Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 2041 Del
Judgement Date : 24 April, 2014
$~R-41
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on :17.4.2014
Judgment delivered on :24.4.2014
+ CRL.A. No. 272/2003
RAM PRABHU SHARMA ..... Appellant
Through Appellant with his counsel Mr.
Sanjay Jain, Adv.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through Ms. Fizani Hussain, APP
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1 The appellant is aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order
of sentence dated 05.4.2003 and 17.4.2003 respectively wherein he has
been convicted under Section 376 of the IPC and has been sentenced to
undergo RI for a period of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- in
default of payment of fine to undergo SI for 1 year.
2 Record shows that as per the version of the prosecutrix (PW-3) on
07.7.2001 at about 9.00 a.m. she was called by the appellant to his house
at Quarter No.14/1 Vayusenabad on the pretext of getting her a job; he
told that she has to spent Rs.10,000/-; she told him that she does not
have the money; he stated that in lieu of getting her a job she would
have to serve him; at that point of time the appellant took off her salwar
and raped her from behind. She was in pain and bleeding but the
appellant continued with the act. Thereafter the appellant absconded and
he finally surrendered only on 11.10.2001.
3 On oath in Court the victim had not supported the version of the
prosecution on the identity of the appellant. She had stated that the
appellant was not the same R.P.Sharma who had committed the said act
of rape upon her. She stated that that the accused present in the Court
was not a resident of Quarter No.14/1 SMQ, Vayusenabad; she had seen
the accused for the first time in the Court; the act and the incident were
otherwise corroborated.
4 The investigating officer SI Balraj Singh was examined as PW-7.
He had recorded the statement of the victim and had sent her for medical
examination. The medical evidence which is the MLC Ex.PW-8/A had
confirmed the act of rape as the hymen of the victim had been torn and
she was found bleeding. There was, however, no unnatural intercourse
through the anus.
5 The Court in its discretion had summoned Ranjit Singh as a court
witness. Ranjit Singh was the allotee of Quarter No.14/1, SMQ,
Vayusenabad where the alleged incident had taken place. He had
deposed that this quarter had been allotted to him and at the relevant
time on 07.7.2001 it was in his occupation; his wife Pushpa was living
there with his son. He categorically denied that the accused was in
possession of this accommodation. He admitted that the accused was
his colleague and they were both working in the Air Force Unit; the
accused was absconding till the time he surrendered i.e. on 11.10.2001.
CW-2, the second court witness was Pushpa (wife of Ranjit Singh). She
had reiterated the version given by her husband. She stated that on the
fateful day i.e. 07.7.2001 she was living in the accommodation i.e. at
quarter No.14/1 Vayusenabad. She denied the suggestion that the
accused was in possession of the accommodation at the time.
6 The Trial Court had however returned a finding that the victim
was deliberately not telling the truth and relying upon the version of the
investigating officer (PW-7) who had recorded the statement of the
victim thought it fit to convict the accused. The court had noted that this
was a case where the victim had either been threatened or had been won
over by the accused and that she was deliberately not identifying him in
Court. The Court had also returned a finding that Quarter No.14/1,
SMQ Vayusenabad although allotted to Ranjit Singh but was in
possession of the appellant on the date of the incident.
7 The arguments of the appellant are four fold:-
i. It is pointed out that in the absence of the identification of
the appellant as is clear from the version of PW-3 the
conviction of the appellant could not have followed.
ii. It is pointed out that there is no evidence whatsoever with
the trial judge to return a finding that the Quarter No.14,
SMQ, Vayusenabad was in possession of the appellant on
the date of the incident.
iii. Third submission being that the trial court has illegally
relied upon the version of investigating officer (PW-7) to
return a finding that this quarter was in fact in possession of
the appellant; submission being that the allotee (Ranjit
Singh) examined as CW-1 himself has denied this fact;
reliance by the trial judge on the testimony of PW-7 was
wrong. For this proposition reliance has been placed upon
(2005) 9 SCC 736 Ram Kishan and Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
iv. Last submission of the learned counsel for the appellant
being that even if there are certain discrepancies in the
statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.
P.C. the same cannot be taken advantage of by the
prosecution as the prosecution has to prove its case to the
hilt. For this proposition reliance has been placed upon
(2010) 11 SCC 423 Nanhar and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana.
8 Arguments have been refuted. It is pointed out that on no count
does the impugned judgment call for any interference and for this
purpose attention has been drawn to the finding returned by the Trial
Court.
9 Arguments have been heard. Record perused. 10 Version of PW-3 has been perused. She has not identified the
accused in Court; she has categorically stated that although the act of
rape and incident had occurred but it was not the accused present in the
court who had committed this act; he was not the said R.P.Sharma. She
had seen the accused for the first time in the Court. R.P.Sharma who
raped her used to visit her father before the death of her father; the
accused present in the Court was not living at Quarter No.14/1, SMQ,
Vayusenabad. PW-3 had stuck to her stand in the entire cross-
examination both by learned public prosecutor and learned defence
counsel.
11 Linked with this argument is the testimony of CW-1 i.e. Ranjit
Singh. CW-1 was admittedly the allottee of Quarter No.14/1, SMQ,
Vayusenabad which has been allotted to him by the Air Force in his
capacity as its employee. He stated that at the relevant time when the
incident occurred on 07.7.2001 the appellant was not his tenant.
Admittedly, no statement of Ranjit Singh has been recorded by the
investigating officer under Section 161 Cr. P.C. It was only at the
direction of the Court that CW-1 had been summoned. Version of
CW-1 was supported by his wife Pushpa examined as CW-2. She has
deposed that on the fateful day i.e. 07.7.2001 she was in possession of
this quarter along with her son. Testimony of CW-1 and CW-2 remains
unrebutted.
12 The evidence thus gathered clearly shows that the Quarter
No.14/1, SMQ, Vayusenabad which was the alleged place of incident
was allotted to Ranjit Singh and on the date of the incident it was in
possession of his wife. In this background the trial judge relying upon
the statement of PW-7 who has not even recorded any version of Ranjit
Singh under Section 161 Cr.P.C. holding that Ranjit Singh was
deliberately telling a lie to save his friend who was his colleague has
committed an illegality. Such a statement could not have been admitted
where the witness himself has made a categorical denial. In the absence
of the identity of the appellant having been established the trial judge
returning a finding that this was the same R.P.Sharma who had
committed the offence of rape upon the victim is clearly an illegality. In
the statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr. P.C. he had
admitted that after he learnt from the office about an FIR having been
lodged against him he had become frightened and had absconded. He
had surrendered on 11.10.2011 i.e. almost three months after the date of
the incident. Learned public prosecutor has also drawn attention of this
Court to the answers given by the appellant to Question Nos. 9 and 12 in
his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stating that these are
irreconcilable answers. This Court is not in agreement with this
submission. The appellant has candidly answered that he had become
frightened and stopped going to his office. The fact that he had learnt
about this case from his office is not contrary to the earlier version as the
office could through a letter have communicated this fact to him; it was
not necessary that his physical presence in the office was necessary to
learn about this FIR.
13 In this background the conviction of the appellant cannot be
sustained. Giving benefit of doubt to the appellant he is acquitted. Bail
bond cancelled; surety discharged.
14 Appeal is allowed in the above terms.
INDERMEET KAUR, J
APRIL 24, 2014/ndn
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