Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 1450 Del
Judgement Date : 1 March, 2012
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 1937/2011 & CMs 4128/2011, 12501/2011 &
2532/2012
Reserved on : 29.02.2012
Decided on: 01.03.2012
IN THE MATTER OF
MD. MOBASHASHIR SARWAR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. R.K.Saini, Mr.Sitab Ali Chaudhary,
Mr.Alamgir, Advocates
versus
JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Jaya Goyal , Mr.Rohit Gandhi and
Mr.Ketan Madan, Advocates
CORAM
HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. The petitioner, a student of XI standard in the respondent
No.4/School had filed the present petition through his local guardian,
Mr.M.Munawwer Hussain on 18.3.2011, praying inter alia for issuance of
a writ of certiorari to quash the expulsion order dated 20.12.2010 issued
by respondent No.3/Director and respondent No.4/Principal, Jamia Senior
Secondary School, expelling him from the school and banning his entry in
the school campus. The second prayer made in the writ petition is for
issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to allow the
petitioner to stay in the hostel and to attend his classes in XI standard
and permit him to sit for the examinations conducted by respondent
No.4/School through the scheme of Compartment/Re-examination 2011.
2. It may be noted at the outset that the second relief sought by
the petitioner hereinabove no longer survives for the reason that during
the pendency of the present petition, by virtue of an interim order dated
4.4.2011, the petitioner had been permitted to take the supplementary
examinations for standard XI, without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of both the parties and without creating any equities in his
favour. The result of the petitioner was directed not to be declared and it
was made subject to further orders in the present petition. Later on, vide
order dated 11.8.2011, his results were announced and he was declared
as having passed the XI standard examinations. Prior thereto, vide order
dated 19.5.2011, the petitioner had been permitted to attend the classes
in XII standard. In September 2011, the petitioner had approached the
Court for permission to deposit the fee for sitting in the examinations in
XII standard which was allowed vide order dated 30.9.2011 and it was
directed that his examination form for sitting in the examinations in XII
standard would be forwarded by the respondent No.4/School to the
Controller of Examinations, Jamia Millia Islamia.
3. During the pendency of the present petition, various
applications have been filed by both sides. An attempt was also made to
enable the parties to arrive at a rapprochement but the same was not
successful as both sides were firm on their respective stands. On
9.2.2012, the present case was directed to be listed for arguments on
13.3.2012. In the meantime, the petitioner filed yet another application
for directions to the respondents to issue him an admit card for sitting for
his annual examinations for XII standard, which are to commence on
2.3.2012. The aforesaid application was listed on 27.2.2012. Due to the
urgency expressed by learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel
for the respondents was directed to file a reply to the application within
one day and the matter was adjourned for 28.2.2012.
4. On 28.2.2012, a reply was prepared and handed over by the
learned counsel for the respondents in Court and she insisted that no
interim orders of the nature as sought by the petitioner could be granted
in his favour as the said relief was beyond the scope of the relief sought
in the main petition. She also submitted that the second relief sought in
the petition did not survive due to the interim orders that had been
passed during the pendency of the present petition and that the scope of
the petition was now limited only to testing the legality and validity of the
impugned expulsion order dated 20.12.2010 passed by respondent
No.3/Director and respondent No.4/Principal of the school. As counsels
on both sides agreed that the writ petition be taken up for hearing by
advancing the date of hearing and having regard to the urgency in the
matter, the date of hearing already fixed, i.e., 13.3.2012 was cancelled
and the petition was directed to be listed for final arguments on
29.2.2012. Arguments were addressed by counsels on both sides on
29.2.2012 and judgment reserved on the same day.
5. The facts of the case need to be set out. The petitioner who
is a permanent resident of Medhapura, Bihar, was admitted in class VI
in respondent No.4/School in the year 2005 and since then he was
continuing his studies in the said school as a boarder student. In the year
2010, the petitioner had successfully passed the X standard examination
and was promoted to XI standard. As per the petitioner, he has been a
diligent student, having an excellent academic record and has not given
any occasion to the respondents to find any fault with his conduct. To
press home his blemishless record, the petitioner relies upon a good
conduct and moral character Certificate dated 5.7.2010 issued by
respondent No.4/Principal of the school (Annexure P-2). However, the
petitioner claimed that like a bolt from the blue, he was served with the
impugned order dated 20.12.2010 signed by respondent No.3/Director
and respondent No.4/Principal which reads as below:-
"Dated 20th December, 2010
Notice
In view of unending complaints of misbehavior and indiscipline, Mr.Mubashshir Sarwer s/o Mr.Sami Sarwer is expelled from the school with immediate effect and his entry in the school campus is banned. This has the approval of the Hon‟ble Vice- Chancellor,JMI.
