Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 1586 Del
Judgement Date : 6 March, 2012
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 06.03.2012
+ Rev. Pet. 129/2012 and CM Nos. 4172-4175/2012 in RC.REV.
69/2012
SARITA SHARMA & ORS ..... Petitioners
Through Mr. Varun Goswami, Mr. Vijay
Kumar and Mr. Rajesh Singh,
Adv.
versus
SUNDER DEVI ..... Respondent
Through None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)
1. This is a review petition. This petition seeks a review of the order
dated 14.02.2002 wherein counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vijay Kumar
had sought permission of this court to withdraw this petition; permission
having been granted petition had been dismissed as withdrawn. The
petitioner was aggrieved by this order; he had filed an SLP before the
Apex Court; the Apex Court on 02.03.2012 had granted permission to
the petitioner to move an appropriate application seeking review of this
order before this court; petitioner is accordingly before this court today.
2. Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
although admittedly Mr. Vijay Kumar was the advocate of the petitioner
but he had made a wrong statement on the date when the impugned
order was passed i.e. 14.02.2012. Relevant would it be to state that it is
not the contention of the petitioner (now represented through a new
counsel) that Mr. Vijay Kumar was not authorized to appear on behalf
of the petitioner or Mr. Vijay Kumar had made a statement which was
not as per the instructions of the petitioner; contention is that the earlier
advocate, Vijay Kumar was under the impression that since the ground
urged by him before this court was a ground which did not find mention
in his application for leave to defend, it would be more appropriate for
him to withdraw this petition and to agitate the impugned order by way
of a writ petition. This is borne out from the submission made by Mr.
Vijay Kumar who had been also requested to appear in court today.
Petitioner is also present in person. In fact it is not the case of any
person before this court (i.e. the petitioner, his counsel, Mr. Vijay
Kumar or the new counsel, Mr. Varun Goswami) that Mr. Vijay Kumar,
Advocate did not have the requisite power of attorney or the authority to
make a statement on behalf of the petitioner. This petition accordingly
deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone.
3. Be that as it may, the merits of the controversy raised by the
petitioner have also been considered. His contention is that his
application seeking leave to defend could not have been dismissed as
triable issues had been raised by him; attention has been drawn to the
averments made in the application seeking leave to defend wherein it
has been brought to the notice of the court that the landlord was also the
holder of another property i.e. property bearing No. 7753, Nawab Road,
Sadar Bazar, Delhi measuring 7.5' x 20'; there was yet another property
which was available with the landlord which is property bearing No. E-
16/243, Tank Road, Bapa Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi measuring 15'
x 20'; these alternate accommodations have not been considered by the
ARC. In this background, eviction petition having been decreed suffers
from an infirmity
4. Record shows that the present eviction petition has been filed by
the landlady under Section 14-D of the DRCA; contention is that one
room/shop on the ground floor of property bearing No. H-16/47, Gali
No.4, Tank Road, Bapa Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi had been let out
by the husband of the petitioner to the husband of the respondent No. 1.
The petitioner is the owner of this property by virtue of registered
documents i.e. general power of attorney, agreement, affidavit and Will
dated 18.01.1985; house tax has also been paid by the petitioner. No
dispute has in fact been raised by the counsel for the tenant on the
ownership/qua the status of the petitioner as landlord. His only
grievance is that the alternate accommodations which were available
with the landlord (as noted above) have not been considered by the
Trial Court. The corresponding para of the reply seeking leave to defend
have been perused.
5. The tenant has categorically stated that property bearing No.
7753, Nawab Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi which was an ancestral property
of her deceased husband measuring about 50 sq. yards has been
distributed floorwise among the share holders and share of the husband
of the petitioner was one room measuring 7.5' x 20' which was earlier
under the tenancy of Harnath Singh and which is now in occupation of
her elder son namely Deshraj, his wife and two children after this room
was vacated on 13.11.2002. Qua the other property i.e. property bearing
No. E-16/243, Tank Road, Bapa Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, it has
been stated that one portion of this property measuring about 33 sq.
yards had been purchased by the petitioner on 26.11.1999 in her name
and re-built in the year 2000 and let out to the tenants; first floor is being
occupied by her younger son Charan Singh for a commercial purpose
which comprises of one room and one kitchen; it was a hall which was
divided into two portions; first portion is being used as a bed room and
the other portion is being used as a kitchen-cum-bathroom. The
petitioner continues to reside on the second floor of the said premises;
the ground floor, second floor and third floor are in occupation of other
tenants. Petitioner is stated to be an aged widow lady suffering from
knee-pains as also diabetic and finds it difficult to climb to the 2 nd floor
of the suit property where her room is located. Present shop would be
used for a residential purpose which is on the ground floor; it is also
located in the residential area. It was in this background that the bona
fide need of the landlord was found to be established and eviction
petition had been decreed in favour of the landlady.
6. This petition is a petition under Section 14 (D) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act (DRCA). The essential ingredients require to be established
by the petitioner are that (i) the landlady is a widow; (ii) the premises
have been let out either by herself or by her husband. (iii)the premises
are required by her for her residence. There is no dispute to the first two
ingredients; as noted above, arguments have been addressed only on the
third ingredient which also stands satisfied. It would be relevant to note
that the provision under Section 14 D of the DRCA does not contain the
word 'bona fide'; it must be presumed that the averments made by the
landlady are averments which are bona fide; she has been able to
establish that the accommodation which is available with her on the
second floor is not suitable for her need.
7. The Supreme Court in V.Rajaswari Vs. Bombay Tyres
International Ltd. reported in (1995) Supp (3) SCC 172 had noted that
an averment the fact that the landlady/widow is living with her
daughter or any other person is no ground to say that the premises in
question are not required for her residence. The Apex Court in order to
make this provision more reasonable had read into it that the need to
substantiate the request of the widow to recover possession of the
premises for her own residence should be bonafide; the word 'bonafide'
being missing from the provisions of Section 14-D, her need and request
for the premises even in the absence of a specific stipulation to that
effect should be read as a bonafide need.
8. Thus even on merits, no case is made out to interfere with the
reasoned order passed by the Trial Court.
9. Petition is without any merit; dismissed.
INDERMEET KAUR, J MARCH 06, 2012 rb
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