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Mmtc Ltd. vs Raj Rani Gulati (Deceased) ...
2013 Latest Caselaw 5623 Del

Citation : 2013 Latest Caselaw 5623 Del
Judgement Date : 5 December, 2013

Delhi High Court
Mmtc Ltd. vs Raj Rani Gulati (Deceased) ... on 5 December, 2013
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
          *IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                   Date of decision: 5th December, 2013

+                              RFA 84/2010
       MMTC LTD.                                         ..... Appellant
                         Through:     Mr. Rohit Puri, Adv.

                                Versus

    RAJ RANI GULATI
    (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS & ORS.           ..... Respondents
                  Through: Mr. S.P. Gairola, Adv. for Mr. D.S.
                           Chauhan, Adv. for LR's of R-1.
                           Mr. J.S. Bakshi & Mr. A.S.
                           Bakshi, Advs. for LRs of R-2.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

1. The appeal impugns the judgment and decree dated 10.11.2009 of the

Court of Additional District Judge (ADJ) (Central District), Delhi in suit

No.182/2009 filed by the deceased respondent No.1 / plaintiff against the

appellant and against the respondents No.2 to 4 viz. Sh. L.C. Madan, Smt.

Veena Chanana & Smt. Shashi Madan and thereby declaring as null and

void the Mortgage Deed and No Objection Certificate (NOC) allegedly

executed by the deceased respondent No.1 / plaintiff pertaining to property

No. M-1/3C, Model Town-III, Delhi in favour of the appellant and directing

the appellant to return the original sale deed of the said property in favour of

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff to the respondent No.1 / plaintiff.

2. Notice of the appeal was issued. The counsel for the appellant /

defendant today informs that the original sale deed supra was filed by the

appellant / defendant No.1 in the suit file and pursuant to the judgment /

decree and before the filing of this appeal, the legal heirs of the respondent

No.1 / plaintiff took the delivery thereof from the Court file; in the

circumstances, vide ex parte ad-interim order dated 26.03.2010, the

respondents were restrained from creating any third party interest in the suit

property. The respondent / defendant No.2 Sh. L.C. Madan died during the

pendency of the suit and vide order dated 24.01.2011, his legal heirs were

substituted. The appeal was on 29.09.2011 admitted for hearing and the ex

parte ad-interim order dated 26.03.2010 confirmed. The hearing of the

appeal was expedited on the application of the respondents on the ground

that some of the respondents were senior citizens. The counsel for the

appellant and the counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased

respondents / defendant No.2 Sh. L.C. Madan have been heard. The arguing

counsel for the legal heirs of the deceased respondent No.1 / plaintiff has not

appeared and the counsel who has been sent has no knowledge of the case.

However, since the appeal is being shown in the list of regular matters of

this Court, it is not deemed expedient to await the counsel for the deceased

respondent No.1 / plaintiff and the records have been perused.

3. The deceased respondent No.1 / plaintiff instituted the suit from

which this appeal arises, pleading:

(i) that her husband Sh. K.L. Gulati had initially purchased the

property No.M-1/3C, Model Town-III, Delhi by virtue of

Agreement to Sell, Power of Attorney, Will etc.;

(ii) that the said Sh. K.L. Gulati, as attorney of the recorded owner

of the property, executed and registered sale deed dated

22.02.1993 of the said property in favour of the deceased

respondent No.1 / plaintiff;

(iii) that the respondent / defendant No.2 Sh. L.C. Madan being the

son-in-law of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff was also present at

the time of registration of the sale deed and took with himself

for safe keeping the slips issued by the office of the Sub-

Registrar, Kashmiri Gate to enable collection of the registered

sale deed after two months;

(iv) that after two months, when the respondent No.1 / plaintiff

asked the respondent / defendant No.2 for the sale deed, he

avoided the same on some pretext or the other;

(v) that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff then herself went to the

office of the Sub-Registrar, Kashmiri Gate to collect the sale

deed but learnt that the respondent / defendant No.2 had already

taken away the original sale deed within one week of the date of

registration thereof;

