Delhi High Court
Shri G R Gupta vs Lok Sabha Secretariat on 29 November, 2013
Author: Manmohan
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 370/2013
SHRI G R GUPTA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Sunil K. Mittal, Advocate with
Mr. Kshitij Mittal and Mr. Anshul
Mittal, Advocates.
versus
LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Maninder Acharya, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Yashish Chandra,
Advocate.
Reserved on : 22nd October, 2013
% Date of Decision: 29th November, 2013
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
JUDGMENT
MANMOHAN, J:
1. Present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed challenging the judgment
and order dated 14th May, 2013 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)
538/2012 whereby the appellant's writ petition was dismissed.
2. The admitted facts of the present case are that the appellant, a retired
IPS officer, was allotted Bungalow No. 16, Talkatora Road, New Delhi from
Lok Sabha Secretariat Pool. The appellant was posted on deputation with
the Lok Sabha Secretariat from 14th February, 1979 to 26th July, 1982.
However, the appellant continued to occupy the aforesaid house even after
his repatriation from the Lok Sabha Secretariat.
3. The appellant superannuated from the Government Service on 31 st
December, 1993. Subsequently, on 15th May, 1996, the appellant was
appointed as Member of Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Delhi, which
position he continued to hold till his retirement on 11th December, 2000.
4. The Lok Sabha Secretariat vide letter dated 27th August, 2001 asked
the appellant to vacate the aforesaid premises. By the same letter, the
appellant was informed that his occupation of the aforesaid house was
unauthorized from 26th September, 1982 as the appellant could have retained
the aforesaid house maximum for two months from the date of his
repatriation to his parent department. The appellant was also asked to
deposit rent at the market value w.e.f. 26th September, 1982 till the vacation
of the house. This was followed by two more reminders. Appellant finally
vacated the aforesaid house on 27th September, 2001.
5. On 22nd October, 2001, a notice under Section 4 of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as 'PP Act, 1971') was issued to the appellant. Another notice
under Section 7(2) of the PP Act 1971 was also issued with respect to
damages to be paid by the appellant for unauthorised occupation of
government premises.
6. Vide order dated 24th November, 2003, the Estate Officer held that
appellant's occupation of the premises till his retirement from his
government service, i.e., 31st December, 1993 was not unauthorised.
Consequently, the appellant was held entitled to retain the house for another
eight months, i.e., till 31st August, 1994. The Estate Officer also took note
of the fact that no action had been initiated by the Lok Sabha Secretariat to
get the premises vacated for a long period. The Estate Officer held that since
the appellant never requested the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum to
deduct licence fee from his emoluments, the appellant was liable to pay
licence fee at the normal rates from 01st January, 1994 to 31st August, 1994
and double the normal rate for the period 01st September, 1994 to 27 th
September, 2001.
7. The Lok Sabha Secretariat, being aggrieved by the Estate Officer's
order dated 21st November, 2003, preferred an appeal before the District
Judge, Delhi. The District Judge decided the appeal vide order dated 13th
September, 2010 wherein it was held that the appellant's occupation after the
expiry of two months from the date of his repatriation to his parent
department was unlawful and unauthorised. However, the District Judge
took the view that no damages could be recovered from the appellant till the
date of superannuation as no proceedings had been initiated by the Lok
Sabha Secretariat for as many as nineteen years and that, had the Lok Sabha
Secretariat asked the appellant to vacate the house, he would have had
sought allotment of some other accommodation from his own department.
However, the appellant was held to be an unauthorised occupant from 01st
January, 1994 to 27th September, 2001. The District Judge remitted the
matter back to the Estate Office to assess the quantum of damages as no
evidence had been led by the Lok Sabha Secretariat with regard to the same.
8. The District Judge's order dated 13th September, 2010 was impugned
by way of a writ petition, being, W.P.(C) 114/2012.
9. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the Estate Officer re-
assessed the quantum of damages to be paid by the appellant. The order of
the Estate Officer was challenged by appellant before the District Court. By
order dated 28th November, 2011 District Judge dismissed the appeal.
10. Since the order dated 28th November, 2011 had not been challenged in
the W.P.(C) No.114/2012, the same was disposed of by the learned Single
Judge after granting liberty to appellant to file a fresh writ petition
challenging both the orders dated 13th September, 2010 and 28th November,
2011 passed by the District Judges. Thereafter, W.P.(C) No. 538/2012 filed
by the appellant was dismissed by learned Single Judge by the impugned
order.