-sd- -sd-
(NASEERUDDIN) (PROF.M.MUTABA KHAN)
Offg.Principal Hony.Director, Jamia Schools"
6. It is the aforesaid order which is in the eye of the storm. The
leitmotif of the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside for the reason that it
violates the principles of natural justice and runs contrary to the
provisions of Ordinance 14 promulgated under the Jamia Millia Islamia
Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") which relates to `Student
Discipline‟ and the provision of Rule 37 of the Delhi School Education
Rules, 1973 for the reason that neither the petitioner nor his
parents/local guardians were afforded an opportunity of hearing before
the impugned order came to be passed. Learned counsel for the
petitioner contended that the petitioner was never confronted with a
notice to show cause, enlisting the complaints of
misdemeanor/misbehavior/indiscipline on his part for him to offer any
explanation or take a defence. He submitted that the complaints filed on
record by the respondents would reveal that some dated back to the
years 2006 to 2009 and some of them were false and fabricated as one
did not bear the signatures of the complainant, another did not bear any
date and a couple of them did not relate to the petitioner, but to his
namesake, who was studying at the relevant time in a higher class. It
was further submitted that in any event, if the school did not bother to
take any action against the petitioner even though it had been receiving
complaints against him ever since the year 2006, then it can only be
treated as a conscious decision of the respondents to ignore the incidents
and any attempt on their part to use the said complaints that date back to
the years 2006-09 today, would amount to an arbitrary and motivated
action on their part.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner asserted that the
underlying reason for passing the impugned order is the fact that the
petitioner had been filing a number of applications under the RTI Act
seeking information from the respondents relating to the management
and affairs of the hostel which had not gone down well with them. In this
regard, learned counsel relied on an internal letter dated 20.12.2010
addressed by respondent No.4/Principal to respondent No.3/Director
pointing out the behavior of the petitioner towards his
teachers/wardens/students. One of the observations made in the said
correspondence was that the petitioner and his friends were misusing the
RTI Act to defame the respondents. He also referred to a letter dated
28.3.2011 addressed by the office of respondent No.3/Director to the PIO,
Jamia Millia Islamia with reference to a couple of RTI queries raised by
the petitioner, wherein, he had been described as a "habitual information
seeker". Learned counsel wondered whether seeking information under
the RTI Act could be treated as an offence and submitted that the direct
consequent of seeking such information was that the petitioner has been
penalized by the issuance of the impugned expulsion order by the
respondents. Lastly, it was urged that the impugned order is bad in law
as only the respondent No.1/Vice-Chancellor has the power to expel a
student and not the respondent No.4/Principal of the school, as has been
done in the present case.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents refuted all the arguments
urged by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the
respondents were constrained to issue the impugned order expelling the
petitioner from the school and imposing a ban on his entry in the school
campus in view of the continuous and unending complaints of
misdemeanor, misbehavior and indiscipline of very serious nature on the
part of the petitioner. She denied the contention made by the other side
that the impugned order had been passed by respondent No.4/Principal of
the school and instead submitted that the said expulsion order had been
passed by the competent authority, i.e., respondent No.1/Vice-Chancellor,
JMI by exercising the powers vested in him under Statute 31 of the
Statutes of the University (hereinafter referred to as `the Statutes‟),
promulgated under Section 24 of the Act. She submitted that the casual
attitude of the petitioner can be gauged by the fact that while the
impugned order was passed on 20.12.2010, he had chosen to approach
this Court on 18.03.2011, i.e., after the passage of almost three months.