(vi) that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff again enquired from the

respondent / defendant No.2 about the sale deed when the

respondent / defendant No.2 informed that he had mortgaged

the same with the appellant / defendant No.1;

(vii) that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff told the respondent /

defendant No.2 that he had done a wrong to her by mortgaging

her sale deed with the appellant / defendant No.1 without her

consent and at her back;

(viii) that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff never signed any documents

mortgaging her property and it appeared that the respondent /

defendant No.2 must have played a fraud with the appellant /

defendant No.1 by misrepresenting any other lady in place of

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff;

(ix) that the respondent / defendant No.2 gave an assurance in

writing dated 22.04.1993 to the respondent No.1 / plaintiff that

he had mortgaged the sale deed with some bank from where he

had obtained certain credit facility and he will get back and

return to the respondent No.1 / plaintiff the said documents

within six months;

(x) however the respondent / defendant No.2 did not honour his

commitment even for four years and the sale deed was still

lying deposited with the appellant / defendant No.1;

(xi) that any Mortgage Deed of her property with the appellant /

defendant No.1 was not binding on the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff or her property;

Accordingly, the suit for the reliefs decreed, was filed.

4. The appellant / defendant No.1 contested the suit, by filing a written

statement, on the grounds:

       (a)       that the suit claim was barred by time;


       (b)       that the suit was not properly valued for the purposes of court

                 fees and jurisdiction;


       (c)       that the subject sale deed was deposited by the respondent No.1

/ plaintiff with the appellant / defendant No.1 vide a

Memorandum of Mortgage (MoM) dated 23.02.1993 with the

intent to create the charge thereon for securing the repayment of

a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- advanced by the appellant / defendant

No.1 to M/s Madan Jewellers, the sole proprietorship firm of

the respondent / defendant No.2 together with interest thereon;

(d) that the said MoM was duly signed by the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff;

(e) that the factum of the property being mortgaged with the

appellant / defendant No.1 was admittedly within the

knowledge of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff; however, the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff neither made any representation nor

complained of the fraud allegedly played on her;

(f) that the appellant / defendant No.1 had filed a suit against the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff for restraining her from selling or

alienating the property and in the written statement to the said

suits, no such case as had been set up in the plaint was set up;

and,

(g) that the appellant / defendant No.1 was the mortgagee of the

said property.

5. The respondent / defendant No.2 also filed a written statement

pleading:

(I) that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff had herself collected the sale

deed from the office of the Sub-Registrar, Delhi and on the

request of the respondent / defendant No.2 had handed over the

same to him and he had deposited the same with the appellant /

defendant No.1 with the consent of the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff; and,

(II) denying that any Memorandum of Deposit was executed and

that anything was due from the respondent / defendant No.2 to

the appellant / defendant No.1.

6. Needless to state, replications to both the written statements were filed

by the respondent No.1/plaintiff, reiterating her case.

7. On the pleadings aforesaid of the parties, the following issues were

framed in the suit on 09.01.2008:

"1. Whether plaintiff has filed this suit within the period of limitation? (OPP)

2. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purposes of Court Fee and jurisdiction and appropriate Court fee has been affixed on the plaint? (OPP)

3. Whether the title documents of property of plaintiff were obtained by defendant no.1 from the office of Sub Registrar and deposited with defendant no.1 without her consent? (OPP)

4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the decree of declaration as has been claimed? (OPP)

5. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the decree of mandatory injunction as claimed? (OPP)

6. Relief."

8. The respondent No.1 / plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit

and some of her legal heirs were substituted in her place and two other legal

heirs were impleaded as defendants No.3 and 4 (who are now respondents

No.3&4).

