The Management Of Mayo ... vs Ms. Anju Farswan And Anr.
2013 Latest Caselaw 4093 Del

*            IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                         W.P.(C) No. 5866/2011

%                                                   11th September, 2013

THE MANAGEMENT OF MAYO INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL
                                          ..... Petitioner
                Through: Mr. Satender Verma, Advocate.

                          versus

MS. ANJU FARSWAN AND ANR.                   ..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Kushal Yadav, Advocate for respondent No.2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. By this writ petition, the petitioner-school impugns the order of

the Delhi School Tribunal (DST) dated 31.5.2011. By the impugned order,

DST accepted the appeal filed by the respondent No.1/teacher and set aside

the termination of her services. DST has held that since the period of

probation was not extended after it was completed on 14.4.2003, termination

of services of the appellant (respondent No.1 herein) on 25.3.2004 without

holding any domestic enquiry was illegal.

2. Before me, on behalf of the petitioner-school the following

arguments are raised:-

(i) Tribunal was not correct in arriving at a finding that the

respondent No.1 was not a probationer and her probationary period stood

completed on 14.4.2003, and for which purpose reliance was placed upon

the school register which shows that probationary period of respondent No.1

was extended for one year from 1.4.2003.

(ii) Respondent No.1 was not appointed from the year 2000 and she

was in fact appointed from the year 2002 pursuant to her application for

being appointed to the post of Hindi teacher in terms of the advertisement in

the newspaper „Hindustan Times‟ dated 15.3.2002. Photocopy of this

application is filed before me today.

(iii) Termination of services of respondent No.1 is legal because she

has been terminated on account of unsatisfactory services in the extended

year of probation.

3. I have recently had an occasion to consider the issue as to the

consequences when schools give only a temporary appointment without

valid reasons, continue the same thereafter, again call the teacher to seek

fresh employment on probation and thereafter terminating the services in the

extended period of probation. I have held that these actions which are

resorted to by some schools are sham and a fraud upon the provisions of

Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 which require statutory

protection to services and also payment of emoluments to teachers which

would be the same as those appointed in a government school. The only

reason for giving non-regular appointment can be that as provided in sub-

Rule (3) of Rule 105 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973. I have held

as aforesaid in the case of Army Public School and Anr. Vs. Narendra

Singh Nain and Anr. in W.P.(C) No.1439/2013 decided on 30.8.2013.

Relevant paras of this judgment are paras 3 to 8 and which read as under:-

"3. On the basis of the admitted facts: in the form of various appointment letters and the termination letters which have been issued by the petitioner-school as detailed above; the provision of Rule 105 of the Delhi School Education Act & Rules, 1973; the judgment delivered by me in the case of Hamdard Public School Vs. Directorate of Education and Anr. in W.P.(C) No.8652/2011 decided on 25.7.2013 interpreting Rule 105; and, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School Vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 472 read with Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Social Jurist, a Civil Rights Group Vs. GNCT & Ors. 147 (2008) DLT 729, the issues which arise, and on which counsel for the parties have been heard, are first as to whether the respondent No.1 at all can be said to only be a contractual employee in terms of the first contractual appointment letter dated 3.12.2007 or whether the employment of respondent No.1 since inception in the peculiar facts of this case would have a statutory favour in view of the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973, and secondly as to whether the actions of the petitioner-school amount to over-reach the provision of Rule 105 and is, therefore, against the ratio not only of the categorical language of Rule 105 but also the ratio of the judgment passed by me in the case of Hamdard

Public School Vs. Directorate of Education and Anr. (supra). The following issues are, therefore, crystallized for decision by this Court:

(i) Should the respondent No.1‟s services in the facts of this case be not taken as having statutory protection in terms of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 since the original date of the contractual appointment in terms of letter dated 3.12.2007. Related with this issue would be whether the respondent No.1 is estopped from challenging the nature of appointment as contractual inasmuch as respondent No.1 thereafter accepted services first as a probationer and thereafter again on contractual basis.

