Delhi High Court
The Managing Committee Of Shiksha ... vs Director Of Education And Anr. on 3 September, 2013
Author: Valmiki J. Mehta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) Nos. 10573/2009, 10574/2009, 10575/2009,
1279/2011, 3608/2011 & 1291/2011
% 3rd September, 2013
1. W.P.(C) 10573/2009
THE MANAGING COMMITTEE OF SHIKSHA BHARATI SENIOR
SECONDARY PUBLIC SCHOOL ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mudit Sharma, Advocate.
versus
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
2. W.P.(C) 10574/2009
THE MANAGING COMMITTEE OF SHIKSHA BHARTI SENIOR
SECONDARY public SCHOOL ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mudit Sharma, Advocate.
versus
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
3. W.P.(C) 10575/2009
THE MANAGING COMMITTEE OF SHIKSHA BHARTI SENIOR
SECONDARY PUBLIC SCHOOL ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mudit Sharma, Advocate.
versus
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
4. W.P.(C) 1279/2011
MAMTA YADAV ..... Petitioner
Through: None.
versus
GNCTD OF DELHI AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Mudit Sharma, Advocate for
respondent No.3.
5. W.P.(C) 3608/2011
KRISHNA AHLAWAT ..... Petitioner
Through: None.
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Mudit Sharma, Advocate for
respondent No.3.
6. W.P.(C) 1291/2011
MEENU GARG ..... Petitioner
Through: None.
versus
GNCTD OF DELHI AND ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Mudit Sharma, Advocate for
respondent No.3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
W.P.(C) No.10573/2009
1. By this writ petition, the petitioner impugns the judgment of
Delhi School Tribunal (DST) dated 31.3.2009. By the impugned judgment,
DST allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No.2/employee challenging
the termination of her services from the petitioner-school as Primary
Teacher during the extended period of probation of one year. The Tribunal
set aside the termination order dated 27/29.6.1998 on the ground that the
order is stigmatic.
2. Let us for the sake of convenience reproduce this termination
letter dated 27/29.6.1998 and which reads as under:-
"SBPS/AN/98/947 JUNE 27/29, 1998
OFFICE ORDER
Whereas Mrs. Mamta Yadav was appointed as Primary Teacher, in the
Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School on probation, initially for a
period of one year with effect from 1.07.1996.
AND WHEREAS on first review, the Managing Committee, in its
meeting held on 01.06.1997, found that the work and conduct of said
Mrs. Yadav, during the initial period of probation, had not been upto
the mark; that she be given another opportunity to bring needed
improvement in her work and conduct.
AND WHEREAS in pursuance of aforesaid decision of the Managing
Committee, the initial period of probation in respect of said Mrs.Yadav
was extended for another year with effect from 1.7.1997 vide order No.
SBPS/25/Staff/dated 16.06.1997.
AND WHEREAS on second review of her work during the extended
period of probation, the Managing Committee, in its meeting held on
05.06.1998, noted with concern that the work and conduct of said Mrs.
Yadav, during the extended period of probation, had been greately
disappointing; that she lacked professional capability, careless and
negligent in the matter of class work, her conduct has also been
deplorable and also indulged in acts of indiscipline and insubordination;
that she acted in a manner unbecoming of a teacher and the Committee
reached to the conclusion that said Mrs. Mamta Yadav is not a fit
person to be retained in the services of Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary
Public School; and that it decided and RESOLVED:
"THAT THE SERVICES OF SAID MRS. MAMTA
YADAV BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE
EXPIRY OF EXTENDED PERIOD OF PROBATION ON
30.06.1999."
NOW IN PURSUANCE of the aforesaid decision of the Managing
Committee, the services of Mrs. Mamta Yadav, a Primary Teacher are
hereby terminated with effect from 30.06.1998 (afternoon); and that she
be deemed relieved accordingly.
BY ORDER &
IN THE NAME OF MANAGING COMMITTEE
SHIKSHA BHARTI SR. SECON. PUBLIC SCHOOL
MANAGER
Mrs. Mamta Yadav
C-84, Mahavir Enclave
Behind MCD School
Palam
New Delhi-110045
Copy forwarded to:-
1. The Principal, Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School
2. The Accountant, Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School.
3. The Education Officer, Zone XXI, Dist. South West, Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi.
4. Personal file
MANAGER"
3. The issue is that whether stating that the employee lacked
professional capability or was negligent and careless or her conduct was
deplorable and had indulged in acts of indiscipline and insubordination
would amount to order being stigmatic.
