Manohar Lal Vij vs Cbi & Anr.
2012 Latest Caselaw 6707 Del

$~26
*    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                             Date of Decision : 23rd November, 2012

+      CRL.MC.3991/2012

       MANOHAR LAL VIJ                         ..... Petitioner
                   Through: Mr.Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advocate with
                   Mr.Sanchit Dhawan, Ms.Preeti Gupta and
                   Mr.Ajay Saroya, Advs.

                     versus

       CBI & ANR                                         ..... Respondents
                              Through: Ms.Sonia Mathur, Standing Counsel
                              for R-1/CBI.

       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

PRATIBHA RANI, J. (Oral)

% Crl.M.A. Nos. 19079-80 of 2012 (Exemption)

1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

2. Application stands disposed of.

Crl.M.C No.3991/2012 and Crl.M.A. No.19078/2012 (Stay)

1. This is a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of RC No.DAI-2003(A)-0049 registered with PS CBI/ACB/New Delhi as well as the chargesheet and the criminal proceedings pending pursuant thereto against the petitioner, in view of the compromise entered into

between petitioner and respondent No.2-Bank in civil litigation. Alongwith the petition, the petitioner has also annexed the copy of the FIR and the chargesheet.

2. Notice.

3. Ms.Sonia Mathur, Standing Counsel accepts notice on behalf of CBI/R-1.

4. As per CBI, on the basis of internal valuation report dated 23.02.2001, respondent No.2-Bank filed a complaint with CBI, ACB against the petitioner and other accused persons resulting in registration of FIR No. RC-DAI-2003 (A)-0049. In the chargesheet, apart from other allegations, the main allegation is that in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy Shri Vijay Manchanda, partner, SLF Housing Company, C-1, Ambedkar Road, Ghaziabad, executed a sale deed in favour of M/s. SLF India Ltd. through Shri B.R.Bajaj, S/o A.L.Bajaj regarding a plot measuring 25 sq. Yards situated at C-1, Ambedkar Road, Ghaziabad on 09.06.1998 and after that by adding figure "9" before 25 sq. yards, the size of the plot was changed to show it measuring 925 sq. yards. Investigation further revealed that in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy Shri V.P.Aneja, approved Valuer, evaluated the said plot on 11.06.1998 and as per his report he evaluated the said property to be of Rs.64,75,000/- @ Rs.7,000/- per sq. yds. The said valuation was falsely done is established from the fact that subsequently at the time of filing the suit before DRT, when valuation of the said property was done by Sh.J.P.Verma approved Valuer then he specifically mentioned that the value of the said property stated in the sale deed should be considered as „NIL‟ as the plot mentioned in the sale deed did not exist at the site.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier the sale deed of the said property submitted to bank was executed on 9.6.1998 at a premium of Rs.2,19,500/- and on 11.06.1998 i.e. after three days how a property could be evaluated to be of Rs.64.75 lakhs which shows that Shri V.P. Aneja, the valuer was in league with Sh. M.L.Vij and Shri S.C.Gupta and falsely evaluated a non-existing property at Rs.64.75 lakhs. Similarly, Shri Anil Sharma, Advocate also submitted non-encumbrance certificate dated 21.07.1998 wherein he certified that the said non- existing property is free from all encumbrances. It was established during investigation that as per the record of Sub-Registrar, Ghaziabad, the area of the said property was only 25 sq. yds and the sale deed was executed at a valuation of Rs.2,19,500/-.

5. As per chargesheet, the above omissions/commissions on the part of the bank officers disclosed their dishonest intention in enhancing the limits and releasing the property worth Rs.1,00,78,000/- kept as equitable mortgage. The said bank officers had not secured the interest of the bank and rather facilitated the party to get the public money. The above circumstances show that the bank officers were in criminal conspiracy with private accused persons and in pursuance thereof, they did above acts. It was revealed during investigation that in criminal conspiracy with Shri M.L.Vij and Shri S.L.Gupta both directors of MIPL, private persons Sh.Vijay Manchanda executed the forged/fabricated sale deed, Sh.B.R.Bajaj mortgaged the said sale deed to the bank, Sh.V.P.Aneja prepared forged/fake valuation report and Sh.Anil Sharma prepared fake search report regarding the title of the sale deed of the plot which does

not exist and facilitated the accused persons to cheat the bank by submitting the forged/fake documents prepared by them.