(ii) Whether all the appointment letters, whether giving contractual appointment or as appointment on probation, have to be read in their substance and not in form whereby actually the respondent No.1 should be treated as on probation either from 28.11.2007 or in any case from 1.4.2008 and since there is no mention of termination on account of unsatisfactory services in the termination letter dated 10.6.2010, and none exist as stated in the letter dated 21.3.2010, therefore, respondent No.1 would have confirmation of employment on account of language of Rule 105 and the judgment in the case of Hamdard Public School Vs. Directorate of Education and Anr. (supra).

4. So far as the first issue is concerned, as to whether the respondent No.1‟s services originally w.e.f 28.11.2007 are contractual in nature or statutory in character, it would be necessary at this stage to refer to the relevant para 10 of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School Vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra), but, before I do so I must hasten to add that the observations which are being made by me in this judgment as regards the first issue is because of the facts of this case whereby I am not treating the first appointment as contractual in nature in spite of the letter dated 3.12.2007 so specifying because I hold this letter, and also subsequent probationary/contractual appointment letters, to be a sham and given only for denying regular employment to respondent No.1 as LDC. The repeated appointments and terminations, have persuaded me to hold that the petitioner‟s-school‟s actions are a fraud upon the requirement to normally not to appoint an employee on contract basis. Accordingly, in a case where on account of genuine exigencies a contractual appointment is required (like when a regular employee suddenly leaves etc.) then such employment will be treated as

adhoc/temporary/contractual and not a statutory one having protection of the Act & Rules. With this preface let us reproduce para 10 of Montfort Senior Secondary School's case (supra) and which reads as under:-

"10. In St. Xaviers' case (supra) the following observation was made, which was noted in Frank Anthony's case (supra): "A regulation which is designed to prevent mal-administration of an educational institution cannot be said to offend clause (1) of Article 30. At the same time it has to be ensured that under the power of making regulation nothing is done as would detract from the character of the institution as a minority educational institution or which would impinge upon the rights of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The right conferred by Article 30 is intended to be real and effective and not a mere pious and abstract sentiment; it is a promise of reality and not a teasing illusion. Such a right cannot be allowed to be whittled down by any measure masquerading as a regulation. As observed by this Court in the case of Rev. Sidhajbjai Sabhai (supra), regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as minority institution as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conclusive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority or other persons who resort to it."

The effect of the decision in Frank Anthony's case (supra) is that the statutory rights and privileges of Chapter IV have been extended to the employees covered by Chapter V and, therefore, the contractual rights have to be judged in the background of statutory rights. In view of what has been stated in Frank Anthony's case (supra) the very nature of employment has undergone a transformation and services of the employees in minorities un-aided schools governed under Chapter V are no longer contractual in nature but they are statutory. The qualifications, leaves, salaries, age of retirement, pension,

dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, suspension and other conditions of service are to be governed exclusively under the statutory regime provided in Chapter IV. The Tribunal constituted under Section 11 is the forum provided for enforcing some of these rights....."

5. A reference to aforesaid para shows that the Supreme Court in Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School Vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra) has laid down the ratio that the very nature of employment of the employees of a school are that they are no longer contractual in nature but statutory. This observation was made by the Supreme Court in spite of the fact that the minority schools had entitlement under the provisions of Section 15 and Rule 130 of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 to have a contract of services for its employees. It be noted that so far as the non-minority schools are concerned there is no provision in the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 to have a contractual appointment. Therefore, once if minority schools‟ employees cannot have contractual employment and they have to be treated as statutory employees, then a fortiorily non-minority schools whose employees cannot be engaged in employment on contractual basis, such employees in non-minority school would surely have statutory protection of their services. In Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School Vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has made it clear in the aforesaid paragraph 10 that the qualifications, leaves, salaries, age of retirement etc, removal and other conditions of services are to be governed "exclusively" under the statutory regime provided under the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973. Once that is so, then, as per Rules 118 to 120 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 the services of an employee can only be terminated on account of misconduct and that too after following the requirement of holding of a detailed enquiry and passing of the order by the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, in view of the categorical ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School Vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra) and in view of the facts of this case the respondent No. 1‟s services from the inception cannot be taken as only contractual in nature and would be statutory in nature. Once the services are statutory in nature, and admittedly the respondent No. 1 has not been removed by

following the provisions of conducting an enquiry and passing of an order by the Disciplinary Authority as required under the Rules 118 to 120 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, the respondent No. 1‟s services cannot be said to have been legally terminated. Respondent No. 1, therefore, continues to be in services.