4. Law with respect to termination of services of a probationer is
now well-settled. Termination has to be by a non-stigmatic order. However,
it has been held that stating that the performance is not satisfactory or giving
of facts in the termination order will not amount to the termination order
being a stigmatic one. Also the principles of natural justice have not to be
followed before termination of services of a probationer. If an enquiry is
held and the enquiry report forms the foundation of termination of services
of a probationer, only then, principles of natural justice are required to be
followed, however, where the enquiry against a probationer is only for
determining employee's suitability for continuing in service and the enquiry
report only forms the motive for removal (as differentiated from a
foundation for removal) then, a detailed enquiry in terms of the service rules
is not necessary. In the recent judgment in the case of Muir Mills Unit of
NTC (U.P.) Ltd. Vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava & Anr. (2007) 1 SCC 491
Supreme Court has observed that even if the termination order states that
services of a probationer has been terminated on account of the work being
not satisfactory, the order cannot be said to be stigmatic. It is also held in
this judgment that the principles of natural justice need not be followed for
termination of services of the probationer. Paras 44 to 46 of the said
judgment are relevant and the same read as under:-
"44. Also in the case of Registrar, High Court of Gujarat and
Anr. v. C.G. Sharma it was observed that an employee who is on
probation can be terminated from services due to unsatisfactory
work.
45. This Court's decision in the case of P.N. Verma v. Sanjay
Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences can be referred to in this context,
where it was held by this Court that, the services of a probationer
can be terminated at any time before confirmation, provided that
such termination is not stigmatic. This Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Virendera Kumar Chourasiya also has held that in the
event of a non-stigmatic termination of the services of a
probationer, principles of audi alteram partem are not applicable.
46 We are also of the view that the award of the Labour Court
is perverse as it had directed grant of back wages without giving
any finding on the gainful employment of respondent No.1 and
held that the discontinuance of the services of a probationer was
illegal without giving any finding to the effect that the
disengagement of respondent No.1 was in any manner stigmatic.
The decision in the case of MP State Electricity Board v. Jarina
Bee (Smt) (supra), this Court held that payment of full back wages
was not the natural consequence of setting aside an order of
removal. In the instant case, though the termination was as far back
as in 1983, the Industrial Adjudicator has not given any finding on
unemployment. This Court in a recent case of State of Punjab v.
Bhagwan Singh (2002)9SCC636 has held that even if the
termination order of the probationer refers to the performance
being "not satisfactory", such an order cannot be said to be
stigmatic and the termination would be valid."
5. The Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of State of W.B.
and Others Vs. Tapas Roy (2006) 6 SCC 453 has held that where the
discharge order mentions other instances of unauthorized absence of the
probationer and concluding that he was not interested in training and had no
respect for discipline, then making of such remarks in the termination order
cannot be said to make the termination order a stigmatic one. Paras 4,5 7
and 8 of the judgment in the case of Tapas Roy (supra) read as under:-
"4. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that Rule 10 of
the Rules did not apply in the facts of the case. It was also of the view
that the statement, quoted below; in the order of discharge casts a
stigma on the respondent. Since no opportunity of hearing had been
granted to the respondent, therefore, the order could not be sustained.
The decision of the Tribunal was, accordingly, set aside and the
appellants were given liberty to take appropriate action against the
respondent on the same grounds in accordance with law.
5. The particular passage from the order of discharge which the High
Court found to be stigmatic reads as follows:
"I am convinced that he is not likely to make an efficient constable
and is unsuitable for the Police Department. His frequent
unauthorised absence from training centre also indicates his lack of
interest in training and his scant respect for discipline."
7. The order of discharge has, as we have already indicated, set out
several instances of the respondent absenting himself unauthorisedly
from the training centre. These facts have been relied upon for the
purpose of concluding that the respondent was not interested in the
training and had no respect for discipline. This conclusion was a ground
for holding that the respondent was unsuitable for the Police
Department.