She submitted that respondent No.1/Vice-Chancellor, JMI was constrained
to pass the expulsion order in view of the fact that the petitioner had
been repeatedly committing acts of indiscipline for which on an earlier
occasion in the year 2010, the matter had gone right upto the Vice
Chancellor and despite the same, leniency had been shown to the
petitioner, when on 23.7.2010, the Vice-Chancellor had requested the
respondent No.3/Director to grant him hostel accommodation. Learned
counsel emphasized that the petitioner was repeatedly pardoned and
warned for his acts of indiscipline and further, that both the petitioner and
his guardians had submitted undertakings to the respondents assuring
them that he would abide by the said undertakings and maintain good
conduct, but the said undertakings were violated by the petitioner time
and again.
9. Learned counsel for the respondents also stated that the last
straw on the camel‟s back was an incident which took place on
15.12.2010. The entire incident that occurred on 15.12.2010 was
narrated by respondent No.3/Director to the Proctor, Jamia Millia Islmaia,
in his letter despatched on the same day. Respondent No.3/Director
stated that he had received a call from a mobile number at about 7.30 in
the evening intimating him that the caller was a student of the
respondent No.4/school and that a hosteller was going to commit suicide
and thereafter the caller had disconnected the call abruptly. It was
submitted that some days prior thereto, i.e., on 10.12.2010 the petitioner
had thrown a plateful of steaming rice on the face of the caretaker of the
hostel in the presence of a number of hostellers and when the incident
was reported, his local guardians were summoned in the evening and his
mother, who resided in Bihar, was contacted over telephone.
10. On repeated pleas from his guardians and his mother to afford
the petitioner one opportunity to improve his conduct, he was called upon
to apologize to the caretaker at dinner time on the same day, but he
failed to do so and instead, he created an ugly scene. The entire incident
is stated to have taken place in the presence of the local guardian of the
petitioner who was called upon to take him to his residence till his father
arrived from Bihar. The father of the petitioner arrived from Bihar on
13.12.2010 and the whole situation was explained to him and he was
asked to take the petitioner from the hostel. On 15.12.2010, the father
and the local guardian of the petitioner again approached the respondents
in the afternoon, with a request to permit the petitioner to stay on in the
hostel. However, respondent No.3/Director declined the aforesaid request
and told them that the petitioner would not be taken back till the end of
the examinations of XI standard that were to be held in March 2011 and if
in that duration, his behavior was found to be normal, he would be
admitted in the hostel. On the same evening, i.e., on 15.12.2010, the
aforesaid telephonic call was received on the mobile number of
respondent no.3/Director. The caller was later identified as Mr.Akhlaqur
Rehman, a First Year Diploma student and a friend of the petitioner.
11. After receiving the aforesaid call, the University Proctor
apprised the local police of the incident. Apprehending an untoward
incident, respondent No.3/Director approached respondent No.1/Vice
Chancellor, JMI with a recommendation to expel the petitioner from the
school and impose a campus ban on him. However, keeping in mind his
age and career, it was suggested that the petitioner be permitted to
appear in his examinations as a private candidate. The aforesaid
recommendations made by respondent No.3/Director on 20.12.2010 were
duly considered by respondent No.1/Vice Chancellor, JMI who noted in the
file that the complaints against the petitioner were of an extremely
serious nature and the school could not take responsibility for his
abnormal behavior despite best efforts to counsel him. As a result, it was
decided that the petitioner be handed over to his father and be expelled
from the school as also banned from entering into the school campus.
However, while penning the aforesaid note, respondent No.1/Vice
Chancellor, JMI added a post script to the effect that an as exception, the
petitioner could be allowed to appear as a private candidate.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
petitioner‟s misdemeanor did not cease even during the pendency of the
present petition, and she pointed out that the particulars of one incident
that took place on 31.7.2011 and five incidents that took place on
18.8.2011 had been mentioned in the brief list of dates and events, filed
by the respondents on 28.1.2012. The said incidents include the
complaint that the petitioner had abused and threatened the warden of
the hostel, misbehaved and abused the respondent No.3/Director, had
been instigating the students against the administration and teachers,
and had misbehaved with the female trainee teachers and threatened
them. She submitted that in view of all the aforesaid acts of indiscipline,
a notice to show cause dated 15.11.2011 had been served on the
petitioner, but no precipitative action was taken in view of the pendency
of the present petition. To fortify her submission that the respondents
were justified in passing the impugned order as the petitioner had
become a threat to the school and that he had no right to continue as its
student or be associated with the respondent/School, learned counsel
relied on a judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in the case of
Narender Singh Vs. Delhi University reported as 1997(70) DLT 509.
13. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the invocation of Statute 31 by the respondents was unjustified in the
present case as the said provision is an emergent provision which ought
to be exercised only in case of an emergency and the notings of the
respondent No.1/Vice Chancellor, JMI, as placed by the respondents on
record, did not reflect that any such emergent situation had arisen for him
to have exercised the extraordinary powers vested in him under Statute
31. It was contended that when an authority is vested with general
powers that are meant to be exercised for the same purpose, they cannot
be bypassed by exercising the emergent provisions and thus the action of
the respondents of straightway invoking Statue 31 is unjustified and
arbitrary. He argued that assuming without admitting that the petitioner
had indulged in misbehaviour as a student of the hostel, he could have
been expelled from the hostel but he could not have been expelled from
the school, as has been done by the respondents herein. The earlier
expulsion of the petitioner from the hostel in the year 2009-10 was
described by learned counsel as a "breach of discipline" and not a "breach
of studies". The delay in approaching the Court by filing the present
petition against the impugned order dated 20.12.2010, in the month of
March 2011, was explained by him by submitting that during the period of
three months, the petitioner had been running from pillar to post by
submitting representations to various authorities right upto the Ministry of
Education, but to no avail. It was asserted that the suicide threat
mentioned by respondent No.3/Director in his letter to the Proctor could
not be termed as a threat extended by the petitioner to the school or the
Principal for the reason that even the said letter only mentioned that a
telephonic call had been received from a student of the school, and there
is no direct linkage of the suicide threat to the petitioner. It was reiterated
that due to the frequent RTI applications filed by the petitioner seeking
information from the respondents with regard to the hostel and its affairs,
he had become an uncomfortable person for the respondents who found
themselves on the back foot and that the impugned order was passed
only with the idea of getting rid of him.
14. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions of
the counsels for the parties and examined the documents placed on
record. Before proceeding to deal with the respective submissions of the
parties, it is considered appropriate to examine the relevant provisions,
which in this case, are the Jamia Millia Islamia Act, 1988 and the relevant
Statute and Ordinances. Section 24 of the Act empowers the Executive
Council of the JMI to promulgate Statutes and Section 25 of the Act
provides for making Ordinances for various matters, including the
admission of students to the University and their enrolment, the
conditions of their residence etc. Statute 31 of the Statutes of the
University (hereinafter referred to as „the Statutes') prescribes the
powers of maintenance of discipline among students of the University and
lays down as below:-
"31. MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE AMONG
STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
(1) All powers relating to discipline and disciplinary action in relation to students shall vest in the Shaikh-ul- Jamia (Vice-Chancellor).
(2) The Shaikh-ul-Jamia (Vice-Chancellor) may delegate all or any of his powers as he deems proper to any officer as he may specify in this behalf.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of his powers relating to the maintenance of discipline and taking such action in the interest of maintaining discipline as may seem to him appropriate, the Shaikh-ul-Jamia (Vice- Chancellor) may, in the exercise of his powers, by order, direct that any student or students be expelled or rusticated, for a specified period, or be not admitted to a course or courses of study in a Department or an Institution of the University for a stated period, or be punished with fine for an amount to be specified in the order, or be debarred from taking an examination or examinations conducted by the University or a Department or an Institution for one or more years, or that the results of the student or students concerned in the examination or examinations in which he or they have appeared be cancelled."
15. Ordinance 14, which deals with students discipline, stipulates
as below:-
"Ordinance 14 "Students Discipline" :
4. Students found guilty of breach of discipline shall be liable to such punishment, as prescribed below:
(1) Fine;
(2) Campus Ban;
(3) Expulsion; and (4) Rustication.
However, no such punishment shall be imposed on an erring student unless he is given a fair chance to defend himself. This shall not preclude the Sahikhula-Jamia(Vice-Chancellor) from suspending an erring student during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him
5. All powers relating to discipline & disciplinary action in relation to the student shall vest in the Shaikhula-Jamia(Vice-Chancellor). However Shaikhula-Jamia(Vice-Chancellor) may delegate all or any of his powers as he deems proper to the proctor or to the discipline committee as the case may be or any functionary of the University.