6. To distinguish the applicability of the Supreme Court in the case of Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following two arguments:

(i) Respondent No.1 is estopped from questioning his first appointment as contractual, thereafter appointment on probation and his termination during the probation period and thereafter again a fresh contractual appointment and finally his termination as per the last contract dated 8.4.2010. It is argued that respondent No.1 having acted upon the aforesaid sequence of events comprised in different appointments cannot now contend that the ratio of the judgment in Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra) should come to his aid.

(ii) It is argued that the judgment in Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra) was intended only to apply to minority schools and ratio of the said judgment cannot be read to apply to non-minority schools.

7. So far as the second arguments urged on behalf of the petitioner- school to distinguish the applicability of the ratio in the case of Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra), I have already dealt with this aspect above by holding, and the same is reiterated herein, that, if for minority schools, there cannot be contractual appointments, and which in fact was so envisaged under the relevant provisions of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973, then, surely and indubitably, so far as non-minority schools are concerned, and who do not have provisions even in terms of Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 for making contractual appointments, the ratio of Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School vs. Sh. Vijay Kumar and Ors. (supra) would squarely apply and the employees of the non-minority schools will be treated not as contractual employees of the schools but

statutory employees having statutory protection in terms of the relevant provisions of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973.

8. So far as the first argument of estoppel is concerned, that argument is attractive only at the first blush, however, this argument overlooks the elementary principle that there is no estoppel against law. Of course, there may be estoppel against law where the provisions of law are only for private individual interest and not meant to be in public interest, however, considering that statutory protection is given to the employees of a school and which results in stability to the education system, the same therefore cannot be held to be as not in public interest, more so after amending of the Constitution by introduction of Article 21A by which right to education has been made as a fundamental right for children from the ages of 6 to 14 years. Also one cannot ignore the fact that right to education otherwise also is an important part of Directive Principles of State Policy vide Article 41 and Article 45 of the Constitution, and thus subject of education itself has been treated by the Supreme Court as a public function and consequently, writ petitions lie against even private educational institutions. Reference need in this regard be only made to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Unni Krishnan J.P. & Ors. etc. etc. Vs. State of A.P. & Ors. etc. etc. 1993(1) SCC 645 and which clearly holds that the subject of education is a public function, and hence writ petitions are maintainable even against private educational institutions." 4(i) In the present case if it is held that the respondent No.1 was

appointed in the year 2000 as a temporary teacher without there being any

administrative exigencies for the ad hoc or temporary employment, then, the

respondent No.1‟s services from inception in the year 2000 would be taken

as a service having statutory protection in terms of ratio laid down in the

case of Army Public School (supra).

(ii) Respondent No.1 in her appeal filed before the DST pleaded

that she was actually appointed by the petitioner-school for the first time in

the year 2000 and not in the year 2002 as claimed by the school. It is

pleaded that she was appointed afresh on probation w.e.f 15.4.2002.

5. In order to determine as to whether respondent No.1 was

originally employed in the year 2000 or only for the first time on probation

w.e.f 15.4.2002, two aspects when considered will result in this issue being

held in favour of respondent No.1. The first aspect is that the respondent

No.1 specifically stated that her appointment was from the year 2000 in her

legal notice dated 18.5.2004, and the petitioner-school admittedly in spite of

receiving this notice did not reply to this legal notice in which it was stated

that respondent No.1 was appointed in the year 2000 on a consolidated

salary of `2,500/- per month. In view of the silence of the petitioner-school,

an adverse inference has to be drawn against the petitioner-school. Also, if

the petitioner-school wanted really to show that respondent No.1 was not

appointed in the year 2000, but was for the first time appointed w.e.f

15.4.2002, all that the petitioner-school had to do was to file a copy of the

salary register showing that no salary was paid to the respondent No.1 from

2000 to 2002. If the petitioner-school has filed the register of appointment

to show extension of services of the respondent No.1 as probationer w.e.f

1.4.2003, then surely nothing would have prevented the petitioner-school

from filing the photocopy of salary register maintained by it. Photocopy of

salary register has obviously however not been filed because this register

would have shown that respondent No.1 was an employee since the year

2000.