11. Mr. Sunil K. Mittal, learned counsel for appellant submitted that the
learned Single Judge had erred in holding that the appellant was in
unauthorised occupation of the premises in question. He stated that appellant
was lawfully inducted into the premises in question and remained so even
after his repatriation from Lok Sabha. According to Mr. Mittal, appellant's
occupation of the premises could be said to be unauthorised, only if he had
refused to vacate the premises despite being served an eviction notice. He,
therefore, contended that at no point of time the occupation of the appellant
of the premises was unauthorized.
12. Mr. Mittal further submitted that the learned Single Judge had erred in
not appreciating that the respondents had failed to lead any evidence to
prove as to what rent could have been realized if the house in question had
been let out to a private person during the period of alleged unauthorised
occupation.
13. Mr. Mittal also submitted that the office memorandums relied by the
Estate Officer in assessing the damage had been issued by the Central
Government regarding the revision of rates of damages for unauthorised
occupation of General Pool accommodation. He stated that the said office
memorandums did not apply to houses in Lok Sabha Secretariat pool.
14. Mr. Mittal lastly submitted that the learned Single Judge had failed to
appreciate that the law of limitation is equally applicable to proceedings
before the Estate Officer under the PP Act, 1971. In support of his
submission, Mr. Mittal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
New Delhi Municipal Committee Vs. Kalu Ram and Another, (1976) 3
SCC 407 as well as judgment of High Courts in Lakhanlal Rawat Vs.
Union of India, 2010 (2) M.P.H.T. 14 and M/s. Automobile Association of
Eastern India and Ors. Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata
and Ors., (2010) 4 CALLT 591 (HC).
15. On the other hand, Ms. Maninder Acharya, learned senior counsel for
respondent relied upon the findings of the learned Single Judge and
submitted that the appellant had rightly been held to be in unauthorised
occupation of the premises. She stated that appellant could not have stayed
in the aforesaid house after his repatriation from the Lok Sabha Secretariat.
16. Ms. Acharya, learned senior counsel contended that the Estate Officer
had rightly relied upon office memorandums issued by the Central
Government from time to time for fixing the rate of damages for
unauthorized occupation of General Pool residential accommodation. She
submitted that these rates are fixed by the Government after carrying out
surveys in various localities to assess the prevailing market rentals.
17. Ms. Acharya submitted that the PP Act, 1971 is a special Act and the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short Act, 1963) cannot be
extended to such special Act. According to her, there cannot be any period
of limitation for recovery of damages for unauthorized use and occupation
of Government premises by its employee. She submitted that the Supreme
Court's judgment in New Delhi Municipal Committee vs. Kalu Ram and
Another (supra) was clearly inapplicable as it dealt with a case of Section
7(1) and not Section 7(2) of PP Act, 1971. In support of her submission, she
relied upon L.S. Nair vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai and Ors. AIR 1980
Madhya Pradesh 106 wherein it has been held as under:-
"10. It was also submitted that the recovery of damages for a
period beyond 3 years was time barred. The Limitation Act has no
application to proceedings before the Estate Officer who is not a
Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the case of
Kalu Ram v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (1965) 67 Pun LR
1190 in support of his submission. There is nothing in S.7(2) which
authorises the Estate Officer to assess the damages on account of the
use and occupation of the premises and by order require the person
to pay the damages, to show that there is any rule of limitation by
which the Estate Officer is governed. As the Limitation Act has no
application to proceedings before the Estate Officer and as the
jurisdiction of Civil Court is entirely barred in matters governed by
the Public Premises Act, it is difficult to accept the argument that
there is any period of limitation for recovery of damages. The
Punjab case on which reliance was placed, construed the words
"rent payable" as they occurred in S. 7 (i) of the Public Premises
Act, 1958, and construed them to mean "rent legally recoverable by
a suit." The case has no application for construing S. 7(2) of the
Public Premises Act, 1971, which deals with the power to assess and
order payment of damages and where the language used is entirely
different. Further, S.15 of the 1971 Act now bars a suit and the
remedy under the Act is the only remedy which can be availed of. In
such a situation, the Limitation Act cannot be inferentially applied to
proceedings before the Estate Officer."
18. Ms. Acharya lastly submitted that as the District Judge's order dated
13th September, 2010 had attained finality, appellant could not raise the plea
of limitation as by the said order the matter had been remanded back to the
Estate Officer only for determination of quantum of damages for the period
when appellant was in unauthorised occupation in question, that means from
1st January, 1994 to 27th September, 2001.
