Harvinder Singh vs C B I
2013 Latest Caselaw 5199 Del

20
*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+     W.P.(CRL) 1880/2013 & Crl.M.A.Nos.17140-41/2013


                                               Decided on 13.11.2013
IN THE MATTERS OF :
HARVINDER SINGH                                     ..... Petitioner
                             Through : Mr. Ravi P. Shukla, Advocate


                        versus

CBI                                                  ..... Respondent
                        Through : Mr. Bakul Jain, proxy counsel for
                        Mr. P.K. Sharma, SC for CBI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI

HIMA KOHLI, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying inter alia for setting

aside the order on charge dated 24.1.2012 passed by the learned

Special Judge, (PC Act-CBI), Delhi in C.C. No.19/2008 entitled CBI

vs. Brij Mohan Sethi etc.

2. As the order impugned by the petitioner is dated 24.1.2012,

upon a query posed to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to the

stage of proceedings, the Court is informed that the case is at the

stage of recording of evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

3. Counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner (accused

No.7) was working as a Statistical Investigator/Dealing Assistant in the

office of the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies and the only role

attributed to him is of submitting a false and incorrect note dated

21.6.1999 to the effect that the documents submitted by New

Anamika Cooperative Group Housing Society in respect of the

resignation of four members were false and that the petitioner had

simply verified the said documents and recommended approval of the

final list of 75 members of the Society for further transmission to the

DDA for allotment of land. He further states that as the petitioner's

role was limited to verification of the signatures of four members that

were submitted by the Society, which he did by comparing the

photocopies of the resignation letters of the four members placed on

record with the originals that had been submitted by the Society, the

CBI has erred in naming him as an accused and the Special Judge, CBI

did not have any material before him to direct framing of charge

against the petitioner.

4. As per the prosecution version, the petitioner had checked all

the records relating to the resignations of some members of the

Society in question and he had observed that the same were found to

be in order and that the four resignations in question had been verified

as test check cases and were found to be correct, whereas the correct

position that had emerged during the investigation was that out of the

four resignations of the members on record, as many as three

resignations that had been duly verified by the petitioner, were found

to be bogus. Based on the aforesaid report submitted by the

petitioner (accused No.7), the Assistant Registrar of the Cooperative

Societies (accused No.1) had proceeded to dishonestly recommend the

revival of the Society in question even when the revival application,

affidavit of the Secretary of the Society and the minutes of the

meeting of the Society submitted at the time of its revival had been

forged.

5. After the investigation was concluded in the present case, the

CBI had filed a charge sheet on 22.5.2008, naming nine accused

persons therein, including the petitioner herein (accused No.7). Upon

examining the material placed on record by the investigating agency

and hearing the counsels for the parties, the order on charge came to

be passed on 24.1.2012 and charges were also framed on the same

date.

6. At the time of addressing arguments before the learned Special

Judge, CBI, learned counsel for the petitioner had urged that the job

profile of the petitioner was that of a Statistical Investigator and he

had no role to play in the case beyond the same. The aforesaid

submission was however disputed by the learned Public Prosecutor,

who had drawn the attention of the trial court to the VIP reference

register maintained by the petitioner, wherein he had confirmed the

resignation of four members of the Society who had, on inquiry,

denied having ever resigned from the Society or having signed any

resignation letters. The attention of the trial court was particularly

drawn to the records maintained by the office of the Registrar of the

Cooperative Societies relating to the purported resignation of the four

persons in question, which were taken out for a test check. In the

records maintained by the department, the petitioner herein had

specifically noted that he had checked all the records relating to the

resignations and had found them to be in order. He had further

verified the fact that the four resignations were examined as test

check cases and were found to be correct.

7. After considering the submissions of the parties and upon

examining the report of the GEQD that had clearly demonstrated that

the specimen signatures of the two members did not tally with the

disputed signatures on the resignation letters in question, the trial

court had observed that there was no ground to discharge the

petitioner herein and that he had played an active role in the

conspiracy.

8. This Court has considered the arguments urged by the learned

counsel for the petitioner, who submits that the documents submitted

by the Society are only prima facie evidence and the petitioner being a

dealing assistant in the department, was simply required to compare

the photocopies of the documents with their originals which he did and

whether the documents were in proper order or not or simply because

the original itself turned out to be forged, cannot be a ground to

attribute any complicity to him in the alleged conspiracy.

9. It is now settled law as held in the case of Anur Kumar Jain vs.

CBI reported as 178 (2011) DLT 501, that the scope of interference

in an order on charge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and the power of

supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised by the High Court very

sparingly, with great care, caution, circumspection and only in

appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the writ court

demands that it has to act lest there would be gross failure of justice

or grave injustice would usher in.

10. It is an equally settled legal position that while examining the

order on charge, the Court is not required to delve deep into the

nature of the evidence gathered by the investigating agency and

placed on record or scrutinize it with a tooth comb. Suffice is to state

that at the time of framing of charge, the trial court is only required to

have a bird's eye view of the material gathered by the investigating

agency in respect of the case and is to consider judicially, whether on

consideration of the materials on record, it can be said that the

accused has been reasonably connected with the offence alleged to

have been committed and that on the basis of the said materials,

there is a reasonable probability or chance of the accused being found

guilty of the offence alleged (Ref. Sati Kanta Guha and Anr. Vs. State

of West Bengal reported as 1997 Crl.L.J. 1644). At the said stage,

without going into the deep probative value, the Court is required to

peruse the evidence on record and conclude if there exists a ground

for presuming that the offence has been committed and not

necessarily that a ground for convicting the accused has been made

out.

11. In the present case, from a perusal of the impugned order dated

24.1.2012, particularly paras 28 to 30 thereof that deal with the

submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, it is apparent that the

trial court has examined the material on record including the report of

the GEQD that demonstrates that the specimen signatures of the four

persons of the Society that had been verified by the petitioner as test

check cases, did not tally with the questioned signatures on the

resignation letters and in such circumstances, the trial court had

rightly observed that there was no ground to discharge him.

Thereafter, charges were framed against the petitioner.

12. This Court is inclined to agree with the findings returned by the

trial court on the aforesaid aspect and is of the opinion that at this

stage, the order on charge cannot be quashed and the petitioner held

to be guilt free. The present petition is accordingly dismissed being

devoid of merits. It is also relevant to note that the petitioner has

taken almost two years from the date of passing of the order on

charge to approach the Court by impugning the order on charge

framed by the trial court and that too when the case is at an advance

stage of trial, which is an additional consideration that has weighed

with the court while declining to entertain the present petition.

13. The petition is therefore dismissed along with the pending

applications. Needless to state that the observations made

hereinabove are confined to the relief sought by the petitioner herein

and are purely preliminary in nature and shall not cause any prejudice

to the petitioner during the course of trial.

HIMA KOHLI, J NOVEMBER 13, 2013 sk