8. The High Court was of the view that Rule 10 of the Rules did not
apply to orders which were stigmatic. As has already been held by this
Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi Post Graduate
Institute Medical Sciences 2002(92)FLR349(SC) that in order to
constitute a stigmatic order necessitating a formal inquiry, it would
have to be seen whether prior to the passing of the order, there was an
inquiry into the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct so
that the order of discharge was really a finding of guilt. If any of these
three factors are absent, the order would not be punitive. We have also
held that a stigma in the wider sense of the word is implicit in every
order of termination during probation. It is only when there is
something more than imputing unsuitability for the post in question,
that the order may be considered to be stigmatic. In our view, the
language quoted earlier in the discharge order, cannot be said to be
stigmatic as it neither alleges any moral turpitude or misconduct on the
part of the respondent nor was there an inquiry as such preceding the
order of discharge. The order has been passed strictly in terms of Rule
10 of the Rules. We are, accordingly, of the view that the appeal must
be allowed. It is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned order is set
aside." (emphasis added)
6. Also, the Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Chaitanya
Prakash and Anr. Vs. H. Omkarappa (2010) 2 SCC 623 has again held that
there is no need for following the principles of natural justice while
terminating the services of a probationer and even if the termination order
refers to the unsatisfactory services of the probationer, the order is not
stigmatic. Paras 18 and 21 of this judgment read as under:-
"18. It is no longer res integra that even if an order of termination refers
to unsatisfactory service of the person concerned, the same cannot be
said to be stigmatic. In this connection, we make a reference to the
decision of the decision of the Supreme Court in Abhijit Gupta v.
S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences (supra), wherein also a similar
letter was issued to the concerned employee intimating him that his
performance was unsatisfactory and, therefore, he is not suitable for
confirmation. We have considered the ratio in light of the facts of the
said case and we are of the considered opinion that the basic facts of the
said case are almost similar to the one in hand. There also, letters were
issued to the concerned employee to improve his performance in the
areas of his duties and that despite such communications the service
was found to be unsatisfactory. In the result, a letter was issued to him
pointing out that his service was found to be unsatisfactory and that he
was not suitable for confirmation, and, therefore, his probation period
was not extended and his service was terminated, which was challenged
on the ground that the same was stigmatic for alleged misconduct. The
Supreme Court negatived the said contention and upheld the order of
termination.
21. In Abhijit Gupta (Supra.), this Court considered as to what will be
the real test to be applied in a situation where an employee is removed
by an innocuous order of termination i.e whether he is discharged as
unsuitable or he is punished for his misconduct. In order to answer the
said question, the Court relied and referred to the decision of this Court
in Allahabad Bank Officers Assn. v. Allahabad Bank (1996) 4 SCC
504; where it is stated thus:
"14. ...As pointed out in this judgment, expressions like "want of
application", "lack of potential" and "found not dependable" when made
in relation to the work of the employee would not be sufficient to attract
the charge that they are stigmatic and intended to dismiss the employee
from service."
7. In the case of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of
Jharkhand and Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 447 Supreme Court has held that while
taking a decision to terminate the services of the probationer, no notice is
required to be given to the probationer nor is the probationer required to be
given any opportunity of hearing. Para 10 of the said judgment reads as
under:-
"10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken
by the Respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and
suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither any
notice is required to be given to the Appellant nor he is required to be
given any opportunity of hearing. Strictly speaking, it is not a case of
removal as sought to be made out by the Appellant, but was a case of
simple discharge from service. It is, therefore, only a termination
simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline
or misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct and overall
suitability, his performance record as also the report from the higher
authorities were called for and they were looked into before any
decision was taken as to whether the officer concerned should be
continued in service or not."