6. In brief, the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was partner along with one S.C.Gupta in the firm M/s. Madhusudan International. The partnership firm applied for working capital credit facility to respondent No.2 for its business requirements and the same was sanctioned by way of fund based limits of Cash Credit (Hypothecation) of Rs.15 lacs and Overdraft facility against Book Debts of Rs.10 lacs and Non-Fund based limit of Import LC (DA 90 days) of Rs.100 lacs against hypothecation of stocks/book debts and mortgage of residential property of Mr.Suraj Bhan, father of other partner Mr.S.C. Gupta.

7. Subsequently, constitution of the firm was changed from partnership to private limited company with permission of respondent No.2-Bank and fresh loan documents were executed by both the Directors on behalf of Madhusudan International Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as MIPL). At the time of renewal, proposal for enhancement of credit facility was submitted which was allowed vide letter No.ADV:98-99/277.

8. At the time of renewal of credit facilities in 1998, MIPL submitted proposalof enhancement of credit facility. Request was also made for substitution of the existing collateral security of father of S.C. Gupta with plot of the petitioner at Paschim Vihar because of some personal family dispute in respect of the property of father of S.C. Gupta. The bank did not respond to said proposal for substitution of the collateral security.

9. On the request of Mr.S.C.Gupta, originally mortgaged property of his father bearing No.E-1, Dairy Road, Adarsh Nagar Extn., Delhi was substituted with another property bearing No. C-1, Ambedkar Nagar, Ghaziabad which was allowed by the respondent No.2-Bank. Since MIPL could not maintain financial discipline, respondent No.2-Bank asked MIPL to liquidate the entire amount. Thereafter respondent No.2 Central Bank of India, after serving a legal notice, filed a civil suit on 03.06.2002 for recovery of Rs.114.76 lacs before Debt Recovery Tribunal, New Delhi. The respondent no.2 also sent a notice under Section 13 of the Securitisation and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 which indicates that the dispute between the parties was of civil nature i.e. non-payment of the loan amount but false evidence was produced by the respondent no.2 bank to implicate the petitioner in a criminal case and civil dispute has been given the colour of a criminal liability. Then the petitioner vide letter dated 04.07.2012 initiated the process of negotiation, in response thereof, the respondent No.2 issued a letter No.ARBDEL/F-96-2012-13/17 dated 11.09.2012 wherein the respondent no.2 has settled the dispute for a sum of Rs.55 lacs which amount has been deposited by the petitioner with respondent No.2 bank. No dues certificate has also been issued by the bank to the petitioner on 29.10.2012.

10. The petitioner is seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings mainly on the ground that the petitioner has settled the civil dispute with respondent no.2 bank and now the respondent no.2 bank has no outstanding claim against the petitioner and in the given facts and circumstances, continuance of criminal proceedings would only be

wastage of precious judicial time and State machinery and would not serve any purpose.

11. Mr.Sandeep Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that basically it is a case involving civil liability which has been discharged by the petitioner. While referring to the Annexure P-3 i.e. approval of Central Bank of India for one time settlement, it has been submitted that in accordance with terms & conditions incorporated in the letter dated 11.09.2012 sent by the Central Bank of India, payment has been made by the petitioner to the bank. „No Dues Certificate‟ in view of the compromise has been issued by respondent No.2 wherein it is specifically mentioned that there are no dues towards company as per compromise/settlement and the bank has discharged the company i.e. M/s. Madhusudan International Pvt. Ltd. and its Directors and guarantors from their liability towards the bank.

12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the bank is not aggrieved and has discharged the company of its liability, no fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the criminal prosecution of the petitioner and it is in the interest of justice that the criminal proceedings against the petitioner may be quashed for the reason that all the disputes between the parties stand finally resolved.

13. It has been submitted by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that while answering the reference in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2012 (9) SCALE 257, the Apex Court has already observed that cases of B.S.Joshi vs. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675, Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2008) 9 SCC

677 and Manoj Sharma vs. State & Ors. (2008) 16 SCC, were correctly decided.