9. The learned ADJ has vide the impugned judgment decreed the suit in

favour of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff and against the appellant /

defendant No.1, finding / observing / holding:

(A) that since it was the case of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff that

she came to know about the execution of the alleged MoM and

NOC on 09.05.1996 only from the plaint in the suit for

injunction filed by the appellant / defendant No.1, the suit was

within time;

(B) that though the respondent No.1 / plaintiff in the plaint had

admitted knowledge of deposit of the sale deed by the

respondent / defendant No.2 with the appellant / defendant No.1

in or about the year 1993 itself but she was not aware that any

MoM deed or NOC had been fabricated and she learnt of the

said fact only from the plaint in the suit for injunction filed by

the appellant / defendant No.1 and thus the period of limitation

would start running from that date only;

(C) that the suit had been correctly valued for the purposes of court

fees and jurisdiction;

(D) that once the respondent No.1 / plaintiff had disputed that MoM

and NOC were executed by her in favour of the appellant /

defendant No.1, the onus shifted on the appellant / defendant

No.1 and respondent / defendant No.2 to prove that it was

executed by the respondent No.1 / plaintiff herself;

(E) that the only witness examined by the appellant / defendant

No.1 admitted in cross-examination that the documents were

not executed in his presence and the appellant / defendant No.1

did not produce its official in whose presence the MoM and

NOC, if executed by the respondent No.1 / plaintiff, had been

executed;

(F) that the stand of the appellant / defendant No.1 was

inconsistent;

(G) that since the sale deed was registered on 22.02.1993, the

original could not have been returned by the office of the Sub-

Registrar on the same day or on the next date for it to be

deposited with the appellant / defendant No.1 on 23.02.1993;

(H) that it had been proved that one recovery suit had been filed by

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff against her son-in-law

respondent / defendant No.2 in respect of loan taken by the

respondent / defendant No.2 and which suit was decreed and

which proved that their relationship was not cordial;

(I) that had the respondent No.1 / plaintiff executed the MoM and

NOC, she would not have filed the suit; and,

(J) that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff had thus proved that the

respondent / defendant No.2 collected the sale deed from the

office of the Sub-Registrar and deposited the same with the

appellant / defendant No.1 to get a loan facility, without the

knowledge and consent of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff and

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff had not executed the MoM and

NOC.

10. The counsel for the appellant / defendant No.1 challenges the finding

on the aspect of limitation and has contended that the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff had not disputed her signatures on the MoM and NOC in favour of

the appellant / defendant No.1 and her case was of fraud having been

practiced by her son-in-law respondent / defendant No.2.

11. On enquiry, as to on whom the property has devolved on the demise

of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff, it is stated that though the husband of the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff claims a Will in his favour but no such Will has

been produced least proved.

12. On further enquiry whether the respondent No.1 / plaintiff had lodged

any FIR against her son-in-law respondent / defendant No.2, the counsel for

the legal representatives of the respondent / defendant No.2 states that no

such FIR or complaint of any offence was lodged.

13. On yet further enquiry as to what steps the appellant / defendant No.1

has taken for recovery of its dues if any against the respondent / defendant

No.2, it is informed that arbitration is underway. However the counsel for

the appellant / defendant No.1 admits that the said arbitration is qua the

respondent / defendant No.2 and / or his legal heirs only and not against the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff. On enquiry, as to what steps for enforcement of

the mortgage have been taken, the counsel for the appellant / defendant No.1

states that only after the amount due to the appellant / defendant No.1 is

crystallized in the arbitration, will such steps be taken and the limitation for

the relief of foreclosure under Article 63 of the Schedule to the Limitation

Act, 1963 is of 30 years commencing from the day when the money secured

by the mortgage becomes due.

14. The counsel for the appellant / defendant No.1 has also argued that the

equitable mortgage by deposit of title deed in favour of the appellant /

defendant No.1 would not be invalidated even if it were to be held that the

MoM and NOC have not been proved.

15. I will first take up the aspect of limitation.

16. The relief claimed in the suit, was two-fold; firstly, of declaration of

the alleged mortgage deed as null and void and not binding on the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff or on her property; and, secondly, of mandatory

injunction directing the appellant / defendant No.1 to return the title

documents of the appellant plaintiff. As per para No.14 of the plaint, the

cause of action for the suit had accrued to the respondent No.1 / plaintiff, on

05.03.1993 when the respondent / defendant No.2 illegally obtained the

original sale deed from the office of the Sub-Registrar and pledged the same

with the appellant / defendant No.1; thereafter on 22.04.1993 when the

respondent / defendant No.2 in writing promised to get back and deliver the

sale deed to the respondent No.1 / plaintiff within six months; thereafter on

various dates when the respondent No.1 / plaintiff requested the respondent /

defendant No.2 for return of the sale deed; and, lastly on 23.06.1997 when

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff served the 'defendants with a legal notice but

the defendants failed to comply with the same'.

