Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 524 Del
Judgement Date : 25 January, 2012
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25th January, 2012
+ CRL.M.C. 3845/2010
% DR. MEENA CHAUDHARY
@ DR. MEENA P.N. SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: None.
Versus
BASANT KUMAR CHAUDHARY & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
JUDGMENT
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. This petition has been preferred under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code (Cr.P.C.) impugning the order dated 26.08.2010 of the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate dismissing the complaint under Section 200 of the
Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner of offence under Section 120-B read with
Section 494 and Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). This
petition was listed before the learned Single Judge on 10.12.2010 when the
petitioner appearing in person sought adjournment. The petitioner had also
filed LPA No.64/2009 and contempt case No.C-386/2010. The petitioner
on 03.05.2011, while appearing before the Division Bench in LPA
No.64/2009 sought consolidation of the contempt petition as well this
petition with the LPA and the matter was accordingly placed before
Hon'ble the Chief Justice who vide order dated 22.05.2011 directed that
the contempt petition as well as this petition be placed before the same
Division Bench before which the LPA was pending. It is for this reason
that the matter is before us. We may also notice that though the LPA and
the contempt petition have since been disposed of but the petitioner
appearing in person stated that rather than sending back this petition to the
learned Single Judge, we only should hear the same. In view of the said
request and for the reason that by doing so, the petitioner is not being
deprived of any remedy had the matter been considered by the learned
Single Judge, we proceeded to hear the petitioner. The petitioner sought
and was granted liberty to file written arguments which have also been
filed.
2. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate after recording the statements
of the petitioner and her witnesses held no case for summoning of the
accused / respondent to have been made out for the reason of the petitioner
herself having obtained decree of dissolution of her marriage with the
respondent from the Court in U.K. and the respondent having so ceased to
be the husband of the petitioner there being no question of his being guilty
of the offence of bigamy under Section 494 of the IPC or of causing
cruelty to the petitioner as wife under Section 498-A of the IPC. Qua the
offence under Section 498-A of the IPC, reliance was also placed on the
status report submitted by the police and on the petitioner having failed to
make out any case of cruelty.
3. The argument of the petitioner before us, orally as well as in writing,
is that the divorce decree obtained by her in U.K. being not a valid decree
and hence not bringing to an end the relationship of husband and wife
between the petitioner and the respondent. Reliance in this regard is placed
on Smt. Satya Vs. Shri Teja Singh (1975) 1 SCC 120 and on Y.
Narasimha Rao Vs. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451. The
Supreme Court in both Smt. Satya and Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) was
faced with a situation of the husband setting up a decree of a foreign Court
of dissolution of marriage as a defence to the claim / charge of the wife in
the Indian Courts for maintenance or of bigamy. In both cases, the
husband was found to have obtained the decree of foreign Court
fraudulently.
4. The situation here is however converse. It is the petitioner herself
who had obtained the decree from the foreign Court of dissolution of
marriage and who now wants our Courts to ignore the same. Obviously,
no case of the foreign decree having been obtained fraudulently can be said
to exist in this scenario. Rather the said foreign decree was at the sole
initiative of the petitioner with the respondent having no role in the same
and having not even contested the same. The question which arises is, can
the petitioner, who by obtaining the said decree led the respondent to
believe that his marriage with the petitioner stood dissolved and that he
was free to remarry, can now be permitted to challenge the foreign decree
obtained herself and charge the respondent with the offence of bigamy. In
our opinion, no and the complaint has been rightly dismissed by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate. As far back as in Asanalli Nagoor Meera
Vs. K.M. Madhu Meera MANU/TN/0707/1925, a division bench of the
Madras High Court held that a litigant cannot be allowed to deny the
jurisdiction which he himself invoked. The same principle was recently
applied by a Single Judge of the same Court in Ms. Dorothy Thomas Vs.
Rex Arul MANU/TN/2876/2011 in near similar facts.
5. We may also notice that under Section 13 of CPC a foreign
judgment is conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon
between the same parties except in cases specified thereunder. However
the right if any to contend that the said foreign judgment is not conclusive
can be only of the party who had himself / herself / itself not initiated the
process of obtaining the said judgment and cannot be of a party at whose
instance such foreign judgment has been obtained. No litigant can be
allowed to abuse the process of the Courts or to approbate and reprobate as
per convenience. Mention at this stage may also be made of the finding
recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and not disputed before us
that the petitioner in the disputes with her siblings before another Indian
Court sought to justify her claim by contending herself to be a divorcee by
virtue of the said foreign judgment.
6. Thus, whichever way we may look, we cannot find any error in the
order of dismissal of the complaint aforesaid. We had also called for the
records of the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate and have perused the
pre-summoning evidence led by the petitioner. The petitioner had deposed
that she was in U.K. from 1993 to 1999. She has not even whispered,
alleged or made out any case of any of the grounds for the foreign
judgment of dissolution of her marriage with the respondent being not
conclusive. For the said foreign judgment to be not conclusive, the
petitioner was required to make out a case of the same being either
pronounced by a Court having no jurisdiction and / or having been not
given on the merits of the case or being founded on an incorrect view of
international law or the proceedings resulting therein being opposed to
natural justice or having been obtained by fraud or sustaining a claim
founded on a breach of any law in force in India. Moreover all the grounds
specified in Section 13 of the CPC and on establishment whereof a foreign
judgment can be said to be not conclusive are such which can be set up
only by a party not himself/herself/itself approaching the foreign Court.
The judgments cited by the petitioner cannot be read as laying down and
indeed do not lay down any absolute principle that a marriage under the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot be dissolved by a foreign Court. Here
the petitioner who is challenging the judgment was at the relevant time
resident for a fairly long time within the jurisdiction of the foreign Court,
did not approach the foreign Court under the dictates of the respondent and
made out a case before the foreign Court for obtaining the judgment.
Indeed in Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) itself the Supreme Court held
matrimonial action filed in the forum where the wife is domiciled or
habitually and permanently resides or where the wife voluntarily and
effectively submits to the foreign jurisdiction or where the wife consents to
the grant of the relief by the foreign Court although the jurisdiction of the
foreign Court is not in accordance with the provisions of the Matrimonial
Law of the parties, to be valid and the judgment of such foreign Court to be
conclusive. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this petition.
7. Before parting with the case, we may observe that though the order
of the Metropolitan Magistrate of dismissal of complaint is under Section
203 of the Cr.P.C. and is challengeable by way of Revision Petition under
Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. but since the matter had
remained pending before this Court, though in the circumstances aforesaid
for considerable time, we did not deem it appropriate to reject this petition
on the said ground.
The petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE JANUARY 25, 2012 'gsr'.
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