14. Referring to the facts of Nikhil Merchants's case (Supra), it has been submitted that the case of petitioner is similar as in this case also, the petitioner had discharged all liabilities towards the bank and „No Dues Certificate‟ has been issued to the petitioner and bank is no more aggrieved. Thus, the case of petitioner being squarely covered by Nikhil Merchant's case, criminal proceedings against the petitioner may be quashed.

15. On behalf of the CBI, Ms.Sonia Mathur, learned Standing Counsel submitted that on entering into settlement with the respondent No.2- Bank, the petitioner has only discharged his civil liability. But so far as criminal offence is concerned, he needs to be prosecuted because huge loss was caused to the public exchequer by fraudulent means on the basis of forged documents. Referring to the allegations against the petitioner in the chargesheet, she submitted that title deeds in respect of a non-existent property were submitted as collateral security and even the sale deed was got executed in respect of 25 sq.yds. and by committing forgery, it was made to appear in respect of plot size of 925 sq.yds. Even the valuation report and the search report by the Advocate, were false as revealed during investigation. Relying on Y.N.Kashyap & Ors. vs. CBI & Anr. Crl.M.C.Nos.944/2010 and 3819/2010, learned counsel for CBI submitted that merely because civil liability has been discharged by the petitioner is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings where the petitioner has played tricks and documents were forged, thus causing huge loss to the bank.

16. The petitioner is seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the payment has been made to the bank in full and final settlement of all the dues and proceedings against the petitioner may be quashed as his case is squarely covered by the case of Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2008) 9 SCC 677.

17. Before dealing with the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner to the above effect, it is necessary to refer in what circumstances, proceedings in B.S. Joshi's case (Supra), Nikhil Merchant's case (Supra) and Manoj Sharma's case (Supra) were quashed and what necessitated the reference to larger Bench.

18. In B.S. Joshi's case (Supra), there was a dispute between husband and wife and on the basis of the complaint made by the wife, FIR was registered under Sections 498-A/323/406 IPC. During the pendency of the criminal case, the dispute between husband and wife and family members was settled. The wife filed an affidavit to the effect that dispute has been finally settled and she and her husband had agreed for mutual divorce. Both the parties moved the High Court for quashing of the proceedings in view of the settlement. The petition was dismissed for the reason that the offences under Sections 498-A/406 IPC were non- compoundable and inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not be invoked to by-pass Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In exercise of powers under Article 142 of Constitution of India, the proceedings were quashed by the Apex Court observing that hyper technical view would be counterproductive and would act against the interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. It was also observed that non-exercise

of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier, which is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code.

19. In Nikhil Merchant's case (Supra), while quashing the proceedings pursuant to compromise, it was observed that basic intention of the accused in the case appeared to misrepresent the financial status of the company to avail the credit facilities to an extent to which the company was not entitled. The Court was of the view that the dispute involved had overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The compromise was effected in the civil suit filed by the bank and as per clause 11 of the compromise, both the parties agreed to withdraw all allegations and counter allegations made against each other. Thus, in view of the nature of allegations and withdrawal of allegations and counter allegations, the criminal proceedings were quashed.

20. In Manoj Sharma's case (Supra), FIR pertained to a dispute of private nature wherein the quashing was in view of the compromise between the parties. During the course of judgment, the Hon‟ble Mr.Justice Markandey Katju (as his Lordship then was) observed as under :

'23. There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302 IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395, 307 or 304B cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases, (like those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will

have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger bench (so as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.

24. I am expressing this opinion because Shri B.B. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent has rightly expressed his concern that the decision in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) should not be understood to have meant that Judges can quash any kind of criminal case merely because there has been a compromise between the parties. After all, a crime is an offence against society, and not merely against a private individual.'

21. Thus, it can be noted that in the above noted three cases, taking into consideration the facts of each case, on finding that continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futile, the proceedings were quashed.

22. Having regard to the divergent views expressed by different Benches of Supreme Court on the issue, when the same issue arose for consideration in Gian Singh's case (Supra), wherein the decision in B.S. Joshi's case (Supra), Nikhil Merchant's case (Supra) and Manoj Sharma's case (Supra) came to be considered, Gian Singh's case was referred to larger Bench to examine the correctness of these decisions. It was in the fact situation in above referred three cases that the position was summarised and reference answered in paras 57 and 58 of the report as under :

'57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences Under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it

would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

58. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi MANU/SC/0230/2003 : (2003) 4 SCC 675, Nikhil Merchant MANU/SC/7957/2008 : (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1 were not correctly decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the concerned Bench(es).'