6. Powers relating to discipline/misconduct shall be regulated by Statute 31 read with Section 30 JMI Act, 1988.
7.(i)Without prejudice to Section 30 of JMI Act 1988 as also Statute 31, there shall be a Discipline Committee comprising of the following members;
(1)The Shaikhula-Jamia(Vice-Chancellor)- (Chairman);
(2) The Naib Shaikhula-Jamia(Pro-Vice-Chancellor); (3) The Dean Students, Welfare;
(4) The Provosts;
(5) The Dean of the Faculties;
(6) The Warden, who shall be invited, when the matter concerning his/her Hotel/Kitchen is required
to be placed before the Committee for consideration; and
(7) the Proctor(Member/Secretary)".
16. It may be pertinent to note that Ordinance 14 is quite akin to
Rule 37 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, that prescribes forms
of disciplinary measures, which include fine, expulsion and rustication and
mandates in sub-rule(7) that no student shall be expelled or rusticated
from a school except after giving the parent or guardian of the student a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action.
Footnote (i) at the bottom of Rule 37 clarifies that expulsion or rustication
shall be resorted to only in cases of grave offences where the retention of
the student in the school is likely to endanger its moral tone of discipline.
17. The relevant facts of the case have already been noted above.
On the one hand is the claim of the petitioner that the impugned
expulsion/campus ban order passed by the respondents has come like a
bolt from the blue for the petitioner, who was never issued a notice to
show cause prior to passing of the said order, much less afforded an
opportunity of hearing. On the other hand, it is the stand of the
respondents that having regard to the provisions of Statute 31,
respondent No.1/Vice-Chancellor, JMI is well empowered to take such
action as he may deem appropriate in the interest of maintaining
discipline amongst the students and in the present case, the impugned
order expelling the petitioner from the school and banning his entry in the
school campus had to be passed in the interest of maintaining discipline in
the school.
18. The Court is cognizant of the fact that when it comes to
maintenance of academic standards, Courts should ordinarily refrain from
interfering with matters relating to the internal working of educational
institutions for the reason that the decisions taken by such academic
bodies are largely in the nature of policy decisions and the rules and
regulations made by the institutions are based on their day to day
experience. As long as such a decision/rule/regulation is on the face of it
unreasonable, arbitrary or in violation of the principles of natural justice,
the Courts ought not to interfere therein as every institution has a right to
set its own benchmark for achieving academic excellence. The Court is
also not blind to the fact that there should be strict discipline in academic
matters and to maintain such discipline, an academic institution is well
empowered to take disciplinary action against a delinquent student, that
may include imposition of fine, campus ban, passing expulsion orders
and/or rusticating a student. The bottom line is that if the tussle is
between the interest of an institutional body and a student, the former
ought to prevail over the latter, and further that the head of the
institution is the best judge of a prevailing situation and wherever, a
student is found to be acting in an indisciplined manner or is found to be
indulging in violent/criminal acts and/or in moral turpitude, he is
empowered to take a decision taking into consideration the past conduct
of a student and the prevalent situation in the institution.
19. The constant strain of the learned counsel for the respondents
was that they had been receiving a litany of complaints against the
petitioner for the past number of years, which included unending acts of
misconduct, immoral behaviour and indiscipline, prejudicing the discipline
and academic stability of respondent No.4/school and despite the
undertakings given by the petitioner, and his local guardian, he continued
to breach the same with great impunity not only prior to the passing of
the impugned order but even during the pendency of the present petition.
Thus, it was contended that the impugned order does not deserve to be
interfered with inasmuch as no lesser punishment could have been
imposed on the petitioner having regard to his past conduct and
consequently, the writ petition ought to be dismissed.
20. However, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Director (Studies), Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition
& Catering Technology, Chandigarh and Others vs. Vaibhav Singh
Chauhan reported as (2009) 1 SCC 59, there is a difference in jural
interference in academic standards and judicial review of the punishment.
When an order of punishment is examined, the Court must satisfy itself
that the order is a reasoned one. In the case in hand, the impugned
order states that in "view of unending complaints of misbehaviour and
indiscipline, the petitioner has been expelled from the school with
immediate effect and his entry into the school campus is banned". The
Court is required to examine whether it ought to interfere in the aforesaid
decision of the respondents and consider whether there is any
arbitrariness in the action taken or whether the rules of natural justice
have been violated or ignored, or the decision taken is so unreasonable
and/or discriminatory that it requires interference.