6. I cannot agree with the argument urged on behalf of the petitioner-

school that onus of proof lies on the respondent No.1 to prove that she was

employed from the year 2000 inasmuch as, as per Sections 106 and 114

(Illustration g) of the Evidence Act, 1872, onus of proof lies on a person

when the facts are in the special knowledge of a person. In this case, the

facts being the salary register record, are in the special knowledge of the

petitioner-school because that record would be the salary register in its

control and possession. Since the petitioner-school has failed to file the

photocopy of the salary register, and petitioner-school very much had onus

to do the same, I cannot agree that onus of proof was on the respondent No.1

to show her employment from the year 2000. Adverse inference has to be

drawn against the school. In any case, even if we take the onus of proof on

the respondent No.1 the fact that there was no response to the legal notice

issued by the respondent No.1 dated 18.5.2004, and which aspect when is

taken alongwith non-filing of the salary register by the petitioner-school, the

respondent No.1 in my opinion has discharged the onus of proof that she

was appointed in the year 2000 and not from 15.4.2002 as is argued on

behalf of petitioner-school.

7(i) I may note that it is not the case of the petitioner-school that

respondent No.1 was appointed in the year 2000 because of some

administrative exigencies or a post suddenly falling vacant or vacancy

otherwise suddenly arising because of a particular urgent reason. That being

so, the sequence of events show that respondent No.1 was appointed in the

year 2000, was again appointed on probation w.e.f 15.4.2002 and her

services were thereafter terminated holding that she was on probation till

31.3.2004. Therefore, applying the ratio in the case of Army Public School

(supra) I hold that respondent No.1‟s services had statutory protection right

from inception in the year 2000.

(ii) I therefore hold that respondent No.1 was a regular employee

since 2000 and had statutory protection of her services, and thus she could

not have been terminated by the petitioner-school simply by issuing the

letter dated 25.3.2004. Respondent No.1 could only have been terminated

from the services by following the provisions of conducting an enquiry as is

required in terms of Rules 118 to 120 of the Delhi School Education Rules,

1973 and which admittedly have not been followed.

8. There is another way of looking at the matter, and which is that

even if respondent No.1‟s services are not taken as having statutory

protection from the year 2000, respondent No.1 can be said to be on

probation from the year 2000 and hence confirmed on satisfactorily

completing her probationary services as per Rule 105(2). I have recently

held in the judgment in the case of Hamdard Public School Vs. Directorate

of Education and Anr. in W.P.(C) No.8652/2011 decided on 25.7.2013 that

a teacher of a school should ordinarily continue in probation only for a

period of three years. If the teacher continues in probation beyond three

years, reasons must exist which are justiciable before the Court. Para 11 of

the judgment in the case of Hamdard Public School (supra) is relevant and

the same reads as under:-

"11. Now that takes us to the most vexed question as to what should be a reasonable period. We will have to keep in mind Article 21A of the Constitution for this purpose. To understand the issue of what should be a reasonable period qua Rule 105 as regards a teacher, let us start with two extreme examples. One extreme example is that probation period cannot be extended at all for the third year and the other extreme example is that the probation period can be kept on extending by the management even till the age of superannuation. Obviously, both these extreme situations cannot decide what is a reasonable period. In many statutory rules and rules of many organizations , there is provided a three year period of probation like in the case of Lawrence School (supra). Therefore, probation period undoubtedly can be of 3 years under Rule 105 because as already stated there is no outer limit of probation period provided. The question is that for how long beyond the third year can a period of probation continue. In my opinion, reasonable period will have to be dependent on the facts of each case including as to what is the post or nature of employment in question, what are the terms and conditions agreed to at the time of original appointment and subject of course to the same being in accordance with Delhi School Education Act and

