Vinod Kumar, Ex. Constable vs The Commissioner Of Police And Ors
2012 Latest Caselaw 1349 Del

        *         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                     Judgment reserved on: 21.02.2012
                                      Judgment pronounced on: 28.02.2012

+       W.P.(C) 995/2012 and CM No. 2202/2012

VINOD KUMAR, EX. CONSTABLE                                                 ..... Petitioner

                      versus

THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ORS                                         ..... Respondent


Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner             : Mr V.K. Rao, Senior Advocate with Mr Gyanendra Singh
For Respondent                 : None

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN

V.K. JAIN, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against the orders dated 02.06.2010 and

21.10.2010 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New

Delhi, whereby OA No. 401/2009 and RA No. 272/2010 respectively were

dismissed. The facts giving rise to the filing of the OA can be summarized as

follows:-

Three Constables of Delhi Police, namely, Ravinder Kumar, Gajraj and

Kanhaiya Lal, who were posted in Rashtrapati Bhawan were transferred from there

prior to June, 2006. W/ASI Bimlesh Varun, while making entries in the check sheet

about salaries paid to the lower subordinates for the months of June and July, 2006,

noticed that the salary bills of the above-referred three constables had been

prepared for the months of June and July, 2006, despite the fact that they had

already been transferred from Rashtrapati Bhawan and Last Pay Certificates had

also been issued to them. A preliminary inquiry was conducted by Assistant

Commissioner of Police, who reported that the petitioner, who was preparing the

salary bills of the lower subordinates had prepared inflated salary bills of

Constables Ravinder Kumar, Gajraj and Kanhaiya Lal for the months of June and

July, 2006, deleted their respective account number and replaced them by the

number of his account with UTI bank and, thereby transferred the money to his

own account through computer entries. The salary of these Constables was inflated

by adding extra allowances and reducing deductions. However, the petitioner

returned the amount of Rs 31,437/- which had been transferred to his account in the

aforesaid manner, vide memo dated 02.08.2006. The petitioner was chargesheeted

on the aforesaid allegation and on another allegation that he had also inflated his

own salary by showing drawing of Transport Allowance at Rs 200 instead of Rs

100 to which he was entitled. The Inquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty and the

Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 18.05.2007 imposed penalty of dismissal

of service upon the petitioner. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by

the Appellate Authority vide order dated 01.05.2010. The penalty imposed upon

the petitioner and maintained by the Disciplinary Authority was challenged in the

aforesaid OA which came to be dismissed by the Tribunal.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the decision of the

Tribunal on two grounds. The first ground taken by him is that the guilt attributed

to the petitioner could not be substantiated during inquiry. The second contention

of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the penalty imposed upon the

petitioner was disproportionate to the charge stated to have been established against

him.

3. With respect to the power of the Tribunal or for that matter this Court to

interfere with the finding recorded in a Departmental Inquiry, this Court in a recent

judgment dated 19.1.2012 in WPC 2431/2011 Ex. Head Constable Manjeet Singh

v. Union of India & Ors inter alia observed as under:

It is by now a settled proposition of law that the Court, while considering challenge to the orders passed in disciplinary proceedings does not act as an Appellate Authority and does not reassess the evidence led in the course of the inquiry nor can it interfere on the ground that another view in the matter is possible on the basis of the material available on record. If the Court finds that the inquiry has been conducted in a fair and proper manner and the findings rendered therein are based on evidence, the adequacy of evidence or the reliability of the evidence are not the grounds on which the Court can interfere with the findings recorded in the departmental inquiries. It is not

open to the Court to interfere with the finding of fact recorded in such inquiries unless it is shown that those findings are based on „no evidence‟ or are clearly perverse. A finding would be considered to be perverse if no reasonable person could have recorded such a finding on the basis of material available before him. Another ground on which the Court can interfere with the findings recorded in a disciplinary proceeding is violation of principles of natural justice or statutory rules or if it is found that the order passed in the inquiry is arbitrary, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. This proposition of law has been reiterated by Supreme Court in a number of cases including B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India: 1995(6) SCC 749, Union of India v.

G.Gunayuthan: 1997 (7) SCC 463, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana: 1999 (5) SCC 762 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shahsi Kant S. Patil: 2001 (1) SCC 416.

4. In the case before us, the Tribunal after examining the record of inquiry

found the following undisputed and admitted facts:-

 Salary Bill of Constable Gajraj was prepared for the month of July, 2006,

despite the fact that he was already transferred and LPC issued.

 Though as per LPC Shri Gajraj‟s net salary was Rs.7971, the bill prepared

for July indicated Rs.10513, an inflated amount of Rs.2542 [GPF deduction

reduced from Rs.2000 to Rs.500 (Rs.1500), No deduction of festival

allowance (Rs.150), addition of training allowance (Rs.872) and addition of

washing allowance (Rs.20)]

 In case of Constable Ravinder Kumar, who was already transferred and LPC

issued, the salary bill was prepared for the month of June, 2006.

 As per the LPC, the net salary of Ravinder Kumar was Rs.7962, but the

salary bill for June 2006 for Ravinder Kumar was prepared for Rs.10462;

and increase of Rs.2500 by reducing the contribution to GPF from Rs.3000

to Rs.500.

 Insofar as the salary bill for July 2006 for Constable Kanhaiya Lal is

concerned, the same was prepared despite his transfer and release of LPC.

 The LPC of Shri Kanhaiya Lal revealed the net salary as Rs.7942 but the bill

for July 2006 was for Rs.10462-a difference of Rs.2520 by (a) addition of

Rs.20 as washing allowance and (b) reduction of GPF deduction from

Rs.3000 to Rs.500.