19. Upon a perusal of the paper book this Court finds that learned Single
Judge with regard to appellant's first submission that appellant was not an
unauthorised occupant of the premises in question, has held as under:-
"6. ......................Admittedly, no permission as given by Lok
Sabha Secretariat to the petitioner to continue to occupy the house in
question on expiry of two months from the date of his repatriation.
Consequently, the possession of the petitioner with effect from
26.09.1982 became unauthorized.
7. ...............the learned District Judge vide his order dated
16.09.2010 held that since the respondent did not write to the
petitioner asking him to vacate house in dispute, the petitioner is not
required to pay damages till the date of his superannuation, i.e.
31.03.1993 and the said order dated 16.09.2010 was not challenged
by the respondent, no order can now be passed,.......to pay damages
for use and occupation of the house in question for the period from
26.l09.1982 to 31.12.1993.
8. ..........Therefore, the only question which requires
consideration is as to whether the petitioner was unauthorized
occupant for the period from 01.09.1994 to 27.09.2001 and if so
what should be the amount of damages which he is required to pay
for unauthorized occupation of the house during the aforesaid
period. As noted earlier, the occupation of the petitioner, after
25.09.1982 being without permission of Lok Sabha Secretariat was
unauthorized and even thereafter, the Lok Sabha Secretariat never
permitted the petitioner to continue to occupy house in question, it
can, therefore, hardly be disputed that the possession for the period
from 01.09.1994 to 27.09.2001 was also unauthorized and
unlawful......... The petitioner having superannuated from
Government service on 31.12.1993 and having been appointed as a
Member in District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum only with
effect from 15.05.1996, he was not a Government servant during the
intervening period and consequently had no legal right to retain the
Government accommodation during the said period. Therefore, on
the date of his appointment as a Member in District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Forum, the petitioner was occupying house in
question, without any authority in law and, therefore, it is not open
to him to say that he is not liable to pay damages for the aforesaid
period.............Admittedly, no order was passed by Government of
Delhi either permitting the petitioner to continue to occupy house in
question during his tenure as a Member of District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Forum. The house in question is a house placed
by Directorate of Estate, Government of India in the pool of Lok
Sabha Secretariat. An employee of Government of India has no legal
right to continue to occupy the accommodation belonging to
Directorate of Estate/Lok Sabha Secretariat, without prior
permission from the Directorate of Estate/Lok Sabha
Secretariat..........In fact, even if he is entitled to accommodation
from the State Government, he has no legal right to occupy or
continue to occupy an accommodation which the State Government
has placed in a specific pool. Therefore, the possession of the
petitioner during the period in question, i.e., 01.09.1994 to
27.09.2001was clearly unauthorized and unlawful for which he is
required to pay damages to the respondent."
20. This Court is in agreement with the aforesaid reasoning of the learned
Single Judge. Failure of the respondent to initiate eviction proceedings
against the appellant does not confer any right upon the appellant to
continue to occupy the Government accommodation. We are of the opinion
that the appellant occupied the premises even after his superannuation in
blatant disregard of all rules, regulations and proprietary.
21. In so far as the computation of the quantum of damages is concerned,
it has to be seen whether the damages have been computed in accordance
with the principles enumerated in the rules prescribed under the PP Act,
1971. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has held as under:-
"9................Clause (e) of Rule 8 enables the Estate Officer to take
into consideration any material which would be relevant for the
purpose of assessing the damages and the office memorandum, issued
by Government of India from time to time, fixing the rate of damages
for unauthorized occupation of General Pool residential
accommodation certainly cannot be said to be a matter irrelevant for
the purpose of assessing damages in terms of the said Rule..................
The Government having already undertaken such an exercise in the
form of market surveys before fixing such rates, it would neither be
necessary nor practicable for the Estate Officer to undertake such an
exercise. Therefore, in my view, the Estate Officer was fully justified
in quantifying damages on the strength of the office memorandums,
issued by Government of India from time to time, fixing the rates of
damages for unauthorized occupation of General Pool
accommodation............."
22. This Court is in agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge
that the office memorandums issued by the Central Government with respect
to revision of rates of damages for unauthorised occupation of general pool
accommodation have rightly been relied upon by the Estate Officer while
calculating the damages. The rates as mentioned in the office memorandums
issued by the Central Government are relevant as they have been arrived at
by the Government after undertaking a market survey.