Rules, 1973. The nature of job or duties to be performed by the teacher will also have to be kept in mind. It will also have to be kept in mind whether the teacher will be overage for similar employment if he/she is not confirmed. Keeping in mind all the relevant facts, probation period, except in exceptional cases, so far as a teacher is concerned, should not continue beyond a period of 5 years from the first date of appointment. Even a period of 4/5 years has to be really in a very grave and exceptional case depending on the facts of that case. However, I do not express myself finally with respect to what should be a reasonable period between 3 to 5 years because Courts will necessarily examine that aspect in the facts and circumstances of each individual case. I am making these specific observations with respect to the maximum period of probation being ordinarily only of 5 years because in the absence of fixing an outer limit by the statute viz Rule 105, the entire purpose of a probation period and a probationary teacher being confirmed would be defeated by the machinations of the management of the schools in certain cases thus affecting education and bringing in of Article 21A in the Constitution. Therefore, I hold that the Rule 105 must be so interpreted that the reasonable period therein should ordinarily be around three years, should not extend beyond five years in most of the cases, and, in the rarest or rare cases, one more year upto 6 years may be considered. However again at the cost of repetition it is stated that six years period is being observed only as a most grave and rarest of rare circumstance in a case, and ordinarily, a probation period qua a teacher should not extend beyond/around three years which is a reasonable period, and as per the facts and circumstances of certain case, and which issues/decisions are of course justiciable before Courts the probation period can go up to 5/6 years as stated above."

9. In the present case, if we take the employment of the

respondent No.1 from the year 2000 she has continued for well over three

years, and in fact almost for four years, and since no valid reasons are found

for terminating her employment by the letter dated 25.3.2004, I hold that

respondent No.1 should be taken as confirmed in her services on satisfactory

completion of probation period w.e.f 1.4.2003 as per Rule 105(2). It may be

noted that there is no documentary evidence placed on record with respect to

any alleged unsatisfactory services of the respondent No.1 prior to 1.4.2003.

Therefore, even on this independent reasoning as per the ratio of Hamdard

Public School (supra), respondent No.1 will be taken as becoming a

confirmed employee w.e.f 1.4.2003.

10. It is very relevant at this stage to note that the petitioner-school

has been less than honest in dealing with its teachers and employees. This

has been extensively noted by the DST in the impugned judgment in paras

10 to 13, and which paras show that the petitioner-school at its convenience

has been hiring and firing employees. Para 13 of the judgment of DST

shows that as per the inspection report of the Director of Education dated

30.7.2007 out of 25 teachers working in the school, only two teachers were

there whose services were more than three years old and 18 out of 25

teachers were only appointed in the then current year 2007. Since report of

the Director of Education dated 30.7.2007 shows gross malafides and illegal

attitude of the petitioner-school, therefore, the said report dated 30.7.2007

bears notice and is therefore reproduced hereunder:-

  "Sub:     INSPECTION REPORT OF MAYO INTERNATIONAL
  SCHOOL I.P. EXTENSION DELHI.

As desired by the director of Education Mayo International School I.P. Extension Delhi was inspected by a team of the following members

headed by DDE (East) on 30.7.2007.

1. Smt. B.B. Punj, EO Zone

2. Sh. Tiwari, O.S. (Inspection)

3. Sh. C.K. Sharma, JAO (East) During the course of inspection the team found that:-

Mayo International School run by Lakhpat Siksha Samiti is a recognized School up to Secondary level (From Class Ist to Xth) by the Directorate of Education. The School is running on DDA Land Measuring 4000 SQ Meter. The land was allotted to Lakhpat Siksha Samiti (Regd.) for construction of a Middle School major discrepancies recorded by the team are as under:-

1. The school is recognized from class I to X whereas classes are running from pre nursery to Xth.

2. School has not followed instructions of the department regarding admission of the students and academic schedule:-

Admission remains open throughout the year. So far admission in nursery classes are concerned school does not follow the recommendation of Ganguli Committee and admitted students without adopting any admission criteria. However as per the records produced by the school authorities all the students who applied for admission got admitted.

