Citation : 2013 Latest Caselaw 3789 Del
Judgement Date : 29 August, 2013
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 29th August, 2013
+ RFA No.392/2010
S. JASKIRAT SINGH @ PRINCE
KHURANA & ANR. ..... Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Umesh Kumar, Adv.
Versus
S. DALIP SINGH (DECEASED)
THROUGH LRs. & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Vinod Wadhwa & Ms. Vipasha Singh, Advs. for R-4.
Mr. R.S. Sahni, Adv. for R-
5,6,9&10.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J
1. The appeal impugns the judgment and decree dated 04.02.2010 (in
Civil Suit No.428/2008) of the Court of Additional District Judge-03
(North), Delhi dismissing the suit filed by the two appellants / plaintiffs,
(a) for partition of property No.2429, Tilak Street, Chuna Mandi,
Paharganj, New Delhi; (b) for permanent injunction restraining the
respondents / defendants from dispossessing the appellants / plaintiffs
from the portion of the property in their occupation and / or dealing with
the said property; and, (c) for rendition of accounts of the business carried
on from Shops No.1 and 3 of Market Nos.646-647, Fancy Cloth Market,
Main Bazar, Paharganj, New Delhi, as barred by Section 11 of the CPC.
The appeal also impugns an order of the same day dismissing the
application filed by the appellants / plaintiffs under Order 6 Rule 17 of
the CPC.
2. Notice of the appeal was issued and the Trial Court record
requisitioned. The appeal was admitted for hearing on 20.09.2011 and
ordered to be listed in due course. Application for early hearing was filed
by the respondent No.4 Harmit Singh claiming himself to be a senior
citizen and the appeal was accordingly given priority and ordered to be
listed in the regular matters of the Senior Citizens. An application under
Order 41 Rule 27 has been filed by respondent No.4 which is pending
consideration.
3. Though the appeal is listed in the category of regular matters but
the counsel for the appellants / plaintiffs started by saying that first the
application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC has to be disposed of and he is
ready for arguments thereon only. Upon being told that such
applications, as per the established law, are to be heard along with the
appeal only, though he has given a narration of the facts of the case,
however stating that some of the respondents are still unserved with the
notice issued of the application of the respondent No.4 under Order 41
Rule 27 of the CPC.
4. The counsel for the respondents No.5,6,9 and 10 states that the
respondent No.5 is the main contesting respondent and the other
respondents are not interested.
5. However when after further perusing the impugned judgment /
order, some query was raised to the counsel for the respondents No.5,6, 9
and 10, he states that he has neither brought the judgments on which he
needs to rely, nor has inspected the file and also seeks adjournment.
Upon it being enquired from him as to why the application for early
hearing was made if none of the counsels are interested in addressing
arguments for early disposal of the appeal, he states that the application
for early hearing was filed not by him but by respondent No.4.
6. Upon the counsel for the respondent No.4 being asked to address,
he states that he has nothing to say as the respondent No.4 is the father of
the two appellants and is supporting the appellants / plaintiffs.
7. The aforesaid shows that though priority in hearing was claimed
and given, over the appeals of the year 2004 onwards pending before this
Court, but neither of the parties are interested in addressing arguments.
8. Be that as it may, since the impugned judgment has been read, it is
not deemed appropriate to adjourn the matter and the records have been
perused.
9. The appellants / plaintiffs, in the suit from which this appeal arises,
claimed partition of the property pleading that the said property was
purchased by their grandfather Sh. Dalip Singh (against whom the suit
was filed) from the claim amounts received with respect to the properties
left in Pakistan by late Sh. Jawahar Singh being the father of Sh. Dalip
Singh, and great-grandfather of the appellants / plaintiffs, and the
appellants / plaintiffs thus had a right since their birth in the said
properties. The same is the position of the other claim in the suit, for
accounts with respect to the business.
