Delhi High Court
Jai Bhagwan vs The Asstt. General Manager on 15 March, 2013
Author: V. K. Jain
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 159/2013
JAI BHAGWAN ..... Appellant
Through : Mr. Atul T. N, Adv.
versus
THE ASSTT. GENERAL MANAGER ..... Respondents
Through : Mr. Rajiv Kapur and Ms. Vatsala Rai,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
ORDER
% 15.03.2013
CM No.4474/2012 (exemption)
Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions.
The application stands disposed of.
CM No.4475/2012 (delay)
The delay of 19 days in filing the appeal is condoned.
The application stands disposed of.
LPA 159/2013
The appellant claims to have been appointed and worked as a
Messenger with State Bank of India, Kishan Garh Branch continuously from
8.9.1993 to 6.11.1995. Since the services of the appellant were terminated
by the Management on 7.11.1995, an industrial dispute was raised by him.
On the said dispute being referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication,
an order was passed on 10.4.2008 holding that since the appellant had not
worked for 240 days in a year, the termination of his service was legal and
justified. Being aggrieved from the rejection of his claim, the appellant filed
W.P(C) No.6775/2008 challenging the decision of the Industrial Tribunal.
The writ petition having been dismissed, he is before us by way of this
appeal.
2. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR (1964) SC 477],
Supreme Court identified the limitations of Certiorari jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following terms:-
"The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under
Article 226 has been frequently considered by this
Court and the true legal position in that behalf is
no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be
issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or Tribunals; these
are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in
excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise
jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where
in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the
Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as
for instance, it decides a question without giving
an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by
the order, or where the procedure adopted in
dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of
natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that
the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a
supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it
is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This
limitation necessarily means that findings of fact
reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a
result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be
reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An
error of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that
in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and
material evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the
impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is
based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an
error of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases,
however, we must always bear in mind that a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari
on the ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal was
insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence
led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn
from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points
cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within
these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of
certiorari can be legitimately exercised."
In Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab [(1976) 2 SCC 868], Supreme
Court, inter alia, held as under:-
"In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an
inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued
only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has
acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or
has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the
finding is not supported by any evidence at all,
because in such cases the error amounts to an error
of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases
where orders are passed by inferior courts or
tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a
result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested
in them or they act illegally or improperly in the
exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave
miscarriage of justice."
3. In the case before us, the Tribunal after considering the evidence
produced by the parties, returned a finding of fact that the appellant had not
worked with the respondent for at least 240 days in a year. It is not open to
this Court to interfere with the findings of fact returned by the Tribunal
unless it is shown that the finding is perverse being without any evidence or
being a finding which no reasonable person could have returned on the basis
of the material available to the Tribunal. This is also not the case of the
appellant that the aforesaid finding of fact was recorded by the Tribunal
without giving opportunity to him to lead evidence. The finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the
evidence available before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to
sustain such a finding. Therefore, we find no good reason to interfere with
the aforesaid finding recorded by the Tribunal which has also been accepted
by the learned Single Judge.
4. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant
drew our attention to the certificates issued by the bank to the appellant
certifying the number of days for which he had worked in the year 1994 and
1995 and contended that the aforesaid certificates did not include Saturdays
and Sundays though such days were also required to be included while
computing the number of days for which the appellant had worked.
However, on a perusal of the claim petition filed by the appellant before the
Tribunal we find that though the appellant relied upon the aforesaid
certificates in para 10 of the claim petition, nowhere did he allege that the
number of days specified in the aforesaid certificates did not include
Saturdays and Sundays. We also find that the Industrial Tribunal also noted
that this was not the case of the workman in the certificates given by the
management that Sundays and holidays had not been calculated. Therefore,
we find no merit in the contention that the appellant had worked for 240
days in a year.
5. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the appeal is dismissed. There
shall be no orders as to costs.
CHIEF JUSTICE
V.K. JAIN, J
MARCH 15, 2013
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