17. Similarly, the respondent No.1 / plaintiff, in para No.6 of the plaint

pleaded having told her son-in-law respondent / defendant No.2 that he has

done a wrong to her by mortgaging her sale deed with the appellant /

defendant No.1 without her consent and by playing a fraud and

misrepresentation'. In para No.7 of the plaint, the respondent No.1 / plaintiff

admitted knowledge prior to 22.04.1993 of her son-in-law respondent /

defendant No.2 having obtained 'certain credit facility by mortgaging the

sale deed of the plaintiff.

18. As would be apparent from the above, it was not the case of the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff in the plaint that the cause of action had accrued

to her only on receipt of copy of the plaint in the suit for injunction filed by

the appellant / defendant No.1 and which is the reason given by the learned

ADJ for holding the suit to be within time. It is not found to be her case in

the replication to the written statement either. In fact, the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff is not found to have even proved the plaint in the suit for injunction

filed by the appellant / defendant No.1 and on the basis whereof the learned

ADJ has held the suit within time. The reasoning of the learned ADJ on the

aspect of limitation is thus clearly unsustainable, being beyond pleadings

and evidence and rather I am nonplussed as to how the learned ADJ gave the

said reasoning.

19. From the pleadings of the respondent No.1/plaintiff itself, it is evident

that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff prior to 22.04.1993 was aware of the title

documents of her property having been pledged / mortgaged with the

appellant / defendant No.1 to secure the loans taken by the respondent /

defendant No.2. The limitation for suits relating to declaration is dealt with

in Part-III of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 and Article 56

provides limitation of three years for a suit to declare the forgery of an

instrument issued or registered, commencing from the date when the issue or

registration of the document becomes known to the plaintiff and Article 58

provides limitation of three years for obtaining any other declaration

commencing from the date when the right to sue first accrues. The

respondent No.1 / plaintiff in the present case, three years prior to the

institution of the suit was aware of the pledge of the title deeds / mortgage of

her property with the appellant / defendant No.1. Even if it were to be

believed that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff was on that date not aware of

the MoM or NOC in favour of the appellant / defendant No.1 purportedly

executed by her but the use of the words / expressions 'pledge of title deeds /

mortgage of the property' clearly shows knowledge by the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff of a lien on her property having been created. If it was the case of

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff that no such lien could have been created, the

words 'pledge / mortgage' would not have been used. Rather, the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff claims to have given time of six months to her

son-in-law respondent / defendant No.2 to get back the said documents.

20. In Khatri Hotels Private Limited Vs. Union of India (2011) 9 SCC

126 the Supreme Court was concerned with the aspect of limitation for a suit

for declaration of title and mandatory and permanent injunction. The cause

of action was pleaded to have accrued on the date when the plaintiff came to

know of the entries in the revenue records in favour of defendant Union of

India. It was held that while enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the

legislature had designedly made a departure from the language of Article

120 of the 1908 Act ;The word 'first' has been used between the words `sue'

and `accrued'. This was held to mean that if a suit is based on multiple

causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date

when the right to sue first accrues; successive violations of right were held

not to give rise to fresh cause and it was observed that suit was liable to be

dismissed if it was beyond the period of limitation, counted from the day

when the right to sue first accrued. Applying the said principles it was held

that since the plaintiff, from the pleadings of DDA in an earlier suit knew of

the rights claimed by the plaintiff having stood violated, even if the plaintiff

did not know of the notifications by which his right to property was taken

away, knowledge of violation of right was enough and cause of action had

accrued and mere knowledge of entries would not confer a fresh cause of

action to appellant/plaintiff.