21. Learned counsel for the respondents had sought to draw
strength from Statute 31 to claim that the respondent No.1/Vice
Chancellor, JMI was empowered to pass the impugned order in exercise of
the powers vested in him under the said provisions. Upon carefully
perusing sub-section (3) of Statute 31, it emerges that while respondent
No.1/Vice Chancellor is undoubtedly entitled to take action in the interest
of maintaining discipline amongst students as it may be deemed
appropriate by him, and in furtherance of the said object, he could order
expulsion or rustication of a student, the said order of expulsion or
rustication is required to be for passed a specified period and cannot be
an open ended one. In the present case, the impugned order of expulsion
of the petitioner and of banning his entry into the school campus is
without fixing a timeline. The said order, therefore, does not qualify as an
"order for a specified period", as stipulated in sub-section(3) of Statute
31.
22. Furthermore, when the Act itself envisages that Ordinances
shall be promulgated for various matters and the respondents have
enacted Ordinance 14 specially for maintaining discipline amongst the
students when Ordinance 14 prescribes that no punishment shall be
imposed on an erring student unless he is given a fair chance to defend
himself, it was incumbent upon the respondents to have followed the
procedure prescribed in the aforesaid Ordinance before passing the
impugned order. Furthermore, Ordinance 14 has categorized the
punishments to be imposed on students found guilty of breach of
discipline under four heads, which include imposing of fine, campus ban,
expulsion and rustication. The aforesaid Ordinance also provides that
imposition of such a punishment does not preclude the respondent
No.1/Vice-Chancellor from suspending an erring student during the
pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him. Again, for the
purposes of initiating disciplinary proceedings, the Act, Statutes and the
Ordinances envisage constitution of a Disciplinary Committee in the
manner as prescribed in Ordinance 14.
23. The punishment of expulsion and campus ban have serious
implications and ought to be inflicted on a student only in cases of grave
offences. Footnote (i) at the bottom of Rule 37 of the Delhi School
Education Rules, 1973 is also a pointer in that direction as it describes
grave offences to be of the nature where the retention of the student in
the school is likely to endanger its moral tone of discipline. Again, it may
be underscored that it is the discretion of the respondents to determine as
to whether the actions of the petitioner herein called for the punishment
inflicted on him. The records reveal that before inflicting the punishment
of expulsion and campus ban on the petitioner, the respondents did not
issue any notice to show cause to him or to his parents/local guardian,
much less afford him/them an opportunity of hearing. In the case of
Amir-Jamia and Ors. vs. Desharath Raj reported as ILR 1969 Delhi
2002, while considering the question as to whether Jamia Millia is a
public authority amenable to issuance of directions in the nature of
certiorari, a Division Bench of this Court had observed that the right to
education is not a merely a contractual right and that it finds a place in
the Constitution and the State is directed to provide for the securing of
such a right of a student. The Division Bench had remarked that when a
student is expelled by an educational authority on the allegations that he
is guilty of indiscipline, such an action is in the nature of an adjudication
and therefore, a student against whom such a serious action is proposed
to be taken, must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard
against the proposed action and that rules of natural justice ought to be
observed before exercising the drastic powers of expulsion and if they
failed to do so, the Court would be constrained to intervene, though
reluctantly.
24. In the present case, the facts as narrated by the respondent
No.3/Director to the Proctor, Jamia Millia Islamia on 15.12.2010 reveal
that just a few days before passing of the impugned order, on
10.12.2010, the petitioner had misbehaved in the dining hall and had
allegedly manhandled the caretaker of the school hostel. When the said
incident was reported to the respondent No.3/Director, he stated that he
had summoned the local guardian of the petitioner on the same day at
about 4 PM and also telephonically spoken to the mother of the petitioner
in Bihar. On the request of the petitioner‟s guardian to excuse him, he
was asked to apologize to the caretaker in the dining hall at dinner time
on 13.12.2010. However, the petitioner did not apologize and instead he
created an ugly scene. In view of the above, the petitioner was entrusted
to his local guardian, who was requested to take him to his residence,
until the father of the petitioner arrived from Bihar. On 13.12.2010, when
the father of the petitioner arrived, he was explained the circumstances
and asked to take the petitioner away from the hostel. On 15.12.2010 at
about 2 PM, the father and the local guardian of the petitioner again
approached respondent No.3/Director with a request to take the
petitioner back in the hostel, but respondent No.3/Director declined to do
so till the completion of the examination, i.e., in March, 2011. However,
as per respondent No.3/Director, on the very same evening, he received a
telephonic call from a person, who described himself as a friend of the
petitioner, intimating him about the petitioner‟s intention to commit
suicide. The aforesaid telephonic call galvanized the respondent
No.3/Director into action and he requested the Proctor of the Jamia Millia
Islamia to hand over the case to the local police in the presence of the
father and local guardian of the petitioner and seek an explanation from
the petitioner‟s friend, who had, by then been identified as the person
who had made a telephonic call to the respondent No.3/Director.
