Council For The Indian School ... vs Ajay Jhuria & Anr
2012 Latest Caselaw 4377 Del

                  THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                      Judgment delivered on: 24.07.2012
+        L.P.A. 617/2011

COUNCIL FOR THE INDIAN SCHOOL CERTIFICATE
EXAMINATION                      ... Petitioner
                        Versus

AJAY JHURIA & ANR                                             ... Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner           : Mr J.K. Das, Sr Advocate with Mr P.P. Nayak, Mr Sandeep Devashish
                               Das, Mr Swetaketu Mishra and Mr S.K. Das
For the Respondents          : Mr Mohd Safder Imam for R-1



CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL

                                       JUDGMENT

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)

1. The only issue which arises for consideration in this appeal from the

impugned order dated 30.05.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of this

Court is whether the Council for Indian School Certificate Examination

(hereinafter referred to as the Council) is a public authority within the

meaning of Section 2 (h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter

referred to as the said Act). The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted

that the learned Single Judge has fallen into error in holding that the Council

was a public authority inasmuch as according to the learned counsel the said

Council was not at all controlled either by any State Government or the

Central Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted

that it was an admitted position that there was no notification or order issued

by any Government whereby the said Council was established or constituted.

Therefore, the said Council could only be regarded as a public authority if it

fell within the definition as given in Section 2 (h) (d) of the said Act, that is,

if it was a body owned or controlled or substantially financed, directly or

indirectly, by the funds provided by the appropriate Government. According

to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said Council was neither a body

owned or controlled or substantially financed by either any State

Government or the Central Government and, therefore, it could not, at all be

regarded as a public authority.

2. Upon going through the impugned decision we find that the learned

Single Judge has been persuaded to hold that the Council was a public

authority merely on the basis of the constitution of the membership of the

Council. It is an admitted position that the Council is a registered society

under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. There is also a letter on record

issued on 24.03.2006 by the Ministry of Human Resource Development

which indicates clearly that the Council is not owned or controlled by the

Ministry of Human Resource Development. Therefore, according to the

learned counsel for the petitioner since the Council is neither owned nor it is

substantially financed and, because of the clear statement made in the said

communication dated 24.03.2006, nor is it controlled by Central

Government, the question of the Council being regarded as public authority

does not arise at all.

3. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The definition clause

contained in Section 2 (h) of the said Act has reference to 'appropriate

government'. Appropriate Government could either mean the Central

Government or the State Government. Clearly the Central Government has

indicated that it does not control the Council. Insofar as State Governments

are concerned, only one person, namely, the Director of Education of that

particular State would be a Member of the Society. Therefore, no particular

State would have control over the Council. Consequently, there is prima

facie some merit in what the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended

with regard to the Council not falling within the definition of public

authority under Section 2 (h) of the said Act.

4. However, we feel that we need not go into that aspect of the

matter inasmuch as the learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly stated

that he is willing to provide all the information that the respondent No.1 is

seeking. For this purpose, he states that the petitioner shall even permit the

respondent No.1 and all his representatives to visit the office of the

petitioner, after seeking a prior appointment, and to inspect the relevant

file(s). He shall also be permitted to obtain copies of the documents which

he feels would be relevant for his purpose.

5. In view of this offer given by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we

feel that we need not go into the question whether the Council is a public

authority or not, however, we set aside the impugned order passed by the

learned Single Judge as also by the Central Information Commission. We

leave the question of, whether the Council is a public authority or not within

the meaning of The Right to Information Act, 2005, open and to be decided

in an appropriate case.

6. With these observations and directions, the appeal stands disposed of.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J JULY 24, 2012/dn