Citation : 2013 Latest Caselaw 2870 Del
Judgement Date : 9 July, 2013
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 9th July, 2013.
+ RFA 10/2013
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK .... Appellant
Through: Mr. R.P. Vats, Adv.
Versus
VIJENDER KUMAR & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. B.S. Maan, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
JUDGMENT
% 09.07.2013
1. This appeal under Section 96 of the CPC impugns the judgment and
decree dated 17th November, 2012 of the learned Addl. District Judge-03,
South District, Saket, New Delhi allowing the application of the
respondents/plaintiffs under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC and passing a
decree for ejectment of the appellant/defendant from the entire first floor ad
measuring 3142.25 sq. ft. of property No.A-4, Sarvodya Enclave, Sri
Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi.
2. Notice of the appeal was issued and the Trial Court record
requisitioned. On subsequent date attempt at amicable settlement were
initiated and the counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs made a statement not
to execute the decree. No amicable settlement has been arrived at between
the parties and the counsels have been heard.
3. The respondents/plaintiffs instituted the suit from which this appeal
arises on 4th November, 2011 pleading, (a) that the property aforesaid was
let out to the appellant/defendant vide Lease Deed dated 30 th January, 2006
by the erstwhile owners who sold the said property to the
respondents/plaintiffs vide Sale Deed dated 30 th June, 2006; (b) that the
appellant/defendant upon being intimated of the same commenced paying
rent to the respondents/plaintiffs; (c) that the term of the lease expired on
31st January, 2011; (d) no fresh registered Lease Deed was executed
between the parties and the appellant/defendant thus became a month to
month tenant w.e.f. 1 st February, 2011 and which tenancy was determined
by the respondents/plaintiffs vide Notice dated 4 th October, 2011; (e) that
the appellant/defendant gave a reply dated 29th October, 2011 refusing to
vacate the premises; (f) that the appellant/defendant had never showed any
intention to get the Lease Deed renewed and hence had not exercised the
option of renewal of the lease and was not entitled to renewal of lease. The
respondents/plaintiffs thus besides the relief of ejectment / recovery of
possession, also claimed the relief of mesne profits/damages for use and
occupation w.e.f. 1 st November, 2011.
4. The appellant/defendant contested the suit by filing a written
statement on 2nd February, 2012, relying on the following clause of the
Lease Deed dated 30th January, 2006 supra:
"that the period initial for the lease is 5 (five) years commencing from 01/02/06 with two options for continuing the lease for further two terms of five years each, on the same terms and conditions as herein contained, subject to the conditions that rent shall be increased by 20% on the last rent paid and the Lessors shall not be entitled to refuse the extension for further two terms of five years each if the Lessee exercised that option within one month before the expiry of the original terms of five years, provided that in the absence of notice for the exercise of option, the lessee will be deemed to have exercised the same. A fresh lease deed shall be executed on every renewal."
5. It was further pleaded that on oral request of the
respondents/plaintiffs the appellant/defendant started adjusting the advance
rent of Rs.6,61,500/- from the month of December, 2010 at Rs.1,50,000/-
for the months of October, November & December, 2010 and also adjusted
an amount of Rs.50,000/- each in the months of January, February &
March, 2011 and Rs.60,250/- for the months of April to July, 2011 and the
balance amount was credited to the account of the respondents/plaintiffs and
was thus regularly paying the enhanced rent in terms of the clause aforesaid.
It was further pleaded that the appellant/defendant having exercised the
option for renewal of the lease, the respondents/plaintiffs were not entitled
to the relief of ejectment.
6. The respondent/plaintiffs filed a replication denying having made oral
request to the appellant/defendant for adjusting the advance rent.
7. The respondents/plaintiffs having filed the application under Order
XII Rule 6 of the CPC, the learned Addl. District Judge while allowing the
same has in the impugned judgment held:-
(i). that the Lease Deed dated 30th January, 2006 between the
parties was for a period of five years only and not for a period
of 15 years;
(ii). though the appellant/defendant had an option for renewal but
no fresh Lease Deed was agreed to be executed for renewal of
the lease;
(iii). the appellant/defendant had not given any notice in writing in
January, 2011 to renew the lease for a period of five years
though claimed to have telephonically informed the
respondents /plaintiffs of the same; however no date also of the
said telephone communication was pleaded;
(iv). that though the appellant/defendant pleaded having credited
enhanced rent in terms of the clause aforesaid of the Lease
Deed to the account of the respondents/plaintiffs w.e.f. 1 st
February, 2011 but the same was done only on 8 th October,
2011 i.e. after the respondents/plaintiffs notice dated 4th
October, 2011;
(v). that even in the reply dated 29th October, 2011 sent by the
appellant/defendant to the notice of determination the
appellant/defendant did not call upon the respondents/plaintiffs
to execute fresh Lease Deed; the same was done subsequently
on 25th July, 2012 and thereafter on 4 th October, 2012 a suit for
specific performance was filed; and,
(vi). the respondents/plaintiffs were thus, in the absence of a
registered Lease Deed after 31 st January, 2011, entitled to
determine the tenancy and sue for possession.