25. On the basis of the aforesaid information, the matter was
placed before the Vice-Chancellor, whose remarks in the noting file were
as below:-
"The complaints against Sarwar are of an extremely serious nature. He was given an opportunity by me to rejoin the boys hostel despite and against all advice.
There is a full file of complaints against him. The last threat to commit suicide - puts an extremely serious tenor to this child‟s character. The School cannot take responsibility for his abnormal behaviour despite all our efforts to counsel him.
The child be handed over to the father. He should be expelled & all teachers/proctor etc. notified restricting his entry into the campus. The School/Law will - after today - no longer be responsible for him. This be made clear to his father. All students of class 9 upwards be informed of this.
Sd.
20.12.2010 PS: As an exception he can be allowed to appear as a private candidate"
26. One fact, that stands out starkly on a careful scrutiny of the
sequence of events that unfolded on the eve of the passing of the
impugned order, is that the trigger point was the telephonic call received
by respondent No.3/Director on 15.12.2010. Admittedly, at that time, the
petitioner was not residing in the hostel as he had been entrusted to his
local guardian two days prior thereto, on 13.12.2010 and had remained
with him thereafter since the respondents had refused to take him back in
the hostel. Thus, there was no such imminent danger or threat perceived
to the institution or any such critical/crucial circumstance, which called for
dispensing with the prescribed procedure of issuance of a notice to show
cause to the delinquent student and/or his parents/local guardian and
giving them a complete and meaningful opportunity of being heard before
passing the impugned expulsion order. As observed in the case of
Director (Studies), Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition
& Catering Technology, Chandigarh (supra), before any punishment is
inflicted on a person, even in circumstances where he admits to his guilt,
the authority should carefully exercise its mind and determine as to
whether the circumstances call for a particular punishment and it is
essential for an authority to give a complete and meaningful opportunity
to the delinquent to be heard. In the present case, there is no such
confession that was made by the petitioner. Rather, in his rejoinder, the
petitioner has disputed the entire sequence of events as narrated in the
letter dated 15.12.2010 addressed by respondent No.3/Director to the
Proctor, Jamia Millia Islamia. In such circumstances, the action of the
respondents in dispensing with the procedure of issuance of a notice to
show cause and proceeding to pass the impugned order, inflicting the
punishment of expulsion from school with immediate effect and banning
the entry of the petitioner in the school campus, does not inspire the
confidence of the Court.
27. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on
the judgment in the case of Narender Singh(supra) cannot be of any
assistance inasmuch as the same is based on the fact situation of the said
case, which is entirely different from the one in hand. It is also relevant
to note that a perusal of the facts of the aforesaid decision reveals that
before inflicting a punishment on the petitioner therein, the respondents
had issued two notices to show cause to him setting out the allegations
against him and asking him as to why disciplinary proceedings be not
initiated against him. Only after replies were submitted by the petitioner
to both the show cause notices did the disciplinary committee of the
respondent/college hold a meeting and recommended that the petitioner
therein ought not to be admitted to the third year BA pass course. The
said recommendations of the disciplinary committee were submitted to
the Principal of the college, who then accepted them and directed that the
petitioner be not permitted to deposit the fee for admission to the next
course.
