Gurpreet Singh & Ors. vs Smt. Munni Devi
2011 Latest Caselaw 4310 Del

*        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                         RC. REV.No. 101/2009
+                                    Date of Decision: 5th September, 2011



#      GURPREET SINGH & ORS.                           ...Petitioners
!                        Through: Mr. Amarjeet Sahni , Advocate

                               Versus

$    SMT. MUNNI DEVI                                          ....Respondent
                               Through:     Mr. M.G Dhingra & Ms. Geeta
                                            Dhingra, Advocates


       CORAM:
*      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K.BHASIN

1.     Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed
       to see the judgment? (No)
2.     To be referred to the Reporter or not? (No)
3.     Whether the judgment should be reported in the digest? (No)


                            ORDER

P.K BHASIN,J:

This petition under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958

is against the impugned order dated 5.09.09 passed by the learned Additional

Rent Controller whereby the petitioners' application for grant of leave to

defend the eviction petition in respect of the shop no .3, in the property no. F-

14/38 ,Model Town -II , Delhi, filed against them by their landlady(respondent

herein) under Section 14-D has been dismissed and eviction order has been

passed.

2. The brief facts are that deceased father of the petitioner no.1 was a tenant

in respect of shop in question under the original owner of the property F-14/38

from whom the respondent's deceased husband had purchased it. After the

death of her husband the respondent claimed to have become the owner of the

said property. She then filed the eviction petition against the petitioners for

their eviction by invoking Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

which is a special provision for the benefit of widows seeking eviction of

tenants in their premises for their residence.

3. The petitioners sought leave to contest the eviction petition primarily on

the ground that the eviction petition under Section 14-D was not maintainable

since the shop in question had been let out to him neither by the respondent nor

by her deceased husband but, in fact, he was already in occupation of the shop

in question as a tenant under the original owner from whom the respondent's

husband had purchased it.

4. The learned Additional Rent Controller while rejecting the objection

raised by the petitioners regarding the very maintainability of the eviction

petition under Section 14-D observed as under in para nos. 7 and 8 of the

impugned order:-

7. "xxxxxxxAt this stage it is relevant to mention here that the scope and ambit of provisions of section 14-D and that of section 14(1)

(e) of the DRC Act, 1958 are different from the bare reading of those provisions it is clear that section 14-D of the DRC Act does not talk about any residential premises. Section 14(1) (e) of the DRC Act envisages that the premises are let for residential purposes. Now, by the judgment passed in the case of Smt. Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India, the word „residential‟ stands deleted from section 14(1) (e) of the DRC Act. However, under the provisions of section 14-D, the purpose of letting is not mentioned and it is simply mentioned that where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her or by her husband are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the controller for recovering the immediate possession of the said premises. Admittedly, the petitioner is widow as well as landlady and the premises let out to respondents are allegedly required by her for her own residence. The counsel for the respondents argued that at the time of the property in question was purchased by the husband of the petitioner the respondent was already a tenant in the suit property and it was submitted that, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to obtain the possession u/s 14-D of the DRC Act. On the other hand the counsel for the petitioner submitted that at the time of purchase of property the petitioner was not a widow and the petitioner, therefore, is entitled to obtain the possession of the premises as she became widow after the purchase of the property. I find force in the contention of the petitioner since it is logical that in case the widow herself purchase a property in the capacity of widow and at the time of purchase there is a tenant in the said property then she may not be able to claim the possession of the premises u/s 14-D of the DRCT Act. However, in case the property is purchased when there is already a tenant in the property and subsequently the petitioner becomes widow then it is no bar for widow for obtaining the possession u/s 14-D of the DRC Act.

8. The requirements of law u/s 14-D of the DRC Act, 1958 are fulfilled in the present petition. In such cases the respondent/tenant has practically a very limited or no defence."

5. The view taken by the learned Additional Rent Controller that even if the

shop in question had not been let out to the petitioners' father either by the

respondent or by her deceased husband the eviction petition under Section 14-D

would be maintainable is clearly contrary to the Constitution Bench decision of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta", (2005) 2

SCC 271 wherein it had been clearly held that for a petition under Section 14-D

of the Delhi Rent Control Act to be maintainable the premises in question

should have either been let out by the widow herself or by her deceased

husband and by none else. This decision has been followed recently by the

Supreme Court in "Rafiquen vs. Husana Bano", 2010 (IX) SCC 23.

Therefore, in the present case, since admittedly the shop in question had been

let out to the father of the three petitioners, late Shri Harpal Singh, by the

previous owner of the property from whom the respondent's husband had

purchased it the eviction petition under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control

Act was not maintainable. Consequently, not only the leave to defend

application filed by the petitioners should have been allowed but the eviction

petition itself should have been rejected as being not maintainable under Section

14-D. That kind of order was passed even by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Nathi Devi's case (supra) by observing that it would be futile to remit the matter

to the trial Court for granting leave to defend to the petitioner - tenant since the

eviction petition itself was not maintainable.

6. This revision petition is accordingly allowed and while reversing the

impugned eviction order passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller the

eviction petition of the respondent - landlady itself is also dismissed as being

not maintainable. It is, however, clarified that the respondent - landlady would

still be at liberty to file a fresh eviction petition against the petitioners on any of

the other grounds mentioned in Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

which may be available to her for seeking their eviction.

P.K. BHASIN,J

SEPTEMBER 05, 2011 sh