23. In the present case, the nature of allegations against the petitioner are very serious. The manner in which the property belonging to father of partner Mr.S.C. Gupta which was lying mortgaged with the bank was taken out and subsequently, a sale deed for a property measuring just 25 sq.yds. which too was non-existent, was obtained and thereafter, the area shown in the sale deed was changed to 925 sq.yds. speaks of volumes about the nature of fraud allegedly played upon by the petitioner on the bank in conspiracy with the bank officers. Mere discharge of civil liability in such type of matters cannot be treated as sufficient to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner.

24. In Rajiv Bakshi & Anr. vs. CBI & Anr. in Crl.M.C. No.1035/2009 decided on 15.03.2010, in similar situation where quashing was prayed on the ground that matter was compounded with MMTC, a co-ordinate bench of this Court, declined the prayer of the petitioners observing as under :

'19. Considering the fact that MMTC is a Government Company and the funds belonging to it are public funds, and also the fact that unlike in the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra) while accepting the offer for payment pursuant to the award passed in its favour, MMTC has neither withdrawn the charges against the petitioners nor agreed to join them in seeking quashing of criminal proceedings pending against them, it would not be appropriate to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners. If repayment of money becomes the sole ground for quashing of criminal proceedings involving public funds, that would not only encourage unscrupulous persons to cheat the Government, Public Sector Banks, Government Companies and Public Financial Institutions with impunity, but, will also embolden them to repeat such crimes, in the belief that even if they are caught and are prosecuted, they will be able to get away merely by returning the money taken by them by illegal means. The money lying deposited in banks and the money belonging to Public Financial Institutions /Government Companies does not belong to an individual and belongs to the country as a whole. Cheating such a Company/Bank/Institution, therefore, is cheating with the country and m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e i r m o n e y i s misappropriation of money belonging to the nation. The cheating of Government Companies/Public Financial Institutions/Public Sector Banks, etc., therefore, need be viewed seriously and the prosecutions involving cheating such Institutions/Companies and/or misappropriation of their funds need to be taken to their logical conclusion by subjecting those who are accused of committing such offences to trial in accordance with law. Any sympathy with such persons, despite payment made by them will be wholly misplaced and is likely to be misconstrued by the society. It would also be pertinent to note here that as far as this case is concerned, the petitioners had no option but to make payment to MMTC once the arbitral Tribunal had passed award in its favour. Therefore, it is not a case where they have of their own and without any proceedings having been instituted against them, have gone to MMTC and paid its dues, out of a feeling remorse or repentance.

20. The economic offences involving loss of public funds, whether of Government Departments or Public Sector Undertakings or Public Financial Institutions, have the potential of affecting the economy of the country and posing serious threat to its financial health. The courts cannot be oblivious to the fact that such offences are preceded by cool, calculated and deliberate design, with an eye on personal gains, and in fact, not all such offences come to the surface, most of them having been committed in connivance with the public servants, manning key posts in such Undertaking/Institutions/Banks, etc. cannot be treated at par with cases of cheating a private person or a private firm or company. A case of criminal conspiracy, cheating and misappropriation of public funds, need to be treated differently from the cases of cheating private citizens or misappropriation of private funds which do not concern with the society as a whole. In such cases, in the absence of exceptional and compelling circumstances justifying such a course of action, the courts, in my view, will not be justified in quashing the case merely on account of repayment of money to the concerned Institution/Company/Bank.'

25. In the case Rumi Dhar vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. AIR 2009 SC 2195, the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the maintainability of the criminal action and continuance of the criminal proceedings after settlement and repayment of loan pursuant to the settlement arrived at by the debtor with the bank. In paras 18 and 19 of the report, it was observed as under :

'18. It is now a well settled principle of law that in a given case, a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding can proceed simultaneously. Bank is entitled to recover the amount of loan given to the debtor. If in connection with obtaining the said loan, criminal offences have been committed by the persons accused

thereof including the officers of the bank, criminal proceedings would also indisputably be maintainable. When a settlement is arrived at by and between the creditor and the debtor, the offence committed as such does not come to an end. The judgment of a tribunal in a civil proceeding and that too when it is rendered on the basis of settlement entered into by and between the parties, would not be of much relevance in a criminal proceeding having regard to the provisions contained in Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act.