 It is also a fact that the Applicant‟s salary bill for June and July 2006 the

transport allowance per month was enhanced from Rs.100 to Rs.200. Thus,

additional payment was Rs.200.

 The total amount raised in those 3 relevant salary bills is Rs.31437

(Rs.10513+Rs.10462+Rs.10462), which were credited to the Applicant‟s

UTI Bank Account No.120010100039969 held at Khan Market Branch,

Delhi.

 The Applicant withdrew Rs.31437 from his account and voluntarily

deposited in the Account Branch of Rashtrapati Bhawan on 2.8.2006, which,

later on 24.8.2006 was deposited in the Government treasury.

5. It also came in the evidence of PW-7 Head Constable Mahesh Kumari that

the salary bills of lower subordinates for the month of June and July, 2006 were

prepared by the petitioner. From the records produced by the respondents, the

Tribunal found that the petitioner was independently working on the seat for

preparation of salary bills of lower subordinates. PW-1 SI Daya Ram also told the

Inquiry Officer that the bills for the months of June and July, 2006 were prepared

by the petitioner on his directions. It also transpired from the deposition of PW-5

W/ASI Bimlesh Varun that salary bills of lower subordinates were put up by the

petitioner directly to the Accountant instead of rooting the same through her. Thus,

at least three witnesses, namely, PW-1 SI Daya Ram, PW-5 W/ASI Bimlesh Varun

and PW-7 Mahesh Kumari had stated during the course of the inquiry that the bills

of Constables Ravinder Kumar, Gajraj and Kanhaiya Lal for the months of June

and July, 2006 were prepared by the petitioner. It also transpired from the record

that not only the bills of the above-referred three Constables for the months of June

and July, 2006 were prepared despite their having been already been transferred

from Rashtrapati Bhawan, the bills had also been inflated thereby transferring an

amount more than the actual salary which would have been payable to these

Constables had they continued to work in Rashtrapati Bhawan, in June and July,

2006.

6. It is an admitted case even before us that an amount of Rs 31,437/- was

transferred to the account of the petitioner with UTI bank and that amount was later

deposited by him with the Accounts Department. It cannot be a mere co-incidence

that the account number of the petitioner was inserted, by removing the account

number of the concerned constable in all the three bils and thus the salaries of all

the three Constables were transferred to the account of the petitioner. Though the

learned counsel for the petitioner contended that W/ASI Bimlesh Varun was

inimical to the petitioner, and indicated that this could be her mischief, there is no

evidence of any animosity between her and the petitioner at any time prior to the

aforesaid credits in the account of the petitioner were detected.

7. She being pregnant at that time, bulk of the work was being done by the

petitioner. Moreover, W/ASI Bimlesh Varun was not the only witness to depose

against the petitioner. PW-1 SI Daya Ram as well as PW-7 Mahesh Kumari have

also categorically stated during the course of inquiry that the salary bills of the

above-referred three Constables for the months of June and July, 2006 were

prepared by the petitioner.

8. The other charge which has been held to be proved against the petitioner was

manipulation of his own salary by drawing Rs 200/- as against admissible amount

of Rs 100/- towards Transport Allowance for the months of June and July, 2006.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the findings recorded against the petitioner

by the Inquiry Officer and upheld by the Appellate Authority as well as by the

Tribunal are based on no evidence, nor the same can be said to be perverse. We

cannot say that no reasonable person called upon to record a finding on the basis of

the evidence which was led during the course of inquiry could have recorded a

finding of guilt against the petitioner. We, therefore, find no ground to interfere

with the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and maintained by the

Appellate Authority as well as the Tribunal.

9. As regards the quantum of punishment, this Court in Ex. Head Constable

Manjeet Singh (supra), had inter alia, observed as under:-

"It is a settled proposition of law that neither the Central Administrative Tribunal nor the Writ Court can interfere with the punishment awarded in a departmental proceeding, unless it is shown that the punishment is so outrageously disproportionate, as to suggest lack of good faith. While reviewing an order of punishment passed in

such proceedings, the Court cannot substitute itself for the Appellate Authority and impose a lesser punishment merely because it considers that the lesser punishment would be more reasonable as compared to the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Court or for that matter even the Tribunal can interfere with the punishment only if it is shown to be so disproportionate to the nature of the charge against the delinquent official that no person, acting as a Disciplinary Authority would impose such a punishment. The following observations made by Supreme Court in V.Ramana v. A.P.SRTC And Others: (2005) III LLJ 725 SC are pertinent in this regard:

"The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator‟s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.

To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the

court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed."

In B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India: 1995(6) SCC 749, Supreme Court, after considering a Constitution Bench decision in State of Orissa And Others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra: (1963) ILLJ 239 SC and some other decisions, inter alia held as under:

A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the

litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."

Considering the nature of the charges established against the petitioner, we

cannot say that the punishment awarded to him was so disproportionate to the

charge, as to shock the conscience of the Court nor can the same be said to be

illogical or improper in any manner. The petitioner, despite being a police official,

had no compunction in diverting Government funds to his own account by

preparing inflated bills of the police officials who had already been transferred

from Rashtrapati Bhawan and by drawing higher Transport Allowance as a part of

his salary. Such an official, in our view, is not entitled to any leniency in the

matter of punishment. The punishment awarded to the petitioner, therefore, does

not call for any interference.

For the reasons given hereinabove, the writ petition is devoid of any merit

and is hereby dismissed with costs.

V.K.JAIN, J

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 BG