Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 4135 Del
Judgement Date : 13 July, 2012
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 13.07.2012
+ W.P.(C) 3453/2012
HOTEL QUEEN ROAD PVT LTD ... Petitioner
versus
N.D.M.C. AND ORS. ... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr B.B. Jain, Mr Mohit Choudhary, Mr A. Das,
Mr Rohit Bansal
For the Respondent : Ms Madu Tewatia, Ms Sidhi Arora
Mr Sumit Pushkarna
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL
JUDGMENT
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)
CM No. 8039/2012
Allowed subject to all just exceptions.
CM No. 8038/2012 (stay) in W.P. (C) No. 3453/2012
1. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the
learned counsel for NDMC. The learned counsel who had appeared on
behalf of the UOI through the Ministry of Home Affairs stated at the outset
that the Ministry of Urban Development and L&DO ought to have been
made parties in the present writ petition. According to him this is so because
the petitioner's primary case seeking a stay is that the petitioner is not the
owner of the land and building and it is the President of India who is the
owner of both the land and building situated at 19, Ashok Road, New Delhi
on which the hotel 'Royal Plaza' is being run by the petitioner.
2. This point is well taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner who
requests that the L&DO as well as the Ministry of Urban Development
should also be added as party respondents. We feel this request ought to be
accepted straightway and we direct that the L&DO as well as Ministry of
Urban Development be also added as party respondent Nos. 4 and 5. The
amended memo of party shall be filed within a week. In any event, the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the UOI, through the Ministry of
Home Affairs, accepts the notice on behalf of both the newly added
respondents.
3. The sole ground on which the petitioner is seeking a stay of the
demand that has been raised against the petitioner in respect of the said
property situated at 19, Ashok Road, New Delhi is that his case falls under
section 66 (1)(a) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 (hereinafter
referred to as the said Act). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
NDMC submitted that the present case falls within section 66(2). Insofar as,
the petitioner is concerned, it is contended that since the land as well as the
building on the said land belongs to the lessor i.e, the President of India, it is
the lessor alone who is primarily liable for paying the property taxes leviable
in respect of the said land and building. He further states that clause 8.10 of
the lease executed by the President of India in favour of the petitioner does
provide for payment of property taxes by the lessee. However, this is subject
to the condition that the said property taxes are leviable in law. He submits
that because of section 66(1) of the said Act since the property tax is
primarily leviable on the lessor, there is no liability, in law, on the petitioner
to pay the property tax insofar as the premises in question is concerned. He
placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of MCD v.
Shashnak Steel Industries P. Ltd.: 2009 (2) SCC 349 in order to support his
contention.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that this is not
a case which would fall under section 66 (1) (a) of the said Act. However, as
pointed out above, the learned counsel for the NDMC made several
submissions to the effect that it is section 66 (2) which would be applicable.
5. Section 66 (2) provides that if any land has been let out for a term
exceeding one year to a tenant and such tenant has built upon the land, the
property tax assessed in respect of that land and the building erected thereon
shall be primarily leviable on the said tenant, whether or not the land and
building are in the occupation of the such tenant. In this backdrop, the
learned counsel for the NDMC submitted that the land in question had
initially been leased by the President of India in favour of Indian Tourism
Development Corporation (ITDC). Thereafter, the ITDC erected a building
thereon and was running a hotel by the name of 'Ashok Yatri Niwas'.
Subsequently, that hotel was re-named as 'Indraprastha'. However, the
hotel ran into some difficulty and a decision was taken to disinvest.
Consequently, according to the learned counsel for the NDMC, a scheme
under section 391/394 of the Companies Act, 1956 was presented before the
Company Court whereby the entire undertaking of the 'Ashok Yatri Niwas'
which was later on known as 'Indraprastha' came to be transferred to the
petitioner. The learned counsel for the NDMC also pointed out that after the
construction of the building by the ITDC, the ITDC was paying property tax
thereon on a composite basis. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the
NDMC, since the entire undertaking of the ITDC which was being run in the
name of 'Indraprastha' got transferred lock, stock and barrel to the
petitioner, the primary liability of paying property tax would be on the
transferee i.e., the petitioner herein. Therefore, according to her, the
arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner claiming that the
case fell under section 66(1)(a) of the said Act do not hold any water.
6. After having considered arguments advanced by the learned counsel
for the parties at length, we are of the prima facie view that this is not a case
which would fall under section 66 (1) (a) of the said Act. In fact, if we were
to notice the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 27 of the said
decision in the case of Shashnak Steel Industries P. Ltd. (supra) it would be
clear that the Supreme Court was also concerned with the distinction of
whether the case was one of letting or conferment of ownership of leasehold
rights. In that case the Supreme Court came to the conclusion, upon a
reading and analysis of the lease deed, that the same did not operate as a
conveyance of leasehold rights. On the contrary, on a prima facie view, we
find that the lease in question would operate as a transfer of leasehold rights
and therefore would operate in the nature of a conveyance of the same.
Therefore, the decision of the Supreme court in the case of Shashnak Steel
Industries P. Ltd. (supra) is clearly distinguishable.
7. In this view of the matter, and particularly because of the history of
the property as narrated by the learned counsel for the NDMC, we are prima
facie of the opinion that the case falls under section 66 (2) and therefore it
would be the tenant/ lessee, in other words the petitioner herein, in respect of
whom the property tax would primarily be leviable.
8. Therefore, as no prima facie case has been made out at this stage for
the grant of a stay, on the issue of primary liability, we are not agreeing with
the learned counsel for the petitioner and are not granting stay of the
demands raised by virtue of the Assessment Order (s) under the unit area
method which pertains to the period 1.4.2009 onwards.
9. Insofar as the period prior to 01.04.2009 is concerned the counsel are
agreed that there was a stay granted by the learned single Judge by virtue of
the orders dated 09.04.2008 and 06.03.2009 pertaining to vacancy remission
up to the date of completion of construction, in W.P. (C) No. 2592/2008
which was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh writ petition and it is the
present writ petition which has been filed thereafter. In view of the
foregoing we see no difficulty in continuing the interim orders dated
09.04.2008 and 06.03.2009 till the decision in this writ petition insofar as the
period prior to 01.04.2009 is concerned.
The application stands disposed of.
Dasti.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J JULY 13, 2012 kb
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