Mohd Jamal Mustafa vs Sabira Begum
2012 Latest Caselaw 6366 Del

*           THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                          R.C. REV 381/2011

                                           Date of Decision: 31.10.2012

MOHD JAMAL MUSTAFA                                 .......Petitioner
               Through:                 Mr.Prag Chawla, Mr.Saurabh
                                        Shokeen and Mr.Sudeep Sudan,
                                        Advocates

                                  Versus
SABIRA BEGUM                                      ......Respondent
                           Through:     Mr.Adnan Khan, Advocate


CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA

M.L. MEHTA, J. (Oral)

1. This is a revision petition u/S 25 B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control

Act (for short "the Act") against the order dated 04.06.2011 passed by

the Ld. Rent Controller, Saket Court, Delhi, whereby the leave to

defend application filed by the respondent tenant, was allowed.

2. The facts that lead to the passing of the impugned order have

been enumerated as under. The respondent was the tenant in two

bedrooms, one drawing-cum-dining and verandah, kitchen, latrine and

bathroom forming part of property bearing no 352-B, Ground Floor,

Gali No.1, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi (hereinafter referred

to as the "tenanted premises"). The petitioner landlord along with his

family was residing at village Walidpur, Dist. Mau, Uttar Pradesh, in a

property owned by his father and was working for gains there. In the

year 2009, the petitioner left his job and wanted to shift back to Delhi

permanently. Consequentially, he requested the respondent to vacate

and handover the peaceful possession of the tenanted premises to him

as he had no other alternative accommodation in Delhi. The respondent

refused to vacate the tenanted premises, as a result of which, the

petitioner filed an eviction petition against him u/S 14(1) (e) of the Act.

The petitioner in the petition submitted that the property was required

bonafide by him and his family for residential purposes and that he had

no other alternative accommodation in Delhi. The leave to defend

application filed by the respondent was eventually allowed by the Rent

Controller vide order dated 04.06.2011. This order is under challenge

in the present revision petition.

3. Before proceeding to examine the submissions made by the

counsels, it is vital to note that the powers of revision of this court u/S

25B (8) are not as wide as that of an appellate court. If it is found that

the impugned order is according to law and does not suffer from a

jurisdictional error, then this court has no power to interfere. Only

when there is a gross miscarriage of justice caused or where the

conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller, based on the material

provided is not possible, that this Court interferes. Keeping this aspect

in mind, I have examined the impugned order and the arguments put

forth by the learned counsels.

4. The respondent, in the leave to defend application raised the

issue that the tenanted premises were not bonafidely required by the

petitioner. According to him, it has no where been explained as to how

the petitioner landlord required the premises and that it was incumbent

on him to prove his bonafide requirement. The learned Rent Controller

rightly agreed with the respondent tenant stating that the bonafide

requirement of the petitioner of the tenanted premises as also his

planning to shift permanently to Delhi, is indeed a triable issue and

needs to be examined.

5. It is settled proposition of law that the landlord is the best judge

of his own requirements and neither the court nor the tenant can dictate

terms to him. It has been held so in a plethora of cases decided by both

the Supreme as well as the High Courts. Having said which, it cannot

be said that everything the landlord states should be taken to be the

gospel truth. The object behind Rent laws is to strike a balance

between the rights of the tenants and the landlords. In the case of "Liaq

Ahmed v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, (2000) 5 SCC 708", the Supreme

Court elaborated the object behind rent laws as under:-

" 3.........It thus became imperative for the legislature to intervene to protect the tenants against harassment and exploitation by the landlords for which appropriate legislations came to be passed by almost all the States and Union Territories in the country with the paramount object of essentially safeguarding the interest of tenants and for their benefit. The Rent Acts also made provision for safeguarding the interests of genuine landlords. The Rent Acts are intended to preserve the social environment and promote social justice by safeguarding the interests of the tenants mainly and at the same time protecting the legitimate interests of the landlords. The provisions of the Rent Acts are, therefore, not required to be interpreted in a hyper technical manner which in cases may result in frustrating the object for which the legislation was made. It should be kept in mind that the Rent Acts undoubtedly lean more in favour of the tenants for whose benefits they were essentially passed. A rational approach in interpreting the law

relating to the control of rents is expected from the courts dealing with the cases under the statutes relating to rent by keeping in mind the object of the legislation intended to provide social justice preventing unscrupulous landlord to exploit the circumstances and force the tenants to submit to their pressure under the threat of eviction.

6. It is also very important to remember that burden is placed on

the landlord to prove that his need is a bonafide one. The case of

"Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand, (1983) 1 SCC", the Supreme

Court has specifically held that the burden is on the landlord to prove

his personal requirements more so when he is residing outside the

place where the tenanted premises is located. Reference can be made to

the relevant portions of the judgment:-

"4. When landlord seeks possession for personal requirement he has to prove his present need. If he has any premises in his possession he must allege and prove why that is not sufficient for his present use, or why he has to shift to the premises of which he seeks possession. If the tenant avers that the landlord is not in need of the premises and that he is not staying in the city in which the premises involved in dispute is situated and that the landlord has a big building in his possession at a different place

where he is shown to be staying obviously a very serious triable issue would arise."

7. If in the process of the landlord trying to prove his bonafide

requirement, the tenant is able to raise any triable issue then the court

has to allow the leave to defend application. By allowing the leave to

defend application, an opportunity is being given to the tenant to try

and test the contentions of the landlord. It is obvious that on mere

assertion of the tenant leave cannot be granted, but if the tenant is able

to bring about certain issues which need to be examined then the rent

controller is bound to allow him the leave to defend. In this case, the

triable issue is the petitioner shifting to Delhi and requiring the

tenanted premises for the need of himself and his family. The case of

"Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand (supra)" is a classic example

of such a case wherein it was held that:-

"7.........Burden is on the landlord to prove his requirements and his assertion is required to be tested more so when it is shown that for long he is staying outside Delhi, that he has a building albeit standing in the names of his sons and daughters where he is staying and at which place he receives his normal

correspondence. If in such a situation one can say that a triable issue is not raised, one is at a loss to find out where, when and in what circumstances such an issue would arise."

8. In light of the factual matrix and the principles of law as

discussed above, the respondent was able to raise some triable issue. I

see no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. The petition is

hereby dismissed.

M.L. MEHTA, J.

OCTOBER 31, 2012 rmm