8. In the case of Abhijit Gupta Vs. S.N.B.National Centre, Basic
Sciences & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 469 Supreme Court has held that even when
a termination order of a probationer referred to earlier letters which called
the probationer a person of "perverted mind" and "dishonest, duffer having
no capacity to learn" yet, the order would not be stigmatic one, and merely
that if such an order was read by a prospective employer would prejudice
the probationer's future employment, the same is not a correct test
to determine the termination order as stigmatic. Paras 4,5,8,10,13, 15,16 and
17 are relevant which read as under:-
"4. On 20th November 1995 the appellant was served with a letter
informing him that his performance during the probationary period was
"far from satisfactory" and that it had been observed that he lacked
drive, imagination and initiative 'in the performance of his duties'. He
was informed that, despite being told time and again to improve
performance in the said areas, but with no effect. He was advised to
improve "in order to enable us to consider your case for confirmation
favourably". He was issued several such letters drawing his attention to
the fact that his services left much to be desired. His probationary
service came to be extended from time to time, the last such extension
being granted till 9th April 1998. Finally, by the letter dated 7.4.1998
the petitioner was informed that his service was "unsatisfactory in the
areas of drive, initiative, promptness and leadership" and that despite
advised verbally and through letter, what were deficiencies in his work
he had shown no improvement. His attendance, office work and
attention to the academic work and the affairs of the guest house were
also unsatisfactory. The first respondent, therefore, said "your
performance, ability and capability during the period of probation has
been examined and your service during the period of probation is
found to be unsatisfactory and hence you are considered unsuitable for
the post you have to. The governing body is of the view that your
performance was unsatisfactory and you are not suitable for
confirmation". For these reasons the appellant's probationary period
was not extended on the expiration of his probation period on 9 th April
1999.
5. The appellant challenged the order of termination of his service on
the ground that it was a stigmatic termination by way of punishment
for alleged misconducts. The learned single Judge of the High Court
allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of termination and
directed re-instatement of the appellant with full back- wages. The
Division Bench of the High Court, however, allowed the letters patent
appeal and held that the letter dated 7th April 1998 was not stigmatic
and that it was a legitimate exercise of assessment of probationer's
service by the employer, and, therefore, there was no scope for judicial
interference therewith. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench
allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge
and dismissed the writ petition. Hence, this appeal.
8. Heavy reliance was placed on Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra
Nath Bose National center for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and
Ors. [1999]1SCR532 ,where this Court held that the termination of
service of the employee in similar circumstances amounted to
misconduct. We may mention here that it is common ground that while
the matter was pending before the learned single Judge, sometime in
the year 2005, the appellant attained the age of superannuation. The
learned Counsel for the appellant contended that in the letter dated
7.4.1998 there is reference to certain earlier letters in which the
appellant had been called a person of "perverted mind" and "dishonest,
duffer having no capacity to learn". A reading of all the letters referred
to in the letter of 7.4.1998 would clearly make out a case of allegations
of misconduct against the appellant, in the submission of the learned
Counsel.
10. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical
Sciences and Anr. (2002)ILLJ690SC this Court considered what
should be the best to determine whether a letter of termination of
service was termination simpliciter or stigmatic termination. After
referring to a number of authorities including the judgment
in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1958)ILLJ544SC
and Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) the Court observed (vide para 19):
"Courts continue to struggle with semantically indistinguishable
concepts like motive" and "foundation"; and terminations founded
on a probationer's misconduct have been held to be illegal while
terminations motivated by the probationer's misconduct have been
upheld. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find
a clear path through the jungle of precedents."
13. In the case of the appellant before us, the record in uncertain terms
makes it clear that every time the appellants attention was drawn to his
deficiencies and he was repeatedly advised to improve his behavior,
conduct and discharge of work. True, that in some of the letters there
was intemperate language used (the appellant was also equally guilty
of doing that). Notwithstanding the intemperate language, we are
unable to accept the contention of the appellant's counsel that the letter
dated 7.4.1998 indicates that the appellant was being charged with the
misconduct and, therefore, being removed from service. Read as a
whole, the letter gives the impression that the removal of the appellant
from service was only because the respondents, after giving a long
rope to the appellant, had come to the conclusion that the appellant's
service was unsatisfactory and there was no hope of his improvement.
15. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, strongly contends
that the "stigma" cast on the employee may not be confined to his
personal character but may also affect his capacity to work. The test,
learned Counsel for the appellant submitted, is that, if what is stated in
the order of termination is read by a future employer, it prejudices the
future employment of the employee. In the face of the law laid down in
the judgment just referred, we are unable to accept this as the correct
test.
16. In Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation
Ltd. and Anr.(1988)ILLJ73SC this Court pointed out that in a large
corporation administration is bound to be impersonal and in regard to
public officers assessment of service has got to be in writing for
purposes of record, though it cannot be assumed that such an
assessment recorded and the order of termination made with reference
to that record would automatically take a punitive character.