8. Though the impugned judgment has also discussed the defence of the
appellant/defendant of waiver of Notice of determination of tenancy and of
being entitled to continue in possession under Section 53A of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882 but need is not felt to elaborate on the said aspect as
the counsel for the appellant/defendant has confined his submissions before
this Court to only one aspect.
9. It is the contention of the counsel for the appellant/defendant that for
an order of ejectment to be passed, three ingredients are required to be
fulfilled, firstly relationship of landlord and tenant; secondly the rent being
in excess of Rs.3,500/- per month; and, lastly determination of tenancy. He
has further argued that though the first two ingredients are fulfilled in the
present case but the last ingredient in the present case is not fulfilled. It is
argued, that there is a distinction between 'renewal' and 'extension' of
lease; that the language used by the parties in the clause aforesaid in the
lease deed in the present case is of 'extension' of the lease and which
'extension' does not require any renewal or fresh Lease Deed to be executed
and the learned Addl. District Judge has erroneously come to the conclusion
that the registered Lease Deed in favour of the appellant/defendant had
expired by efflux of time and the appellant/defendant was a month to month
tenant thereafter and which tenancy could have been terminated by notice.
Reliance in this regard is placed on a judgment of the High Court of
Calcutta reported in Ranjit Kumar Dutta Vs. Tapan Kumar Shaw AIR
1997 Calcutta 278 and which in turn relies on the judgment of the Apex
Court in Provash Chandra Dalui Vs. Biswanath Banerjee 1989 SCC Supl.
(1) 487.
10. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 in Article 35 of Schedule I thereof
provides for payment of stamp duty on leases in slabs of less than one year,
less than five years, less than ten years and less than 20 years etc. It has
been enquired from the counsel for the appellant/defendant whether the
stamp duty on the registered Lease Deed dated 30 th January, 2006 was paid
for a period of five years or for a period of 15 years.
11. The counsel has fairly stated that the stamp duty paid was for a period
of five years only and the lease contemplated execution of a fresh Lease
Deed at the time of each of the two renewals of five years.
12. It has next been enquired from the counsel for the appellant/defendant
whether by having a Lease Deed registered by paying stamp duty for five
years and mentioning therein for extension thereof for further period of five
years each, the payment on stamp duty can be avoided.
13. The counsel has fairly admitted that it cannot be.
14. It has next been enquired from the counsel (till that time the
impugned judgment had not been gone into) whether the
appellant/defendant had instituted any suit for specific performance of the
agreement claimed by it for extension of lease.
15. Though the counsel replied in the negative but on instructions from
the officer of the appellant/defendant present in Court states that a suit for
specific performance has been filed.
16. The counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs states that the same was
instituted after the institution of the suit from which this appeal arises.
17. As far as the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the
appellant/defendant are concerned, in the case before the Supreme Court,
the lease was for a period of 20 years but with a condition that it will be in
the first instance for a period of 10 years and if the lessee did not fail to pay
the rent and perform its other obligations during that period, the lease would
be extended for a further period of five years and similarly for a yet further
period of five years. The question which had arisen was whether such a
lease would be for a period of 10 years or 20 years in as much as under the
Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 protection from eviction was available
only if the lease was for a period of less than 10 years and was not available
if the lease was for a period of 20 years. While holding the lease in that case
to be for a period of 20 years, the Supreme Court carved out a distinction
between renewal and extension. It would thus be seen that the context in
which the observations relied upon were made was entirely different and the
said judgment cannot be read as permitting registration of a lease by paying
the stamp duty for a lesser period, for a longer period by using the word
extension. I, for the said reason am unable to agree with the judgment
aforesaid of the Calcutta High Court and with respect whereto also it may be
stated that there was a dichotomy of opinion between two of the Hon'ble
Judges of that Court before which the matter was listed first and the third
Judge to whom the reference was made applied the judgment aforesaid of
the Supreme Court to hold that a lease for a lesser period could be treated as
for a larger period if the word used was extension and not renewal.