21. In my view, the cause of action if any for a suit for declaration

accrued to the respondent no.1 / plaintiff before 22.04.1993 and the suit filed

beyond the period of three years therefrom was clearly barred by time.

22. The matter can be looked at from another perspective. Even if it were

to be believed that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff before 22.04.1993 was not

aware of the MoM and NOC purportedly executed by her, once the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff had learnt of the title documents of her property

having been pledged / or her property having been mortgaged, the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff ought to have been put to enquiry and cannot be

permitted to allow such a state of affairs to continue to exist and, by

unilaterally deciding when to make enquiries as to how without her consent

the appellant / defendant No.1 on the security of the title documents of her

property, advanced loans to the respondent / defendant No.2, govern the date

of commencement of the limitation. The suit for declaration was thus barred

by time and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

23. This court in Satya Prakash Gupta Vs. Vikas Gupta

MANU/DE/2042/2010 held that where the plaintiff was aware of the

existence of the document qua which the declaration of forgery was claimed,

limitation of 3 years under Article 56 would begin to run and the plea of the

plaintiff of not knowing of the exact documents would be of no avail. RFA

(OS) No. 23/2010 titled Satya Prakash Gupta Vs. Vikas Gupta preferred

thereagainst was dismissed, again emphasising knowledge of existence of

documents and observing that rules of limitation are meant to see that parties

do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly and those

who sleep upon their claims should not be assisted by the courts.

24. The same is the position with respect to the suit for the relief of

mandatory injunction. The respondent No.1 / plaintiff, for more than three

years prior to the date of institution of the suit was aware of the title

documents of her property having been pledged / deposited by the

respondent/ defendant No.2 with the appellant / defendant No.1. The cause

of action if any for the relief of taking back the said documents accrued to

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff latest by 22.04.1993 and the suit for the said

relief also could not have been instituted beyond three years. Again, the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff could not by choosing not to make a demand for

the said documents on the appellant / defendant No.1, stop the period of

limitation from running.

25. Thus the suit for the relief of mandatory injunction is also found to be

barred by time.

26. I also find merit in the contention of the counsel for the appellant /

defendant No.1 that there was no denial by the respondent No.1 / plaintiff of

her signatures on the MoM / NOC.

27. The respondent No.1 / plaintiff died before her evidence could be

recorded and her husband Sh. K.L. Gulati only appeared as a witness. He in

his affidavit by way of examination-in-chief though deposed that neither he

nor the respondent No.1 / plaintiff signed any deed of alleged mortgage or

any other document of deposit of sale deed in the office of the appellant /

defendant No.1 (as the said documents purportedly bear not only the

signatures of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff but also of her husband Sh. K.L.

Gulati) and also that the alleged mortgage deed is forged and fabricated but

refrained from deposing that the signatures on the MoM and NOC are not of

the respondent No.1 / plaintiff or his own. I must however record that even

the counsel for the appellant / defendant No.1 did not put the said signatures

to him.

28. The witness of the appellant / defendant No.1 in his deposition proved

the MoM and the NOC and deposed the same to have been executed by the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff. In cross-examination, he stated that the

signatures of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff on MoM and NOC matched the

signatures on the sale deed. The said witness of the appellant / defendant

No.1 was not cross-examined by the respondent / defendant No.2. The

respondent / defendant No.2 in his evidence deposed that the property was

mortgaged by the respondent / plaintiff No.1 herself and her signatures were

attested by her husband Sh. K.L. Gulati. No suggestion was given to him

that he had forged the signatures of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff or Sh.

K.L. Gulati on the said documents.

29. I am of the view that the learned ADJ has mis-appreciated the

evidence in this respect also. The only inference possible from the aforesaid

state of evidence is of there being no denial of the signatures on the MoM

and NOC being of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff and her husband.