23. The contention of the appellant that the office memorandums would
not be applicable for assessment of damages as the premises in question did
not fall in the general pool of the Directorate of Estates is untenable. The
assessment of the prevailing market rent of a government accommodation
would depend on factors like its type, structure, size, location etc. and not
whether the said premises is in general pool or any other pool. This Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that identical accommodation on the same
road is normally allotted to different pools and different institutions like Lok
Sabha Secretariat pool, High Court pool, Ministry of Defence etc.
24. However, we are of the opinion that the law of limitation applies to
proceedings initiated before the Estate Officer under the PP Act, 1971. The
Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Committee Vs. Kalu Ram and
Another (supra) has held as under:-
"............ If the recovery of any amount is barred by the law of
limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate Officer could still insist
that the said amount was payable. When a duty is cast on an authority
to determine the arrears of rent, the determination must be in
accordance with law. Section 7 only provides a special procedure for
the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or
foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred.
Construing the expression "any money due" in section 186 of the
Indian Companies Act, 1913 the Privy Council held in Hans Raj
Gupta and others v. Official Liquidators of the Dehradun Mussorie
Electric Tramway Company Ltd.(1) that this meant moneys due and
recoverable in suit by the company, and observed:
It is a section which creates a special procedure for obtaining
payment of moneys; it is not a section which purports to create a
foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no
new rights.
We are clear that the word "payable" in section 7, in the context in
which its occurs, means "legally recoverable." Admittedly a suit to
recover the arrears instituted on the day the order under section 7
was made would have been barred by limitation. The amount in
question was therefore irrecoverable. This being the position, the
appeal fails and is dismissed with costs."
(emphasis supplied)
25. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme
Court, this Court is of the opinion that the distinction sought to be drawn by
the respondent between proceedings under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the PP
Act, 1971, is untenable in law. The reliance of the respondent on the
judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in L.S. Nair vs. Hindustan
Steel Ltd., Bhilai and Ors. (supra) is also misplaced as the same did not deal
with or refer to the aforesaid Supreme Court's judgment in New Delhi
Municipal Committee Vs. Kalu Ram and Another (supra). In fact, in L.S.
Nair vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai and Ors. (supra), the Madhya Pradesh
High Court has dealt with the judgment of the Punjab High Court in Kalu
Ram v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (1965) 67 Pun LR 1190 and not
the Supreme Court's judgment.
26. It is settled law that a judgment of one High Court is not binding on
the other, but in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the
Supreme Court judgment is binding on all High Courts. Consequently, the
finding of the learned Single Judge that the limitation prescribed under the
Act, 1963 has no application to recovery of damages under Section 7(2) of
the PP Act, 1971, is not correct.
27. Even though we have held that the Act, 1963 applies to proceedings
under the PP Act, 1971, yet the question that arises for consideration is
whether the right to claim damages under Section 7(2) of the PP Act, 1971,
was barred on the date the proceedings were initiated by the Lok Sabha
Secretariat.
28. Article 112 of the Act, 1963 reads as under:-
" Description of suit Period of Time from which
limitation period begins to
run
112. Any Suit (except a Thirty years When the period
Suit before the Supreme Court of limitation
In the exercise of its original would begin to
Jurisdiction) by or on behalf run under this
of the Central Government Act against a
or any State Government, like suit by a
including the Government private person.
of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.
29. It is pertinent to mention that the Act, 1963 grants extended
limitation of 30 years only to Central and State Governments and not to
statutory authorities like NDMC and Calcutta Port Trust. In any event, in
none of the judgments cited before us the import and significance of Article
112 of the Act, 1963 has been considered. In fact, in The Union of India
and Another Vs. The District Judge Amritsar and Another, 1985 P.L.J.
(67) 120 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) it has been held that "The
damages are being recovered in the present case by the Estate Officer on
behalf of the Central Government. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act
damages for a period of 30 years prior to the initiation of proceedings under
the said provision could be claimed and recovered." Consequently, as the
proceedings for recovery of damages for the period 01st January, 1994 to
27th September, 2001 had been filed in 2001 i.e. within 30 years of cause of
action having arisen, the respondent's claim for damages was within
limitation.
30. Consequently, the present appeal being bereft of merit, is dismissed.
MANMOHAN, J
CHIEF JUSTICE
NOVEMBER 29, 2013
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