18. Once the aforesaid judgments relied upon are out of the way, no other
aspect has been argued by the counsel for the appellant/defendant save for
contending that if the appellant/defendant is ejected from the premises, the
suit for specific performance filed by the appellant/defendant would become infructuous.
19. I am unable to agree. The claim of the appellant for specific
performance is not before me. It is for the appellant/defendant to prove, if he
has a case in the said suit for specific performance, to seek an order
restraining its ejectment from the premises during the pendency thereof.
20. No merit is thus found in the appeal which is dismissed; however
since the enquiry into mesne profits is still going on, no costs.
21. At this stage, the counsel for the appellant Bank under instructions
from Mr. Harish Gupta, Senior Manager, Punjab National Bank, Sarvodaya
Enclave, New Delhi states that the appellant Bank be granted sometime to
vacate the premises.
22. The counsel has been asked whether the appellant Bank is willing to
withdraw the appeal and furnish an undertaking to vacate the premises.
23. The counsel again under the instructions from Mr. Harish Gupta,
Senior Manager, Punjab National Bank sought a passover, to take
instructions from the appropriate/authorized officer of the appellant Bank.
24. On passover, it is informed that Mr. L.K. Malhotra, Circle Head,
Sough Delhi Circle, Punjab National Bank has been telephonically
contacted by Mr. Harish Gupta present in Court and he has on behalf of the
appellant Bank offered to withdraw the appeal and to furnish an undertaking
to vacate the premises on or before expiry of one year from today, subject to
the said time being granted.
25. The counsel for the respondents also in the meanwhile has obtained
instructions and has agreed to the aforesaid.
26. The counsels have further on suggestion of the Court agreed that the
enquiry underway before the Trial Court be also disposed of in terms of this
compromise.
27. The counsel for the appellant Bank in the circumstances withdraws
this appeal and on behalf of the appellant Bank states, (i) that the appellant
Bank accepts the order of its ejectment and shall not challenge the same; (ii)
that the appellant Bank be granted time till 31st July, 2014 to vacate the
premises; (iii) that the appellant Bank if has not already paid the charges for
use and occupation of the premises enhanced by 20% with effect from 1 st
February, 2011, will pay the same within four weeks from today and will
hereinafter pay charges for use and occupation of the premises till vacation
thereof enhanced by 20% as aforesaid; and, (iv) that the appellant Bank
through Mr. Harish Gupta, Senior Manager and Mr. L.K. Malhotra, Circle
Head of the appellant Bank undertakes to this Court to hand over vacant,
peaceful and physical possession of the premises to the respondents on or
before 31st July, 2014 and to, till the date of such vacation pay all water and
electricity dues with regard to the said premises as per actuals. The said
officers of the appellant Bank further undertake to continue to pay the user
charges as aforesaid in advance for each month by the 10 th day of the month
till the date of vacation of the premises.
28. The counsel for the respondents has stated, (a) that subject to the
undertaking aforesaid of the appellant Bank being accepted, the appellant
Bank be granted time as aforesaid; and, (b) that the respondents are
agreeable to confine the relief for mesne profits/damages for use and
occupation as aforesaid and the enquiry underway before the Trial Court
there into shall also stand disposed of in terms of this compromise.
29. The aforesaid compromise is found to be lawful and is allowed.
30. The appellant is however granted time till 31 st July, 2014 to hand over
vacant, peaceful and physical possession of the premises to the respondents.
31. The undertakings of Mr. Harish Gupta, Senior Manager and Mr. L.K.
Malhotra, Circle Head of the appellant Bank on behalf of the appellant Bank
are accepted and the appellant Bank is ordered to be bound thereby and has
been cautioned with the consequences of breach of undertaking given to the
Court.
32. It is further ordered that upon failure of the appellant Bank to pay the
user charges as undertaken, the appellant Bank besides being liable for
consequences of breach of undertaking given to this Court shall also be
liable for ejectment forthwith.
33. The enquiry into mesne profits/damages for use and occupation
underway before the Trial Court shall also stand disposed of/compromised
in terms of above.
34. The appeal is disposed of in terms of above compromise, leaving the
parties to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be drawn up.
This order to form part of the decree sheet.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J JULY 09, 2013 pp/bs..
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