Coir Board vs Harbans Kaur Sethi
2012 Latest Caselaw 229 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                             Date of Judgment: 12.01.2012

+             R.C.R.144/2010

COIR BOARD                                     ........... Petitioner.
                         Through:   Mr. Sugriva Dubey, Advocate.

                    Versus

HARBANS KAUR SETHI                             ..........Respondent
                 Through:           Mr. D.D. Singh, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR


INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)

1 Order impugned before this Court is the order dated

15.04.2010 vide which the application filed by the tenant M/s Coir

Board (public sector undertaking) seeking leave to defend in a

pending eviction petition under Section 14 (1)(e) of the Delhi Rent

Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'DRCA') filed by the

landlady Harbans Kaur Sethi had been dismissed.

2 The premises in dispute are a showroom on the back portion

of property No. 16/A, 1, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi; original owner

Bhai Sunder Dass, the father of the petitioner had died on

27.10.1963 and during his life time, he had executed a registered

Will dated 22.01.1964 pursuant to which this property had

devolved upon his wife Somawanti; Somawanti had expired on

03.10.1991; she had died intestate; registered relinquishment

deeds qua the said property had been executed by the other legal

heirs of Somawanti in favour of the present petitioner Harbans

Kaur Kohli and as such she has become the owner of the suit

premises. There is no dispute to this averment; it is admitted that

the petitioner is in fact the owner of this property. Record shows

that an application under Section 27 of the DRCA had also been

filed by the respondent claiming the petitioner to be her tenant

and as such the submission of the petitioner that he is the

owner/landlord of the property is further fortified.

3 The contention in the eviction petition is that the petitioner

hails a high status in society; her husband has retired as a Colonel

from the Army; he had been allocated a petrol pump by Indian Oil

Company at Bhikajicama Place but due to some problem the

license of the said petrol pump had been revoked and now the

husband of the petitioner has no means of income; the pension

which accrues in their account falls short for them for running

their households needs and as such the premises which are

located in a main commercial area of Delhi is required bonafide by

the petitioner and her husband to run a business therefrom the

disputed premises for earning the livelihood for the family.

4. The leave to defend application merely states that the

petition has been filed with a malafide intent to compel the

respondent to increase the rate of rent; further contention being

that no notice has been served upon the respondent before filing

of the present petition which the trial Court has aptly noted that a

petition under Section 14 (1)(e) does not have to be preceded with

a notice.

5. The only argument which has been urged before this Court

is that the husband of the petitioner admittedly had a license

which has been revoked but no steps had been taken by the

landlady and her family to get that license renewed; no writ

petition had been filed by the petitioner claiming the petrol pump

back and this itself reflects that the need of the landlady to

acquire the present premises same is not bonafide; she does not

need any additional income. This submission carries no merit.

Admittedly for one reason or the other, the license of the petrol

pump of the husband of the landlady has since been cancelled and

the income which the husband was earning from the said petrol

pump is not now available to them. Premises in dispute are

admittedly a showroom on Asaf Ali Road which is in the heart of

Delhi and it is a viably commercial area from where the intent of

the landlady and her husband to run a profitable business is

substantiated. The need of the petitioner in these circumstances

to claim back possession of this showroom can in no manner be

said to be malafide; her bonafide stands established.

6. No triable issue has been raised in the application for leave

to defend. The tenant cannot in a routine or in a mechanical

manner be granted leave to defend in proceedings under Section

14 (1)(e) of the DRCA; if the defences sought to be raised are

sham, moonshine or illusory, which clearly are so in the present

case, no leave to defend can be granted or should be granted.

Impugned order decreeing the eviction petition and dismissing the

application of the tenant seeking leave to defend in no manner

suffers from any infirmity.

7. Dismissed.

INDERMEET KAUR, J JANUARY 12, 2012 a