28. In the present case, admittedly no such steps of issuance of a
notice to show cause to the petitioner had been taken by the respondents
before inflicting such a grave punishment on him. Furthermore, a perusal
of the impugned expulsion notice shows that the respondents have not
given any plausible reasons for exercising such drastic powers, except for
making a bald reference to the continuous and unending complaints of
misbehavior, immoral behavior and indiscipline of very serious nature
without buttressing the allegations levelled against the petitioner with
actual instances, more so, when as per the respondents, they had
received a plethora of complaints against the petitioner from different
quarters. Dispensing with the notice to show cause on the ground that
the petitioner and his local guardian were all along aware of the
petitioner‟s misdemeanours, is not justifiable for the reason that in the
past, the trespasses of the petitioner may have been frowned upon by the
respondents but even as per them, the petitioner was shown leniency
each time and let off the hook. In such circumstances, the respondents
had only to confront the petitioner by itemizing his past misconducts in
seriatim and then calling upon him to offer an explanation, before passing
appropriate orders.
29. The impugned order passed by the respondents has far
reaching consequences. Expulsion from the school and the ban imposed
on the petitioner from entering the school campus is a grave punishment
to be inflicted. While it is true that no leniency ought to be shown in
academic matters and the educational institutions ought to be very strict
in maintaining high academic standards and academic discipline, but at
the same time the rules of audi alteram partem cannot be thrown to the
winds. Following the principles of natural justice is the first filter of a
judicial act. Turning a blind eye to the said rule is close to being
sacrilegious to the rule of law. The circumstances noted hereinabove do
not justify dispensing completely with the procedure prescribed under
Ordinance 14 by invoking Statute 31.
30. Even if it is assumed that the situation was of such a grave
magnitude and the past conduct of the petitioner was perceived as a
grave threat to the peaceful functioning of the institution and
consequently the respondent No.1/Vice-Chancellor, JMI was of the opinion
that a serious punishment was required to be inflicted on the petitioner,
he ought to have been given a fair chance to defend himself. While doing
so, respondent No.1/Vice-Chancellor was not powerless to
contemporaneously suspend the petitioner during the pendency of the
disciplinary proceedings against him. The suspension order would have
balanced equities both ways. On the one hand, it would have ensured
that the petitioner did not endanger the moral tone of discipline required
to be maintained by the respondents in the school campus and at the
same time, the petitioner would have had an occasion to explain his stand
and place forward his point of view. Then, for the disciplinary committee
to have recommended/taken disciplinary action against him, which could
have included imposition of a fine, or a campus ban, or/and
expulsion/rustication could have been justified and in those
circumstances, the Court would have been loathe to interfere. However,
failure to follow the well trodden path of issuing of notice to show cause
to the petitioner/his parents/local guardians, followed by affording an
opportunity of hearing to him/them, strikes a jarring note. The
punishment of expulsion and campus ban are drastic powers and while
exercising such drastic powers, the respondents ought to have acted
cautiously and taken reasonable steps to afford an opportunity of hearing
to the petitioner and/or his parents/local guardian and thereafter,
carefully examined all the relevant facts and circumstances before
proceeding to inflict a particular punishment on him.
31. On the principles stated above, this Court is the opinion that
the impugned order cannot be sustained as it does not withstand judicial
scrutiny, the same having been passed without following the principles of
natural justice. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and having
regard to the grave allegations levelled against the petitioner, it was all
the more incumbent upon the respondents to have acted judiciously by
affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to him against the action
proposed to be taken and after receiving a reply/explanation from the
petitioner/his local guardian/parents, the authorities ought to have
applied their mind to the question as to whether the petitioner had
committed such a grave act of indiscipline as alleged against him to inflict
the punishment proposed to be inflicted.
32. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the
impugned order dated 20.12.2010 is quashed and set aside. However, it
is made clear that the Court has refrained from making any observation
on the merits of the allegations levelled against the petitioner and vice-
versa. It may further be noted that this decision shall not preclude the
respondents from following the due process of law by issuing a notice to
show cause to the petitioner and setting out all the allegations/complaints
received against him and then affording him/his parents/local guardian an
opportunity of hearing and thereafter, if the competent authority arrives
at a conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct/indiscipline, the
authority shall be entitled to inflict upon the petitioner such punishment
as may be deemed appropriate. It is also clarified that additionally, the
respondents shall be at liberty to take further steps in pursuance to the
notice to show cause dated 15.11.2011 issued to the petitioner and take
the said proceedings to its logical conclusion, in accordance with law.
33. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are left to
bear their own costs.
(HIMA KOHLI)
MARCH 01, 2012 JUDGE
mk/rkb
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