Capt. Anirudh Tyagi vs Indian Airlines Ltd.
2013 Latest Caselaw 1205 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                         WP(C) No.2599/1996

%                                                        March 12, 2013

CAPT. ANIRUDH TYAGI                                        ..... Petitioner
                 Through:                Mr. S.N. Gupta, Advocate.


                          versus


INDIAN AIRLINES LTD.                                     ..... Respondent

                   Through:              Ms. Bhavna Dhami, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J. MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. By this writ petition, the petitioner, a Pilot, seeks various

reliefs, but, they are essentially one of being paid compensation of

`50,000/- per month, and which was being given to other Pilots as stated in

the order dated 30.8.1995 of the respondent. For the sake of record, I

note that though the relief clauses are worded in a particular manner, in

essence counsel for the petitioner states that claim of the petitioner is limited

to this claim of compensation of `50,000/- per month.

2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was a Pilot with the

respondent and was flying aircrafts Boeing-737. The petitioner as also other

Pilots were thereafter given training for flying airbus aircrafts A-320.

Before a person flies A-320 aircraft, he has to undergo three tests and which

are as under:-

"Phase I- Ground class room technical training at the end of which the trainee has to qualify the examination conducted by DGCA (Directorate General of Civil Aviation).

Phase II- Simulator Training After completion of the Simulator Training the Pilot is granted the Co- Pilot‟s endorsement by the DGCA and in this capacity the Pilot has to fly the aircraft for 100 hours of flight time.

Phase III- Actual Flight Training and mandatory Route Checks."

3. On behalf of the petitioner, it is urged that the petitioner

completed Phase I of ground class room technical training in July-August,

1994, but he was not sent for Phase-II of simulator training although persons

junior to the petitioner were sent for the simulator training and thereafter

these persons also flew A-320 aircrafts. It is further pleaded on behalf of the

petitioner that in order to compensate those pilots who otherwise were fit for

flying such A-320 aircrafts, but were not allowed to do so, were given

compensation at `50,000/- per month in terms of the order dated 30.8.1995,

and which is Annexure-C to the writ petition at page 13. Petitioner claims

illegal and unlawful discrimination against him as it is urged that on one

hand he is not sent for simulator training for Phase-II, and on the other hand

he is not paid the amount of `50,000/- per month as is being paid to five

other Pilots in terms of the order dated 30.8.1995.

4. On behalf of the respondent, in the counter affidavit it is

pleaded that the five Pilots who are getting compensation of `50,000/- per

month, and who continued to fly the Boeing 737 aircrafts, because the said

five persons have the necessary qualifications to give training to those pilots

who would be Pilots-in-Command of Boeing 737 aircrafts, and to give

training to such persons to become Pilots-in-Command, the five stated Pilots

were retained for flying Boeing 737s. It is pleaded that since the petitioner

is not qualified to give training to the Pilots who would be Pilots-in-

Command of Boeing737s, petitioner was not paid the amount of `50,000/-

per month and which is not illegal discrimination against the petitioner

because the five persons mentioned in the order dated 30.8.1995 stand on a

different footing i.e they were qualified to give training to Pilots-in-

Command of B-737 aircrafts whereas the petitioner was not. It is also

pleaded in the counter affidavit that none of the persons who were junior to

the petitioner were sent for Phase-II training in preference to the petitioner.

5. So far as the aspect of discrimination is concerned, it is not

disputed on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is not qualified to give

the Pilots-in-Command training with respect to Boeing 737 aircrafts, and the

five Pilots who were stated in the order dated 30.8.1995 were competent to

do so. These Pilots therefore were given a special compensation of

`50,000/- per month as they were retained in Boeing 737 aircrafts for giving

training. On account of the fact that the petitioner was not qualified and

therefore did not and could not give training for Pilots-in-Command for the

Boeing 737 aircrafts, petitioner did not get and was not entitled to the

compensation of `50,000/- per month. I therefore do not find any illegality

or unlawful discrimination against the petitioner and the petitioner therefore

cannot be entitled to the amount of `50,000/- per month as being given to

the other Pilots in terms of the order dated 30.8.1995.

6. So far as the aspect that juniors to the petitioner have been

given Phase-II simulator training with respect to aircrafts A-320, the

respondent in its counter affidavit has denied the same and the petitioner in

the rejoinder affidavit has not given any details of any such Pilot who was

junior to the petitioner. Though, there is an averment in rejoinder affidavit

only for one Pilot R. Suri (Sic Suir), however, it is not mentioned in the

rejoinder affidavit that how the petitioner is actually senior to Mr. R. Suri

and there is only a bald assertion without factual details or documents. In

any case, if the issue is that a person junior to the petitioner has been given

training in Phase-II simulator training, then, actually the petitioner should

have applied for the relief of grant of Phase-II simulator training, however

on that ground petitioner cannot be entitled to the amount of `50,000/- per

month being paid to those persons who are giving training for Pilots-in-

Command of Boeing 737 aircrafts and were retained for flying Boeing 737s

and not graduated for flying A-320 aircrafts.

7. In my opinion, there is one another important reason for

dismissing the writ petition inasmuch as the petitioner during the pendency

of the writ petition applied vide letter dated 20.4.1999 for resignation from

the respondent-corporation. A reference to this letter shows that the

resignation is not conditional upon grant to the petitioner of rights which are

claimed in the present writ petition. The respondent vide its letter dated

28.10.1999 accepted the offer of resignation of the petitioner, and the

petitioner in response wrote his letter dated 28.2.2000 for crediting the dues

in his bank account. The respondent thereafter credited dues to the bank

account by means of the letter dated 2.6.2000, and this letter specifically

uses the expression „final dues‟. Therefore, a conjoint reading of the

aforesaid four letters shows that without reserving any right claimed in this

writ petition, petitioner applied for resignation, got his resignation and was

paid his final dues.

8. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of

A.K.Bindal & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 163 that once

a person resigns from a company the jural relationship of employer and

employee comes to an end and thereafter an employee cannot claim any past

service dues. This is so stated by the Supreme Court in para 34 of the

judgment in the case of A.K. Bindal (supra) and which reads as under:-

"34. This shows that a considerable amount is to be paid to an employee ex-gratia besides the terminal benefits in case he opts for voluntary retirement under the Scheme and his option is accepted. The amount is paid not for doing any work or rendering any service. It is paid in lieu of the employee himself leaving the services of the company or the industrial establishment and foregoing all his claims or rights in the same. It is a package deal of give and take. That is why in business world it is known as 'Golden Handshake'. The main purpose of paying this amount is to bring about a compete cessation of the jural relationship between the employer and the employee. After the amount is paid and the employee ceases to be under the employment of the company or the undertaking, he leaves with all his rights and there is no question of his again agitating for any kind of his past rights, with his erstwhile employer including making any claim with regard to enhancement of pay scale for an earlier period. If the employee is still permitted to raise a grievance regarding enhancement of pay scale from a retrospective date, even after he has opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme and has accepted the amount paid to him, the whole purpose of introducing the Scheme would be totally frustrated."

9. No doubt, in the case of A.K. Bindal (supra) the Supreme

Court was dealing with voluntary retirement, however, the principle of

estoppel will also apply not only to voluntary retirement but also for

voluntary resignation which will lead to termination of jural relationship of

employer and employee. For the record I note that respondent has given in

Court a copy of the additional affidavit dated 11.3.2013 which mentions the

factum of the petitioner‟s resignation having been accepted and alongwith

which various documents have been filed. Let the respondent place on

record this original affidavit within a period of one week.

10. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to

bear their own costs.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J MARCH 12, 2013 Ne