19. The judgment in the civil proceedings will be admissibile in evidence only for a limited purpose. It is not a case where the parties have entered into a compromise in relation to the criminal charges. In fact, the offence alleged against the accused being an offence against the society and the allegations contained in the first information report having been investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation, the bank could not have entered into any settlement at all. The CBI has not filed any application for withdrawal of the case. Not only a charge sheet has been filed, charges have also been framed. At the stage of framing charge, the appellant filed an application for discharge. One of the main accused is the husband of the appellant. The complicity of the accused persons was, thus, required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the application for discharge upon taking a realistic view of the matter. While considering an application for discharge filed in terms of Section 239 of the Code, it was for the learned Judge to go into the details of the allegations made against each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall subserve the requirements of law.'

26. In Rumi Dhar's case, the Apex Court, while dismissing the petition seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings, cautioned that in exercise of power under Article 142 of Constitution of India, the Supreme Court and under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the High would not direct quashing of a case involving crime against the society particularly

when both the learned Special judge as also the High Court have found that a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant herein for framing charge.

27. In another case Ashok Sadarangani and Anr. vs. Union of India (UOI) & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 1563, the allegations against the accused were that accused secured the credit facility by submitting forged property documents as collateral. Accused utilized credit facility in dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letter of credit in respect of foreign supplier of goods without actually bringing the goods but induced the bank to encash the letter of credit in favour of foreign supplier by misusing the cash-credit facility. It was held that despite settlement of dues with the Bank and issuance of no dues certificate, since loss has been caused to the public exchequer which is a serious economic offence, the petitioner cannot be absolved of his criminal liability. While distinguishing the fact situation different from that in Nikhil Merchant's case (Supra), it was observed as under :

'20. In the present case, the fact situation is different from that in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra). While in Nikhil Merchant's case the accused had misrepresented the financial status of the company in question in order to avail of credit facilities to an extent to which the company was not entitled, in the instant case, the allegation is that as part of a larger conspiracy, property acquired on lease from a person who had no title to the leased properties, was offered as collateral security for loans obtained. Apart from the above, the actual owner of the property has filed a criminal complaint against Shri Kersi V. Mehta who had held himself out as the Attorney of the owner and his family members. The ratio of the decisions in B.S. Joshi's case and in Nikhil Merchant's case or for that matter, even in Manoj Sharma's case,

does not help the case of the writ Petitioners. In Nikhil Merchant's case, this Court had in the facts of the case observed that the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute with criminal facets. This is not so in the instant case, where the emphasis is more on the criminal intent of the Petitioners than on the civil aspect involving the dues of the Bank in respect of which a compromise was worked out.

21. In the different fact situation of this case and those in B.S. Joshi's case or in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra), we are not inclined to grant the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.'

28. The accusations against the petitioner cannot be termed as having civil fervour. Even otherwise, the suit for recovery filed before DRT was for Rs.114.76 lacs in the year 2002 and in the year 2012, the dispute was settled for a sum of Rs.55 lacs thereby causing huge loss to the public exchequer.

29. The powers under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law or otherwise secure the ends of justice which would entirely depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In Gian Singh's case, the quashing in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape and dacoity were categorised to be one which cannot be quashed despite settlement between the victim or victim‟s family and the offender. Similarly any compromise between the victim and the offence in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, cannot form basis of quashing of criminal proceedings involving such offences.

30. Taking into consideration that the petitioner is involved in a serious economic offence and huge loss has been allegedly caused to the exchequer by the petitioner in conspiracy with the co-accused, the prayer of the petitioner to quash the criminal proceedings is declined.

31. For the reasons given above, I am of the considered view that merely on account of discharge of civil liability, the petitioner is not entitled to quashing of criminal proceedings against him in the case RC No.DAI-2003(A)-0049 registered with PS CBI/ACB/New Delhi. The petition is hereby dismissed.

PRATIBHA RANI, J NOVEMBER 23, 2012'dc/st'