10. The learned Additional District Judge by the impugned judgment
held the claim for partition of the appellants / plaintiffs to be barred by
Section 11 of the CPC for the reason of the judgment in a suit filed by the
grandfather of the appellants / plaintiffs Sh. Dalip Singh against the father
of the appellants / plaintiffs Sh. Harmit Singh, respondent No.4 in this
appeal, for possession of the portion of the said property in occupation of
the respondent No.4 and in which suit the respondent No.4 herein had
taken a defence of being in occupation of the property as owner for the
reason of the property having been acquired through ancestral funds and
which defence of the respondent No.4 was not believed and a decree for
possession passed in favour of Sh. Dalip Singh grandfather of the present
appellants / plaintiffs and against the father of the appellants / plaintiffs
i.e. the respondent No.4 herein.
11. The learned Additional District Judge has further reasoned that the
said judgment had attained finality till the Supreme Court and the issue of
the property being not ancestral in the hands of Sh. Dalip Singh had thus
attained finality. It was further held that the additional contention of the
appellants / plaintiffs, that the said decree was obtained in collusion and
by playing a fraud upon the Court, did not come in the way of
applicability of the principle of res judicata because the appellants /
plaintiffs, in the suit from which this appeal arises, had not claimed the
relief of declaration of the decree in the earlier suit to be null and void but
had simply claimed partition. It was yet further held that the suit filed by
the appellants / plaintiffs was based on the same facts which had already
been decided in the suit for possession filed by Sh. Dalip Singh and was
thus barred by provisions of Section 11 of the CPC.
12. Finding the bar of Section 11 of the CPC to be applicable, only
between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any
of them claim or litigating under the same title, it was enquired from the
counsel for the respondents No.5,6, 9 and 10 as to how the appellants /
plaintiffs, who were admittedly not a party to the earlier suit filed by the
grandfather Sh. Dalip Singh against respondent No.4 herein, could be
said to be litigating under the same title or claiming under their father.
13. The counsel for the respondents No.5,6,9 and 10 instead of
replying to the said question, states that the appellants / plaintiffs were
fully aware and participating in the earlier suit though not parties thereto.
Upon further enquiry, he states that he is not ready and again seeks
adjournment.
14. I am unable to hold that the claim of the appellants / plaintiffs, in
the suit from which this appeal arises, was under their father respondent
No.4 herein or that the appellants / plaintiffs were litigating under the
same title under which their father had litigated in the earlier suit.
15. I have enquired from the counsels as to when the father of Sh.
Dalip Singh died. The counsel for the appellants / plaintiffs states that
Sh. Jawahar Singh, father of Sh. Dalip Singh died in Pakistan in the year
1944. The counsel for the respondents No.5,6,9 and 10 though states that
Sh. Jawahar Singh died in Pakistan but is unable to either admit or
controvert the year of death of Sh. Jawahar Singh.
16. If Sh. Jawahar Singh has died in the year 1944 i.e. prior to the
coming into force the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the suit property
can be traced to the funds of Sh. Jawahar Singh, then the suit property
would be ancestral in the hands of Sh. Dalip Singh and in which the
appellants / plaintiffs being the grandsons of Sh. Dalip Singh (who is
stated to have died on 13.07.2008) would have a right by their birth.
Such rights of the appellants / plaintiffs are in accordance with the ancient
Hindu laws as applicable prior to the coming into force of the Hindu
Succession Act in the year 1956 and though the share of the appellants /
plaintiffs in the property would be from the branch of their father but the
mere fact that their share would be out of the branch of their father would
not make their said right as through their father or under the same title as
their father, the respondent No.4 herein.
17. The learned Additional District Judge did not consider the
aforesaid aspect and the judgment is totally bereft of any discussion in
this regard. However I find the said aspect to have been raised at the time
of hearing of the application in the suit (from which this appeal arises)
under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC and the order dated 03.10.2006
thereon to have rejected the contention of the counsel for the respondents
No.5,6, 9 and 10 to the said effect and having held that the grandsons
acquire right by birth and their right does not flow through their father. I
may notice that FAO No.324/2006 preferred to this Court against the said
order dated 03.10.2006 was allowed on 08.05.2007 inter alia on the
ground that the suit filed by the appellants / plaintiffs prima facie was in
abuse of the process of the law and citing certain judgments holding that
if the predecessor in interest was party to the suit / proceedings involving
the same property, the judgment therein binds his successor in interest.
