Naresh Kumar vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors
2012 Latest Caselaw 4508 Del

         THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                                      Judgment delivered on: 30.07.2012

+       W.P.(C) 4480/2012

NARESH KUMAR                                                   ... Petitioner

                                         versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS                                  ... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner          : Mr Sourabh Ahuja
For the Respondent Nos. 1-3 : Mr Sachin Chopra

CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL

                                    JUDGMENT

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)

1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 18.01.2012 passed in

OA 879/2011 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench,

New Delhi, whereby the petitioner's said OA was dismissed on the ground

of limitation.

2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 07.03.2008 passed by

the Appellate Authority which had confirmed the order of dismissal dated

20.06.2003. The petitioner had initially challenged the order dated

07.03.2008 by filing an Original Application being OA 1397/2010 on

22.02.2010 which was 23 months after the date of the impugned order

passed by the Appellate Authority on 07.03.2008. That OA was withdrawn

by the petitioner on 13.01.2011 with liberty to file a better OA. It is

thereafter that the said OA 879/2011 was filed on 28.02.2011 which had

been dismissed by virtue of the impugned order dated 18.01.2012 on the

ground of limitation. Even if we do not count the gap between the

withdrawal of the first OA and the filing of the OA No. 879/2011 and

construe it to be as if OA was filed on 22.02.2010, there is yet a period of

23 months between the date of the appellate authority's order dated

07.03.2008 and the filing of the said OA. The OA ought to have been filed

within 12 months as prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative

Tribunals Act, 1985. In other words, it should have been filed by

06.03.2009. However, it was filed further 11 months later on 22.02.2010.

3. In the first application, that is, OA 1397/2010, there was a

miscellaneous application seeking condonation of delay. However, in the

subsequent OA, that is, OA 879/2011, there is no application seeking

condonation of delay. The petitioner has also not filed a copy of the

initially Original Application, that is, OA 1397/2010. However, the learned

counsel was carrying a copy of the same, which was shown to us. In that

Original Application we found that there were two miscellaneous

applications - one for condonation of delay and the other for condonation

of delay in re-filing of the OA. Insofar as the condonation of delay

application is concerned, there appeared to be some purported grounds

taken so as to explain as to why he had sufficient cause for not approaching

the Tribunal in time. However, they are not supported by any medical

certificates etc.

4. We may also point out that in the second round, that is, when the OA

879/2011 was filed, it was not accompanied by any condonation of delay

application. According to the petitioner, the petitioner was under the

impression that since he had been given the liberty to file a better OA, the

delay had been condoned. Unfortunately, there is no such order of the

Tribunal which would indicate that the delay had been condoned. Since

there was no application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal, in the

second round, had no material before it which would enable it to examine

as to whether the petitioner had sufficient cause for the delay or not. In the

absence of any condonation of delay application, the Tribunal has rightly

rejected the OA 879/2011 as being barred by limitation inasmuch as there

was a clear-cut delay of 11 months.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan: (1970) 2

SCR 90. However, there is an observation in that decision itself to the

effect that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is

always a sufficient ground for condoning delay. It is always a question

whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an

ulterior purpose. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that there was

nothing in the case to show that the error committed by the counsel was

tainted by any mala fide motive.

6. In the absence of any application for condonation of delay and in the

absence of any material to show that there was indeed a mistake committed

by the counsel or that such a mistake was, in fact, bona fide, we do not see

as to how this decision of the Supreme Court would come to the aid of the

petitioner.

7. In view of the foregoing, we do not find any fault with the order

passed by the Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's OA on the ground of

limitation. The writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to

costs.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J JULY 30, 2012 SR