Delhi Transport Corporation vs Ramesh Chand
2013 Latest Caselaw 1249 Del

$~12
*    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                          Date of Decision: March 13, 2013

+                          W.P.(C) 300/2013

      DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION              ..... Petitioner
               Represented by: Ms.Avnish Ahlawat, Advocate

                                  versus

      RAMESH CHAND                                            ..... Respondent
              Represented by:              None

      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
      HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (Oral)

1. As per the net tracking report the registered docket containing the notice and the writ petition which was issued pursuant to the order dated January 21, 2013 has been received by the respondent.

2. None appears for the respondent in spite of the matter being passed over once and called out for a second time.

3. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that O.A.No.1159/2011, filed by the respondent, was allowed by the Tribunal without notice to the writ petitioner.

4. We had summoned the record of the Tribunal and the same would reveal that O.A.No.1159/2011 was listed for admission on March 25, 2011 before a Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr.M.L.Chauhan and Hon'ble Mr.Shailendra Pandey. The two learned Member Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, as recorded in the order dated March 25, 2011,

heard arguments without even issuing notice to the respondent i.e. the writ petitioner before us. Thereafter, on April 06, 2011 the order was pronounced.

5. A perusal of O.A.No.1159/2011 would reveal that the respondent had laid a challenge to a communication dated August 26, 2010, denying the ACP benefit to him.

6. The fact pertaining to ACP benefit being denied to the respondent, as pleaded in the original application would reveal that having joined service as a driver with DTC on July 05, 1988, services of the respondent came to be terminated on December 18, 1989 due to his involvement in an accident resulting in a criminal case being registered against him. The respondent i.e. the applicant before the Tribunal was acquitted in the criminal case on November 11, 1998. On the strength of his being acquitted he sought reinstatement in service, a request which was denied. Respondent sought a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 raising an industrial dispute which was referred by the appropriate Government to the concerned Labour Court and was registered as I.D.No.107/2003. Parties entered into a compromise on December 11, 2003, resulting in the respondent i.e. the applicant before the Tribunal being reinstated in service.

7. On February 29, 2008 the respondent made a representation that he be granted ACP benefit, reckoning 12 and 24 years service rendered with effect from the date when he joined DTC i.e. July 05, 1988 which was denied to him by the department.

8. At the heart of the dispute was the manner in which the period interregnum commencing from when respondent's services were terminated till he was reinstated would be required to be treated.

9. Since the writ petitioner, impleaded as respondent before the Tribunal, had given reasons as to why said period had to be excluded, it is apparent that what came up for consideration before the Tribunal was the legality of the reason contained in the order dated August 26, 2010.

10. Principles of natural justice required that the writ petitioner ought to have been granted an opportunity to defend its order.

11. What the Tribunal has done is that arguments of the respondent i.e. the claimant before the Tribunal have been noted, and reflecting thereon fault has been found with the reasoning contained in the order dated August 26, 2010.

12. Law, as conceived of by the Tribunal, has been penned down. A declaratory decision has been pronounced and matter has been remanded to DTC with a direction that the declaration of law by the Tribunal would be applied while reconsidering the matter.

13. In other words, DTC would now be bound by the law as declared by the Tribunal in the impugned order and this would leave hardly any scope for the authority to reach a destination other than which would automatically to be reached with reference to the law declared by the Tribunal. In other words, the competent authority of DTC would now be required to act as a mechanist.

14. Suffice would it be to state that any decision, whether declaratory of somebody's right or issuing a direction with reference to somebody's right, cannot be pronounced except after putting to notice the person or the party on whom the obligation is cast as a result of the decision. Thus, we dispose of the writ petition setting aside the impugned order dated April 06, 2011. We restore O.A.No.1159/2011 for fresh consideration and adjudication by the Tribunal. Since the respondent has chosen not to appear

before us today in spite of being served we are not fixing a date of hearing before the Tribunal.

15. But, as and when the respondent i.e. the applicant before the Tribunal would move an application before the Tribunal for O.A.No.1159/2011 to be heard, after putting DTC to notice of the said application and granting an opportunity to DTC to file a response to O.A.No.1159/2011 the same shall be decided.

16. Record of the Tribunal which has been summoned through Special Messenger be returned forthwith.

17. No costs.

18. Dasti.

(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE

(PRATIBHA RANI) JUDGE MARCH 13, 2013 mm