30. Even otherwise, the collusion between the respondent No.1 / plaintiff

and the respondent / defendant No.2 who is none other than her son-in-law,

is writ large in the facts of the case and the suit was clearly an attempt to

defeat the security against which the appellant / defendant No.1 had

advanced monies to the respondent / defendant No.2. It is unfortunate that

the learned ADJ has failed to see through the game being played and has

allowed such security in favour of the appellant / defendant No.1 a Public

Sector Undertaking to be nullified. The husband of the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff in fact in his cross-examination admitted that the respondent /

defendant No.2 was not inimical to him and his wife respondent No.1 /

plaintiff in 1993. The only inference possible was of the mortgage by

deposit of title deeds in favour of the appellant / defendant No.1 being

consensual and the suit having been filed as an afterthought, after the

appellant / defendant No.1 had already initiated proceedings upon default by

the respondent / defendant No.2 and sought injunction against the

respondent No.1 / plaintiff.

31. Though the pleadings in the suit for injunction filed by the appellant /

defendant No.1 have not been proved but I find photocopies thereof on

record and a perusal of the written statement of the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff in the said suit shows that that the respondent No.1 / plaintiff was

fully aware of the business affairs of her son-in-law respondent / defendant

No.2 in the name and style of M/s Madan Jewellers even though the

respondent/defendant no.2 was not a party to the said suit, so much so that

allegations were also made against the Arbitrator by then already appointed

by the appellant / defendant No.1 and the claim of the appellant / defendant

No.1 against the respondent / defendant No.2 before the Arbitrator was

styled as frivolous and untenable.

32. The learned ADJ, instead of taking up the respondent / defendant

No.2 who was then still alive to task, unfortunately chose to deprive the

Public Sector Undertaking of the means to recover public monies.

33. I am also of the view that even if it were to be believed that the initial

deposit of title deeds of the property of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff with

the appellant / defendant No.1 was without the consent of the respondent

No.1 / plaintiff, the respondent No.1 / plaintiff by allowing the said title

deeds to remain with the appellant / defendant No.1 for a period of over

three years and by allowing the appellant / defendant No.1 to rest secured in

the knowledge of holding mortgage of the property of the respondent No.1 /

plaintiff as security for recovery of its dues against the appellant / defendant

No.1, created / ratified such mortgage. The counsel for the appellant /

defendant No.1 is correct in his contention that a mortgage by deposit of title

deeds under Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does not

require any MoM to be executed. All that is required is delivery to a

creditor of documents of title of immovable property with intent to create a

security thereon. Even if the intent to create a security is lacking at the time

of delivery of the documents, if the owner of the immovable property by not

taking any action inspite of knowledge, of another having created a situation

of delivery of such documents to a creditor under the impression that the

same was with an intent to create a security thereon, allows the said state of

affairs to continue, that itself would amount to the intent of the owner of the

immovable property to create security of her property in favour of the

creditor.

34. Some of the other reasons given by the learned ADJ for deciding in

favour of respondent No.1/plaintiff also astound me. The reasoning, that the

original Sale Deed could not have been returned on the very next day of

registration or that if the respondent No.1/plaintiff had executed the

MoM/NOC, she would not have filed the suit, is nothing but conjectures and

surmises and presumptions. The reasoning, of the relationship between

respondent No.1 / plaintiff and her son in law respondent/defendant No.2

being not cordial because of suit filed, inspite of express admission in cross-

examination, is also baffling. The learned ADJ did not notice that the suit

was filed much later, just prior to institution of the suit from which this

appeal arises and ex-parte decree was obtained. There is nothing to show

that the respondent No.1/plaintiff executed the said decree against

respondent/defendant No.2. The said proceeding was thus nothing but

creation of evidence to show the relationship to be strained.

35. The appeal thus succeeds, the judgment and decree of the learned ADJ

is set aside and the suit filed by the deceased respondent No.1 / plaintiff is

dismissed. The legal heirs of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff are also

burdened with exemplary costs of Rs.20,000/- for bringing and pursuing a

false and frivolous suit.

36. The legal heirs of the respondent No.1 / plaintiff or such of the legal

heirs who have taken delivery of the original sale deed are directed (in

exercise of the powers of restitution) to within 30 days deposit the same

back with the appellant/defendant No.1, failing which they / he / she shall be

liable for being proceeded against for disobedience of the directions of this

Court.

Decree sheet be drawn up.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

DECEMBER 05, 2013 'gsr'..

 
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