported by any document. The tenant was unable to show or specify any space or

accommodation in possession of the landlord from where his son could start the business of educational coaching to children, nor had the tenant specified any vacant room in possession of the landlord which could accommodate his numerous adult family members in residential rooms or a guest room. Accordingly, the tenant's defence was found untenable and not a triable issue.

3. The Trial Court relied upon Hari Shanker vs. Madan Mohan Gupta, 111 (2004) DLT 534 to emphasise that frivolous and vague allegations which can never be substantiated cannot be permitted to defeat the summary procedure envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. It also relied upon this Court's observations in Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. vs. Leela Wati & Ors., 155 (2008) DKT 383 which held that where a tenant leads to defend preposterous prepositions and makes such averments which are palpably false and the landlord refused the same, the ARC is not precluded from considering and concluding the falsity of facts on the basis of material placed by the landlord before it. It held that if the leave to defend is granted on mere assertions that landlord was the owner of the premises of which he actually was not, then in every case the tenant would get leave by just naming any premises with which landlord has no concern. The Trial Court took into account the size of the family of the eviction-petitioner and his inability to accommodate the eight adult members and one minor in the space available with him at WZ-111, Shadi Pur, New Delhi; coupled with the delay in the marriage of the second son due to paucity of accommodation and the non-availability of space for starting an educational coaching institute for students by the elder son and placed reliance upon the dicta of the Supreme Court in Joginder Pal Singh vs. Naval Kishore Behal, Air

2002 SC 2256 which held "24......Keeping in view the social or socio religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section or society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord."

4. In view of the above, the Trial Court found that there was no triable issue with respect to the bonafide need of the landlord. It also relied upon Sarwan Dass Bange vs. Ram Prakash, 167 (2010) DLT 80 as well as Baldev Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778 which held that "whenever the landlord would approach the Court, his requirement shall be presumed genuine and bonafide". The Court found that the leave to defend application does not disclose any triable issue which could disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, therefore the eviction order was passed. In the present case, the petitioner has reiterated the same arguments as before the Trial Court.

5. This Court is also conscious of the limited jurisdiction it has in Rent Control matters. This court in the case of Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450, has held that while exercising jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision, the Court does not act as a Court of Appeal. The Court has to see whether the learned ARC has committed any jurisdictional error and has passed the order on the basis of material available before it. Moreover, a Full Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Ram Chopra and Anr., AIR 1982 Delhi 405, exhaustively dealt with Section 25-B of the Act. On the scope of the proviso to Sub-section (8) of this Section, after

examining the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hari Shanker and Ors. v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 and Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223, it was laid down as follows:

"In our opinion the jurisdiction of the High Court under proviso to Section 25B (8) has to be interpreted, keeping in view the legislative intent. The revision under Section 25B (8) cannot be regarded as a first appeal and nor can it be as restricted as the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. The High Court would have jurisdiction to interfere if it is of the opinion that there has been a gross illegality or material irregularity which has been committed or the Controller has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or has not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. A finding of fact arrived at by the Controller would not be interfered with by the High Court unless it can be shown that finding has been arrived at by misreading or omitting relevant evidence and this has resulted in gross injustice being caused. If none of the aforesaid circumstances exist the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with the order of the Controller in exercise of its jurisdiction under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act."

6. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in another case tilted as Chaman Prakash Puri v. Ishwar Dass Rajput and Anr., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 445 has held that if the Rent Controller finds that landlord was in bonafide need of premises, the High Court in revision would not be entitled to re-appreciate evidence and reverse the finding. In Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani & Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 141, the Supreme Court held:

"12....It is no doubt that the scope of a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to

find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters or record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional court to interfere with such a matter."

7. This Court is of the view that each of the contentions have been duly dealt with in the impugned order which is based upon the records. The reasoning for and conclusion arrived at cannot, therefore, be faulted. The tenants could not show any suitable alternate accommodation with the landlords; the contention regarding thirty tenants was irrelevant; no alternate or contrarian site plan was filed by the tenant nor was it shown that the landlord's children were not dependent upon their father for their accommodation residential or otherwise. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is not persuaded by the petitioner's arguments to grant her relief against the impugned eviction order. The petition is without merit and is accordingly dismissed.

NAJMI WAZIRI (JUDGE) April 29, 2014/ak