Citation : 2013 Latest Caselaw 3842 Del
Judgement Date : 30 August, 2013
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO 339/2013
Decided on 30th August, 2013
MANMOHAN SINGH & ANR ..... Appellants
Through: Mr.Basant Kumar Singh, Advocate.
versus
GE MONEY FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD ..... Respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
V.K. SHALI, J. (ORAL)
1. This is an appeal against the order dated 23.03.2013 passed by the
learned ADJ vide which the objections of the appellants under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the award passed by the
arbitrator, were partly allowed.
2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that
the appellants had not received the notice about the proceedings having been
initiated before the arbitrator and consequently an ex parte award was
passed against him. It has been contended by him that since principles of
natural justice were not followed, therefore, the arbitration award passed
again him is void ab initio.
3. In order to support his contention, the learned counsel for the
appellants has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dulal
Poddar vs.Executive Engineer, Dona Canal; 2004 (1) Arb.L.R. 24 (SC).
4. I have gone through the said judgment. There is no doubt that the
case which has been sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the
appellant, the apex court has observed that the award which has been passed
by the arbitrator without affording an opportunity of hearing to the
respondent in the said case was illegal and void, but the question is as to
whether a party to an arbitration proceeding has been served or not, is
essentially a question of fact. In the instant case, there is no dispute about
the fact that the appellants had taken a loan of Rs.15 lakhs from the
respondent and mortgaged the property. In the loan agreement, there was an
arbitration clause and the appellants had given their correspondence address
of Rohini. Since the appellants had defaulted in payment of loan, the
respondent appointed an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause who
entered into the reference. The arbitrator is purported to have issued two
notices to the appellants at the Rohini address on 04.04.2011 and
08.05.2011. Both these notices were received by the appellant inasmuch as
the acknowledgement card which had gone along with the notices was served on one Ms.Rajini and another person whose signatures were illegible.
5. Despite the said service on Ms.Rajini and another person, there was
no appearance on behalf of the appellants and consequently they were
proceeded ex parte and the arbitrator passed the ex parte award.
6. Prima facie, the acknowledgment card which is purported to have
been accepted by the arbitrator as proof of service shows that the appellant
had been served the notice. It was essentially now for the appellants to have
discharged the onus by putting in appearance and refuting this fact by cogent
evidence by filing an affidavit that they were not the persons who had
received the notice. This has not been done by the appellants. Therefore,
apart from the presumption of fact which may be drawn once a letter is
addressed to the addressee, the acknowledgment card which has been duly
received back after signatures corroborating the fact that the notice has been
served on the addressee. There is nothing wrong in the presumption and the
factum of notice having been served on the appellants being accepted by the
arbitrator as well as by the court below and dismissing the objections of the
appellant in this court.
7. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants
that the arbitrator had not recorded the evidence. This objection of the learned counsel for the appellants has also been rejected by the court below
on account of the fact that documents have been placed on record before the
arbitrator to the effect that the appellants had taken the loan and signed the
loan agreement. It is admittedly not the case of the appellants that they had
not taken the loan or had not created any charge/security by way of
mortgage on the property in question or they had not signed the loan
agreement. In the absence of such a plea and in the light of the fact that the
documents of loan are not denied by the appellants, it was, in my considered
view, not necessary that evidence ought to have been taken by the arbitrator.
The documents in themselves were sufficient enough to fasten the liability
on the appellants. This objection of the learned counsel for the appellants,
thus, does not have any merit and has been rightly dismissed by the court
below.
8. I do not find that there is any illegality and impropriety in the
rejection of the objections of the appellants by the arbitrator. Accordingly
the appeal is dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J AUGUST 30, 2013/dm
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!