17. The High Court has carefully considered all the circumstances
placed before it and arrived at the conclusion that the respondent's
work was under observation during the probationary period and that he
was given repeated opportunities to improve his performance for
which purpose his probation was extended from time to time. The fact
that the authority did not find him fit for confirmation was also brought
to his notice several times and yet he was given opportunities of
improving by extending his probationary service. The High Court has
correctly found that the letter dated 7.4.1998 was not punitive in nature
and stated, albeit in prolix fashion, that the service of the appellant
were unsatisfactory. The High Court points out, and we agree, that
detailed reference to all other correspondence was not necessary, but it
did not reflect any malice or bias. Finally, as this Court pointed out in
P.N. Verma's case (supra) "a termination order which explicitly states
what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's
appointment, does not ipso facto become stigmatic"
(underlining added)
9. It is therefore clear that an honest assessment of the nature of
service performed by an employee when so stated in the order of termination
does not make the termination order stigmatic. The case of Abhijit Gupta
(supra) is a stark example on the point that even if the termination order
makes reference to earlier letters which call the employee of "perverted
mind" and "dishonest, duffer having no capacity to learn" cannot make the
termination order a stigmatic one. The Supreme Court has also observed
that while taking a decision with respect to termination of services of a
probationer no notice is necessary to be given to the probationer.
10. It may be noted that in the grounds of appeal filed before the
Tribunal, respondent No.1 has not taken the stand that the factual statements
which were made in the termination order dated 27/29.6.1998 are not
correct. It was necessary for the respondent No.1 to specifically rebut each
aspect stated in the termination order, and in the absence of challenge to the
contents of the termination order the same has to be taken as correct. I may
also additionally note that it is not the case of respondent No.1 before the
Tribunal that because of the alleged stigmatic order the respondent No.1 has
not been able to obtain any other services. Also, this aspect is really
irrelevant in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Abhijit Gupta (supra) which states that it is not a test that if what is stated in
the order of termination is read by a future employer, the same can prejudice
the future employment of the employee.
11. In view of the above, I hold that the impugned order of
termination dated 27/29.6.1998 is not stigmatic, not only because of the
ratios of the judgments of the Supreme Court stated above, but also more
importantly because the respondent No.1 has not disputed specifically the
factual averments which were made in the order of termination. I may also
state that it is now settled law that there is difference between motive for
removal and foundation for removal, and once unsatisfactory services or any
misconduct is only a motive for removal, and is not the foundation for
removal, it is not necessary that principles of natural justice have to be
followed before termination of services of such a probationer.
12. In view of the above, writ petition is allowed. Impugned order
of the DST dated 31.3.2009 is set aside. The termination order issued by the
petitioner-school dated 27/29.6.1998 is upheld. Parties are left to bear their
own costs.
W.P.(C) No.10574/2009
1. The facts of the present case are more or less similar to the facts
in W.P.(C) No.10573/2009 inasmuch as the termination order dated
27/29.6.1998 reads as under:-
SBPS/AN/98/950 JUNE 27/29, 1998
OFFICE ORDER
Whereas Mrs. Meenu Garg was appointed as Trained Graduate Teacher
(Sanskrit), in the Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School on
probation, initially for a period of one year with effect from 1.07.1996.
AND WHEREAS on first review, the Managing Committee, in its
meeting held on 01.06.1997, found that the work and conduct of said
Mrs. Yadav, during the initial period of probation, had not been upto
the mark; that she be given another opportunity to bring needed
improvement in her work and conduct.
AND WHEREAS in pursuance of aforesaid decision of the Managing
Committee, the initial period of probation in respect of said Mrs. Garg
extended for another year with effect from 1.7.1997 vide order No.
SBPS/25/Staff/dated 16.06.1997.
AND WHEREAS on second review of her work during the extended
period of probation, the Managing Committee, in its meeting held on
05.06.1998, noted with concern that said Mrs. Garg has failed to bring
needed improvement in her work and conduct; that she indulged in acts
of insubordination and indiscipline; that her conduct has also been
unbecoming of a teacher; and that the Committee came to the
conclusion that said Mrs. Meenu Garg is not a fit person to be retained
in the services of Shiksha Bharati Sr. Secondary Public School; and that
it decided and RESOLVED:-
"THAT THE SERVICES OF SAID MRS. MEENU GARG
BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF
EXTENDED PERIOD OF PROBATION ON 30.06.1998."