However the said principle, as aforesaid, is not applicable to rights under
the ancient Hindu law where the rights of the grandsons to the ancestral
property are independent of the rights of their father. Moreover, this
Court at that stage was not concerned with the aspect of applicability of
Section 11 of the CPC and thus I do not consider myself bound by the
said judgment dated 08.05.2007 in FAO No.324/2006.
18. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Lala Maha Deo Vs.
Ranbir Singh AIR 1944 Lahore 220 held that a Hindu son does not claim
under his father within the meaning of Section 11 of the CPC inasmuch
as a son in a joint Hindu family becomes entitled in his own right on
birth. To the same effect is the judgment in (Kintali) Chandramani
Prushti Vs. Jambeswara Rayagaru AIR 1931 Mad. 550.
19. Moreover, the suit as aforesaid was primarily for two reliefs i.e. for
partition of property No. 2429, Tilak Street, Chuna Mandi, Paharganj,
New Delhi and for accounts of business being run in Shops No.1 and 3 of
Market Nos.646-647, Fancy Cloth Market, Main Bazaar, Paharganj, New
Delhi. I do not find any discussion in the impugned order holding the suit
for accounts to be barred by Section 11 and the counsel for the
respondents No.5,6, 9 and 10 is also unable to tell as to how the suit for
the said relief of accounts could be said to be barred under Section 11
owing to the earlier judgment.
20. The counsel for the respondents No.5,6, 9 and 10 has handed over
copy of a judgment dated 16.07.2013 in CS(OS) No.982/2009 titled S.
Harmit Singh Vs. S. Ravinder Singh of this Court dismissing the suit
filed by the father of the appellants / plaintiffs respondent No.4 herein
claiming partition of property No. 2429, Tilak Street, Chuna Mandi,
Paharganj, New Delhi as well as the shops aforesaid. However
admittedly the appellants / plaintiffs were not party to the said suit also.
21. I am therefore unable to uphold the judgment and decree holding
the suit from which this appeal arises to be barred by Section 11 of the
CPC.
22. As far as the challenge to the order of the same day of dismissing
the application of the appellants / plaintiffs for amendment of the plaint is
concerned, the appellants / plaintiffs wanted to, a) implead the Union of
India, Regional Settlement Commissioner and Commissioner of MCD as
parties to the suit; b) seek declaration qua the ownership of the property;
c) to challenge the inter se arrangements entered into between the heirs of
Sardar Dalip Singh with respect to the properties.
23. The counsel for the respondents No.5,6, 9 and 10 interjects at this
stage and states that this application was never argued before the Trial
Court.
24. On that concession alone of the counsel for the respondents No.5,6,
9 and 10, the order rejecting the amendment, though in favour of the said
respondents, is liable to be set aside and is so set aside.
25. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds.
26. The judgment and decree holding the suit to be barred by Section
11 of the CPC is set aside; similarly the order rejecting the application of
the appellants / plaintiffs for amendment of the plaint is set aside and the
application for amendment is remanded to be considered afresh by the
learned Additional District Judge.
27. I may however clarify that the observations aforesaid are on the
basis of the averments in the plaint and thus would not come in the way
of the Additional District Judge, if of the opinion that the suit is liable to
be summarily dismissed on some other ground, to consider the said
aspect.
28. The counsels for the respondents having not argued, no order as to
costs.
29. Decree sheet be drawn up.
30. The Trial Court file be returned forthwith to the District Judge
(North), Delhi. The parties to appear before the Additional District
Judge-03 (North), Delhi or any other Additional District Judge before
whom the suit is marked, on 8th October, 2013.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J AUGUST 29, 2013 'gsr'..
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