3. It is also noted that some students admitted by the school authorities do not have valid documents for admission like T.C.

4. School is charging `500/- as the admission fee for he session 2007- 2008. As per the norms they cannot charge more than `200/- as the admission fee. It is clear cut violation of order dated 5.12.99 and the Rule 10 of DSEAR Act 1973.

5. `4,000/- (Four thousands) are being collected from the students from nursery class to Class X as the development annual charges which are more than 15% of the annual fee collected for the class.

6. After going through the enrolment of the students and staff position it is noticed that staff is not posted as per post fixation norms.

7. On comparison of the staff statement of last two year it is found that almost all teaching staff except 5 out of 19 as on 9.10.2006 has been removed by the school management without following any procedure of termination or resignation.

The school authorities are using the rule of probation to remove the teachers from the school at their whishes and fancies-They do not care even to follow the provision of Probation.

At present 25 persons (teaching & Non teaching) are working in the

school but only 2 teachers are there whose service are more than 3 years old and most of them (18 out of 25) are appointed in current year.

8. Ex Principal Smt. Seema Sharma was appointed by the school management on 15.6.2006 without following any procedure. Further her services were terminated in same fashion.

9. Present Principal (HOS) Smt. Veena Buber who was appointed on 2.3.2007 is overage for the post of the Principal.

School authorities appointed her without observing any procedure as laid down in DSEAR 1973. Even minutes of SSC/DPC were not available with the school. Neither they invited DE‟s nominee for the purpose nor intimated to the department.

Thus termination of Ex. Principal & appointment of present principal both are illegal and clear cut violation of DSER 1973.

10. All the service books in respect of the staff members are incomplete and not attested by the HOS/Manager.

11. Salary is being paid to the teachers in their account as account of all the staff members is in a bank, and salary paid through on line list by the management.

12. The P.B.R. is not maintained by the Management Committee but they only maintaining the Acquaintance Roll on which they have make claim/salary dues.

13. In addition to these it is submitted that a complaint has been received in this office forwarded by worthy DE for enquiry the facts. In this regard it is submitted that the said Ex-Principal has already made the complaint(292/c) and the matter has been enquired and the report is placed at 16/N. Then the case has been examined by the Directorate of Education and issue a show cause notice vide No.594 dated 3.7.2007 (336/c). The management has furnished the reply on 15.7.2007 with detail explanation at page no.415/c. In which the management stated that Mrs. Seema Sharma had withdraw the complaint against the management as all the dues had been cleared by the management. Now, Mrs. Seema Sharma lodged the complaint that the management has harassed her for paying `30,800/- as tuition fee in respect of her child. It is further noticed that the copy of previous complaint at Flag „D‟ (428/c)., she manipulated/tamper the signatures of other teachers. If the said original complaint placed at page No.292/c may kindly compare with the photo copy added in the fresh complaint, it can assume that the tampering has taken place, hence the new complaint has no merits.

14. The statements of teachers who are present on that very day & time

have been collected and placed at page 439/c to 457/c where in no complaint has been made out against the management of the school. In view of the shortcomings/discrepancies explain above, the case is submitted for further necessary orders please.

Dy. Director of Edu.(East) Anand Vihar, Delhi"

11. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the petition.

Though I do not agree with the reasoning of the DST, however, I have given

my independent reasoning above as per the facts which have emerged on

record and which show that respondent No.1 should be either taken to be

having statutory protection from the year 2000 or would at least stand

confirmed w.e.f 1.4.2003 and therefore respondent No.1‟s services could not

have been terminated simply by issuing a termination of services letter dated

25.3.2004 without following the provisions of Rules 118 to 120 of the Delhi

School Education Rules, 1973.

12. Writ petition is therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear

their own costs. Since the respondent No.1 is not represented before me, the

Director of Education which is represented before me will send intimation to

the respondent No.1 of the present judgment by registered post AD, courier

and by hand.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2013                            VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
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