NOW IN PURSUANCE of the aforesaid decision of the Managing
Committee, the services of Mrs. Meenu Garg, a Trained Graduate
Teacher (Sanskrit) are hereby terminated with effect from 30.06.1998
(afternoon); and that she be deemed relieved accordingly.
BY ORDER &
IN THE NAME OF MANAGING COMMITTEE
SHIKSHA BHARTI SR. SECON. PUBLIC SCHOOL
MANAGER
Mrs. Meenu Garg
D-153C, Raj Nagar Part-II
Palam Colony
New Delhi-110045
Copy forwarded to:-
1. The Principal, Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School
2. The Accountant, Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School.
3. The Education Officer, Zone XXI, Dist. South West, Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi.
4. Personal file
MANAGER"
2. In view of the reasoning given while disposing of W.P.(C)
No.10573/2009 and adopting the same this writ petition is also allowed.
Impugned order dated 31.3.2009 is set aside. The termination order issued
by the petitioner-school dated 27/29.6.1998 is upheld. Parties are left to bear
their own costs.
W.P.(C) No.10575/2009
1. The facts of the present case are more or less similar to the facts
in W.P.(C) No.10573/2009 inasmuch as the termination order dated
27/29.6.1998 reads as under:-
"SBPS/AN/98/952 JUNE 27/29, 1998
OFFICE ORDER
Whereas Mrs. Krishna Ahlawat was appointed as Trained Graduate
Teacher (Hindi), in the Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School on
probation, initially for a period of one year with effect from 1.07.1996.
AND WHEREAS on first review, the Managing Committee, in its
meeting held on 01.06.1997, found that the work and conduct of said
Mrs. Ahlawat, during the initial period of probation, had not been upto
the mark; that she be given another opportunity to bring needed
improvement in her work and conduct.
AND WHEREAS in pursuance of aforesaid decision of the Managing
Committee, the initial period of probation in respect of said Mrs.
Ahlawat was extended for another year with effect from 1.7.1997 vide
order No. SBPS/25/Staff/dated 16.06.1997.
AND WHEREAS on second review of her work during the extended
period of probation, the Managing Committee, in its meeting held on
05.06.1998, noted with concern that the work and conduct of said Mrs.
Ahlawat, during the extended period of probation, had not been
satisfactory; that she indulged in activities prejudicial to the interest of
the school; that she acted in a manner unbecoming of a teacher and the
Committee came to the conclusion that said Mrs. Krishna Ahlawat is
not a fit person to be retained in the services of Shiksha Bharti Sr.
Secondary Public School; and that it decided and RESOLVED:
"THAT THE SERVICES OF SAID MRS. KRISHAN
AHLAWAT BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE
EXPIRY OF EXTENDED PERIOD OF PROBATION ON
30.06.1999."
NOW IN PURSUANCE of the aforesaid decision of the Managing
Committee, the services of Mrs. Krishna Ahlawat, TGT (Hindi) are
hereby terminated with effect from 30.06.1998 (afternoon); and that she
be deemed relieved accordingly.
BY ORDER &
IN THE NAME OF MANAGING COMMITTEE
SHIKSHA BHARTI SR. SECON. PUBLIC SCHOOL
MANAGER
Mrs. Krishna Ahlawat
Major Bhola Ram Enclave
V&PO : Pochanpur
New Delhi-110045
Copy forwarded to:-
1. The Principal, Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School
2. The Accountant, Shiksha Bharti Sr. Secondary Public School.
3. The Education Officer, Zone XXI, Dist. South West, Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi.
4. Personal file
MANAGER"
2. In view of the reasoning given while disposing of W.P.(C)
No.10573/2009 and adopting the same this writ petition is also allowed.
Impugned order dated 31.3.2009 is set aside. The termination order issued
by the petitioner-school dated 27/29.6.1998 is upheld. Parties are left to bear
their own costs.
W.P.(C) Nos. 1279/2011, 3608/2011 and 1291/2011
1. These three petitions are by the employees seeking
enhancement of back wages which have been limited only to 50% by the
self-same order of the DST.
2. Since writ petitions of the school have been allowed and the
impugned orders of the Tribunal have been quashed, consequently, therefore
no reliefs can be granted in these writ petitions and the same are therefore
dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
SEPTEMBER 03, 2013 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
Ne
