Ranjit & Ors. vs Charan Kaur & Ors.
2013 Latest Caselaw 5711 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                    Order delivered on: December 10, 2013

+                  RC. REV. No.10/2011 & C.M. No.429/2011

      RANJIT & ORS.                                     ..... Petitioners
                          Through      Mr.R.S. Sharma, Adv.

                          versus

      CHARAN KAUR & ORS.                                ..... Respondents
                  Through              Mr.M.L. Bajaj, Adv.

      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

1. The present petition has been contested by the petitioners under Section 25-B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 assailing the impugned order dated 18th November, 2010 passed by the court of SCJ/RC (West), Delhi in eviction petition No. E-37/2009.

2. The respondents/landlord sought eviction of the petitioners/tenants alleging bonafide requirement of the tenanted property bearing No. 2568, Gali Mandir Wali, Shadipur Khampur, Delhi. The petitioners on being served the summons of the eviction petition filed leave to defend application. The respondents herein filed reply to the application for leave to defend. The learned Addl. Rent Controller after hearing both the parties dismissed the leave to defend application and passed the eviction order in favour of the respondents and against the petitioners.

3. The respondents herein stated in the eviction petition that they have three married sons as well as married daughters and the required the

tenanted property for the residence of the family of one of their sons Sh. Satnam Singh who has three grown up daughters and a son aged 18, 16, 12 and 10 years respectively.

4. The respondent stated that he is in possession of only two rooms on the ground floor which are highly insufficient for a family comprising of six persons and his son Satnam Singh is dependent on him for accommodation, more so, when they are living in a joint family, and therefore, the eviction of the petitioners was sought on the ground of bonafide requirement.

5. In the leave to defend application filed on behalf of the petitioners, it is stated that the respondents are not the owners/landlords of the tenanted property and the same was let out to late Shri. Prakash Singh, the predecessor in interest of the petitioners by one Sh. Gurcharan Singh on a monthly rent of `10/- in 1955 and the respondents have purchased the property from one Ram Kishan by way of unregistered documents and as such their ownership is in dispute. The petitioners stated in the petition that all three sons of the respondent have sufficient accommodation in their possession as the eldest son Sh. Mohinder Singh has two rooms and a guest room on the first floor, second son Satnam Singh has three rooms on the ground floor and the third son Sukhwinder Singh is in possession of four rooms of the tenanted property and there are altogether 11 rooms in possession of the respondents and therefore, there is no bonafide requirement as alleged.

6. In reply to leave to defend, the respondents stated that originally Ram Kishan executed a lease deed for twenty years in favour of the Gurcharan Singh who thereafter sub-leased the property to the predecessors of the respondent and after expiry of that twenty years, Ram Kishan executed title

documents in favour of Ms. Manjit Kaur and Ms. Charan Kaur and thereafter, sale deed was executed in favour of the respondent no. 1 and as such, there is no dispute to their title and further even if its presumed for the sake of arguments that there are eleven rooms in possession of the respondents and their sons, the same are insufficient to accommodate a family of four married couples and nine grown up children. The purpose of letting is not disputed between the parties.

7. The learned Rent Controller after hearing the submissions of both the parties and perusal of the record found from the documents of the respondent that the original owner Ram Kishan executed a lease deed in favour of Gurcharan Singh for 20 years from 1970-1990 and thereafter on 5th September, 1991 sold the property in equal shares to one Ms. Manjit Kaur and Ms. Charan Kaur. Subsequently, Ms. Manjit Kaur sold her share to respondent No. 1 by way of registered documents. Gurcharan Singh who had a lease of twenty years let out the tenanted property to one Prakash Singh, the predecessor in the interest of the petitioners for residential purposes, therefore, the respondents have a valid title in respect of the property and the petitioners being tenants have very little right to challenge the title of the owner which in this case is shown from the registered documents including GPA and sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 1.

8. In so far as the bonafide requirement is concerned, the Rent Controller observed that the respondents being husband and wife need at least one bed room and three married sons require one bedroom each, therefore, the requirement of four bedrooms is genuine. Then these three married sons have nine children. Taking their requirement one by one, the first son has three daughters and a son, therefore needs at least two bedrooms for his

children. The second son has one grown up son and one daughter each of whom require a bedroom each and the third son of the respondents has one daughter and two sons and he too needs at least two rooms for his three children. Therefore, the requirement of bedrooms for nine children is six by all standards which adds up to the total requirement of ten bedrooms consisting fifteen persons. Furthermore, each married son require at least one room apart from guest room for their parents, i.e. the respondent couple. They also require at least two study rooms for children, one drawing-cum- dining room and one room for the married daughter of the respondents which adds the total requirement up to seventeen rooms. As per the petitioners' case though disputed, the respondents have only eleven rooms.

9. In view of the aforesaid requirements of the family members, the court has opined that the requirement of the respondents is genuine and they cannot be asked to live in insufficient accommodation only for accommodating the tenant. The purpose of letting is not in dispute between the parties. The leave to defend application stood dismissed and an eviction order passed in favour of the respondents.

10. The question before this Court is, as to whether said findings call for any interference by the Courts in revisionary jurisdiction or not in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case.

i) A Full Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Ram Chopra and Anr., 1982 (2) RCJ 161 exhaustively considered the provisions of Section 25B of the Act. On the scope of the proviso to Sub-section (8) of this Section, after examining the judgment of Supreme Court in Hari Shanker and Ors. v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, A.I.R. 1963 S.C.

698 and Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom (223) it was laid down as follows:

"In our opinion the jurisdiction of the High Court under proviso to Section 25B(8) has to be interpreted, keeping in view the legislative intent. The revision under Section 25B(8) cannot be regarded as a first appeal and nor can it be as restricted as the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. The High Court would have jurisdiction to interfere if it is of the opinion that there has been a gross illegality or material irregularity which has been committed or the Controller has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or has not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. A finding of fact arrived at by the Controller would not be interfered with by the High Court unless it can be shown that finding has been arrived at by misreading or omitting relevant evidence and this has resulted in gross injustice being caused. If none of the aforesaid circumstances exist the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with the order of the Controller in exercise of its jurisdiction under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act."

ii) In the case titled as Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta, reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2507, it has been held as under:-

".....The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under S.25-B (8) is not so limited as is under S.115, CPC nor so wide as that of an Appellate Court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re- appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of 'whether it is according to law'. For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence, that is, for the

purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached that conclusion on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion for the established facts as betray the lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding of the Controller 'not according to law' calling for an interference under proviso to sub-sec. (8) of S.25-B of the Act. A judgment leading to miscarriage of justice is not a judgment according to law."

iii) The Supreme Court in another case tilted as Chaman Prakash Puri vs. Ishwar Dass Rajput and Another, 1995 Supp (4) Supreme Court Cases 445 has examined with regard to High Court's power to interfere in revision against the finding as to bonafide requirement of landlord. It has been held that if the Rent Controller finds that landlord was in bonafide need of premises, the High Court in revision was not entitled to re-appreciate evidence and reverse the finding.

iv) The Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja versus United India Insurance Company Ltd., reported in AIR (1999) SC 100 held as under:-

"6. .....The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the Rent Controller is "according to the law". In other words, the High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding

arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a finding on the materials available."

It was further held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Ahuja (surpa) that:-

"......The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."

11. After hearing both the parties, I am of the considered opinion that the finding arrived by the learned Rent Controller in paras 4 and 5 of the impugned order are in accordance with law. The same do not call for any interference as no contrary arguments were addressed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. His only submission is that the requirement is bonafide and genuine and there is a sufficient accommodation with the respondent. However, counsel has failed to satisfy the Court on any ground.

12. In view of the aforesaid reasons, facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed.

However, in the interest of justice, the petitioners are granted six months time from today to vacate the tenanted premises bearing No. 2568, Gali Mandir Wali, Shadipur Khampur, Delhi. During this period, the petitioners shall not sublet and create any third party interest in the tenanted property.

13. No costs.

(MANMOHAN SINGH) JUDGE DECEMBER 10, 2013